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ABSTRACT 
 
The European Union recently adopted a Defence Procurement Directive. Designed 
to regulate an internal market for defence material, the development is highly 
controversial. For many years, the U.S. has received privileged access to the 
national defence markets of the Member States. A lack of competition has resulted in 
stagnated markets with decreased increased possibilities of dependence on the U.S. 
In respective to the Directive, U.S. commentators have identified the possibility for its 
provisions to discriminate against U.S. contractors. This forces a fundamental 
assessment of the role of legal institutions which regulate transatlantic defence trade. 
This thesis aims to subject the EU and U.S. defence procurement regimes to critical 
description and analysis. 
 
Extract from the first message sent via Transatlantic telegraph cable 
 
 
August 16, 1858 
 
 
Her Majesty Queen Victoria of Great Britain and Ireland: 
 
 
“Glory to God in the highest; on earth peace, good-will towards men!” 
 
 
President James Buchanan of the United States of America: 
 
“It is a triumph more glorious, because far more useful to mankind, than was ever 
won by conqueror on the field of battle.  
 
May the Atlantic telegraph, under the blessing of Heaven, prove to be a bond of 
perpetual peace and friendship between the kindred nations, and an instrument 
destined by Divine Providence to diffuse religion, civilization, liberty and law 
throughout the world.” 
 
“In this view, will not all nations of Christendom spontaneously unite in the 
declaration that it shall be forever neutral, and that its communications shall be held 
sacred in passing to their places of destination, even in the midst of hostilities?” 
 
 
 
Extract from J A Spencer, History of the United States: from the earliest period to the Administration of 
President Johnson, Volume III (New York 1886) 54
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1 
Introduction and Research Questions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In order to execute their public functions, States must source goods, services and 
works from the market. A key public function for most States is the protection of 
defence and security interests. In protection of these interests, it is necessary for 
Ministries of Defence and other agencies to purchase defence material in order to 
develop and maintain the relevant capabilities in support. It is implicit in the protection 
of those interests that close political control is retained over the market. Defence 
markets are often characterised as monopsonistic. Whilst State control has 
decreased in recent years through privatization, the State continues to be the primary 
customer in a market comprised of a limited number of producers.1 The State has 
historically been an important financier through ownership and subsidisation of 
domestic industries. The State has also dictated the terms of competition by 
controlling its defence expenditures and limiting the award of contracts to national 
contractors. Consequently, defence markets are generally non-transparent and 
economically inefficient.2  
 
                                                 
1 M Lundmark, Transatlantic Defence Industry Integration: Discourse and Action in the Organizational Field of the 
Defence Market (Intellecta Infolog 2011) 41 
2 For an economic perspective on the effect of fragmented national markets within Europe, see H Küchle, ‘The 
cost of non-Europe in the area of security and defence’, Study for the European Parliament Subcommittee on 
Security and Defence, Brussels, June 2006; K Hartley, ‘Defence Industrial Policy in a Military Alliance’ (2006) 
43(4) Journal of Peace Research and B Schmitt, ‘The European Union and armaments. Getting a bigger bang for 
the Euro’, Chaillot Paper no. 63, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, August 2003 
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These issues are compounded in an age of globally reducing defence budgets. 
Reductions accentuate the variable defence spending that already exists between 
States. In turn, this could affect the extent to which States are prepared to cooperate 
in matters of defence.3 According to European Defence Agency (“EDA”) data, in 
2010, the United States of America (“U.S.”) spent the equivalent of €520 billion ($689 
billion) on defence.4 By contrast, the 26 participating EDA Member States (“pMS”) 
had a total expenditure of €194 billion on defence, representing a ratio of 2.7:1.5 
Between 2006 and 2008, the aggregated defence expenditure of the 26 EDA pMS 
has been approximately half that of the U.S.6 Similarly, between 2005 and 2010 there 
was a 14% decrease in European Research and Development (“R&D”) budgets 
down to €9 billion.7 By contrast, the U.S. spends seven times more on defence R&D 
than all European Union (“EU”) Member States combined.8  
 
Historically, as the world’s largest defence market, the U.S. has been able to sustain 
its own defence industrial base without substantial recourse to foreign sources. In 
contrast, the EU is comprised of 28 fragmented and functionally distinct national 
defence markets which increasingly lack the capabilities to sustain competitive 
industries. Further, in addition to competition from the U.S., the EU could face 
                                                 
3 D Blair, ‘America, Our Great Protector, Is Looking The Other Way: the free-riding nations of Europe are making 
a big mistake by slashing their defence budgets’, The Telegraph (London, 23 April 2013) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10013197/America-our-great-protector-is-looking-the-other-
way.html> accessed 20 September 2013 
4 European Defence Agency, Europe and United States Defence Expenditure in 2010, Brussels, 12 January 
2012 <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/EU-US_Defence_Data_2010.pdf?sfvrsn=0> accessed 20 
September 2013 
5 ibid. All EU Member States except Denmark participate in the EDA 
6 In 2009 and 2010, this difference increased. While the EU aggregated defence expenditure decreased from 
€201 billion in 2008 to €194 billion in 2010, US expenditure increased from €416 billion ($612 billion) to €520 
billion in the same period <http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/news/12-01-
25/EU_and_US_government_Defence_spending> accessed 20 September 2013 
7 Commission, ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’ (Communication) COM 
(2013) 279 final, 3 
8 ibid 
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increasing competition from emerging economies.9  
 
Today, questions are being asked not only by the EU but also the U.S. regarding the 
extent to which an exclusively national outlook is sustainable in a world where 
emerging economies seek to develop their defence markets, defence budgets 
decrease year on year, accountability in public spend demands cost effectiveness 
and value for money and non-conventional warfare necessitates coalition forces that 
require interoperable and high-tech equipment.  
 
It is therefore unsurprising that attention increasingly focuses on the extent to which a 
robust transatlantic defence market can address these challenges.  
 
 
2. An Evolving Transatlantic Defence Market 
 
Commentators have questioned whether a transatlantic defence market is “forever 
elusive”.10  This question neatly captures the incongruence between the political 
emphasis on shared U.S. and European defence objectives whilst national markets 
continue to remain largely fragmented and closed to transatlantic competition. 
Debates continue to ask: how do the U.S. and EU overcome concerns to protect 
jobs, industries, ensure security of supply and guard against risks of illegal re-
                                                 
9 FWC Sector Competitiveness Studies (Commissioned study for the Commission) Study on the Impact of 
Emerging Defence Markets and Competitors on the Competitiveness of the European Defence Sector 12
 
February 2010, Final Report 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/study_defence_final_report_en.pdf> 20 September 2013
 
10 C M O’Donnell, ‘A transatlantic defence market, forever elusive?’ Policy Brief, Centre for European Reform, 
July 2010 
<http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/pb_transatlantic_defence_july10-
704.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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exportation of defence material? A more fundamental question is: should the U.S. 
and EU even commit to more coordinated cooperation on matters of defence trade? 
Possible answers admit as many questions.  
 
Notwithstanding, policy makers and academics continue to recognize the existence 
of a “market” which could be subjected to more competitive discipline through 
coordination.11 Figure 1 is an extract from a major U.S. study entitled “Fortresses and 
Icebergs” which, for explanatory purposes, is sufficient to illustrate the core 
dimensions of the transatlantic defence market.12 
 
 
Figure 1: The Transatlantic Defence Industry 
                                                 
11 The references in the literature are too numerous to recite in this footnote but many of which will be cited 
throughout this thesis. One of the most often cited is B Schmitt (ed) Between cooperation and competition: the 
transatlantic defence market (Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris January 2001). An 
extensive review of transatlantic defence trade ‘discourse’ is provided in M Lundmark, Transatlantic Defence 
Industry Integration: Discourse and Action in the Organizational Field of the Defence Market (n 1) 
12 J P Bialos, C E Fisher S L Koehl, Fortresses and Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic Defence Market 
and the Implications for U.S. National Security Policy, Volume I, Study Findings and Recommendations 
(Washington D.C.: Centre for Transatlantic Relations 2009) Executive Summary, 7. See also it companion text J 
P Bialos, C E Fisher S L Koehl, Fortresses and Icebergs: The Evolution of the Transatlantic Defence Market and 
the Implications for U.S. National Security Policy, Volume II, Study Findings and Recommendations’ (Washington 
D.C.: Centre for Transatlantic Relations 2009) 
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“Fortresses” represent the demand side of the market, in particular, insular 
tendencies towards closed national defence markets protected from foreign 
competition through government laws, policies and practices based on 
considerations of sovereignty, jobs, and security of supply, among others. 13 
Conversely, “icebergs” represent the supply side of the market.14 At one tier, prime 
level defence firms are substantially isolated from each other, with little cross 
ownership or integration; however, globalization has resulted in greater sub-tier 
integration, in particular at the lower component levels where commercial technology 
and industries are involved.15 
 
Historically, European nations purchased their defence requirements on a 
predominantly national basis. To the extent that recourse to foreign competition was 
necessary, preference would likely be accorded to the U.S. above other European 
nations.16 However, the Study identifies the evolution (albeit extremely gradual) in 
European behaviour, specifically a decline in sole source procurement from national 
and U.S. sources, towards increased cooperative and competitive purchasing within 
the EU.17 Conversely, the same Study identifies a movement away from an historical 
U.S. approach to competitive but primarily nationally oriented procurement towards 
increasing openness to foreign competition at the prime contract level.18  
 
                                                 
13 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) 7, Figure 1  
14 ibid 8 
15 ibid 
16 ibid 13 
17 ibid  
18 ibid 16-18 
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As will be examined in detail in this thesis, as part of its so-called “Defence Package”, 
19 the EU recently adopted a defence and security procurement Directive (“Defence 
Procurement Directive”)20 and a Directive on intra-Community transfers of defence 
material (“ICT Directive”). 21  The U.S. identifies the Defence Package as 
determinative that the U.S. can no longer only operate on a bilateral level with 
individual EU Member States nor confine its interactions with Europe to those 
pursued through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”); rather, the U.S. 
must deal with the EU’s growing role not only as a global defence actor but also as a 
defence trade regulator. 22  Whilst U.S. observers identify these initiatives as a 
constructive development for Europe with the potential to positively impact the 
competitiveness of the transatlantic defence market, these initiatives have also been 
described as a “mixed blessing” for the U.S that could risk the development of a 
“Fortress Europe”.23  
 
Consequently, as will be discussed in this thesis, official and commissioned studies 
have increasingly focused on so-called “barriers” to transatlantic defence trade. 
Transatlantic defence procurement has also been specifically identified as an area 
which could benefit from the complementarity of competition policy and trade 
liberalisation.24  
                                                 
19 The Commission launched the EU’s so-called Defence Package on 5 December 2007. See Commission, ‘A 
Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry’ (Communication) COM (2007) 764 
final 
20 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting 
authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC 
[2009] OJ L 216/76 
21 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and 
conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2009] OJ L 146/1 
22 See J Gansler, Special Forward to the Fortresses and Icebergs Study (Vol 1) (n 12) viii 
23 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 31-32 
24 R D Anderson and W E Kovacic, ‘Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation: Essential 
Complements to Ensure Good Performance in Public Procurement Markets’ (2009) 18 PPLR 67, 94-99 
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3. Procurement as a Proportion of Defence Expenditure 
 
In order to put the significance of procurement in its economic context, Figures 2 
provides an indication of the relative importance attributed to procurement as part of 
overall defence expenditure. 
 
 
Figure 2: Defence Expenditure Breakdown25 
 
Further, Figure 3 provides a breakdown of investment expenditure. As indicated, the 
differences in procurement and R&D expenditure are stark. 
 
                                                 
25 EDA, Europe and United States Defence Expenditure 2010 (n 4) 7  
  8 
 
Figure 3: Defence Investment Breakdown26 
Having outlined the relative significance of defence procurement as part of overall 
U.S. and EU expenditures, it is necessary to consider the notion that public 
procurement law can act as a barrier to, and instrument for, transatlantic defence 
trade liberalisation. This, in turn, necessitates consideration of the correspondence 
between procurement law and its effects in practice. 
 
4. Correspondence Between Procurement Law and its Impact 
 
In recent years, academic focus has increasingly been placed on comparative 
approaches to, and uses of, regulatory controls in the U.S. and EU and their effects 
as “barriers” to transatlantic trade. 27 These insights become even more pertinent in 
                                                 
26 ibid 10 
27 See, for example, D Vogel, Barriers or Benefits, Regulation in Transatlantic Trade (Brookings Inst. Pr. 1997), 
although the principal focus has concerned health, safety, and environmental standards. More recently, see R J 
Ahearn, ‘Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis’, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, August 24 2009 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34717.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2013 
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light of the recent proposal for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(“TTIP”), which, by its terms, intends to cover public procurement.28 
 
More generally, legal commentators have identified that public procurement law, 
especially the legal regimes that govern public contract formation, often erects “a 
dense, twisted web of rules, which may impede (and frequently intimidates) potential 
foreign entrants”.29 In the U.S., it has been identified that statutory restrictions that 
deny eligibility to foreign firms seeking to supply goods and services to federal 
agencies constitute a “straightforward illustration of regulatory barriers”.30 It has been 
observed that given the global value of defence procurement, the operation or 
effectuation of procurement laws can result in a significant increase of international 
trade flows.31 To this extent, whilst procurement legislation may act as a barrier, it 
may also inversely act as an instrument to achieve trade liberalization.  
 
However, there is, in fact, little known legal or empirical research examining precisely 
how legal institutions 32  may “impact” (howsoever defined) 33  on procurement in 
                                                 
28 For details on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, see:  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-
focus/ttip/> accessed 20 September 2013. With specific regard to public procurement, see EU-US Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, ‘Public Procurement’, Initial EU position paper 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151623.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013. However, 
defence procurement is not covered by the terms of current negotiations or the envisaged agreement 
29 C R Yukins and S L Schooner, ‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to A Global Procurement Market’ 
(2006-2007) 38 Geo J Int’l L 529, 530. As will be discussed in Part II, the U.S. Defence Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy Office itself states that access to the U.S. defence market is complicated by a number of laws 
which prevent or impair the ability of non-U.S. entities to perform defence work as well as those which prevent or 
discourage DoD use of non-US products. See <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/about.html> accessed 20 
September 2013. The main laws identified in this regard will be examined in this thesis 
30 W E Kovacic, ‘Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government Procurement’ (1992) 25:1 Policy 
Sciences, 29, 34 
31 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (2009) 39(1) Pub Cont LJ, 93, 
95-6 
32 In light of the different forms of legislation which are found in a discussion of national, regional and 
international procurement systems, this thesis uses the descriptor “legal institutions” to refer collectively to the 
forms which legislation may take e.g. treaties, statute, regulation, directive, decision etc. However, the thesis will 
distinguish these forms where their particular characteristics have a bearing on the nature and function of the 
legislation. As will become apparent, differences in approach to legislating on defence procurement issues e.g. 
from directory provisions to comprehensive regulatory codes are an important consideration in any analysis 
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practice.34 As this thesis will observe, it is important to differentiate (so far as is 
possible) between any legitimate function of legislation and its discretionary 
(mis)application and consequent effect(s). Further, it is important not to over or 
understate the ability of legislation to affect the behaviour of the relevant actors. 35 
 
The upshot of the above is that there is often a central underlying assumption that 
legislation will have a “positive” or “self-evident” effect on the behaviour of relevant 
actors and the market in which those actors operate.36  
 
To a certain extent, it must be accepted that the legislator cannot necessarily know 
the precise effects of the legislation it adopts in advance or at all, an issue which is 
exacerbated by the secrecy and reluctance on the part of relevant stakeholders in the 
defence sector to impart information. Nevertheless, legislators should think at a 
deeper level of enquiry about how legislation in the field is configured with a view to 
mitigating the potential for its (in)discriminate use. 
 
These basic observations underscore much of the thinking that has motivated and 
qualified the objectives of a thesis, which, in the first instance, is concerned to focus 
                                                                                                                                                        
33 The thesis highlights use of the word “impact” in light of the fact that official publications often identify the 
purported impact of legislation on procurement without precisely identifying how such effects are qualified and 
quantified 
34 For a useful discussion which purports to be the first to examine the impact of international agreements in the 
field of public procurement on foreign discrimination, see S J Rickard and D Y Kono, ‘Do Preferential Trade 
Agreements Discourage Procurement Discrimination?’ (Princeton: 2010)  
<http://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/S830_paper1.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
35 It is stark that major studies often qualify Governments and industries as relevant stakeholders in such 
debates without recognizing the interests of the legal community/communities that will be required to advise those 
very stakeholders on the legislation which is intended to result. It is even more stark when supranational 
legislation is then adopted without a comprehensive understanding of the national legal position of individual 
States 
36 Kovacic, ‘Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government Procurement’ (n30) 30. As Kovacic also 
observes at 34, as result of this assumption, little consideration is given inter alia to the costs of regulatory 
compliance which must be factored in as an increment to the price of, for example, airplane, missile and tank 
contracts, as well as to its effects on the ability or willingness of firms to compete  
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on the role that existing legal institutions do, and could, play as barriers to, and 
instruments for, transatlantic defence trade liberalisation. This is a necessary 
precursor to any consideration of the kinds of transatlantic defence trade treaties 
which have either been adopted or proposed. 
 
5. Purposes, Aims and Objectives 
 
Much of the transatlantic defence trade literature comprises economic and policy 
analyses which support findings about the extent of transatlantic trade flow, barriers 
to transatlantic trade, degrees of political and industrial integration and cooperation 
and proposals for a more competitive transatlantic defence market (and usually in 
that order). However, analyses of legal institutions are largely descriptive, providing 
only a background context for the above.  
 
The thesis of the present work is that whilst policy-makers continue to identify legal 
institutions as barriers to trade and advocate their use to liberalise transatlantic 
defence trade, there is, in fact, little understanding of the role which legal institutions 
have played, and could play, in this regard. It has been observed that the issue of 
ensuring “more effective regulatory approaches” to transatlantic defence competition 
has long been recognized although not substantially acted on.37 Yet, it is difficult to 
discern what an “effective regulatory approach” is absent a fundamental 
understanding of how existent approaches may be said to be ineffective. It is 
submitted that it is necessary to engage the foundational task of subjecting EU and 
                                                 
37 Speech by K V Miert, ‘The Transatlantic and Global Implications of European Competition Policy’ (European 
Commissioner for Transportation) delivered on February 16 1998, North Atlantic Assembly Meeting, Palais 
Egmont, Brussels, 1, 11-12 
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U.S. laws to critical description and analysis with a view to better understanding their 
role in the conduct of transatlantic defence trade relations. By providing a legal 
cartography of the core components of each system using procurement law as an 
example, the groundwork will be put in place for developing comparative legal 
research. It is hoped that a transatlantic dialogue will inform the task of policy-makers 
and legislators in assessing the extent to which existing and proposed legal 
institutions could occupy a discrete role in liberalising transatlantic defence 
procurement.38 
 
5.1. A Cartography of EU and US Defence Procurement Law 
 
The intuition for the thesis derives from observations about the limited legal 
scholarship on transatlantic defence procurement issues. 
 
Firstly, there is substantially no detailed contemporary legal scholarship examining 
the legal position of foreign contractors in terms of their access to, and treatment in 
the conduct of, public defence contracts.39 This is likely due to the fact that, as 
indicated above, in both the U.S. and the EU, defence procurement has largely been 
conducted on a national basis. Therefore, the external interface of procurement 
legislation has not been a priority. As this thesis will demonstrate, the Defence 
Directives have brought issues of access and treatment to the fore. However, whilst 
U.S. legal commentary has focused on the Directives’ implications for U.S. interests, 
                                                 
38 The thesis intends to engage dialogue at the level of U.S. and EU Member State Governments, international 
organisations (e.g. the EU and its institutions, EDA, NATO etc) and civil society more generally. It is also 
strategically aimed at advisory groups such as the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue set up to guide the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (among others) 
39 Part II of the thesis will identify certain examples dating back to the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, these are 
largely descriptive 
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this has not been accompanied by more penetrating analysis of how the U.S., EU 
Member State and EU legal regimes operate with regard to foreign contractors. 
 
Secondly, legal scholarship is largely written from a discernable “perspective” which 
centres on an overt national bias.40 This creates a risk that legal commentary simply 
becomes a vehicle to advocate protectionist regulatory responses. It is necessary to 
address these issues in the interests of a more openly reflectively and rigorous 
comparative legal scholarship. 
 
The lack of a methodological pre-commitment to systematic comparative legal 
analysis means that no real attempt is made to question the premises, definitions and 
configuration of procurement legislation by reference not only to national and 
European objectives but also by reference to transatlantic objectives (howsoever 
defined). It is hoped that this thesis will provide a normative reference point to further 
explore, through comparison and contrast, fundamental conceptual issues facing the 
design and operation of procurement legislation, as well as incidents of (inter-
)relation between U.S. and EU laws from which it may be possible to extrapolate 
priority areas which could be amenable to some level of transatlantic coordination. 
 
In light of the above, this thesis is not intended to propose and analyse a full set of 
regulatory reforms or promote grand designs for a “Transatlantic Defence 
Procurement Treaty”. Rather, the thesis emphasises the necessity, in the first 
                                                 
40 This is particularly, although not exclusively, prevalent in certain of the U.S. legal literature. The thesis is 
cautious to observe that this is due, primarily, to the fact that only U.S. legal literature has focused on issues of 
foreign access and treatment. The preoccupation of the EU legal literature has, to date, been on the internal 
operation of the Defence Directives with regard to EU economic operators as opposed to third countries. As will 
be indicated in Part I, this reflects more generally a discernable “internalisation” of the EU legal debate which 
focuses on the prioritisation of EU internal market objectives absent any real consideration of the external 
interface of EU defence procurement legislation with third countries 
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instance, of exploring the idiosyncratic national and regional legal perspectives on 
defence procurement issues in order to inform the bases for reform proposals. These 
risk being overlooked in premature proposals for supra-legal structures.41 However, 
whilst prioritising the importance of fundamental research of this kind, it is also 
necessary to provide an indication of the extent to which there is increasing evidence 
of a process of legalization of transatlantic defence trade relations. Through the 
identification of short-term, medium-term and long-term research priorities, this thesis 
will seek to tie fundamental research to more long-term possibilities for substantial 
reform. 
 
5.2. Specific and General Objectives 
 
The specific aims and objectives of the thesis are: 
a. To consolidate the existing body of legal literature on issues pertaining 
to defence procurement under EU and U.S. law. 
b. To provide a first formative legal analysis of EU law applicable to 
defence procurement with specific regard to its external relation to 
States which do not constitute EU Member States (so-called “third 
countries”), in particular, the U.S. 42 
c. To provide a first formative legal analysis of U.S. law applicable to 
defence procurement in light of developments in EU law. 
d. To identify current initiatives aimed at regulating transatlantic defence 
                                                 
41 In any event, the thesis’ more modest objectives also respect that any assessment of the viability, feasibility 
and credibility of the proposed use of legal institutions to regulate transatlantic defence procurement or trade 
more generally, would have to take account of the broader political and economic context of any such proposals 
42 This thesis should be seen as a continuation of the developing body of legal research in the field of EU 
defence procurement law which is referenced throughout this work 
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trade with a view to discerning the nascent state of legalization of 
transatlantic defence procurement and trade relations. 
The general aims and objectives are to stimulate legal and empirical research in a 
number of areas (which are not exhaustive). A full list of research questions arising 
from this thesis are appended in the Annex. Key issues include: 
a. The use of exclusions and exceptions limiting access of foreign 
competitors to defence contracts (e.g. on grounds of national/essential 
security; industrial mobilization; security of supply etc); 
b. Access to, and treatment of, foreign competitors in procedures for the 
award of public defence contracts; 
c. Access to, and treatment of, foreign competitors in judicial and 
administrative proceedings on matters pertaining to defence 
procurement; 
d. The interaction between the national laws of the Member States and 
EU law with regard to third countries in the field of defence 
procurement; 
e. EU external relations law and policy in the field of defence procurement 
(e.g. issues of national and EU competence; terms of access etc); 
f. U.S. law and policy in the field of defence procurement with specific 
regard to U.S-EU relations (as distinct from U.S. relations with 
individual EU Member States); 
g. The interaction of procurement law with other legislation relevant to the 
regulation of defence trade (e.g. anti-trust law, State aid, merger 
control, investment, licensing etc).  
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At the international level, these issues include: 
a. The possibilities for discrete regulatory mechanisms to govern 
transatlantic defence procurement and trade more generally; 
b. The possibilities for inclusion of defence procurement matters within the 
scope of existing international procurement regimes. 
 
6. Research Questions 
 
The thesis will utilise the following research questions as a guiding structure.  
 
6.1 The External Dimension of Defence Procurement Regulation 
1. What is the scope of application of EU and U.S. law with regard to defence 
procurement? 
2. How does EU and U.S. law regulate access and treatment of foreign 
contractors in the field of defence procurement? 
3. To what extent are the EU and U.S. procurement systems legally configured 
or calibrated to deal with issues concerning access, and treatment, of foreign 
contractors bidding for public defence contracts, with particular reference to 
the transatlantic defence trade context? 
6.2. Discerning the Impact of Legal Institutions in Practice 
4. On the basis of available data, how, and to what extent, does EU and U.S. 
defence procurement law apply to and/or impact on foreign contractors in 
practice?  
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5. How is any “effect” or “impact” qualified and quantified? 
6.3. Incidents of Relation Between Defence Procurement Regimes 
6. In what respects does EU law and U.S. law compare and contrast in the field 
of defence procurement? 
7. How could these points of comparison and contrast affect choices about how 
to regulate transatlantic defence trade? 
6.4. Role of Legal Institutions in Transatlantic Liberalisation  
8. What is the extent of current transatlantic initiatives aimed at the regulation of 
transatlantic defence trade and, more specifically, transatlantic defence 
procurement? 
 
7. Methodology and Limitations  
 
Before commencing the research, the following considerations were taken into 
account. 
 
7.1. Desk-Based Analysis 
 
This thesis is primarily a text- and desk-based analysis of defence procurement law. 
In light of the limited research on the practices of procurement officials in the defence 
sector, the inability to fully qualify and quantify the effects of legal institutions in 
practice constitutes a significant limitation of the thesis. Consequently, any and all 
statements have, as far as possible, been appropriately qualified.  
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7.2. Procurement of “Hard” Defence Material 
 
In the U.S., the descriptors “public contract law” and “federal acquisition law” 
encompass both formation of government contracts and contract administration. 
Contract formation includes (but is not confined to) the rules which regulate the public 
award of defence contracts from the selection of procedure to award and review. The 
EU procurement Directives generally cover aspects of contract formation to the 
exclusion of contract administration. Therefore, this thesis focuses primarily on the 
common aspect of regulated contract formation and which may be termed 
“procurement”. 
 
It follows from the specific focus on defence that the thesis does not cover sensitive 
security procurement.43 Further, the law on “civil” procurement is only examined to 
the extent that it is relevant to an analysis of the defence procurement rules.  
 
This thesis also does not specifically differentiate the type of contract or material that 
might be covered by the term “defence procurement”. Its overriding focus is on goods 
as opposed to works or services. This focus therefore also excludes the regulation of 
dual-use material.44 
 
The limits of the thesis also preclude a more extensive analysis of the interaction of 
                                                 
43 This thesis accepts that the distinction between “defence” and “security” is not clear-cut. For an interesting 
examination of the extent to which there is a “blurring” of the distinction within the EU, see EU Commissioned 
study,  ‘Industrial Implications in Europe of the Blurring of Dividing Lines between Security and Defence’, Final 
Report Contract no. SI2. 516182, 15 June 2010. With specific regard to public procurement, see 117-124 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/new_defsec_final_report_en.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2013 
44 An examination of the law in this area would necessitate a thesis in its own right 
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procurement law and regulation with other trade law regimes.45 However, this thesis 
is conscious to ensure that procurement law is not viewed in isolation from other 
areas of trade regulation.46  
 
Importantly, given the focus on procurement law, this thesis does not examine the 
significant issue of corruption. 
 
7.3. Exclusion of NATO and EU Member States  
 
Finally, it is recalled that the U.S. emphasises the need to focus on its relations with 
the EU independently of NATO and the EU Member States. The thesis does not 
examine NATO procurement. This would necessitate a thesis in its own right.  
 
Further, the thesis is cautious to observe that EU defence procurement law will 
ultimately be interpreted, applied and adjudicated, in the first instance, in accordance 
with national law. This interaction inevitably magnifies the complexity of the legal 
issues faced not least because of the discrete relations each Member State will have 
with the U.S. However, as this thesis will demonstrate, there is, in fact, little available 
research on the operation of the national laws and policies of Member States with 
regard to the conduct of defence trade, especially concerning access and treatment 
of foreign contractors. It is therefore not possible to engage substantial analysis of 
the national legal and policy positions. Notwithstanding, whilst a primary focus of the 
                                                 
45 On the relation of public procurement law to other EU trade law regimes see e.g. B Heuninckx, ‘Defence 
Procurement: The Most Effective Way to Grant Illegal State Aid and Get Away with It…Or is It?’ (2009) 46 CML 
Rev, 191; A S Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford Hart 2011); A S Graells, ‘Public 
Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?’ (2012) 6 PPLR 205  
46 As will be demonstrated, the thesis examines the relevance of certain other fields of trade regulation such as 
export control and licensing laws, the regulation of technical standards and competition law 
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thesis is on assessing the overall configuration of EU defence procurement law, it is 
hoped that the research will encourage further analysis of the extent to which the 
Defence Procurement Directive affects the dynamics of the interactions between 
Member States and third countries. 
  
8. Constituent Parts 
 
The Thesis comprises Three Parts.  
 
8.1. A View from the European Union 
 
Part I is entitled “A View From the European Union” and comprises six Chapters. 
Chapter 2 examines the conditioning effect of the EU essential security interests 
derogation on the development of an EU armaments market and the possible 
relevance of this derogation to third countries. Chapter 3 examines the Defence 
Procurement Directive’s provisions on excluded contracts and their relevance to 
transatlantic defence trade. Chapter 4 examines the legal position of third countries 
seeking access to the EU procurement market. Chapters 5 and 6 undertake a critical 
analysis of the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions on security of supply and 
technical specifications, which U.S. commentators have identified as demonstrating a 
latent potential to “discriminate”. Chapter 7 examines the intergovernmental 
dimension of EU defence procurement law. 
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8.2. A View from the United States of America 
 
Part II is entitled “A View from the United States of America” and comprises four 
Chapters. Chapter 8 provides an overview of the institutional and legal framework of 
U.S. federal procurement law. Chapters 9 and 10 examine U.S. law on full and open 
competition and non-competitive awards, respectively. Chapter 11 examines U.S. 
foreign acquisition law with particular emphasis on Reciprocal Defence Procurement 
Memoranda of Understanding (“RDPs”) given their attributed significance to 
transatlantic defence trade.  
 
8.3. Cables and Bridges Across the Atlantic 
 
Part III is entitled “Cables and Bridges Across the Atlantic”. This Part comprises a 
single Chapter 12 which summarises the thesis’ findings, identifies the current state 
of existing and proposed legal initiatives in the field and proposes areas for further 
research. 
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PART I 
A VIEW FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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2 
Limiting the Essential Security Derogation: 
Priming the EU Defence Procurement Market 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1950, a European Defence Community (“EDC”) Treaty was proposed.47 Designed 
to integrate the defence efforts of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(“ECSC”), 48  the EDC would have comprised inter alia a European army, 
supranational institutions with legislative competences, an independent 
administration and a Court of Justice.49 However, in 1954, the project was terminated 
after the French Assemblée Nationale entered a motion préalable against further 
deliberation.50 This precipitated a shift away from integration predicated on defence 
                                                 
47 For a useful historical overview of events leading to the proposal, see M Trybus, European Union Law and 
Defence Integration (Modern Studies in European Law, Hart Oxford 2005) 9-22 
48 The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty was signed by France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg in 1951. See Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 
1951 (not published). The U.S. citation can be found at 261 U.N.T.S. 140. The Treaty entered into force on 24 
July 1952 and expired on 23 July 2002. For a discussion of the influence of defence considerations on the 
ECSC’s development, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 19-21 
49
 See La Traité Instituant la Communauté Européene de Défense – La Documentation Française (undated: circa 
1952) published by the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. There appear to be two English translations of the 
Treaty. One was presented to the United Kingdom Parliament in April 1954 as The European Defence 
Community Treaty Paris, 27 May 1952 (together with related documents), Cmd 9127 (HMSO, London 1954). The 
Office of the United States Special Representative in Europe published a separate and unofficial translation of the 
EDC Treaty on 26 January 1953 based on the United States Senate publication 94118 (82nd Congress 2nd 
session), a NATO version published on 12 July 1952 and on translation of one of the agreements by the Allied 
High Commission’s Secretariat. See Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 22, fn 61. For 
contemporary commentary, see J L Kunz, Editorial Comment: ‘Treaty Establishing the European Defense 
Community’ (1953) 47(2) AJIL 275; C G Fenwick, ‘Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community’ (1952) 
46 AJIL 698; J Trempont, ‘La Communauté Européene de Défense’ (1952) 1(4) ICLQ 519; H W Briggs, ‘The 
Proposed European Political Community’ (1954) 48(1) AJIL 110; G Bebr, ‘The European Defence Community and 
the Western European Union: An Agonizing Dilemma’ (1955) 7(2) Stan L Rev 169. For a detailed discussion of 
the EDC Treaty provisions, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 22-42  
50 For this and other reasons for failure, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 43 and 
fn143 
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towards an economic common market imperative which culminated in the 1957 
European Economic Community Treaty (“EEC”).51 
  
Consequently, European defence integration has been incremental and slow to 
progress.52 The 1992 Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) introduced a Common 
Foreign and Security policy (“CFSP”).53 A European Security and Defence Policy 
(“ESDP”) was added under the Treaty of Nice in 2001.54 The current Consolidated 
Version of the TEU pursues a CFSP committed to the framing of a common defence 
policy, which “might” lead to a common defence.55 The TEU also provides for a 
Common Security and Defence Policy (“CSDP”).56 However, the Treaties confirm 
their “progressive” status.57 Thus, supranational centralization of the kind envisaged 
by the EDC continues to lack political consensus.58 
 
                                                 
51 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957 (unpublished). The U.S. citation can 
be found at 298 U.N.T.S. 3. The EEC Treaty into force on 1 January 1958  
52 For a discussion of the extent of predominantly intergovernmental initiatives after the EDC’s failure, see 
Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 44-47 and 51-57 
53 Treaty on European Union (Treaty of Maastricht) [1992] OJ C 191 
54 Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities 
and Certain Related Acts [2001] OJ C80/01. For a discussion of the CFSP and ESDP, see Trybus, ‘European 
Union Law and Defence Integration’ (n 47) 57-118. See also P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy & Defence in EU 
Constitutional Law: The Legal Regulation of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-Use Goods and Armaments (Hart Oxford 
2001) Ch. 2; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Oxford 2006) Chs.11 and 13; F Naert, ‘ESDP in 
Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU Security and Defence Operations’ in M Trybus and N White (ed), 
European Security Law (OUP 2007); A Georgopoulos, ‘The European Armaments Policy: A conditio sine qua non 
for the European Security and Defence Policy?’ In M Trybus and N White (ed) European Security Law 
55 Article 24(1) TEU (ex Article 11 TEU). For a discussion of a Common Defence, see M Trybus, ‘The Vision of 
the European Defence Community and a Common Defence for the European Union’ in M Trybus and N White 
(ed), European Security Law (n 54) 
56 Article 42(1) TEU (ex Article 17 TEU). For a discussion of the legal dimension of the CSDP, see M Trybus, ‘On 
the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU Constitutional Treaty’ in M Trybus and N White (ed) 
European Security Law (n 54); M Webber, 'The Common Security and Defence Policy in a Multilateral World' in P 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (Edward Elgar 2011); P Koutrakos, 
‘The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations and Perceptions’ in P 
Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives  
57 Article 24(1) and Article 24(2) TEU 
58 For the most recent addition to the literature on European defence cooperation, see T Dyson and T 
Konstadinides, European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
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Historically, therefore, whilst EU internal market law has generally applied to the 
defence sector like any other, the limitations of the EU’s defence and security 
competences combined with its failure to render explicit the link between those 
competences and the internal market has meant that Member States have generally 
excluded such trade from compliance with EU law, thereby limiting EU-wide 
competition. As this Chapter will discuss, this has been achieved, primarily, through 
recourse to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”) (ex Article 296 Treaty of the European Communities (“TEC”)), which 
enables derogation from the EU Treaties on the basis of the need to protect 
“essential security interests”. It is at this point that the issue of balance, or separation, 
between economic and security interests is most acute, reflecting fundamental 
uncertainties about who exercises what competences in a field that implicates both 
“defence” and “trade” interests. 
  
Notwithstanding, the EU’s purported strengths as a vehicle of economic integration 
have driven defence integration forward. The most significant legal innovations are 
not to be found in grand designs for an EDC but rather in the Defence Procurement 
and ICT Directives aimed at developing an internal market for the trade of defence 
material.  
 
Whilst the following Chapters examine the relevance of the Defence Directives to a 
transatlantic defence procurement analysis, this Chapter first examines the extent to 
which variable interpretations of Article 346 TFEU have conditioned the development 
of an EU internal market, in particular, with regard to its purported effects on the 
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ability of economic operators to openly compete for the public award of defence 
contracts on a non-discriminatory basis.  
 
For a host of reasons, this analysis is relevant to a transatlantic perspective. Firstly, 
Article 346 TFEU has, in part, precipitated the adoption of the Defence Procurement 
Directive. The fact that the Directive is defined by reference but also remains subject 
to Article 346 TFEU raises questions about the continued effect of this derogation.59 
Secondly, in its White Paper recommendations for improving EU-NATO cooperation, 
the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (“NIAG”) has specifically identified the need to 
define “legally acceptable interpretations of an ‘essential security interest’” under 
Article 346 TFEU.60 Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the analysis provides a 
fundamental insight into the role and effect that broadly defined legal institutions can 
have in conditioning both regulatory approaches to defence procurement and 
Member State and contracting authority practices. 
 
2. Security Exceptions and Derogations in the TFEU 
 
The TFEU contains provisions to ensure rights to free movement of goods, 61 
persons, 62  services, 63  capital, 64  and establishment 65  but also exceptions which 
                                                 
59 Article 1(6) Defence Procurement Directive incorporates the specific wording of Article 346 TFEU by defining 
military equipment covered by the Directive as equipment that is: “[…] specifically designed or adapted for military 
purposes, intended for use as an arm, munitions or war material [.]” As will be indicated in Section 2.1 below, this 
replicates the wording of Article 346 TFEU. However, Article 2 Defence Procurement Directive expressly provides 
that: “[s]ubject to Articles 30, 45, 46, 55 and 296 of the Treaty, this Directive shall apply to contracts awarded in 
the fields of defence and security […]”  
60 For example, see NATO NIAG High Level Advice Study No 154, Developments in Europe to Reform Export 
Control and Defense Procurement Processes and Implications and Opportunities Resulting, Particularly with 
Regard to Multinational Programs Supporting NATO Capabilities and Interoperability’, 17 (2011) 
<http://www.aofs.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/110920-Developments-in-Europe.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2013 
61 Articles 34 (ex Article 28 TEC) and 35 (ex Article 29 TEC) TFEU 
62 Article 45 TFEU (ex Article 39 TEC) 
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authorise restrictions on these rights. In Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary,66 the European Court of Justice ((“ECJ”), now Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)) held that the only articles in which the 
Treaty provides for derogations applicable in situations involving public safety are 
Articles 36 (ex 30 TEC), 45(3) (ex 39 TEC), 51 (ex 45 TEC), 346 (ex 296 TEC) and 
347 (ex 297 TEC) TFEU.67 Article 65(1)(b) (ex 58(1)(b) TEC) TFEU was only inserted 
into the Treaty after Johnston and must be added to this list. Whilst concerned with 
public safety, the ECJ (and now CJEU) has applied Johnston analogously to 
measures taken on public security grounds. Importantly, the ECJ confirmed that 
these exceptions deal with clearly defined cases, do not lend themselves to a wide 
interpretation and from which it cannot be inferred that a general proviso is inherent 
in the Treaty covering all measures taken under a specified ground.68 Therefore, 
whilst Member States are said to retain responsibility to determine public security 
requirements, such recourse nevertheless remains subject to judicial review when 
challenged.69 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
63 Article 56 TFEU (ex Article 49 TEC) 
64 Article 63 TFEU (ex Article 56 TEC)  
65 Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 TEC) 
66 Case C-224/94 Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. 
For a useful discussion of this case, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 266-269 
and references cited at 266, fn 23. See also the earlier cases of Case C-13/68 SpA Salgoil v Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453, 463; Case C-7/68 Commission v Italy [1968] ECR 633, 644 
67 Case C-224/94 Johnston, para 26 
68 ibid. This finding was subsequently confirmed in Case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board, ex 
parte Secretary of State for Defence [1999] ECR I-7043, para 16; Case C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v. Germany [2000] 
ECR I-69, para 16; Case C-186/01 Alexander Dory v. Germany [2003] ECR I-2479, para 31 as well as the cases 
discussed in the main text of this Chapter relating to Article 346 TFEU 
69 For early cases in this regard, see Case 35/76 Simmenthal [1976] ECR 1871, para 14; Case 153/78 
Commission v. Germany [1979] ECR 2555, para 5; Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister for the Interior [1975] E.C.R. 
1219, paras 26-27; Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris and Scientology International 
Reserves Trust v. The Prime Minister [2000] E.C.R. I-01335, para 17 
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2.1. Relevance of Article 346 TFEU to Defence Procurement 
 
Both the Public Sector Directive, which regulates the award of civil contracts 
(including by contracting authorities in the field of defence),70 and the Defence 
Procurement Directive, expressly provide that their provisions remain subject to 
Article 346 TFEU.71 Article 346 TFEU provides as follows: 
 
1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the 
following rules: 
 
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure 
of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary 
for the protection of the essential interests of its security which are 
connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of 
competition in the internal market regarding products which are not 
intended for specifically military purposes. 
 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission, make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 
                                                 
70 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ 
L 134/114 
71 Article 10 Public Sector Directive; Article 2 Defence Procurement Directive  
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1958,72 of the products to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply. 
 
Commentators appear to qualitatively distinguish between the free movement public 
security exception and Article 346 TFEU, the latter constituting one of two73 “national 
security” exceptions.74 The predecessor to Article 346 TFEU dates back to the 
original Article 223 EEC. Importantly, its wording has remained unchanged 
throughout each successive treaty revision. On the one hand, the fact that the 
present economic, political and legal context differs from the time of the provision’s 
initial adoption should be kept firmly in mind when evaluating interpretations of Article 
346 TFEU. On the other hand, it has been argued that present political and economic 
circumstances should not detract from its nature as a “constitutional” article, which 
delineates Member State and EU competences in the politically sensitive field of 
defence trade.75 Article XXIII(1) WTO Government Procurement Agreement (“WTO 
GPA”) contains a similar exclusion as follows: 
 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking 
any action or not disclosing any information which it considers necessary for 
                                                 
72 Council Decision defining the list of products (arms, munitions, and war material) to which the provisions of 
Article 223(1)(b) apply. See Minutes of 15 April 1958, 368/58 (unpublished)  
73 Article 347 TFEU constitutes the other exception in this regard. Article 347 TFEU (ex 297 TEC) provides that: 
“Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking together the steps needed to prevent the 
functioning of the internal market being affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take 
in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of war, 
serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the 
purpose of maintaining peace and international security.” For a discussion of Article 347 TFEU, see C Stefanou 
and H Xanthaki, A Legal and Political Interpretation of Articles 224 and 225 of the Treaty of Rome, The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Cases (Ashgate 1997); P Koutrakos, ‘Is Article 297 EC ‘a reserve of 
sovereignty’?’ (2000) 37 CMLRev 1339; Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) Ch 6; P 
Koutrakos, ‘The Notion of Necessity in the Law of the European Union’ in I F Dekker (ed), Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law: Necessity Across International Law (TMC Asser Press 2010) 204-207 
74 See M Trybus, ‘The EC Treaty as an Instrument of European Defence Integration: Judicial Scrutiny of Defence 
and Security Exceptions’ (2002) 39 CML Rev 1347, 1349 fn9. However, not all commentators accept this 
distinction. See for instance, A Arda, ‘Member States’ Right to Derogate from the European Treaties: A 
Commentary on Article 297 TEC’, in: H Smit, P Herzog, C Campbell and G Zagel (eds), Smit & Herzog on the 
Law of the European Union (2nd edition 2006) Chapter 398, 1, 7  
75 See A Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European 
Union’ (Ph.D Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham, January 2004) 110-111  
  30 
the protection of its essential security interests relating to the procurement of 
arms, ammunition or war materials, or to procurement indispensable for 
national security or for national defence purposes.76 
 
The scope of Article XXIII(1) remains unclear.77 A notable difference in wording, 
however, is the additional reference to procurement “indispensable” for “national 
security” or “national defence purposes”.78 
 
2.2. “Secrecy” and “Armaments” Derogations 
 
Article 346 TFEU in fact comprises two derogations. Article 346(1)(a) TFEU has been 
categorised as a “secrecy” exception.79 By contrast, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU has been 
categorised as an “armaments” exception, 80  and is the primary focus of this 
Chapter.81 An important component is Article 346(2) TFEU which refers to a 1958 list 
stipulating the products to which Article 346(1)(b) TFEU is said to apply.82 It has been 
                                                 
76 See Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-1994) – Annex 4 – Agreement on Government 
Procurement (WTO) (GPA 1994) [1994] OJ L336/273.  The GPA applies only to those supplies and equipment 
listed in Annex 1 and Part 3 in Appendix 1 to the GPA. This list covers only non-warlike material  
77 It has been suggested that the interpretation of Article XXIII(1) “might be different” from that of Article 346 
TFEU. See S Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer 2003) 148-150 
78 For a discussion of the range of similar terms used in security exceptions, see S Schill and R Briese ‘“If the 
State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement’ in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, 
(eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol 13, (2009) 61  
79 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 163-4. To date, Article 346(1)(a) TFEU has not 
been the subject of a specific ruling by the EU courts 
80 On the respective scope of application of Article 346(1)(a) and (b) TFEU both before and in light of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 164-5 citing at 
fn 96 Article XXI(a) GATT and H L Schloemann and S L Ohloff, ‘“Constitutionalisation” and Dispute Settlement in 
the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence’ (1999) 93 AJIL, 424;  see also B Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at 
the boundaries: applicability of EU law to defence and security procurement’ (2010) 3 PPLR, 91, 113 
81 However, caution must be exercised as this description suggests that Article 346(1)(b) TFEU is the exclusive 
legal basis for excluding “armaments”. It has been argued that Article 346(1)(a) TFEU also theoretically covers 
“armaments”. See E Aalto, ‘Interpretations of Article 296’ in D Keohane, C Mölling and S de Vaucorbeil (ed) 
Towards a European Defence Market, Chaillot Paper No 113, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, 
November 2008, 30-31   
82 See Council Decision defining the list of products (arms, munitions, and war material) to which the provisions 
of Article 223(1)(b) apply (n 72). The list has not been amended since 1958. See Commission Answer to a Written 
Question 573/85 [1985] OJ C-269; Case C-367/89 Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les 
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argued that Article 346(2) is “integral” to Article 346(1)(b) TFEU in the regard that the 
1958 list is said to replace the words “arms, munitions, and war material”.83 The ECJ 
has recently confirmed that it is for the national court to determine whether a product 
may be classified in one or other of the categories featured in the list.84 
 
In addition, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU is subject to the condition that such measures 
must not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market 
regarding products not intended for specifically military purposes. An unresolved 
issue that falls beyond the scope of this thesis, concerns whether Article 346 TFEU 
may also apply to dual-use goods.85   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Accessoires Scientifiques SNC [1991] ECR I-4621, Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 30; P Gilsdorf, ‘Les réserves de 
sécurité du Traite CEE, a la lumière du Traite sur L’Union Européenne’ (1994) Revue du marche commune et 
l’Union européenne 17, 20. Further, the list was never officially published. Member States have expressed 
different attitudes regarding its confidentiality. The list has been reproduced in academic publications, and has 
therefore been in the public domain. See H Wulf (ed), Arms Industry Limited (OUP 1993) 214. For a list of 
publications citing the list, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 143, fn 15 and 
references therein and M Trybus, ‘The list of hard defence products Under Article 296 EC Treaty’ (2003) 2 PPLR, 
15. In a written question dated 4 May 2001, a Member of the European Parliament asked the Council: “which 
products appear on the list of 15 April 1958 to which Article 296(1)(b) refers?” See Written Question E-1324/01 by 
Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council [2002] OJ C-364 E, 20 December 2001, 85-86. In a reply dated 27 
September 2001, the Council provided a version of the list which can be found in Trybus, European Union Law 
and Defence Integration (n 47) 143-145. For a comparison of this list with those previously in the public domain, 
see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 145-149. This version of the list is the one most 
referenced in the academic literature and continues to be the subject of academic debate. It should also be 
observed that the 1958 list was translated into all languages of the EU in November 2008 and has been publicly 
available since this date. For a cogent argument calling for official publication of the list, see K Eikenberg, ‘Article 
296 (ex 223) EC and external trade in strategic goods’ (2000) EL Rev, 117, 128  
83 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 142  
84 Case C-615/10 Insinooritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat (Judgment of the Court, Fourth Chamber June 
7 2012), para 37 
85 There is a longstanding debate on the issues of whether or not Article 346(1)(b) is exclusively limited to the 
goods identified in the 1958 list, and whether Article 346(1)(b) TFEU also covers “dual-use” items which can be 
used for civil and military purposes. For a useful discussion, see K Eikenberg, ‘Article 296 (ex 223) EC and 
external trade in strategic goods’ (n 82) 125-128; Trybus European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 
149; B Heuninckx, ‘Towards a Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime? European Defence Agency 
and European Commission Initiatives’ (2008) 11 PPLR, 1, 4; P Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the European 
Union (5th ed Hart Oxford 2010), 389 and citations at fn104 
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Finally, it should be emphasised that only Member States can invoke Article 346 
TFEU.86 A company is not itself entitled to invoke the provision in proceedings 
brought against it for an infringement of EU law.87 
 
2.3. Distinguishing Exceptions and Derogations: Judicial Review  
 
By contrast to the public security exception, which only excepts a measure from 
compliance with internal market rules, Article 346 TFEU is a Treaty “derogation” 
stricto sensu excepting a measure from compliance with the EU Treaties. Further, 
Article 346 TFEU is subject to a distinct procedure under Article 348 TFEU (ex 298 
TEC). This procedure permits Member States and the Commission to examine how 
measures taken under Article 346 TFEU can be adjusted to the rules of the Treaties 
but also a possibility to refer a matter to the ECJ if it considers that a Member State is 
improperly using Article 346 TFEU.88 This procedure has only ever been used once 
and only in the context of Article 347 TFEU.89  
 
It is generally considered that the main feature that distinguishes the public security 
and national security exceptions is the form and level of scrutiny applied. With regard 
                                                 
86 See GEC-Siemens/Plessey (Case IV/33.018) Commission Notice relating to a proceeding under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC-Treaty [1990] OJ C-239/2  
87 In support of this view, see J B Wheaton, ‘Defence Procurement and the European Community: The Legal 
Provisions’ (1992) 6 PPLR 432; Trybus European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 233  
88 Article 348 TFEU provides: “If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 346 and 347 have 
the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the internal market, the Commission shall, together with the 
State concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties. By way of 
derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 259, the Commission or any Member State may 
bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper 
use of the powers provided for in Articles 346 and 347. The Court of Justice shall give its ruling in camera.”  
89 This case was later struck from the Court report. See Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece [1996] E.C.R. I-
1513. For a discussion of this case, see Koutrakos, ‘The Notion of Necessity in the Law of the European Union’ (n 
73) 205-207 
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to the public security exception, a strict proportionality test applies.90 Conversely, as 
Section 4 will demonstrate, whilst it is accepted that the Court applies a reduced level 
of scrutiny to Article 346 TFEU, there is no consensus on the form of scrutiny 
applied.91 
 
Collectively, these exceptions constitute an important balancing mechanism between 
the recognition of Member State security interests and the EU’s objectives, in turn, 
defining the limits of EU law as a supranational instrument of European defence 
integration.92 
 
2.4. Differentiating Notions of “Security” 
 
Commentators have also differentiated Article 346 TFEU from the free movement 
exceptions on the basis of the differing notions of “security” to which each exception 
is said to apply. At its most basic, it has been argued that “public security” is a wide 
concept covering all aspects of security both internal and external and includes the 
concept of “national security”. 93 According to one view, “public security” refers to the 
entire field of rules, laid down by sovereign authorities and incapable of being 
waived, which have been adopted in the interest of the political and social integrity of 
                                                 
90 According to this test, the measure must: (1) be suitable to promote the objective of public security; (2) be 
adequate in the sense that there is no other measure less restrictive from the point of view of free movement that 
is capable of achieving the same objective and (3) the positive effect of the measure on public security has to be 
balanced with the negative effect on the internal market. This test was originally formulated by AG van Gerven in 
Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. It has been argued that this test has been applied in a 
number of cases invoking public security grounds. See Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 
47) 134-139 
91 See Section 4.1 
92 Trybus European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 142 
93 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 131 citing Case C-367/89 Criminal Proceedings 
against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoires Scientifiques SNC [1991] ECR I-4621, para 22; Case C-70/94 Fritz 
Werner Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH v Germany [1995] ECR I-3989, para 25 and Case C-83/94 Criminal 
Proceedings against Peter Liefer [1995] ECR I-3231, para 26 
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society”.94 This would concern any measure enacted to protect a Member State’s 
“integrity”.95 However, it has been observed that the precise ambit of the justification 
of public security is “somewhat elusive”.96 By contrast, Articles 346 and 347 TFEU 
would concern a narrower concept, which could be called “national security” or 
“external military security”.97 It has been suggested that “national security” could be 
defined as the entire field of rules which have been adopted to protect the territorial 
integrity, important strategic interests and political independence of a State.98  
 
In assessing the notion of “security”, particular reliance has been placed on Advocate 
General (“AG”) Slynn’s Opinion in Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy.99 
This case concerned Irish legislation requiring importers of petroleum products to 
purchase certain quotas from an Irish refinery, which the ECJ found to be justified 
under Article 30 TEC on public security grounds.100 AG Slynn took the view that 
Article 30 TEC “is clearly not limited to external military security which largely falls to 
be dealt with under Articles [296 to 298]” in support of the proposition that the public 
                                                 
94 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 131 citing the definition of J Schwarze, European 
Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1992) 778 based in turn on Wagbur in H von der Groeben, v Boeckh, 
Thiesing, Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EWG Vertrag, 3rd edn (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1983) Article 36, margin 
nos. 18 et seq 
95 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 131 
96 See LW Gormley, EU Law of Free Movement of Goods and Customs Union (OUP 2009) 11.68, 463-465 
97 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 131 citing at fn 44 Case C-72/83 Campus Oil 
Limited v. Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727, Opinion of  AG Sir Gordon Slynn, 2764 
98 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 131 
99 Case C-72/83 Campus Oil Limited v Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] ECR 2727. For a discussion of 
this case, see K Mortelmans, ‘Annotation to Case 72/83 Campus Oil’ (1984) CML Rev 696; L W Gormley, 
Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within the EEC (Elsevier, 1985) 134-139; F Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for 
the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law (Hart 2004) 188-192; P Koutrakos, ‘The 
Notion of Necessity in the Law of the European Union’ (n 73) 197-8; C Barnard, ‘Derogations, Justifications and 
the Four Freedoms: Is State Interest Really Protected?’ in C Barnard, O Odudu (eds) The Outer Limits of 
European Union Law (Hart Oxford 2009), 273. See also Case C-398/98 Commission v Greece [2001] ECR I-7915  
100 See Case C-72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727, para 34. For a critique of the general and unclear wording 
of aspects of the judgment, see L W Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within the EEC (n 99) 136-139 
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security exception must be construed more restrictively.101 It has been further argued 
that the fact that the material scope of Article 346 TFEU covers “arms, munitions and 
war material” focuses on the exercise of the most fundamental aspects of “national 
sovereignty” and which must therefore be viewed as underpinning the definition of 
“security”. 102  On this conception, Article 346 TFEU would concern interests of 
fundamental significance e.g. protecting the territorial integrity of a State from 
external threat 103  or aggression or the protection of State institutions from 
terrorists.104 Whatever conception of security is adopted, it has been suggested that 
the interpretation of “security” under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU does not render it lex 
specialis in relation to the free movement security exceptions.105  
 
However, this discussion (and that which follows) indicates that there has been only 
limited focus on what conceivably constitutes an “essential” “security” “interest”, such 
as to provide an indication as to the distinct conceptual bases of “public security” and 
“essential security” as well as their relation.106 Rather, the focus has concerned the 
standard of judicial review applied to Article 346 TFEU. In consequence, the issue of 
competence has only been addressed tangentially. The general conceptual and legal 
                                                 
101 Case C-72/83 Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2727, 2674. See also Trybus, European Union Law and Defence 
Integration (n 47) 136 and Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law: The Legal 
Regulation of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments (n 54) 187 and 189 
102 Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence (n 54) 188 
103 The Court has found that the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of 
nations as affecting the security of a Member State. See Case C-70/94 Fritz Werner [1995] ECR I-3189, para 27 
and Case C-83/94 Leifer [1995] ECR I-3231, para 28 
104 Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence (n 54) 188. This categorisation would appear to broadly 
correspond with that presented by Trybus, in particular in reference to protection of “territorial integrity” 
105 It may be argued that Member States can always plead a security exception within the Treaties (i.e. pursuant 
to a free movement exception like Article 36 TFEU) before relying on Article 346 TFEU in the alternative. See 
Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence (n 54) 188 
106 For a discussion of this notion in investment law, see OECD, ‘Security-Related Terms in International 
Investment Law and in National Security Strategies (May 2009) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/42701587.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013; K Yannaca-Small, ‘Essential Security Interests under 
International Investment Law’ in OECD (ed) International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a 
Changing World (OECD 2007) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/40243411.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013  
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nebulosity of “public security” and “national security” as legal terms corresponds with 
uncertainty on the part of the EU legislator107 and the ECJ108 about how to approach, 
define, interpret and question invocation of such an “open textured”109 provision. One 
commentator has even gone as far as to state that it is legally impossible to define 
“essential security interests”.110 
 
To a certain extent, this is explicable and understandable. Security is a multifaceted 
concept with defence, political and economic aspects and which does not lend itself 
to a legal definition.111  Further, emphasis is often placed on the notion that a 
Member State must determine its essential security interests in light of reference in 
Article 346 TFEU to “[…] as it considers necessary […]”.112 However, it may be 
questioned to what extent any review exercised by the ECJ encroaches upon the 
exercise of this apparent competence.113  It is submitted that references to the 
conferment and exercise of “discretion” substantially enable the avoidance of this 
                                                 
107 For example, Article 14 Public Sector Directive provides that: “[t]his Directive shall not apply to public 
contracts […] when the protection of the essential interests of that Member State so requires.” This provision 
should be contrasted with Article 2 of its predecessor Council Directive 93/36/EC of 14 June 1993 co-ordinating 
procedures for the award of public supply contracts [1993] OJ L -199/1 (“Supplies Directive”) which referred to the 
“basic interests of the Member State’s security” (emphasis added). For a discussion of the latter, see Trybus, 
European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 219-221 
108 See for instance, the judgment of the Court in Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173, para 42 
which states: “[i]t should be noted at the outset that measures adopted by the Member States in connection with 
the legitimate requirements of national interest are not excluded in their entirety from the application of 
Community law solely because they are taken in the interests of public security or national defence […]”, citing 
Case C-186/01 Dory [2003] ECR I-2479, para 30 
109 “Open texture” here is used in the sense appropriated by Hart. See H L A Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Clarenden Press 1961). More recently, see B H Bix, ‘Defeasibility and Open Texture in J F Beltrán and G B Ratti 
(ed) The Logic of Legal Requirements, Essays on Defeasibility (OUP 2012) 
110 See Aalto, ‘Interpretations of Article 296’ (n 81) 18 
111 For a discussion in this regard, see Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence (n 54) 165-175  
112 For instance, it is unsurprising that emphasis is placed on statements made in Case C-120/94 R Commission 
v. Greece (FYROM) [1996] ECR I-1513, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para.54 where he states: “Each 
Member State is better placed than the Community institutions or the other Member States when it is a question 
of weighing up the dangers posed for it by the conduct of a third state. Security is, moreover, a matter of 
perception rather than hard fact. What one Member State perceives as an immediate threat to its external security 
may strike another Member State as relatively harmless.”  
113 For a general discussion in this regard see L Azoulai, ‘The ‘Retained Powers’ Formula in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice: EU Law as Total Law?’ 2011 4(2) EJLS, 192. Although, Article 346 TFEU is cited at 
194, fn4 as an exception to an observable phenomenon in which the Court disassociates the existence of state 
powers from the exercise of such powers, thereby legitimizing the application of EU law in any domain that is not 
a priori within the Union’s scope of intervention 
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issue.114 By not engaging these matters, it is possible to avoid difficult questions 
about the delimitation of Member State and EU defence and security competences.  
 
These issues are not simply theoretical excursions that are of little relevance to 
transatlantic defence procurement. It is recalled from the Introduction that NIAG has 
recently recommended that “legally acceptable interpretations” of an “essential 
security interest” should be defined.115  
  
 
3. National Interpretations of Article 346 TFEU 
 
Most Member States have interpreted Article 346(1)(b) TFEU as permitting an 
automatic exemption of defence material from the application of all internal market 
regimes.116 It has been suggested that Member States have “abused” Article 346 
TFEU.117 A number of reasons for such abuse have been identified. These include: 
the prima facie exclusion of defence issues after the EDC’s failure and which 
Member States have correspondingly viewed as reflected in the essential security 
interests derogation; caution on the ECJ’s part to avoid a politically sensitive 
provision; Commission reluctance to institute proceedings out of a possible concern 
                                                 
114 On the posited “deference versus discretion” dichotomy generally, see Schill and Briese ‘“If the State 
Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International Dispute Settlement’  (n 78) 74-81 
115 NIAG High Level Advice Study No 154 (n 60) 17 
116 The Member States’ early submissions before the ECJ are instructive. In Case C-224/94 Johnston (n 66) the 
UK argued at 1671 that: “The EEC Treaty itself leaves intact the power of the Member States to take such 
measures as they consider necessary or expedient” (emphasis added)  
117 It has even been argued that the Commission has, for a long time, accepted this abuse. See D Eisenhut, ‘The 
Special Security Exemption of Article 296 EC: Time for a New Notion of “Essential Security Interests”?’ (2008) 
33(4) EL Rev 577, 578  
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to find a clear case in which the ECJ could narrow the provision’s interpretation and 
application in practice; and, finally, the difficulty of detecting and proving abuses. 118 
 
However, it was not always clear that the Public Sector Directive applied to defence 
contracts. 119  Further, absent a pre-notification requirement for the invocation of 
Article 346 TFEU, monitoring what kinds of contracts have been excluded and for 
what reasons is difficult to verify. In addition, as will be discussed below in Section 5, 
interpretative guidance on Article 346 TFEU is by no means comprehensive and 
unequivocal. Finally, whilst it has been suggested that reference in Article 346 TFEU 
to the fact that Member States “may” take measures confirms the existence of EU 
competence to regulate defence trade,120 as indicated in the Introduction, the EU has 
only recently rendered explicit the link between EU security and defence policy and 
internal market regulation. 
 
Notwithstanding, available evidence indicates that Member States have generally 
excluded material on the basis that all defence goods are said to implicate essential 
                                                 
118 See Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 150-151  
119 One manifestation of this uncertainty concerned the wording of the public sector Directives in their successive 
revisions and the possible effects of case law developments on their interpretation. Specifically, Article 3 Supplies 
Directive (n 107) exempted “products” to which Article 223(1)(b) TEC (now Article 346(1)(b) TFEU) applied. By 
contrast, Article 4(1) Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the co-ordination of procedures for 
the award of public services contracts [1992] OJ L-209/1 excepted “contracts” to which Article 223(1)(b) TEC 
applied. It had been argued that use of the word “contracts” in substitution of “products” evidenced that the EU 
legislator had taken into account the ECJ ruling in Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain [1999] ECR I-5585 
(delivered between revisions of the Directives and discussed below) confirming that Article 346 TFEU did not 
except all hard defence “products” but rather only those “contracts” satisfying the conditions of Article 346 TFEU 
in each individual case. For a discussion of the interpretational uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the 
public procurement Directives to hard defence material, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities 
Procurement (Sweet & Maxwell 2nd Rev ed 2005) 347, para 6.97 and 349, para 6.100; Georgopoulos, ‘European 
Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European Union’ (n 75) 86-109 and Trybus, 
European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 202-213. Article 10 Public Sector Directive (n 71) omits any 
reference to “products” or “contracts”, merely providing that the Directive applies “subject to Article 296 of the 
Treaty”  
120 See Eikenberg, ‘Article 296 (ex 223) EC and external trade in strategic goods’ (n 82) 119 and reference cited 
at fn 8 
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security interests and without defining a relevant security interest.121 It has been 
suggested that barriers to European defence market regulation primarily take the 
form of national objections to the loss of control over a “sovereignty-defining” 
economic sector and that in Member State representatives’ minds and wording, the 
concept of “essential interest of State security” is generally extended, without any 
legal basis, to “sovereignty”.122 Some support for this conclusion can also be derived 
from official statistics.123  
 
The Defence Procurement Directive has now modified the Public Sector Directive to 
provide that the Public Sector Directive now applies to public contracts awarded in 
the fields of defence and security, with the exception of contracts to which the 
Defence Procurement Directive applies, and subject to Article 346 TFEU.124  The 
intention is to make clear that the public award of defence contracts must comply 
with the Directives unless otherwise excepted. The most contentious issue which 
now arises concerns to what extent the Defence Procurement Directive will 
discourage routine recourse to Article 346 TFEU in light of the fact that it is said to be 
specifically ‘tailored’ to defence procurement contracts.125 
                                                 
121 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 150. This interpretation is just one specific 
instantiation of a view generally held by foreign ministries, that all aspects of defence, including defence trade, are 
the imperative of State “sovereignty” and must be excluded from the EU Treaties. See for example Case C-
285/98 Sirdar v. Army Board [1999] ECR I-7403, Opinion of AG La Pergola, para 10; Case C-285/98 Kreil v 
Germany [2000] ECR I-69, para 12  
122 See Unisys, (Commission Study), ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’, Final Report of the Study 
‘Assessment of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products’, Brussels, 
February 2005, 65 <http://www.edis.sk/ekes/en_3_final_report.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
123 In 2007, the Commission published statistics showing that an average of only 13 % of contracts are published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union (“OJEU”), with some Member States publishing as little as 1 or 2 % 
of their defence procurement expenditure. See Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Annex to the Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of defence and 
security’ (Impact Assessment) SEC(2007)1589, December 5, 2007, 13-14 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/impact_assessment_en.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013  
124 Article 71 Defence Procurement Directive  
125 See generally, M Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: limitation, 
flexibility, descriptiveness, and substitution’ (2013) 38(1) EL Rev, 3 
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4. Interpretation of Article 346 TFEU by the Court of Justice 
 
As indicated, a critical issue that will continue to remain is the precise instances in 
which Article 346 TFEU may provide a legal basis to justify non-compliance with the 
Defence Procurement Directive. The following review of certain of the Article 346 
TFEU case law provides the general interpretative context. However, the ECJ has 
not yet been presented with a genuine case requiring detailed examination of its 
terms.  
 
4.1. Spanish VAT Exemption  
 
Commission v. Spain was the first formative ruling on Article 346 TFEU.126 Spain 
adopted legislation 127  exempting intra-Community imports and acquisitions of 
equipment exclusively for military use from value added tax contrary to an EEC 
Directive.128 Spain submitted that its legislation was necessary to guarantee essential 
strategic objectives, in particular, the effectiveness of Spanish armed forces both 
nationally and as part of NATO.129  Spain had neither invoked the then Article 
223(1)(b) TEC (raising Article 223(1)(b) only at the litigation stage) nor provided 
evidence to substantiate its claim. Therefore, the Commission initiated enforcement 
proceedings under the former Article 226 TEC. 130  
                                                 
126 Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain [1999] ECR I-5585  
127 Law No 6/87 of May 14, 1987 concerning budgetary appropriations for investments and operating costs of the 
armed forces (BOE of May 19, 1987)  
128 Council Directive 77/388/EC of May 17, 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating 
to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, [1977] OJ L145/1  
129 Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain para 17  
130 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 156 observes that Spain had not based its 
argument on Article 223(1)(b) TEC in the pre-judicial stage, which could explain why the case had not proceeded 
under the then Article 298(2) TEC. This suggests that if Spain had, in fact, raised Article 296 TEC in argument in 
the pre-litigation procedure, it would have been likely that Article 298(2) TEC proceedings would have been 
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Confirming Johnston, the Court reiterated that because of their limited character, 
Treaty exemptions do not lend themselves to a wide interpretation.131 Further, that it 
is for the Member State to provide evidence that the exception does not go beyond 
the limits of such cases.132 Given that the principal objective was to determine and 
allocate financial resources for its armed forces, Spain had not demonstrated that the 
exemptions provided for were “necessary” for the protection of its essential security 
interests.133 
 
The most fundamental aspect of Commission v. Spain is its confirmation that Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU only applies when there is a security reason for disapplying the EU 
Treaties. Exclusive reliance on the classification of the material as “defence-related” 
is insufficient.134 It also confirmed the ECJ’s jurisdiction to address Article 346 TFEU 
arguments outside the Article 348 TFEU procedure.  
 
However, the most controversial aspect concerns the form and standard of review 
applied, an issue that was not explicit in the judgment as Spain did not provide any 
                                                                                                                                                        
brought. However, as Trybus also observes (citing at fn 66 W Hummer in Eberhardt Grabitz and Meinrad Hilf, 
(eds), Kommentar zum EWGV (CH Beck Verlag, Munich, 1997) loose-leaf, Article 225, para 8, use of the word 
“may” means that Article 298(2) TEC does not actually prioritise, as a matter of law, this particular procedure 
when Article 296(1)(b) TEC is concerned. Trybus, at 152, suggests that the action was also possibly motivated by 
the fact that the Spanish legislation affected the Community’s revenue. This view appears to be substantiated by 
the recent enforcement cases which concerned similar circumstances and also proceeded under Article 226 TEC. 
These cases are discussed in Section 4.4 
131 Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain, para 21 citing Case C-224/94 Johnston (n 66)  
132 Commission v. Spain, para 22. On the issue of who bears the burden of proof, see Trybus, European Union 
Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 157-158 and Georgopoulos ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: 
Proposals for Action within the European Union’ (n 75) 131 
133 The Judgment at para 22 reads in relevant part: “[…] In the present case, the Kingdom of Spain has not 
demonstrated that the exemptions provided for by the Spanish Law are necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security. It is clear from the preamble to that Law that its principal objective is to 
determine and allocate the financial resources for the reinforcement and modernization of the Spanish armed 
forces by laying the economic and financial basis for its overall strategic plan. It follows that the VAT exemptions 
are not necessary in order to achieve the objective of protecting the essential interests of the security of the 
Kingdom of Spain.” (emphasis added) 
134 See S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 347, point 6.97 
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evidence to substantiate its claim.135 It has been argued that use of the word 
“necessary” amounted to the application of a proportionality test.136 On this view, the 
Court applies the test with differing degrees of intensity, leaving variable margins of 
discretion to Member States depending on the security exemption in question.137 It is 
recalled that a strict test is applied to the free movement exceptions, leaving a 
relatively narrow margin of discretion.138 By contrast, it has been argued that the tax 
exemptions were manifestly unnecessary and so the judgment does not confirm the 
application of a very strict scrutiny.139 Instead, Member States had a wide margin of 
political discretion.140  
 
Conversely, certain commentators have argued that a proportionality test cannot be 
derived from the judgment.141 Whilst use of the word “necessary” is ordinarily such an 
indication142 in this case, the Court instead applied a test of “manifest unsuitability”.143 
                                                 
135 ibid 241, point 4.60 
136 It has been suggested that AG Saggio also used the word in the same sense. The Court makes reference to 
para 12 of AG Saggio’s Opinion at para 23. See See Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 
153 
137 For a cogent assessment of certain of the main arguments for and against the adoption of a proportionality 
test by the Court in Commission v. Spain, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 154-
157   
138 See Section 2.3 above 
139 Trybus European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 153-4 
140 According to this interpretation, the Court will only consider a measure disproportionate when: (1) it is clearly 
unsuitable to promote national security which is put forward in bad faith; (2) the Member State has arbitrarily 
chosen a measure which is more detrimental to the internal market than necessary; or (3) the balance between 
the two interests is manifestly not present.  See Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 153. 
See also D Eisenhut, ‘The Special Security Exemption of Article 296 TEC’ (n 117) 577-585 who states that the 
Court has “made it clear that the proportionality test should apply when examining national measures on the basis 
of Article 296 EC.” The conferment of a “wide discretion” was later confirmed by the CFI in Case T-26/01 Fiocchi 
Munizioni SpA v Commission [2003] E.C.R. I-11859 para 58 where it was stated: “Article 296(1)(b) EC confers on 
the Member States a particularly wide discretion in assessing the needs receiving such protection.” Case T-26/01 
Fiocchi is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2 below 
141 For a detailed discussion of the arguments against the application of a proportionality test, see Georgopoulos, 
‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European Union’ (n 75) 123-133 
142 A strict proportionality test would require three levels of scrutiny. Applied to Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, this would 
require that the measure must be: (1) suitable for addressing the essential security interest and must not be relied 
upon in bad faith (on which the Member State bears the burden of proof); (2) necessary in the sense that there is 
not any other less restrictive measure with regard to the internal market which could address the aim (on which 
the Member State also bears the burden of proof) and (3) the security interest should be balanced with the 
interest of the internal market. See Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for 
Action within the European Union’ (n 75) 124 
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The Court first examined whether the Spanish law referred to the protection of 
essential interests of security but does not proceed to an evaluation of these 
interests, rather confining assessment to the evidence adduced by the Member 
State.144 Further, the Court identified that, even if it was accepted that the law 
genuinely addressed essential security interests, the imposition of tax would not 
undermine this objective given that the largest percentage of the income would in fact 
go to the State.145 Accordingly, the exemption was unsuitable beyond any reasonable 
doubt.146 In addition, the Court used a negative syllogism in its conclusion that Article 
296(1)(b) TEC was not able to justify the Spanish law.147 In particular, it provided that 
Spain had not established that the “abolition of the exemption from VAT” constitutes 
a measure which could undermine the protection of essential security interests, thus 
reinforcing the negative character of the Court’s scrutiny.148 
 
More recently, it has been argued that the ECJ simply applies a test based on the 
substantive wording of Article 346 TFEU.149  
                                                                                                                                                        
143 See Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European 
Union’ (n 75) 129 and A Georgopoulos, ‘Defence Procurement and EU Law’ (2005) 30(4) European Law Review, 
559-572, 569 et seq. On this view, the Court did not apply step (2) or (3) of the proportionality test identified above 
at (n 142). Interestingly, Arrowsmith The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 242, point 4.61 has 
referred to Trybus’ interpretation as a “version” of the “manifest unsuitability” test, although Georgopoulos has 
attempted to qualitatively distinguish his version from the test proposed by Trybus 
144 See Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European 
Union’ (n 75) 129  
145 ibid. Here the Court placed specific reliance at para 23 on the reasoning of AG Saggio in his Opinion at para 
12 
146 Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European Union’ 
(n 75) 
147 ibid 
148 ibid 
149 See N Pourbaix, ‘The Future scope of Application of Article 346 TFEU’ (2011) 1 PPLR 1. According to 
Pourbaix, this test comprises a four-stage examination. The first stage considers whether there are security 
interests which the Member State is seeking to protect. The Member State will enjoy a wide “discretion” in 
deciding what interests are to be protected and the ECJ will not interfere in these choices. The second question 
follows the wording of Article 346 TFEU itself, which states that these security interests must be essential. 
According to this view, existing case law is said to support the proposition that Member States will have a wide 
discretion in deciding what is essential to their security. The third step is to determine whether there is a link 
between the protection of these essential security interests and the procurement in question. The final step is 
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Thus, the issue of the form and standard of review has not been conclusively 
resolved. This issue is compounded by the fact that there are anomalous cases in 
which the ECJ has limited its scrutiny to verifying whether security interests are 
invoked without questioning the security requirements in issue or the suitability and 
necessity of the exclusion.150 As the remainder of this Section will demonstrate, it is 
at least clear that Commission v. Spain did not fundamentally alter Member State 
practices.  
 
4.2. Munitions Intended for Export 
 
In 2003, the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) (now General Court of the EU) gave its 
ruling in Fiocchi Munizioni SpA v. Commission. 151  In this case, Spain granted 
subsidies to a Spanish arms manufacturer. Fiocchi, an Italian arms manufacturer, 
requested a determination by the Commission of the subsidies’ compatibility with 
Articles 87,152 88153 and 296 TEC. Spanish authorities had informed the Commission 
that the manufacturer was a public undertaking devoted entirely to arms, munitions 
and tank manufacture such that its activities were covered by Article 296(1) TEC.154 
                                                                                                                                                        
whether the non-application of the Directive is necessary for the protection of those interests. Again, the level of 
scrutiny applied to the necessity of the exclusion is likely to be limited. ibid, 8 
150 See Case C-252/01 Commission v. Belgium [2003] ECR I-11859 
151 Case T-26/01 Fiocchi Munizioni SpA v Commission [2003] E.C.R. I-11859 
152 Article 87(1) provided: “Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, 
be incompatible with the common market.” 
153 Article 88(1) provided: “The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant 
review all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures required 
by the progressive development or by the functioning of the common market.” 
154 Spain further argued at para 7 that its activities were recognized by Spanish law as being in the interest of 
Spain’s national defence, that its factories were the property of the Spanish Ministry of Defence in accordance 
with Spanish law relating to the reorganization of the arms industry and that its production was intended 
principally to meet its army’s requirements. Spain also claimed that the company’s activities were subject to 
Spanish law on state secrets 
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Having not defined its position after 15 months, Fiocchi brought an action against the 
Commission for failure to act.155   
 
After clarifying a number of procedural points in relation to Article 346(1)(b) TFEU,156 
the CFI found that the Commission had not failed to act.157 Whilst Fiocchi is a case 
decided on procedural grounds and did not necessitate review of whether Spain’s 
reliance on Article 346 TFEU was justified, Fiocchi’s submissions merit specific 
consideration. Before doing so, it is important to observe that the CFI emphasized 
that Article 346(1)(b) TFEU confers on the Member States a “particularly wide 
discretion in assessing the needs receiving such protection”.158 
 
With regard to the substance of Fiocchi’s submissions, Fiocchi disputed the 
specifically military nature of the products, arguing that these were intended for both 
military and civilian purposes.159 Fiocchi contended that in order to be regarded as 
“specifically military” within the meaning of Article 296, the products must be intended 
                                                 
155  Article 232(1) TEC provided: “Should the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission, in 
infringement of this Treaty, fail to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may bring 
an action before the Court of Justice to have the infringement established.” 
156 The procedural clarifications were as follows. First, where a Member State considers it necessary to invoke 
Article 296(1)(b) TEC, it does not have to notify the Commission in advance as the rules on competition do not 
apply (para 59). Second, the Court emphasized that two specific remedies are prescribed by the Treaty in relation 
to measures adopted by Member States on the basis of Article 296(1)(b) TEC: bilateral examinations according to 
Article 298 subparagraph 1 TEC and court proceedings according to Article 298 subparagraph 2 TEC (paras 62 
and 63). Within the context of bilateral examinations, it is within the Commission’s discretion to decide whether 
the invocation by the Member State concerned is prima facie credible (para 63). Contrary to the situation in the 
context of Article 88 TEC, the Commission was under no obligation to adopt a decision concerning the measure 
at issue. Moreover, it has no power to address a final decision or directive to the Member State concerned (para 
74) 
157 At para 78, the Court found that that the Commission had: (i) clearly informed Fiocchi of its decision to open 
the special procedure for bilateral examination with the Spanish authorities under Article 298(1) TEC; (ii) informed 
Fiocchi of the state of progress of the examination as well as the Commission’s right to bring the matter before the 
Court in a case of allegedly improper use by Spain; (iii) the Commission had provided sufficient information on the 
legal remedies reserved to the Commission in cases where, considering that it was prima facie plausible to invoke 
Article 296(1)(b) TEC, the Commission decides not to resort to the ordinary rules for monitoring state aid; and (iv) 
finally the Commission had clearly indicated that in view of the procedure under Article 298, it had no intention of 
informing Fiochhi of its final position 
158 See Fiocchi, para 58. The reference to “needs receiving protection” is, however, equivocal  
159 Fiocchi, paras 52 and 53 
  46 
solely for the domestic market.160 Further, this was demonstrated by the condition 
“protection of the essential interests of national security”. 161  The Spanish 
manufacturer had successfully participated in invitations to tender for the supply of 
armaments in other Member States (including for the supply of NATO material) 
because it had been strengthened by the subsidies.162 Thus, the subsidies materially 
improved its ability to produce and market munitions intended for export, which had 
the effect of distorting competition in the context of EU invitations to tender for the 
supply of munitions. Consequently, Fiocchi argued that there was no “military use for 
national defence covered by the derogation”.163  
 
According to one view, it is possible, on the basis of the general rule that exemptions 
have to be narrowly interpreted, that Member States are only able to argue that it is 
necessary to protect essential security interests where production and trade of 
defence material is intended for its own armed forces.164 However, it has also been 
argued that it is possible for the protection of essential security interests to extend to 
the export of defence material (rather than to meet domestic needs) on the basis that 
there is no such limitation expressed in the wording of Article 346 TFEU itself and the 
CFI did not expressly preclude such a possibility.165 It has been suggested that a 
Member State might consider a national defence industrial capability to be essential 
for its national security interests and which might not be economically viable if 
dependent solely on the producing Member State’s own demand or if the Member 
                                                 
160 ibid 
161 ibid  
162 ibid para 52 and para 88 
163 ibid para 88  
164 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 159 
165 ibid  
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State relies excessively on imports from other Member States or third countries.166 
However, it is open to question the extent to which this argument prioritises economic 
considerations above security considerations. Further, in light of the adoption of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, an economic reason may no longer be sufficient, in 
and of itself, to justify recourse to Article 346 TFEU, although it is unclear whether 
this position presumes that a discrete separation of economic and security 
considerations is possible and/or necessary.  
 
It it has also been suggested that it may be possible to justify State aid where the 
sale of equipment serves “strategic objectives”, although it has been acknowledged 
that this would be a difficult argument to sustain.167 Again, in light of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, a very precise reason would be required. 
 
Nevertheless, Fiocchi provokes consideration of the extent to which, if at all, Article 
346 TFEU is able to admit the relevance of ‘external’ factors (howsoever defined), 
including reference to third countries, to a determination of the necessity of Member 
State action in protection of essential security interests.168 As will be discussed in 
Section 4.5 below, Member States have sought a broader interpretation of the 
interests implicated by Article 346 TFEU and which raises questions relevant to a 
transatlantic defence procurement analysis. 
 
                                                 
166 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 160. As will be discussed this argument has 
also been considered by AG Kokott in Case C-615/10 Insinooritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat at para 66, 
discussed at Section 4.5 below 
167 See EDA (Commissioned Study), ‘Level Playing Field for European Defence Industries: The Role of 
Ownership and Public Aid Practices’ (16 March 2009) 29-30, para 2.6.1.1 
<http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Level_Playing_Field_Study.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013. 
168 This aspect will be examined in more detail in the discussion of the enforcement cases and Communication 
on Article 346 TFEU in Sections 4.5 and 5 below 
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4.3.  Agusta Helicopters 
 
In 2009, the ECJ gave two rulings in Commission v. Italy I and II.169 Italy directly 
awarded helicopter contracts for the military and civilian corps to Agusta SpA (an 
Italian company). In Article 226 TEC proceedings, the Commission argued that, in 
accordance with the then Supplies Directive,170 the contracts should have been 
subject to an open171 or restricted172 procedure. Italy did not contest that it had, for a 
long time, awarded such contracts to Agusta using the negotiated procedure173 but 
argued that the helicopters intended for the military corps were covered by Article 
296(1)(b) TEC and Article 3174 of the Supplies Directive because they were “dual-
use” items. Further, the confidential nature of the information obtained by Agusta for 
production purposes justified the negotiated procedure pursuant to Article 2(1)(b) of 
the Supplies Directive, a provision permitting exclusion inter alia where contracts are 
                                                 
169 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173 and Case C-157/06 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-
7313. Commission v. Italy II is substantially identical except that it concerned a Ministerial Decree authorizing 
derogation from EU public procurement rules (Decree No.558/A/04/RR/EC of the Minister for the Interior of 11 
July 2003). In contrast, Commission v. Italy I, simply concerned a longstanding and consistent practice of direct 
awards. For a useful case summary, see D McGowan, ‘A note on Commission v. Italy (C-157/06): Helicopters 
(Part II)’ (2009) 2 PPLR 59. For general commentary on these cases, see B Heuninckx, ‘Case Comment, A note 
on Case Commission v. Italy (C-337/05) (Augusta Helicopters case) (2008)’ 5 PPLR 187; M Trybus, ‘Case C-
337/05, Commission v. Italy (Agusta and Agusta Bell Helicopters), judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8 
April 2008, not yet reported; and Case C-157/06, Commission v. Italy, judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) 
of 2 October 2008, not yet reported’ (2009) CML Rev 973  
170 See the former Supplies Directive (n 107) 
171 For the purposes of Article 1(d) Supplies Directive, an open procedure was a national procedure whereby all 
interested suppliers may submit tenders. For commentary on the open procedure, see C H Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (Edward Elgar: 2007) 229-230 
172 For the purposes of Article 1(e) Supplies Directive, a restricted procedure was a procedure whereby only 
those suppliers invited by the contracting authorities may submit tenders. For commentary on the open 
procedure, see CH Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 231-236 
173 The negotiated procedure without prior call for tender is the least competitive procedure provided for in EU 
public procurement law. It allows negotiating a contract with a single company, provided the requirements of one 
of the clearly listed situations allowing the use of this procedure are met and the other rules of the relevant 
Directive are followed. For commentary on the negotiated procedure without publication, see CH Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (n 171) 250-53. The corresponding provision of the Defence Procurement Directive permitting 
use of the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice is contained in Article 28 
174 Article 3 Supplies Directive provided that: “[w]ithout prejudice to Articles 2, 4 and 5(1), this Directive shall 
apply to all products to which Article 1(a) relates, including those covered by contracts awarded by contracting 
authorities in the field of defence, except for the products to which Article [296](1)(b) [EC] applies.” 
  49 
declared secret.175 In addition, Italy argued that due to the technical specificity of the 
helicopters and nature of the relevant supplies, Italy could rely on Article 6(3)(c)176 
and (e)177 of the Supplies Directive, provisions which are not exclusions but which 
permit use of the negotiated procedure without publication on defined grounds. It 
appears that Italy employed these arguments not to legitimate the use of the 
negotiated procedure within the regime of the Directive, but to justify direct awards 
outside that regime.178 Finally, Italy argued that its relations with Agusta were “in-
house”, thereby precluding the Directive’s application.179  
 
The Court reaffirmed its earlier Commission v. Spain reasoning regarding use of 
security exclusions in clearly defined cases only and which must be subject to strict 
interpretation.180 With regard to the “dual-use” classification of the helicopters, the 
Court held that in accordance with the clear wording of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, the 
products must be intended for “specifically military purposes” and that where this use 
                                                 
175 Article 2(1)(b) Supplies Directive provided that the Directive did not apply to: “[…] supply contracts which are 
declared secret or the execution of which must be accompanied by special security measures in accordance with 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions in force in the Member States concerned or when the protection 
of the basic interests of the Member State’s security so requires.” This exception is now contained in Article 14 
Public Sector Directive. This exception was successfully relied on in Case C-252/01 Commission v. Belgium 
[2003] ECR I-11859 (n 150) 
176  Art. 6(3)(c) provided that the contracting authorities may award their supply contracts by negotiated 
procedure without prior publication of a tender notice when: “ […] for technical or artistic reasons, or for reasons 
connected with protection of exclusive rights, the products supplied may be manufactured or delivered only by a 
particular supplier […]” 
177  Art. 6(3)(e) provided that the contracting authorities may award their supply contracts by negotiated 
procedure without prior publication of a tender notice: “[…] for additional deliver[ies] by the original supplier which 
are intended either as a partial replacement of normal supplies or installations or as the extension of existing 
supplies or installations where a change of supplier would oblige the contracting authority to acquire material 
having different technical characteristics which would result in incompatibility or disproportionate technical 
difficulties in operation and maintenance. The length of such contracts as well as that of recurrent contracts may, 
as a general rule, not exceed three years." 
178 See Trybus, ‘Commission v Italy I and II’ (n 169), 975  
179
 In accordance with Case C-107/98 Teckal Srl v Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale 
(AGAC) di Reggio Emilia [1999] ECR I-8121, para 50. On the ECJ’s finding rejecting the applicability of the “in-
house” exemption on the basis of the fact that Agusta was in part open to private capital, see paras 36-41 and 
Heuninckx, ‘Case Comment, A note on Case Commission v. Italy’ (n 169) 188 
180 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 169) paras 43-44 
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is “hardly certain”, the purchase must necessarily comply with the Directives.181 It 
was uncontested that the helicopters were for civilian use and possibly for military 
use.182 Therefore, their military use was “hardly certain”.183 It has been argued that 
the “hardly certain” criterion merely confirms the strict reading of Article 346(2) 
TFEU.184 
 
With regard to the protection of confidential information, the Court reasoned that Italy 
had not stated precisely why confidentiality would be less well guaranteed were 
production entrusted to other EU companies. 185  The Court determined that a 
confidentiality obligation in no way prevented use of competitive tendering. 186 
Therefore, recourse to Article 2(1)(b) was considered to be disproportionate.187 It has 
been argued that this reasoning is convincing on grounds that, generally, 
confidentiality can be accommodated in negotiated procedures with prior publication 
and tenderers are normally able to adhere to strict confidentiality regimes.188  
 
Finally, with regard to Italy’s arguments concerning technical specificity, the Court 
ruled that the negotiated procedure may only be applied in cases exhaustively 
defined in Article 6(2) and (3) of the Supplies Directive.189 Further, that derogations 
from the rules on public contracts must be strictly interpreted.190 Member States 
                                                 
181 ibid para 47  
182 ibid para 48 
183 ibid para 49  
184 See Trybus, ‘Commission v Italy I and II’ (n 169) 986-988 
185 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 169) para 51 
186 ibid, para 52 
187 ibid para 53  
188 Trybus, ‘Commission v Italy I and II’ (n 169) 989  
189 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 169) para 56 
190 ibid, para 57; Case C-57/94 Commission v. Italy [1995] ECR 1-1249, para 23; Case C-3 18/94 Commission v. 
Germany [1996] ECR 1-1949, para 13; and Case C-3 94/02 Commission v. Greece [2005] ECR 1-4713, para 33 
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cannot use the negotiated procedure in cases not provided for by the Directive or add 
new conditions to existent cases which make that procedure easier to use.191 In 
addition, Member States bear the burden of proving exceptional circumstances.192 
Italy had not demonstrated why only helicopters produced by Agusta would have the 
requisite technical specificities,193 nor how a change of supplier would have resulted 
in incompatibility or disproportionate technical difficulties. 194  Italy had merely 
identified the advantages of interoperability.195 
 
It has been suggested that Commission v. Italy demonstrates that both exclusions 
and provisions restricting competition within the regime of a Directive must be 
subjected to the same level of scrutiny, a logic justified by the fact that the only 
material distinction between the two provisions is that one mechanism operates 
inside the Directives, whereas the other takes the contract outside the regime.196 On 
this view, Agusta may therefore provide a potential insight into how rigorous the 
Court’s scrutiny will be in relation to the exclusions and provisions on the use of 
negotiated procedure without publication under the Defence Procurement 
Directive.197 
 
 
                                                 
191 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 169) ibid, citing Case C-84/03 Commission v. Spain [2005] ECR I-139, 
para 48 
192 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 169) ibid, para 58 citing Case 199/85 Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR 
1039, para. 14 and Case C-394/02 Commission v. Greece [2005] ECR I-4713, para. 33 
193 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy (n 180) 
194 ibid 
195 It has been argued that this aspect of the ruling is significant in light of the fact that the military often procures 
its most expensive defence equipment in tranches, through separate contracts over a number of years. See 
Heuninckx ‘Case Comment, A note on Case Commission v. Italy’ (n 169) 192 
196 Trybus, ‘Commission v Italy I and II’ (n 169) 988-989 
197 For a discussion of the circumstances permitting use of the negotiated procedure without publication under 
the Defence Procurement Directive in the context of a comparison of limitations placed on competition under U.S. 
law, see Chapter 10  
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4.4. Customs Exemptions 
 
More recently, the ECJ issued several judgments concerning failures by Italy,198 
Finland,199 Greece,200 Germany,201 Sweden202 and Portugal203 to pay customs duties 
on imports of military (and, in the case of Sweden, also dual-use) material in 
accordance with EU customs legislation.204 All Member States sought to rely on 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. In response, the Commission issued Article 226 TEC 
proceedings. Greece and Germany raised an objection of inadmissibility on the 
ground that the Commission was obliged, and failed, to use the Article 348 TFEU 
procedure.205 The ECJ rejected this submission on the ground that the Commission 
had not, in fact, alleged the improper use of Article 346 TFEU but rather sought 
simply to enforce payment.206   
 
Before examining the ECJ’s judgments, it is instructive to outline the submissions of 
the Member States. These may be grouped as follows. Firstly, Member States simply 
argued, with varying degrees of specificity, that payment of import duties rendered 
                                                 
198 Case C-239/06 Commission v. Italy [2009] ECR I-11913 
199 Case C-284/05 Commission v. Finland [2009] ECR I-11705 
200 Case C-409/05 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECR I-11859 
201 Case C-372/05 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I—11801 
202 Case C‑294/05 Commission v Sweden [2009] ECR I‑11777  
203 Case C-38/06 Commission v. Portugal [2010] ECR I‑1569 
204 See Articles 2, 9, 10 and 11, Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1552/89 of 29 May 1989, implementing 
Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of the Communities’ own resources [1989] OJ L 155/1 (as 
amended) 
205 Case C—372/05 Commission v. Germany (n 201), para 28; Case C-409/05, Commission v. Greece (n200), 
para 23 
206 See Case C—372/05 Commission v. Germany, paras. 29 and 30 and Case C-409/05, Commission v. 
Greece, para 25  
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equipment acquisition more expensive, thus reducing the operational capacity of 
armed forces.207  
 
Secondly, Member States raised arguments in relation to confidentiality. Of particular 
relevance, certain Member States argued that “confidentiality obligations” owed to 
third parties must be respected. For instance, Sweden argued that because of its 
military neutrality, national defence has a strategic role within its security policy and 
that because of its “surface area” Sweden is dependent on cooperation at the 
international level if it is to meet its national security and defence objectives.208 
Therefore, its confidentiality obligations precluded it from communicating information 
about the imported goods and that any failure to honour them would be likely to 
jeopardize the pursuit of cooperation and trading relations in the military field with 
certain third countries.209 Finland also argued that in order to maintain security of 
supply of high-technology defence material, it had to adhere very strictly to 
confidentiality agreements entered into with vendor States before it became a 
Member State.210  
 
Thirdly, certain Member States also placed additional emphasis on their individual 
characteristics. Finland argued that the need to rely on Article 346 TFEU when 
military equipment is imported depends principally on the size of Member State’s 
                                                 
207 Case C‑294/ 05 Commission v. Sweden, para 36; Case C—372/05 Commission v. Germany, para 56; Case 
C-409/05 Commission v. Greece, para 45 
208 Case C‑294/ 05 Commission v. Sweden, para 37 
209 ibid. By contrast, the Commission argued that Sweden had not established in what respect the commitments 
it entered into under international agreements, on the one hand, and its obligations with regard to own resources, 
on the other, were incompatible. Further, that Sweden had not established how Sweden’s international 
cooperation projects and essential interests of its security and defence policy were seriously jeopardised by those 
obligations. See Case C‑294/ 05 Commission v. Sweden, para 31  
210 Case C-284/05 Commission v. Finland, para 40  
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military industry, the nature of the imported defence material and the extent to which 
that Member State is reliant on imports.211  
 
With regard to the ECJ’s judgments, prior to publication, it had been suggested that 
two main options were available to the ECJ. The first option, described as ‘the status 
quo option’, was to consider these cases as merely concerning the EU’s own 
resources whilst assigning a minor role to Article 346 TFEU arguments.212 The 
second option would be to consider these as major cases pertaining to the 
interpretation of Article 346 TFEU in which the ECJ would define the limits of the 
Member States’ competences.213 The first option accurately summarises the course 
taken. In light of the fact that Commission v. Spain had similarly concerned VAT 
exemptions, the ECJ reiterated that a Member State could not plead the resulting 
increased cost of military material in order to avoid payment.214  The ECJ also 
reinforced that the EU customs procedure was sufficiently capable of protecting 
confidentiality and safeguarding security interests.215  
 
In light of the fact that the cases merely concerned non-payment of customs duties, 
the ECJ did not address the question of whether any of the Member States’ 
submissions could, in a compelling case, provide legitimate recourse to Article 346 
TFEU. Building on the observations in relation to Fiocchi above, it is therefore 
unclear to what extent it may be possible for Member States to rely on factors 
                                                 
211 Case C-284/05 Commission v. Finland, para 37 
212 Aalto, ‘Interpretations of Article 296’ (n 81) 113 
213 ibid 
214 Commission v. Germany, para 73; Commission v. Finland, para. 50 ; Commission v. Sweden, para 48; 
Commission v. Greece, para 55; Commission v. Portugal, para 67 
215 Commission v. Sweden, para 49; Commission v. Finland, para 55; Commission v. Greece, para 56; 
Commission v. Germany, para 74, Commission v. Portugal, para 68 
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pertaining to third countries when determining the basis for derogation under Article 
346 TFEU.  
 
4.5.  Finnish Turntables 
 
The latest ruling of the CJEU is Insinööritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat.216 In 
this case, the Finnish Defence Forces technical Research Centre issued a call for 
tenders for the supply of tiltable turntable equipment for the purposes of simulating 
combat situations, without prior publication and used a form of negotiated procedure 
which did not comply with the Public Sector Directive. One of the unsuccessful 
contractors challenged the award on this basis. The Finnish Court of First Instance 
dismissed the challenge on grounds that Article 346 TFEU could be relied on 
because the equipment was primarily for military purposes and that this was the 
contracting authority’s intended use. 217  The unsuccessful contractor appealed 
arguing inter alia that Article 346 TFEU did not apply because the turntable was a 
technical innovation from the civilian sector.218 
 
Reiterating its earlier case law, the Court first confirmed that Article 296(1)(b) cannot 
be read so as to confer a power to depart from the EC Treaty based on no more than 
reliance on those interests.219 Secondly, the Court determined that it is for the 
referring court to determine whether a product may be classified in one or other 
                                                 
216 Case C-615/10 Insinooritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber), 
not yet reported, June 7, 2012. For a useful case summary, see S Smith, ‘Defence Purchasing of Material which 
Has Both Military and Civilian Applications – Tiltable Turntables in Finland – Case C-615/10’ (2012) 5 PPLR 245 
217 Case C-615/10 Insinooritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat, para 16 
218 ibid para19 
219 ibid para 35 
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categories featuring in the 1958 list.220 Thirdly, the Court cited Commission v. Italy 
(Agusta Helicopters) as authority for the proposition that a contracting authority 
cannot invoke Article 296(1)(b) TEC when material is certainly for civilian use and 
possibly for military use.221 Importantly, however, unlike in Commission v. Italy, the 
equipment was purchased for purely military purposes. The Court then stated that 
even if a product with technical applications for civilian use comes within one of the 
categories of the 1958 list, it can only be considered to be intended for “specifically 
military purposes” if it “results from the intrinsic characteristics of a piece of 
equipment specially designed, developed or modified significantly for those 
purposes”.222 The Court further emphasized that the words “military”, “insofar as they 
are of a military nature” and “exclusively designed” in the 1958 list indicate that the 
products must have, in objective terms, a specifically military nature.223 
 
It should be observed that the Court provides a ruling that pre-empts the adoption of 
the Defence Procurement Directive by emphasizing Recital 10 in which the EU 
legislature identifies that the term “military equipment” as used in the Directive should 
cover products which, although initially designed for civilian use, are later adapted to 
military purposes to be used as arms, munitions and war material.224 
 
On the basis of this guidance, the Court left it to the referring court to determine 
whether the equipment met the above criteria,225 as well as whether the Member 
State can show that it is necessary to have recourse to Article 296(1)(b) TEC and 
                                                 
220 ibid para 37 
221 ibid paras 38-39, citing at 39 Case C-337/05 Commission v. Italy [2008] ECR I-2173, paras 48 and 49 
222 ibid para 40 citing point 48 of the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott  
223 ibid para 41  
224 ibid para 42  
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whether the need to protect essential interests could not have been addressed within 
a competitive tendering procedure.226 
 
Again, whilst the specific relevance of this case to a transatlantic defence 
procurement analysis may not be immediately apparent, AG Kokott made several 
statements relevant to “non-member countries”. Her observations related to the 
possibility that Finland might seek to argue that derogation was necessary to ensure 
confidentiality in relation to certain military information. This aspect was not expressly 
considered by the CJEU. Whilst AG Kokott identified that any such requirement does 
not, in itself, prevent the use of a competitive tendering procedure,227 she also stated 
that certain derogations from the EU procurement procedures may nevertheless be 
justified by the fact that a Member State does not wish simply to disclose security-
related information to “foreign undertakings or undertakings controlled by foreign 
nationals, in particular undertakings or persons from non-member countries”. 228 
Further, that a Member state can also legitimately ensure that it does not “become 
dependent on non-member countries or on undertakings from non-member countries 
for its arms supplies” and that both points were “rightly highlighted” by an observing 
Member State.229  
 
                                                 
226 ibid para 46 citing Commission v Finland, para. 49 and Commision v Italy, para.53. Consistent with the 
generality of Member State practice in this regard, Finland had not actually specified explicitly which essential 
security interest was connected with the procurement of the turntable equipment, nor why the non-application of 
the Public Sector Directive was necessary in the specific case. The order of reference of the referring court stated 
that the Defence Forces had failed to specify these determinations as recommended by the European 
Commission. See Opinion of AG Kokott, para 29 and judgment, paras 25-32 
227 Opinion of AG Kokott, para 64 citing at fn43 Case C-337/05 Commission v. Italy in particular para 52 and 
Case C-157/06 Commission v Italy, para.30. See also para 64, fn44 
228 ibid, para 77 
229 ibid, citing the Czech Government. The submissions of the Czech Government are not rehearsed in the 
Opinion 
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It should be observed that AG Kokott does not, in fact, cite any substantial authority 
for, or elaborate on, the references to “certain derogations” or justifications in support 
of their use. Further, AG Kokott does not explain the references to “foreign 
undertakings” and “foreign nationals” nor the issue of “dependence” on “non-member 
countries”.  
 
Again, this reinforces earlier observations in this Chapter concerning the extent to 
which factors pertaining to third countries may or may not be relevant to a Member 
State’s individual assessment of Article 346 TFEU and which have not been 
examined in any detail. As will be discussed below, these observations are 
particularly pertinent in light of the fact that the Commission and European legal 
commentary has sought to prioritise the importance of shared European security 
interests in the assessment of Article 346 TFEU. It is this issue to which this Chapter 
now turns.  
 
5. Interpretative Communication  
 
Whilst the European Parliament had regularly argued for the deletion of Article 346 
TFEU, the most decisive actor has been the Commission. 230  In a 2003 
Communication, the Commission identified defence procurement as an area for 
action towards the establishment of a European Defence Equipment Market. 231 This 
                                                 
230 See for instance, Resolution A3-0260/92 on the Community’s role in the supervision of arms exports and the 
armaments industry [1992] OJ C/284/138 at 142 and Resolution on the need for European controls on the export 
or transfer of arms [1995] OJ C/43/89, 90  
231 Commission, ‘European Defence – industrial and market issues. Towards an EU defence Equipment Policy’ 
(Communication) COM (2003) 113 final. For an analysis, see A Georgopoulos, ‘Indsutrial and Market Issues in 
European Defence: the Commission Communication of 2003 on Harmonisation and Liberalisation of Defence 
Markets’ (2003) 12 PPLR 82  
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precipitated a 2004 Green Paper, 232  and a public consultation on options for 
improving transparency and openness. 233  The Commission concluded that the 
existing legislative framework did not function properly and that appropriate initiatives 
were required. This culminated in the adoption of the Defence Directives. In the 
interim, in 2006, the Commission adopted an Interpretative Communication on the 
application of Article 296 TEC (“Communication”).234 In 2007, the EU launched its 
“defence package”.235  
 
As this Section will indicate, the Communication contains certain references which 
are relevant to a transatlantic defence procurement analysis. Before examining the 
Communication, it should be observed that this document is not legally binding and 
so cannot give an interpretation of Member States’ essential security interests nor 
determine ex ante the contracts to which Article 346 TFEU applies.236 Further, it does 
not deal with third country arms trade to which it refers as being “governed by WTO 
rules, in particular, the GPA”.237  
  
 
 
                                                 
232 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Defence Procurement COM’ (2004) 608 final. For an analysis, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Green Paper on Defence Procurement’ (2005) 14(2) PPLR 34 
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future Commission initiatives’ (Communication) COM(2005) 626. For an analysis, see A Georgopoulos, 
‘Commission’s Communication on the Results of the Consultation Process on European Defence Procurement’ 
(2006) 4 PPLR 119  
234 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (Communication) COM (2006) 779 final. For a useful analysis of the Communication, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC in the field 
of defence procurement’ (2007) 3 PPLR, 43 
235 Commission, ‘A Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence Industry’ (n 19). For a 
useful overview of this package, summarizing developments largely covered in this Chapter, see See P 
Koutrakos, ‘Editorial: The Commission’s “Defence Package”’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 1 
236 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (n 234) 3 
237 ibid 
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5.1. Procurements of the Highest Importance 
 
The Communication acknowledges that Member States retain responsibility to define 
their security interests but also states that Article 346 TFEU is limited to cases where 
Member States have “no other choice than to protect their security interests 
nationally”. 238  Importantly, the Communication emphasises that protection of 
essential security interests is the only objective capable of justifying recourse to the 
derogation.239 This makes it clear that the specific military nature of the equipment is 
not, by itself, sufficient.240 The Communication specifies that the word “essential” 
limits exemptions to procurements of the “highest importance” for Member States’ 
military capabilities.241 This also means that other interests, “in particular”, industrial 
and economic interests, although connected with the production of, and trade in, 
defence material cannot justify, by themselves, use of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.242 
However, it has been observed that the Commission leaves unresolved the issue of 
what will happen if the measures are linked both with essential security interests and 
also with other economic and industrial interests, for example direct and indirect 
military offsets. 243 It has been argued that such industrial or economic interests 
                                                 
238 ibid 5  
239 ibid 7 
240 ibid 
241 ibid 
242 Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC in the 
field of defence procurement’ (n 234) 47-48 
243 For a discussion of so-called “offsets”, see Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, Section 3. It is by no means clear that 
a discrete separation between security and other interests can be made. For instance, Georgopoulos, ‘The 
Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC in the field of defence 
procurement’ (n 234) 48 states: “Let us take for example the decision of a national MoD to allocate directly a 
contract for the construction of submarines to a national champion in order to maintain national capabilities 
(aiming at the independence or limited dependence from foreign sources of supply). This measure is linked with 
both security concerns (domestic capability in a given field, security of supply) and has also industrial 
consequences (maintenance of post of employment), etc. This duality of concerns is self-evident. It should be 
remembered that this immediate link between capabilities and security considerations is advocated at the EU 
level by the European Commission itself and other actors with regard to the importance of maintaining a healthy 
and vibrant European Defence Industrial and Technological Base […] Ultimately the issue of whether specific 
cases are linked more with industrial concerns rather than security concerns is a matter of judgment.”  
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cannot justify recourse to Article 346 TFEU even if they are connected with the 
production of, and trade in, arms, munitions and war material.244 
 
5.2. Security Interests from a European Perspective 
 
Another interesting aspect is the Communication’s statement that security interests 
should be considered from a “European perspective.” 245  The Communication 
acknowledges that whilst security interests may vary, for example, for geographical 
or historical reasons, European integration has led to an “ever-growing convergence 
of national interests”.246 The Commission cites the CFSP and ESDP in this regard.247 
It continues that Member States share the objective of developing a European 
defence equipment market (“EDEM”) and European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (“EDTIB”), which should be taken into account when assessing 
whether essential security interests would be undermined.248   
 
However, the policy bias and function of the Communication should not be 
overlooked in its overt promotion of a European conception of security. Academic 
commentators have similarly adverted to this possibility. For instance, prior to the 
adoption of the Communication, EU legal commentary had argued that the 
emergence of a common European defence identity might shift the emphasis away 
from the national security interests of the individual Member States to a common 
concept of security and that the result could be that the mere possibility of national 
                                                 
244 Koutrakos, European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (n 56) 253 
245 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (n 234) 7 
246 ibid 
247 ibid  
248 ibid 
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security implications would not be sufficient to invoke the exemption. 249  More 
recently, it has been argued that there should be a “new” notion of “essential security 
interest” predicated on the ostensible emergence of the “Europeanization” 250  of 
national security interests.251 More generally, it has been argued that whilst the 
definition of essential security interests should be left to a Member State’s discretion, 
it is becoming increasingly less possible to look at the security of a State in isolation 
due, in particular, to the fact that State security is closely linked to the security of the 
international community at large, especially within the EU since the creation of the 
CFSP and ESDP.252  
 
Notwithstanding the argument of, or for, convergence, it is important to observe that 
there has never been a comprehensive examination of the conceptual underpinnings 
of the supposedly “old” notion of essential security interests, an issue exposed in 
Section 2.4 of this thesis. Further, the idea of a “europeanized” conception of security 
has not been specifically endorsed by the ECJ and which is difficult to empirically 
validate. This might also appear to be inconsistent with judicial statements which 
specifically emphasise the fact that a Member State exercises a “unilateral” decision 
                                                 
249 M Trybus, ‘Case Comment: ‘On the Application of the EC Treaty to Armaments’ (2000) 25(6) EL Rev 663, 
667 
250 For a useful discussion of this phenomenon in the political science literature, see generally, K Featherstone 
and C M Radaeilli (eds) The Politics of Europeanization (OUP, 2003). For a legal discussion of the phenomenon, 
see J Wouters, A Nollkaemper and E de Wet (ed) The Europeanisation of International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press 
2008) 4-6 
251 See Eisenhut, ‘The Special Security Exemption of Article 296 TEC’ (n 117) 577-585 
252 According to this view, the same approach should also be taken when seeking to exclude an economic 
operator under the Defence Procurement Directive on the grounds that it has been found, on the basis of any 
means of evidence including protected data sources, not to possess the reliability necessary to exclude risks to 
the security of one of the EU Member States concerned. See B Heuninckx, ‘The EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive: Trick or Treat?’ (2011) 20 PPLR 9, 18-19 citing Article 39(2)(e) and Recital 67. These 
provisions are examined in Chapter 5, Section 5  
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to take measures under Article 346 TFEU, a position established as early as Costa v 
Enel.253 
 
The above appears to prioritize an assessment of Article 346 TFEU which is focused 
exclusively on the interdependence of Member State security interests and which 
correspond to a convergent “European” interest. This underplays the equally valid 
independence of those interests as well as the interdependence of those same 
interests on third countries. Such interests might be served or realised outside the 
institutional framework of the EU e.g. through NATO,254 outside the EU and NATO, or 
bilaterally with third countries. Therefore, it is suggested that unsubstantiated notions 
of convergence risk illegitimately constraining the scope of Article 346 TFEU in a way 
that is not expressly mandated by the terms of the provision. 
 
Interestingly, prior to the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, it was 
argued that one of the disadvantages of extending the Public Sector Directive to 
expressly cover defence contracts was that the award of a contract to promote a 
strategic alliance especially with powerful States outside the EU, such as the U.S., 
Russia or China could not constitute a legitimate award sub-criteria or parameter for 
assessment under the “most economically advantageous tender” (“MEAT”) award 
criterion, in particular, because award criteria must be justified by the subject matter 
of the contract in question.255 This observation does not necessarily suggest that the 
                                                 
253 See A-G Kokott, Case C-615/10, Insinooritoimisto InsTiimi Oy v. Puolustusvoimat (n 216) para 24, citing at 
fn14 Case C/64 Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585 
254 Article 42(2) subparagraph 2 TEU provides: “[t]he policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the 
obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence 
policy established within that framework.” 
255 Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European Union’ 
(n 75) 100  
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promotion of a strategic alliance should constitute a legitimate sub-award criterion 
under a procurement procedure. No such provision is included in the Defence 
Procurement Directive. As will be discussed in the remaining Chapters of this Part, 
the Defence Procurement Directive also appears to require any justification under 
Article 346 TFEU to refer to the subject matter of the contract. Notwithstanding, this 
kind of insight is thought provoking in raising the issue as to whether it is possible to 
invoke Article 346 TFEU in consideration of matters pertaining to third countries. As 
will be discussed in this thesis, it is not impossible to conceive of such instances, 
although the legitimacy of which is open to debate. 
 
5.3. Enforcement and Alliance Commitments 
 
Finally, the Communication states that it is for the Member States to provide 
information at the Commission’s request and prove that an exemption is 
necessary.256 Importantly, as indicated above, in the absence of a pre-or post-
notification requirement, information is not required every time Article 346 TFEU is 
invoked.257  
 
In terms of evidence, the Communication specifies that “general references to 
geographical and political situations, history and Alliance commitments” are 
insufficient,258 but does not identify whether specific references might be sufficient 
                                                 
256 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (n 234) 8 
257 For a discussion of the absence of a pre-notification requirement in this regard, see Georgopoulos, ‘The 
Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC in the field of defence 
procurement’ (n 234) 50  
258 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of 
defence procurement’ (n 234) 9. It is observed that the Commission refers to “Alliance” commitments in capitals. It 
is unclear whether the Commission is referring expressly to NATO (to which such reference is often made), or 
whether other “alliances” are also covered by this reference. This is a curious and imprecise term. For a 
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and, if so, the type and/or specificity of information that might be deemed sufficient in 
this regard.259 This issue may be problematic.260 It is suggested that there may be a 
basis for arguing, in an exceptional case, that Article 346 TFEU could be invoked in 
order to exclude the award of a contract because to award the contract in 
accordance with EU law could compromise a particular alliance commitment (with 
another Member State(s) or third country(ies)), which is, in turn, essential to a 
Member State’s security. As indicated by the enforcement judgments, the ECJ has 
neither considered nor expressly rejected specific arguments relating to third 
countries. However, the possibility of raising arguments relating to non-European 
alliances may also be affected by the extent to which Europeanized conceptions of 
essential security interests are prioritised above non-European alliances in any 
justification posited. Much may also depend on the extent to which any consideration 
can be said to refer to the subject matter of the contract. 
 
It was initially suggested that the Communication would become significant, opening 
the floodgates to repeated disputes before the ECJ.261 However, as this Chapter has 
demonstrated, the effect of the Communication has, to date, been limited. Most 
importantly, the ECJ has not used the Communication as an explicit reference point 
in its judgments.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
discussion of references to “alliances” in the context of application of the Defence Procurement Directive, see 
Chapter 5, Section 7.2.2 
259 Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC in the 
field of defence procurement’ (n 234) 51 
260 For a contrary view, see Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application 
of Article 296 EC in the field of defence procurement’ (n 234) 51 who states that it sends a message to Member 
States that have taken the view that they have different security concerns from other Member States that they 
must articulate their particular security interests more clearly. He identifies, in particular, countries at the borders 
of the EU, for example, Spain, Greece and Poland. Further, that new EU Member States who have also joined 
NATO should not consider their NATO membership as a justification for exemption 
261 S N Ferraro, ‘The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?’ 
(2006-2007) 16 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 560, 595, fn269  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Whilst Article 346 TFEU has exercised a formative impact on the development of an 
EU defence market, through a restrictive judicial interpretation, the issuance of 
interpretative guidance and the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, the 
EU is primed to develop a competitive internal market for defence material. The EU, 
its Member States and the U.S. must work out the implications of, and adapt to, any 
change in regulatory dynamics. As the remaining Chapters of the thesis will 
demonstrate, this is complicated by a host of factors.  
 
Notwithstanding, European commentary has suggested that the likelihood of deleting 
Article 346 TFEU is still “close to zero” and that amendment would necessitate the 
complex task of revising the Treaties.262  
 
A more penetrating analysis has revealed legal uncertainty which is directly relevant 
to a transatlantic defence procurement analysis. It is recalled that a high level NATO 
study has attributed significant weight to the effect of Article 346 TFEU in inhibiting a 
more competitive EU defence market, and in turn, the transatlantic defence market 
and recommends the need for a definition of “legally acceptable” interpretations of 
“essential security interest”.263 The preceding analysis signals caution regarding the 
complexity of this task.  
 
The case law provides only the general interpretative context for a more limited 
application of Article 346 TFEU in light of the Defence Procurement Directive. 
                                                 
262 Aalto, ‘Interpretations of Article 296’ (n 81) 35-36  
263 NIAG High Level Advice Study No 154 (n 60)  
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Member States will have to provide specific justifications for non-compliance with EU 
law, necessitating more specific reasoning by national and EU courts. To date, 
absent a credible case, it has been unnecessary for the EU courts to engage the 
substance of Article 346 TFEU. It has been suggested that it by no means follows 
that the ECJ would adopt an intrusive and activist approach once substantive policy 
choices are properly explained.264  
 
Further, there appears to be an increasing focus on the notion that essential security 
interests should be viewed from the perspective of the attainment of European 
defence and security objectives. As a result, little consideration has been given to the 
relevance of third countries in the assessment of Article 346 TFEU.  It should also be 
observed that, similarly, no consideration has been given to third country 
perspectives on the role of Article 346 TFEU. For instance, the U.S. Fortresses and 
Icebergs Study has stated that the Defence Procurement Directive will likely 
accelerate the increasing use of competition in national defence procurement and 
make it harder for U.S. firms to obtain sole source contracts in Europe; however, the 
same Study states:  
 
Perversely, U.S. defense firms will likely be major beneficiaries of 
individual national governments’ continued willingness to invoke Article 
296 EC Treaty to buy on a non-competitive basis from the United States 
(e.g., to fill urgent needs).265  
                                                 
264 Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (n 56) 252 
265 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 32. Whilst reference to “urgent needs” is not unequivocal, Article 28 of 
the Defence Procurement Directive, for example, only permits use of the negotiated procedure without publication 
of a contract notice in two circumstances. The first concerns the instance in which the periods laid down for use of 
the other stipulated procedures are incompatible with the “urgency resulting from a crisis” (Article 28(c)). The 
second concerns the instance in which its use is strictly necessary “for reasons of extreme urgency brought about 
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U.S. commentary has also referred to:  
 
[t]he fact that a country may invoke the application of Article 296 of the EU 
Treaty to procure outside of EU Community law […] (therefore being free 
to accept or refuse U.S. bidders).”266 
 
These views appear to envisage that Member States will be able to continue to 
invoke Article 346 TFEU with the effect of enabling awards to U.S. contractors. 
Importantly, however, these views do not elucidate: (i) whether it is necessary to 
invoke Article 346 TFEU at all; (ii) if so, the circumstances in which Article 346 TFEU 
would be invoked (reference only being made to the fulfilment of “urgent needs”) and 
whether such invocation would likely be deemed legitimate; and (iii) whether any 
invocation would need to make specific reference to third countries. 267 The position 
could also be complicated by the fact that the Defence Procurement Directive permits 
Member States to determine whether or not to permit third countries to participate in 
contract award procedures.268  
 
At the least, it is clear that there ought to be greater focus on the possible role of 
Article 346 TFEU in relation to matters pertaining to third countries. This Chapter has 
identified a risk that the jurisprudence, official documents and EU commentary may 
                                                                                                                                                        
by events unforeseeable by the contracting authorities/entities in question” (Article 28(d)). Therefore, EU law 
attempts, in the first instance, to restrict use of such grounds as a means of limiting competition by regulating 
these circumstances within the scope of the Directive 
266 I Maelcamp, ‘European Union EU Defense Procurement Directive’, U.S. Commercial Service, August 2009, 
MR-131, 3 (available on request) 
<http://export.gov/europeanunion/marketresearch/securityanddefensesector/index.asp> accessed 20 September 
2013 
267 The above U.S. commentary appears to suggest that Article 346 TFEU can be invoked on certain grounds 
without reference to third countries, and that once successfully invoked, a Member State is then able to determine 
whether or not to permit a third country operator to bid or to award the contract to a third country operator  
268 See Recital 18, para 2 of the Defence Procurement Directive, discussed in Chapter 4, Section 2.2 
  69 
endorse a Euro-centric interpretation which may not accord adequate and sufficient 
weight to issues which implicate transatlantic defence trade interests (howsoever 
defined). 
 
This thesis now turns to examine the relevance of certain other exclusions contained 
in the Defence Procurement Directive. 
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3 
“Safe Harbours” 
Contracts Excluded under the Defence Procurement 
Directive 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Whilst Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will accord due consideration to U.S. claims regarding the 
Defence Procurement Directive’s potential discriminatory application, it is important 
to recognize at the outset that the limitations on the Directive’s scope are equally 
significant. The possibility for the Directive’s exclusions to exempt the most 
organisationally complex and politically and economically significant forms of 
procurement from compliance with the Directive, raises real questions about the 
extent to which the Directive is therefore likely to appreciably impact on transatlantic 
defence trade. However, exclusion is not automatic. On a legal analysis, it is 
necessary to determine the extent to which Member States continue to retain 
freedom to conduct their defence procurement relations with the U.S. and 
transatlantic defence organisations such as NATO. In turn, this requires legal 
certainty regarding the scope, conditions for, and limitations on the use of the 
Directive’s exclusions. This Chapter examines the Directive’s provisions on excluded 
contracts.  
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It should be observed that the Directorate General on Internal Market and Services 
issued seven Guidance Notes to coincide with the Directive’s transposition.269 In the 
absence of definitive judicial interpretations of the exclusions, this Chapter will seek 
to draw on the Guidance Note on Defence and Security Specific Exclusions.270 
 
It should be further observed that this Chapter focuses only those exclusions most 
liable to directly implicate transatlantic defence trade, specifically contracts awarded 
in accordance with an international agreement, arrangement or organization, 
collaborative procurement and government-to-government contracts.  
 
2. Residual Application of EU Treaty Principles and Provisions 
 
Before examining the content of the exclusions, it is first necessary to clarify the legal 
relationship between the exclusions and the broader principles of the EU Treaties. 
 
Legitimate recourse to one of the Directive’s exclusions only excepts a measure from 
compliance with the Directive’s provisions.271 Any measure taken must still comply 
with EU Treaty principles as well as other EU Treaty provisions, unless a valid treaty 
derogation can be invoked such as Article 346 TFEU.272 
                                                 
269 This development is unprecedented. The Guidance Notes cover: (1) the Directive’s field of application; (2) 
defence and-security-specific exclusions; (3) security of supply; (4) security of information; (5) subcontracting; (6) 
research and development and (7) offsets. In total, the Guidance Notes comprise 80 pages. It should be observed 
that the Guidance Notes reflect the views of the services of DG MARKT and are not legally binding. As this thesis 
is cautious to observe, other interpretations of the Directive’s provisions are possible 
270 All references to the “Guidance Note” will concern the Guidance Note on Defence and Security Specific 
Exclusions unless otherwise stated 
271 For a discussion of the ways in which such exclusions may operate in this context, see the discussion of 
Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173 in Chapter 2, Section 4.3 
272 For a useful discussion of the applicability of EU law to defence procurement in light of the exclusions from 
the Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives as well as the residual application of Article 346 TFEU and 
EU Treaty principles, see B Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International 
Organisations in the European Union’ (Ph.D Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham, July 2011) 37-61 
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 2.1. Compliance with EU Treaty Procurement Principles 
 
Even if it is possible to rely on an exclusion contained within an EU procurement 
Directive to prevent application of its rules, the award of a public contract must 
nevertheless comply with the specific EU Treaty principles applicable to public 
procurement, which, in turn, derive from the general principles of EU law.273 It must 
be observed that recognition of these principles continues to be controversial.274 
However, there appears to be increasing recognition of the following which include: 
non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality,275 equal treatment of economic 
operators; 276  a positive obligation of transparency; 277  a principle of mutual 
recognition;278  proportionality279  and effective judicial protection.280  It will only be 
                                                                                                                                                        
For a redacted version of this discussion, see B Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international 
organisations in the European Union’ (2001) 4 PPLR 103, 115-121 
273 These include: Article18 TFEU (ex Article 12 TEC) relating to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality; Article 28-32 TFEU (ex Articles 23-31 TEC) on the free movement of goods; Articles 49-55 TFEU (ex 
Article 43-48 TEC) on the freedom of establishment; Article 56-62 TFEU (ex Articles 49-55 EC) on the freedom to 
provide services. See B Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the 
European Union’ (n 272) 117 cited at fn 124. More generally, see Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on 
the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public 
Procurement Directives’ (Communication) [2006] OJ C 179/2 
274 Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 
118 and citations at fn 125 
275 Case 21/88 Du Pont de Nemours Italiana S.p.A. v Unità Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara [1990] E.C.R. I-
889, para 18; Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda v Office national d'immigration [1990] E.C.R. I-1417, para 19; 
Case C-243/89 Commission v Denmark (Storebaelt) [1993] E.C.R. I-3353, para  45. Discussed in Heuninckx, 
‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 
272) 51-52 
276 Case C-3/88 Commission v Italy (Data Processing) [1989] ECR 4035, 8; Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen 
GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG  [2005] ECR I-8585, paras 46-49; Case C-410/04 
Associazione Nazionale Autotrasporto Viaggiatori (ANAV) v Comune di Bari and AMTAB Servizio SpA [2006] 
ECR I-3303, paras 18-23. Discussed in discussion in Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 53. See also Case C-410/04, ANAV v 
Comune di Bari and AMTAB Servizio (“ANAV”) [2006] ECR I- 3303, para 20 
277 Case 45/87 Commission v Ireland (Dundalk)) [1988] ECR 4929, para 16; Case C-275/98 Unitron Scandinavia 
A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrug og Fiskeri 
[1999] ECR I-8291, para 31; Case C- 324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress v Telekom Austria [2000] ECR I-
10745, paras 60-62; Case C-231/03 Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de’ Botti [2005] 
ECR I‐7287, para 16; C-260/04 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-7083, paras 22-24; Case C‐91/08 Wall AG v 
Stadt Frankfurt am Main and Frankfurter Entsorgungs- und Service (FES) GmbH [2010] ECR I-02815, para 36. 
Discussed in Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations in 
the European Union’ (n 272) 52 
278 Case C-340/89 Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten Baden- 
Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357; Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd  [1991] ECR I-4421, 
para 15; Case C- 59/00 Bent Mousten Vestergaard v Spøttrup Boligselskab [2001] ECR I-9505, para 23; Case 
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necessary to comply with these principles if the contract evidences a “certain cross 
border interest” capable of engaging contractors from other Member States.281  
 
Further, the subject of the obligation may also determine the applicability of the EU 
procurement principles. The Public Sector Directive only applies to procurement 
activities performed by ‘contracting authorities’. 282  It appears that contracting 
authorities must also comply with the procurement principles where the Directives do 
not apply.283  The ECJ has also held that ‘public authorities’ which otherwise do not 
fall within the definition of ‘contracting authority’ must also comply with these 
principles.284 As will be discussed below, an authority’s status may be relevant to 
determining the extent to which EU law applies to certain types of international 
organisation. 
  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
45/87 Commission v Ireland (Dundalk)) (n 278), para 22. Discussed in Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative 
Defence Procurement Through International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 52 
279 Case 122/78 SA Buitoni v Fonds d'orientation et de régularisation des marchés agricoles [1979] ECR 677, 
para 16; Case 66/82 Fromançais SA v Fonds d'orientation et de régularisation des marchés agricoles (FORMA) 
[1983] ECR 395, para 8; Case 15/83 Denkavit Nederland BV v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten 
[1984] ECR I-2171, para 25. Discussed in Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through 
International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 52 
280 Case C- 324/98 Telaustria and Telefonadress v Telekom Austria (n 279), para 62; Case C-231/03 Consorzio 
Aziende Metano (Coname) (n 279), para 21. Discussed in Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence 
Procurement Through International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 52-53 
281 Case C-507-03 Commission v. Ireland [2007] ECR I-9777, paras 25-31; Joined Cases C-147/06 and C-
148/06 SECAP SpA and Santorso Soc. Coop. arl v. Commune di Torino [2008] ECR I-3565, paras 21, 24-26. For 
general commentary, see Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) points 4.25 and 4.34 
282 According to Article 1(9), “contracting authorities” means: “the State, regional or local authorities, bodies 
governed by public law, associations formed by one or several of such authorities or one or several of such 
bodies governed by public law.” The Defence Procurement Directive also only applies to contracting authorities or 
entities which are defined by reference to Article 1(9) Public Sector Directive  
283 Case C-507-03 Commission v. Ireland (n 281) para 26 
284 Case C‐91/08 Wall (n 277), paras 47-52 and 60; Case C-26/03 Stadt Halle, RPL Recyclingpark Lochau 
GmbH v Arbeitsgemeinschaft Thermische Restabfall-und Energieverwertungsanlage TREA Leuna [2005] E.C.R. 
I-1, paras 48-50. For a discussion in this regard, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 49-50 
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2.2. Compliance with International Obligations Owed to Third Countries 
 
As indicated above, in addition to the applicability of EU Treaty principles, a Member 
State will also have to comply with other TFEU provisions. An important provision in 
this regard is Article 351 TFEU (ex 307 EC). 285 Article 351 TFEU provides in relevant 
part that: 
 
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, 
between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more 
third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the 
Treaties […] 
In light of the above, post 1 January 1958 or accession, Member States cannot enter 
a commitment within the framework of an agreement that could conflict with an EU 
obligation nor adopt a measure contrary to EU law where it is permitted (but not 
required) by an agreement.286 Relevant to the present discussion, is the issue of 
international agreements concluded between one or more Member States and one of 
more third countries after 1958.  
 
It is generally understood that Member States may not conclude international 
agreements on matters falling within the EU’s exclusive competence without 
                                                 
285 For a detailed discussion of this provision, see J Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (CUP 
2009) Ch. 6, 8 and 9 
286 See respectively Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Officier van Justitie v. Kramer [1976] E.C.R. 1279, paras 44-45 
and Case C-324/93 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Evans Medical and MacFarlane 
Smith Ltd [1995] ECR I–563, para cited by Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through 
International Organisations’ (n 272) 83, fns 325 and 326 
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authorization.287 However, Member States may conclude agreements on matters of 
shared competence. 288 The internal market constitutes a shared competence.289 It 
follows that public procurement is a shared competence. 
 
However, when rules are adopted for the attainment of EU Treaty objectives, the 
Member States are prohibited from assuming obligations which might affect those 
rules or alter their scope.290 This would preclude the conclusion of an agreement by 
an EU Member State with third parties contrary to EU law.291 In addition, Article 4(3) 
TEU provides that: 
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the 
Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying 
out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties 
or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
                                                 
287 Article 3(1) TFEU provides that: “[t]he Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: (a) 
customs union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of marine biological 
resources under the common fisheries policy; (e) common commercial policy.” Article 3(2) further provides that: 
“[t]the Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its 
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its 
internal competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
288 Article 4(1) TFEU provides that: “[t]he Union shall share competence with the Member States where the 
Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.” Article 4(2) 
further provides that: “[s]hared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following 
principal areas: (a) internal market; (b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty; (c) economic, social 
and territorial cohesion; (d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; 
(e) environment; (f) consumer protection; (g) transport; (h) trans-European networks; (i) energy; (j) area of 
freedom, security and justice; (k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this 
Treaty.” 
289 ibid 
290 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263, paras 21-22 
291 Joined Cases C-176/97 and C-177/97 Commission v. Belgium and Luxemburg [1998] ECR I-3557, para 42 
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The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives. 
 
The above obligations are specifically relevant to a transatlantic defence 
procurement analysis. As will be discussed below, Article 351 TFEU may be relevant 
to determining which types of international organization may legitimately be excluded 
from compliance with EU law. Further, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, it is 
generally considered that Member States are prohibited from concluding international 
agreements with third countries in the field of public procurement on the basis that 
the EU has exercised its exclusive competence in the field of common commercial 
policy.292 In the absence of a similar exercise of EU exclusive competence in the field 
of defence procurement, Member States could conceivably conduct their 
procurement relations with third countries in a way determined to be incompatible 
with EU law. An important question, therefore, is whether the Defence Procurement 
Directive provides an effective means of ensuring compatibility between Member 
State international obligations and their obligations under EU law. It is this issue to 
which this Chapter now turns.  
 
2.3. Use of Exclusions under the Defence Procurement Directive  
 
Unlike the Public Sector Directive, the Defence Procurement Directive contains a 
specific provision on the use of exclusions. Article 11 provides: 
                                                 
292 See Chapter 4, Section 2.1 
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None of the rules, procedures, programmes, agreements, arrangements 
or contracts referred to in this section may be used for the purpose of 
circumventing the provisions of this Directive. 
 
The inclusion of such a provision is likely due not simply to the additional number of 
exclusions contained in the Defence Procurement Directive but the greater perceived 
susceptibility for such exclusions to be misused in light of the historical experience 
identified in Chapter 2 regarding the use of exceptions and Article 346 TFEU. The 
Guidance Notes describe Article 11 as a “general safeguard clause”.293 Article 11 is 
said to serve as an explicit reminder of the ECJ case law prohibiting the use of legal 
structures that are exempt from EU public procurement rules with the principal aim of 
avoiding transparent and competitive contract award procedures without objective 
reasons.294  The Guidance Note reiterates that such exceptions must be strictly 
interpreted. 295  Contracting authorities bear the burden of proving that the 
procurement falls under one of the specified exclusions.296  
 
It is clear that Article 11 is intended to have declaratory, rather than any substantive, 
effect. For instance, it is not clear what is meant by “used” for the purpose of 
“circumventing” the Directive’s provisions. Further, there is no pre- or post- 
                                                 
293 See Guidance Note, Research and Development, 4, point 12 and Guidance Note, Security of Information, 11, 
point 26 
294 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 1, point 2, para1 citing Judgment of 9 June 2009 
in Case C-480/06 Commission v. Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, para.48  
295 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 1, point 2, para. 2 citing at fn 2 Case C-480/06 
Bayerischer Rundfunk [2007] ECR I-11173, para 64 
296 Guidance Note, Defence- and security-specific exclusions, 1, point 2  
  78 
notification requirement of use.297 The Directive also expressly excludes review of 
their use.298 In addition, Article 11 does not refer to the requirement to ensure that 
any rule, procedure, programme, agreement, arrangement or contract, must be 
concluded or otherwise be in conformity with EU law.299  
The above is particularly stark given the historical tendency of Member States to 
misuse exceptions to the procurement Directives. Further, the Guidance Note 
specifically envisages the possibility that Member States may enter into agreements 
which specify rules or procedures or permit measures which would be contrary inter 
alia to Article 4(3) TEU.300  
 
Therefore, it is submitted that Article 11 cannot be said to enable adequate 
monitoring, regulation or resolution of compatibility and conflict issues. This may be 
indicative of a more general and fundamental uncertainty regarding the precise 
relationship between Member States’ international and EU law obligations in the field 
of defence procurement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
297 The Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 2-3, point 2, para 3 simply states that 
contracting authorities intending to rely on one of the exceptions “might consider” publishing a voluntary ex ante 
notice under Articles 60(4) and 64 Defence Procurement Directive. The Guidance encourages this option on the 
basis that such publication at least formally announces and justifies its decision to award a contract without prior 
publication of a contract notice in the Official Journal. It also attempts to highlight as an incentive that if the 
contracting authority has published an ex ante notice and observed a standstill period of 10 days following 
publication, the contract cannot be determined to be ineffective by application of Article 60(1) 
298 Article 55(1) Defence Procurement Directive 
299  By contrast, Article 15(a) Public Sector Directive expressly includes a reference to “an international 
agreement concluded in conformity with the Treaty.” It is not clear why such an explicit reference is not made 
either in Article 11 or the exclusions of the Defence Procurement Directive. Such a reference is not strictly 
necessary as a Directive cannot oust the overriding EU Treaty principles. Notwithstanding, such a reference 
would emphasise the positive obligation to ensure conformity  
300 See Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 2, point 3, para 4 
  79 
3. International Agreements and Arrangements 
 
Both the Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives contain exclusions 
concerning the award of contracts governed by international agreements. According 
to Article 12(a), the Defence Procurement Directive will not apply to contracts 
governed by: 
 
        […] specific procedural rules pursuant to an international agreement or 
arrangement concluded between one or more Member States and one or 
more third countries […] 301 
According to the Commission Report on the Directive’s transposition, most Member 
States have transposed this provision without changing the material scope of Article 
12.302 Described in the Guidance Note as “very generic”,303 Article 12(a) is broader 
than its Public Sector Directive comparator in a number of respects. Firstly, the 
Public Sector Directive exclusion is confined to the exploitation of a “work” or 
“project” whereas Article 12(a) contains no restriction as to subject matter. Secondly, 
the Public Sector Directive exclusion refers to contracts concluded between “a” 
Member State and one or more third countries whereas Article 12(a) applies to 
agreements and arrangements involving one or more Member States and third 
                                                 
301 Cf Article 15(a) Public Sector Directive which provides: “[t]his Directive shall not apply to public contracts 
governed by different procedural rules and awarded […] pursuant to an international agreement concluded in 
conformity with the Treaty between a Member State and one or more third countries and covering supplies or 
works intended for the joint implementation or exploitation of a work by the signatory States or services intended 
for the joint implementation or exploitation of a project by the signatory States […]”. For general commentary, see 
S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119), 358-9, point 6.109 
302  See Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 
2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement, Brussels COM(2012) 565 final, 5 
303 See Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 3, point 4, para 2  
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countries.304 Thirdly, the Public Sector Directive exclusion only refers to international 
“agreements” whereas Article 12(a) additionally excludes “arrangements”, the 
significance of which is addressed below. 
 
3.1. Scope of the Term “international Agreement”  
 
The Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives do not define an 
“international agreement”. Similarly, the ECJ has never issued a judgment on its 
meaning for EU law purposes. 
 
3.1.1. Contracts Awarded Through NATO Procurement Procedures 
 
Whilst Article 12(a) does not expressly refer to international organizations, it has 
been argued that given that an international organization can be created by an 
international agreement through its constituting instrument, Article 12(a) most likely 
covers contracts awarded under the procurement procedures of organizations 
comprised of one or more EU Member States and one or more third countries.305 
Importantly, on this interpretation, the operational procurement activities of NATO 
could be excluded. 306 
 
 
                                                 
304 It is not clear whether reference to “a” in Article 15(a) permits the exemption of multilateral agreements 
between more than one EU Member State and one or more third countries or is confined to agreements involving 
a single Member State and one or more third countries. There is no ECJ case law directly confirming either 
interpretation. See B Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries: Applicability of EU Law to Defence and Security 
Procurement’ (n 80), 105. It is therefore unclear whether the addition of “one or more Member States” under 
Article 12(a) constitutes a clarification of, or qualitative difference to, the provision in Article 15(a)  
305 Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 
116 
306 ibid 
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3.2. Classification as an Automatic Basis for Exclusion 
 
It has been questioned whether the term “international agreement” contained in the 
Public Sector Directive exclusion could incorporate international arrangements.307 
The express addition of “international arrangement” renders it unnecessary to seek a 
similarly broad interpretation of “international agreement” under Article 12(a).  
 
However, this does raise the question as to whether the fact of constituting an 
international arrangement would be sufficient, in and of itself, to legitimate exclusion 
under Article 12(a). 
 
For instance, it has been argued that, for the purposes of the Public Sector Directive 
exclusion, “international agreement” could incorporate not only “binding” treaties but 
also “non-binding international arrangements” in the form of Memoranda of 
Understanding (“MOUs”).308 In relation to the Defence Procurement Directive, it has 
been stated that “international arrangements” are seen a “distinct category” from 
international agreements;309 further, that the EU legislator expressly included the 
term “international arrangement” to distinguish between legally binding international 
agreements and non-binding arrangements, in particular, MOU’s.310  The significance 
of these references concerns the fact that the U.S. and certain EU Member States 
are signatories to a number bilateral reciprocal defence procurement Memoranda of 
Understanding or “RDPs” which, as will be discussed in Chapter 11, U.S. legal 
                                                 
307 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 304) 
308
 ibid and fn92 citing A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (CUP 2000) 26-30 on non-binding international 
agreements  
309 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the boundaries’ (n 80) 110 
310 ibid citing at fn 124 a Private communication from I Maelcamp d'Opstaele, United States Mission to the 
European Union, November 17, 2009 
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commentators have identified as playing a potential role in transatlantic defence 
procurement in light of the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive. It has 
been stated that Article 12(a) “by its terms” confirms exclusion of the RDPs.311  
 
It is observed that these views appear to be predicated on the assumption that the 
categorization of an instrument as an “international agreement” or “international 
arrangement” is a sufficient basis to legitimate exclusion.  The assumption appears to 
be that an international agreement is legally binding and, therefore, an international 
arrangement is not; further, if the former is excluded, it must follow that the latter is 
similarly excluded.  
 
However, the Defence Procurement Directive does not, itself, draw a legal distinction 
between “international agreements” and “international arrangements”. Further, the 
Directive does not necessarily identify legal status as constituting the sole basis for 
exclusion.312  It is conceivable that “international arrangement” could have been 
included to indicate that such arrangements require a separate and discrete 
assessment, irrespective of legal status.  
 
To this extent, it is submitted that other criteria for exclusion have possibly been 
overlooked, an issue to which this Chapter now turns. 
 
 
 
                                                 
311 C Yukins, ‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (2009) The Government 
Contractor Vol 51 (41), 5 
312 Recital 26 merely states that “[…] provision should be made for cases where this Directive does not apply 
because specific rules on the awarding of contracts which derive from international agreements or arrangements 
between Member States and third countries apply [...]” 
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3.2.1. Basis for Exclusion: “Specific Procedural Rules” 
 
To an extent, presumptions about the automatic exclusion of international 
arrangements are understandable. For instance, the Guidance Note states that 
inclusion of the term “arrangement” makes it “very clear” that this provision covers 
not only international treaties ratified by national parliaments but also MOUs 
concluded at the level of the ministries concerned.313  
 
Importantly, however, according to the Guidance Note, exclusions under Article 12 
are only possible if the contract falls within the scope of international rules which 
provide a specific procedure for the award of the contract.314 On this interpretation, it 
is the requirement of “specific procedural rules” that ultimately determines the validity 
of the exclusion.315 In this regard, the Guidance Note states that “specific procedural 
rules” should be understood as requiring: 
 
a set of distinct rules that specifically concern the award of contracts and 
provide a minimum of details setting out the principles and the different 
steps to be followed in awarding contracts.316  
 
Importantly, the Guidance Note states that the term must be interpreted 
restrictively.317 
 
                                                 
313 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 3, point 4, para 2  
314 ibid, 2, point 3, para 2 
315 This is arguably supported by Recital 26 (n 312) 
316 Guidance Note (n 313) 
317 ibid 
  84 
It is not clear whether the reference to “specific” as opposed to “different” (the 
wording used in the Public Sector Directive exclusion) is material or what accounts 
for the change in language. This may constitute further evidence of the importance of 
the specificity of procedural rules as an independent exclusion criterion. 
Commentators had previously addressed the reference to “different” procedural rules 
in the Public Sector Directive exclusion. It had been suggested that this exclusion 
appears to apply only when it is intended that “their” procedures should govern, or 
where no other formal procedures have been set out.318 Although not specified, 
“their” appears to refer exclusively to a procedure set by a third country. For instance, 
it has been argued that if the international agreement foresees that contracts will be 
awarded in accordance with the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation, and assuming 
that the other conditions for invoking the exclusion are satisfied, the exclusion would 
be permitted.319 Conversely, it has been argued that if the agreement prescribes that 
contracts will be awarded on the basis of the law of an EU Member State, then the 
Public Sector Directive would probably have to be complied with.320 
 
However, it is difficult to apply this interpretation to Article 12(a). The Guidance Note 
refers to “specific procedural rules set by an international agreement or arrangement 
or by an international organisation.”321 This may require the international agreement 
to prescribe its own independent procedure. 322  It similarly follows that the 
requirement of “specific procedural rules” would preclude exclusion of a contract 
                                                 
318 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 358-359, 6.109 
319 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the boundaries’ (n 80) 105-106. Heuninckx does not specify the “other conditions” to 
which he refers 
320
 ibid  
321 Emphasis added. See Guidance Note, 2, point 3, para. 2.  
322 Clarity is not aided by references to contracts “governed” by different or specific procedural rules “pursuant” 
to an international agreement or arrangement and specific procedural rules “of” an international organisation. 
Similarly, Recital 26 only refers to specific rules which “derive” from international agreements or arrangements 
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under Article 12(a) simply on the basis that no other formal procedures have been 
identified.  
 
Further, there is also a more general uncertainty as to what will constitute “specific 
procedural rules” sufficient to validate exclusion. As the Guidance Note observes, 
Article 12(a) contains no specific requirements regarding the content of the 
procurement rules.323  
 
The Guidance Note only provides the following hypothetical illustration of the 
requirement for “specific procedural rules”: 
 
If, for example, Member States and third countries concluded a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the pooling or sharing of certain 
capabilities which are still to be procured, these procurements would be 
covered by Article 12(a) only if the MoU contained specific procurement 
rules and procedures to be applied to these purchases. If not, the Member 
States concerned would have to award the relevant procurement contracts 
following one of the procedures of the Directive.”324  
 
Whilst not unequivocal, it appears that the above scenario would require a 
contracting authority of a Member State to award a contract to a national or EU 
contractor in compliance with the Directive.325  
                                                 
323 Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 2, point 3, para 4  
324 ibid, para 3  
325 Given that the Defence Procurement Directive provides that Member States retain power to determine 
whether or not to permit third countries to participate in contract award procedures, it is not clear that Member 
States could then be required to award the contract to a third country in accordance with the Directive. For a more 
detailed discussion of the Directive’s formal position with regard to third countries, see Chapter 4 
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However, it appears to be implicit in the Guidance that the fact that the Member 
States concerned would have to procure according to the Directive would not 
affect, or would be without prejudice to, any procurement undertaken by 
cooperating third countries under the arrangement. Yet, it is not clear whether 
the requirement to comply with the Directive may undermine the objectives 
pursued.326 Further, if the purpose of the MOU is to share capabilities, it cannot 
be presumed that it would be feasible or practical for the MoU to specify a 
discrete set of its own procurement procedures where procurement serves 
merely an instrumental function to the pooling and sharing objective. Thus, it is 
unclear the extent to which legal uncertainty of this kind may impact on the 
practical implementation of procurement undertaken within transatlantic 
programmes. Whilst, as will be discussed below, it may be possible to have 
recourse to Article 13(c) Defence Procurement Directive which excludes 
contracts awarded in the framework of cooperative programmes, this exclusion 
only applies to programmes based on R&D. Therefore, an MOU for simple 
purchases of developed equipment i.e. without R&D content would not likely 
benefit from this exclusion. Further, such cooperative transatlantic R&D 
programmes have, to date, been limited.327  
 
In addition to the issues identified, the reference to “specific procedural rules” 
also raises the question of whether the RDPs meet the requirements for 
                                                 
326 For instance, if the Directive’s application is considered, for whatever reason, to unduly prejudice or 
compromise the conduct of the arrangement or organization and efficiency of programmes, certain procurement 
functions may have to be reallocated to cooperating third countries that may, under their arrangements, have a 
greater degree of flexibility. Further, it may not be possible to coordinate procurement procedures between 
cooperating States to ensure a degree of compatibility or logistical practicability. An alternative might be for the 
MoU to adopt the rules of the Defence Procurement Directive as a uniform procurement model. However, it is 
open to question whether relevant third countries would consent to such use. In addition, by the very fact of the 
Directive’s exclusions on cooperative procurement, the Directive’s rules are not necessarily suited for application 
to pooling and sharing functions 
327 See J P Bialos, C E Fisher S L Koehl, Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 146-148 
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exclusion. This analysis is postponed until Chapter 11 which examines the RDP 
procurement provisions in detail.  
 
 
4. International Organisations 
  
The Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives both exclude contracts 
governed by rules of an international organisation. Article 12(c) provides that the 
Defence Procurement Directive does not apply to contracts governed by: 
 
[…] specific procedural rules of an international organisation purchasing 
for its purposes, or to contracts which must be awarded by a Member 
State in accordance with those rules.”328 
 
According to the Commission Report on transposition, most Member States have 
transposed this provision without changing the material scope of Article 12.329 
Before examining the scope of Article 12(c), it is important to clarify that this part of 
the analysis draws heavily on recent research which has assessed the extent to 
which EU public procurement law is prima facie applicable to certain international 
organisations in the field of defence. 330  Such analysis is technical and is 
appropriately qualified by its recognition of the fact that there is no substantial CJEU 
                                                 
328 Article 15(a) Public Sector Directive provides that the Directive does not apply to public contracts governed 
by: “[…] different procedural rules and awarded […] pursuant to the particular procedure of an international 
organisation.” 
329 However, at least one Member State has broadened the scope of the exclusion of Article 12(c). Its national 
implementing measure does not restrict the exclusion to purchases for an international organisation's purposes. 
See Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC 
on Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 5 
330 See Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 
and Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 
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case law directly on this issue. It is nevertheless necessary to provide a synthesis of 
this research in order to identify the extent to which major European and transatlantic 
defence procurement institutions could be said to be subject to EU law.  
In order to aid clarity, it is useful to keep the following in mind. Firstly, the EU 
procurement Directives only apply to “contracting authorities” (and which includes, 
inter alia, “bodies governed by public law”). This raises the question as to whether 
international organisations, including those comprised of mixed EU-third country 
membership, constitute contracting authorities and may therefore be subject to the 
Directive. Secondly, even if international organisations do not meet the definition of 
contracting authority, it is recalled from Section 2 that the EU Treaty procurement 
principles may still apply if an international organisation satisfies the definition of a 
“public authority”. Finally, if an international organisation satisfies the definition of 
“contracting authority”, the question remains as to whether it could rely on the 
relevant international organisation exclusion. Again, it is recalled from Section 2 that 
that even if legitimate recourse to an exclusion is possible, the EU Treaty 
procurement principles may still apply. Having examined the scope of Article 12(c), 
this section concludes by summarizing the extent to which EU law applies to three 
key international organisations in the field of defence procurement. 
 
4.1. International Organisations as Bodies Governed by Public Law 
 
The Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives only apply to procurement 
performed by “contracting authorities”.331 As will be discussed in Section 4.2, the 
                                                 
331 For the definition of “contracting authority”, see Article 1(9) Public Sector Directive and Article 1(17) Defence 
Procurement Directive. The definition is provided at (n 282) 
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questions of whether, and what types of, international organisations are capable of 
constituting contracting authorities such as to enable recourse to the international 
organisation exclusion are not settled. Prior to the adoption of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, it had been argued that international organisations could not 
constitute contracting authorities.332  
 
More recently, it has been questioned whether international organisations could fall 
within the broader notion of “bodies governed by public law” and thus prima facie 
satisfy the definition of “contracting authority”. 333  It has been argued that an 
international organisation comprised exclusively of EU Member States would meet 
the criteria.334 One specific criterion in this regard is that the body must be closely 
dependent on the State.335 The condition of close dependence can be met if the body 
has an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose 
members are State appointed. 336  The supervisory bodies of international 
organisations are usually solely constituted by Member State appointed members.337  
 
It has been argued that international organisations comprised exclusively of EU 
Member States could satisfy this requirement as well as international organisations 
                                                 
332 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 225. For an even earlier view, see Heuninckx, 
‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 98 and citing at fn 
391 Public Procurement in the European Union  - Guide to the Community Rules on Public Supply Contracts 
other than in the Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications Sectors (Directive 93/36/EEC) (Commission: 
1995), Ch.II §2.3, 25 
333 Article 1(19) Public Sector Directive 
334 For a discussion of these criteria, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through 
International Organisations’ (n 272) 94-96; Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international 
organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 111-112  
335 C-44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau [1998] ECR I-73, para 20; C-380/98 R. v HM Treasury, Ex p. University of 
Cambridge [2000] ECR I-8035, para 20, cited in Heuninckx ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 39 fn 80 
336 See Article 1(9)(c) Public Sector Directive 
337 Heuninckx, The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 96; 
see more specifically, Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the 
European Union’ (n 272) 112 citing at fn 89 H G Schermer and N M Blokker, International Institutional Law, 4th 
edn (Nijhof, 2003) ss.771-887 
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comprised of a mixed EU and third country membership, where the latter constitutes 
less than half of total membership.338 However, it has been suggested that it is likely 
that this would be based on the premise that decisions of such boards are made by 
majority voting when the reality is that most decisions are by unanimity; further, third 
countries may possess a veto power on the organisation’s decisions, thereby 
reducing any influence exerted by EU Member States on the organisation’s 
procurement decisions.339 
 
Thus, it is arguable that organisations controlled by EU Member States would 
constitute contracting authorities with the consequence that the Public Sector and 
Defence Procurement Directives prima facie apply, unless an exemption applies.340 
The converse is likely to be the case for organisations in which third countries hold at 
least a blocking minority.341  
 
4.2. International Organisations as Public Authorities Subject to EU 
Procurement Principles 
 
It is recalled from Section 2.1 that even when the EU procurement Directives do not 
apply, contracting authorities and “public authorities” must nevertheless comply with 
                                                 
338 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 97; 
Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 112 
339 See Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 
97 citing at fn 385 Case C-237/99 Commission v France [2001] ECR I-939, para 48-49. On the decision-making 
of international organisations in this context, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 70-73; Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of 
international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 112-113 and fn90 
340 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 97; 
Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 113 
341 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 98; 
Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 113 
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the EU procurement principles. It has been argued that international organisations in 
which EU Member States control the decision-making process (where non-EU 
Member States do not hold a blocking minority) would quite clearly qualify as public 
authorities.342 In particular, it has been argued that a customary privilege exempting 
the procurement rules of such organisations from compliance with EU procurement 
principles would be inconsistent with, inter alia, the obligation under Article 4(3) 
TEU.343  
 
By contrast, it has been argued that where EU Member States do not control the 
decision-making process of an international organisation (e.g. where it also 
comprises third country membership and/or unanimity is required), it is appropriate 
that a customary privilege exists in order to prevent EU Member States from affecting 
the independence and proper functioning of the organisation on procurement 
matters.344  
 
Thus, international organisations comprised exclusively of EU membership may have 
to comply with the EU procurement principles (unless a valid derogation can be 
invoked).345 The converse is likely to be the case for international organisations 
comprising a mixed membership with third countries.346 
 
 
                                                 
342 Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 
119 
343 For the reasons against recognition of a customary privilege that is able to exempt the procurement rules of 
international organisations from compliance with EU procurement principles, see Heuninckx, ‘Applicable law to 
the procurement of international organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 119-120 
344 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 107  
345 ibid 106 
346 ibid 107 
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4.3. Application of the Exclusion to International Organisations 
 
In light of the above, this Section examines the scope of the international 
organisation exclusion. This raises two discrete issues. Firstly, if international 
organisations are capable of constituting contracting authorities, a debate exists as to 
whether the exclusion covers international organisations comprising both mixed (i.e. 
EU and third country) membership and exclusive EU membership, or whether it 
should be confined to excluding mixed membership organisations.347 Secondly, a 
question arises as to the precise scope of activity covered by the exclusion. It is to 
these issues which this Chapter now turns. 
 
4.3.1. Organisations Comprising Exclusive EU and Mixed Membership 
 
EU law does not define the term “international organization”. 348  A fundamental 
argument often cited in support of excluding only mixed membership organisations is 
that if the exclusion also applies to international organisations comprised exclusively 
of EU Member States, it would provide a simple means by which Member States can 
avoid their EU law obligations.349  
 
However, in support of excluding both forms of organisation, it has been argued inter 
alia that most international organisations are created for a genuine purpose, such as 
                                                 
347 For arguments for and against both propositions, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence 
Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 99-102 
348 The Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 4, point 2.4, para 6 identifies an international 
organisation as a permanent institution with separate legal personality, set up by a treaty between sovereign 
states or intergovernmental organisations and having its own organizational rules and structures. However, the 
Guidance Note does not identify the nationality of constituent membership  
349 Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 225; Heuninkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative 
Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 99 
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to conduct collaborative defence procurement to increase interoperability of the 
armed forces and optimise defence budgets.350 Further, the EU Treaties contain no 
provision preventing the EU legislator from exempting all international organisations 
from compliance with a Directive.351 In addition, existing ECJ case law appears to 
support the view that the Directives would not be applicable to international bodies 
set up by the EU institutions.352 This is also said to be supported by the fact that the 
procurement activities of the EU institutions are regulated by specific rules that do not 
have to comply with the Public Sector Directive.353 
 
Whilst there is no definitive CJEU ruling on this issue, it has been argued that 
application of the Public Sector Directive exclusion to all international organisations 
would seem logical but is in need of clarification.354 Similarly, it has been suggested 
that the same analysis should apply to Article 12(c).355 
 
4.3.2. Purchasing for the Organisation’s Purposes  
 
Article 12(c) refers to an international organisation “purchasing for its purposes”. This 
raises the question as to what kinds of procurement would be covered for an 
organisation’s “purposes”. Commentary has distinguished between “administrative” 
                                                 
350 Heuninkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 100 
351 ibid 
352 Heuninkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 101-
102 citing Case T-411/06 Societá generale lavori manutenzioni appalti Srl. (Sogelma) v European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR) [2008] ECR II-2771, para 115; Case T-70/05 Evropaïki Dynamiki – Proigmena Systimata 
Tilepikoinonion Pliroforikis kai Tilematikis AE v European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) [2010] ECR II-00313 
353 Heunicnkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 101 
who observes that if the EU institutions do not have to comply with the EU public procurement Directives, it is 
questionable why other international organisations would be similarly obliged 
354 Heuninkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 115 
355 Heuninkx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 273) 115, 
116, on the basis that the definition of contracting authority under the Defence Procurement Directive 
corresponds to that under the Public Sector Directive 
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and “operational” activities. For instance, whilst it has been acknowledged that such 
a distinction is not always easy to make, administrative expenditure would cover the 
procurement of office equipment whilst operational expenditure would cover 
procurement for the benefit of the Member States’ armed forces.356 
 
It has been suggested that Article 12(c) is probably narrower than the Public Sector 
Directive exclusion.357 This view appears to be based on the understanding that 
Article 12(c) aims to cover mainly administrative procurement activities even though it 
would be extremely rare that administrative procurement covers military 
equipment.358 Notwithstanding, it has been suggested that Article 12(c) would apply 
to the few but significant items owned and managed by international organisations.359 
This narrow interpretation also appears to be predicated on the suggestion that 
Article 12(a) most likely covers contracts awarded through the procurement 
procedures of certain international organisations such as NATO.360 
 
However, it continues to remain uncertain precisely what is meant by “purchasing for 
its purposes”. Further, it is not clear that Article 12(c) only covers administrative 
procurement.361  
                                                 
356 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 73-
74 
357 ibid 
358 ibid 103 
359 For instance, NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) have been cited as an example in this 
regard. See Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 
272) 103 
360 ibid 103 
361  For instance, as Heuninkx  ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International 
Organisations’ (n 272) observes at 47 fn 129: “it is interesting to note that the French version of the Directive 
mentions that this exemption concerns “les règles de procédures spécifiques d’une organisation internationale 
achetant pour l’accomplissement de ses missions” (the specific procedural rules of an international organisation 
purchasing for the accomplishment of its missions), which would seem to be wider than the English version, as for 
instance operational procurement performed for the benefit of its Member States by a collaborative defence 
procurement organisation would probably be found to be performed for the accomplishment of its missions”  
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The Guidance Note states that purchases made by an international organisation in its 
own name and for its own purposes are outside the scope of the Directive.362 
However, it also states that by referring explicitly to “specific procedural rules of an 
international organisation purchasing for its purposes”, the provision points to the fact 
that purchases made by an international organisation for the purpose of its members 
or of third parties may not be excluded.363 Yet, construed in its broadest sense, any 
purchase by an international organization for its purposes is not only for the benefit of 
its own purposes but also for the purposes of the Member States generally.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the relation between Article 12(a) and (c) is unclear. 
Further, the distinction between “operational” and “administrative” procurement is not 
explicit. In addition, the differentiation between purchasing for an organisation’s own 
“purposes” and that of its members is not defined. These issues are symptomatic of 
the degree of interpretational overlap between the Defence Procurement Directive’s 
exclusions and give rise to legal uncertainty. 
 
4.3.3. Contracts Awarded by a Member State 
 
In addition to the circumstance in which an international organisation purchases for 
its purposes, Article 12(c) also excludes “contracts which must be awarded by a 
Member State” in accordance with the procedural rules of an international 
organisation. According to the Guidance Note, this can be the case, for example, 
                                                 
362 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 4, point 2.4, para 7 
363 The Guidance Note cites two scenarios in this regard. The first is when an international organisation acts only 
as an intermediary on behalf of one of its members (with the procurement contract concluded between the 
member and the supplier). The second is when the organisation simply resells to one of its members supplies, 
works or services (which it procured from economic operators at the request of that member). The Guidance Note 
further states in reference to Article 11 that Member States may not, in any case, use contract awards via 
international organisations for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of the Directive. Ibid 
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when a Member State acts on behalf of an international organisation or receives a 
financial contribution from that international organisation for the execution of the 
contract.364 In such circumstances, the specific procedural rules imposed by the 
organisation preclude the use of award procedures under the Directive. 
 
4.4. Application of EU Procurement Law to International Organisations 
 
Having outlined the potential applicability of EU procurement law to international 
organisations, this Section turns to briefly consider its specific application to certain 
international organisations. 
 
4.4.1. Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation 
 
With specific regard to international organisations comprised exclusively of EU 
Member States, one such example is the Organisation for Joint Armaments 
Cooperation (“OCCAR”).365 In 1998, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
(“UK”) (later joined by Belgium and Spain) founded OCCAR to manage more 
efficiently collaborative and nationally assigned armaments programmes and to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the EDTIB.366 It is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to engage a detailed analysis of OCCAR.367 Notwithstanding, whilst OCCAR has 
been the subject of relatively limited focus by commentators (in comparison to the 
                                                 
364 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 4, point 2.4, para 6 
365 See the OCCAR Convention, signed by the defence ministers of the founding nations at the Farnborough Air 
Show on 9 September 1998. Belgium and Spain joined OCCAR on May 27 2003 and January 2005, respectively 
366 At the time of writing, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Turkey participate in 
OCCAR managed programmes but are not members  
367 For a detailed discussion of OCCAR, in particular, its procurement function, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of 
Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 121-150  
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EDA, for example), OCCAR’s importance is signified by the fact that its annual 
budget is higher than the defence budgets of most EU Member States.368 OCCAR 
expenditures in 2009 amounted to approximately 40% of collaborative equipment 
procurement and R&D within the EU.369 
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, OCCAR would likely constitute a body 
governed by public law and thus be subject to the procurement Directives. 370 
However, it could be possible for OCCAR to rely on the Public Sector Directive 
exclusion (and corresponding Defence Procurement Directive exclusion) relating to 
international organisations and/or Article 13(c) of the Defence Procurement Directive, 
which is discussed below.371 Further, in light of the fact that the purpose of the Public 
Sector and Defence Procurement Directives is to coordinate national laws, it is 
possible to argue that because the Directives do not apply to international bodies set 
up by the EU institutions, the same reasoning should be applied to other international 
organisations such as OCCAR.372 However, if OCCAR qualifies as a public authority, 
OCCAR would likely have to comply with EU procurement principles.373 Further, 
OCCAR is unlikely to be able to invoke Article 346 TFEU.374 
 
                                                 
368 According to Heuninckx, if OCCAR were an EU Member State it would rank 9th in terms of total defence 
expenditures and 4th in terms of equipment procurement and R&D after the UK, France and Germany. See 
Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 122-
123 and fn 469 
369 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 123 
370 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 128 
371 ibid 
372 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 
100-101 and 128-9 citing Sogelma and ESMA (n 352) [115] and [126] respectively 
373 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 129 
374 As Heuninckx observes, unless EU Member States delegate to an international organisation the power to 
decide which measures are necessary for the protection of the essential interests of security, the most likely 
proposition is that only EU Member States may invoke Article 346 TFEU. See Heuninckx, ‘The Law of 
Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 129. This is also consistent with 
GEC-Siemens/Plessey (Case IV/33.018) Commission Notice relating to a proceeding under Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EEC-Treaty [1990] OJ C-239 identified in Chapter 2, Section 2 (n 86) 
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4.4.2. European Defence Agency 
 
It is also necessary to consider the legal position of the EDA. In 2004, the EU Council 
created the EDA to support Member States in their effort to improve EU defence 
capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the CSDP.375 As will be 
discussed in Chapters 5 (Section 7.3.1), 6 (Section 2.1 and 2.3) and Chapter 7, the 
EDA has developed a range of initiatives in the field of defence procurement. 
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is similarly likely that the EDA would 
constitute a body governed by public law and thus be subject to the procurement 
Directives.376 However, it could be possible for the EDA to rely on the Public Sector 
Directive exclusion (and correspondingly the Defence Procurement Directive 
exclusion) relating to international organisations.377 Further, the fact that the EDA is 
said to act within the single institutional framework of the EU could mean that it would 
not qualify as an international organisation, but rather an agency of the EU.378  
 
With specific regard to the Defence Procurement Directive, most defence contracts 
concluded by the EDA would likely be excluded under Article 13(c) (discussed 
below). 379  Further, in accordance with Article 12(c), the Defence Procurement 
Directive does not apply to international organisations procuring for their own 
purpose which would also exempt the EDA from compliance with the Directive when 
                                                 
375 See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency, OJ L 245/17, amended by Council Joint Action 2008/299/CFSP of 7 April 2008, OJ 2008 L 102/34 
376 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 183 
377 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 
183-4 
378 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 184 
379 ibid 
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it procures specific studies within its general budget.380 In addition, in light of the fact 
that the purpose of the Defence Procurement Directive is to coordinate national laws, 
it is possible to argue that it is not applicable to international bodies set up by the EU 
institutions.381 However, if the EDA qualifies as a public authority, the EDA would 
likely have to comply with the EU procurement principles. 382  Finally, similar to 
OCCAR, the EDA is unlikely to be able to invoke Article 346 TFEU.383 
 
4.4.3. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Its Agencies 
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the legal position of international organisations 
(and their corresponding agencies) comprising mixed membership. 
 
It has been suggested that NATO and agencies such as the NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Organisation (“NAMSO”)384 would not likely constitute contracting authorities 
or public authorities and so neither the Directives nor the EU procurement principles 
are likely to apply.385 Specifically, the Public Sector Directive would not apply to 
NAMSO procurement in light of the fact that some NAMSO members are not EU 
Member States.386 Further, it has been argued that because NAMSO was created by 
an international agreement and some NAMSO members are non-EU Member States, 
Article 12(a) likely excludes all contracts awarded through the procurement rules of 
                                                 
380 ibid 
381 ibid 
382 ibid 185-6  
383 ibid and see (n 374)  
384 NAMSO is a subsidiary agency of NATO. NAMSO is tasked to provide logistics support which includes supply 
management, maintenance management, procurement and technical assistance. For a detailed discussion of 
NAMSO, in particular with regard to its procurement aspect, see Heuninckx,,‘The Law of Collaborative Defence 
Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 150-176 
385 ibid 175  
386 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 158 
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NAMSO.387 In addition, in light of the fact that important NAMSO decision making is 
by unanimity, EU Member States do not control the decision-making. Therefore, 
NAMSO is unlikely to qualify as a public authority and would not have to comply with 
the EU procurement principles.388 Finally, similar to OCCAR and the EDA, NAMSO is 
unlikely to be able to invoke Article 346 TFEU.389 
 
The legal analysis above is indicative of the complexity that will necessarily be 
entailed in determining the general applicability of EU law to international 
organisations in the field of defence procurement as well as its application in the 
specific instance of purported exclusion.  
 
For the purposes of a transatlantic defence procurement analysis, a provisional 
indication appears to be that whilst the precise legal bases for excluding procurement 
are not explicitly clear, it is likely that most forms of contracting engaged by, and on 
behalf of, NATO and its agencies would be excluded. To this extent, procurement 
performed and managed through transatlantic defence agencies will most probably 
not have to comply with EU law.  
 
A more difficult issue concerns the extent to which it will be possible to exclude 
procurement undertaken within the context of European organisations such as 
OCCAR and the EDA on the basis of Article 12(c). Prior to the adoption of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, it had been observed that the Commission did not 
                                                 
387 ibid 
388 ibid   
389 Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 159 
and see (n 374) 
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appear to be sure about the application of the procurement Directives to the EDA.390 
Yet the Defence Procurement Directive emphasizes the prima facie exclusion of 
these organisations both on the basis of the scope of authorities covered as well as 
by excepting their procurement activities.391 Therefore, any attempt to enhance legal 
certainty in this area is vital.392 
 
Overall, it is difficult to discern what effect the international organisation exclusion will 
have in practice as compared, for example, to the international agreement exclusion 
under Article 12(a), the cooperative programme exclusion under Article 13(c) and the 
government to government sales exclusion under Article 13(f), discussed in Sections 
5 and 6 below. The Guidance Note nevertheless appears to conceive of a risk that 
this exclusion could be utilised to circumvent compliance with the Defence 
Procurement Directive. From a transatlantic perspective, this raises questions 
concerning the overall legal coherence of the EU defence procurement architecture, 
as well as its external relation. 
 
 
 
5. Cooperative Programme Procurement 
 
It is recalled that whilst Article 12 Defence Procurement Directive could potentially 
exclude forms of collaborative defence procurement, Article 13(c) contains a specific 
                                                 
390 See Trybus, EU Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 226 
391 For instance, Recital 28 presumptively excludes the EDA. Recital 28 expressly states that the Directive 
should not apply to contracts awarded by international organizations such as OCCAR, NATO, its agencies, or the 
EDA within the scope of cooperative programmes 
392 For useful preliminary recommendations exploring the options for ensuring greater conformity in this regard, 
see Heuninckx, The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 
205-254 
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exclusion relating to cooperative programmes.393 Before examining the exclusion, it 
is useful to place U.S. and EU cooperation in context.  
 
5.1. Increased Recourse to European Cooperation 
 
Most Member States no longer have the financial, technical and industrial capabilities 
to procure, develop and produce complex weapons systems. This will often 
necessitate a choice to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of engaging 
cooperative programmes at all.394 If so, the choice is generally between purchasing 
from third country defence producers (historically predominantly the U.S.) or sharing 
costs with other European countries.395 
 
Cooperation can take a number of forms. One form is reciprocal trade in which each 
participating country agrees to procure equipment or systems developed and 
produced by the other partner(s), which have comparable and complementary 
uses.396 A second form is co-production in which contractors from one or more 
participating countries produce (often under licence) a weapon system developed by 
firms of one other participating country, mostly on the basis of the individual 
requirements of the latter. 397  A third form is co-development in which defence 
contractors from participating countries jointly develop, and usually produce, a 
                                                 
393 Again, the possibility for interpretative overlap between this provision and the exclusions in Article 12(a) and 
(c) cannot be excluded 
394 There is some debate within the defence community as to whether cooperative programmes yield any 
specific overall benefits. For a useful discussion of the perceived advantages and disadvantages in this regard, 
see B Heuninckx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe: troubles, achievements and 
prospects’ (2008) 3 PPLR, 123, 131-139 
395 See Heuninckx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe: troubles, achievements and 
prospects’ (n 394) 125 
396 ibid 126 
397 ibid 
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weapon system on the basis of harmonised military requirements.398 The first two 
types have regularly been used in collaborative procurement involving the U.S. and 
other countries, with the U.S. almost always playing the senior partner, while the third 
type is mostly used among European countries.399  
 
As indicated above, both OCCAR and the EDA exercise competences in relation to 
collaborative procurement. In 2011, 27.1% or €7.9 billion of total defence equipment 
procurement expenditure was spent on collaborative projects, 92.7% (€7.3 billion) of 
which comprised European collaborations.400 Even though differences between EU 
Member States remain in terms of both the number of collaborative procurements 
undertaken, and with which States, collaborative defence procurement between 
European countries has significantly increased since the 1990’s. 401  In turn, 
collaboration with the U.S. is decreasing, although again this varies between 
individual Member States.402   
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study indicates that cooperative European programmes 
largely exclude U.S. defence firms from significant participation and, for those 
programmes in which the U.S. is able to participate, U.S. companies are generally 
excluded from lead positions and key subsystems being limited to the component 
                                                 
398 ibid 
399 ibid  
400  EDA Defence Data 2011, 4. See <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-
publications/eda_data2011_web> accessed 20 September 2003 
401 Heuninkx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe: troubles, achievements and prospects’ 
(394) 128 and citations therein. Heuninckx states that France has evolved towards more collaborative 
procurement (almost exclusively with other European countries), which now represent about 48 % of its defence 
procurement programmes, while the UK used collaborative procurement for 19 % of its defence procurement 
programmes (in majority with other European countries), but imported 20 % of its major defence equipment from 
the US.  Also citing at fn21 citing J Howe, “The French and British Customers for Defence” (2004) 7(2) RUSI 
Defence Systems 20 
402 Heuninkx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe: troubles, achievements and prospects’ 
(394) 128 
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level.403 The Study refers to a number of European cooperative programmes which 
have excluded the substantial participation of U.S. companies. 404  However, 
importantly, the same Study also indicates that U.S.-EU cooperative Research, 
Development, Testing and Engineering (“RDT&E”) programmes are extremely 
limited.405 In particular, the Joint Strike Fighter programme alone accounted for $1.99 
billion or, in equivalent terms, 87% of the total U.S. cooperative engagement in 
RDT&E with Europe; excluding the Joint Strike Fighter, only approximately $1 billion 
per annum out of a $75 billion U.S. RDT&E budget, or in equivalent terms, around 
1.3 % of the total, is performed on a cooperative basis.406  
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study attributes the limited number of transatlantic 
cooperative programmes to several factors, including the absence of U.S. 
Department of Defense support for cooperative programmes,407 the ability of the U.S. 
to develop programmes without foreign participation and the sustained practical 
problems which have been encountered in major transatlantic cooperative 
                                                 
403 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 139-140 
404 One prime example is the multirole Eurofighter Typhoon in which the European Aeronautical, Defence and 
Space Company (“EADS”) acts as prime contractor while U.S. companies (mostly their European subsidiaries) 
provide a number of subsystems. Other examples of limited U.S. participation that are cited include the Meteor 
Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile (BVRAAM); the Advanced Short-Range Air-Air Missile (ASSRAAM); the 
A400M Future Large Airlifter; the Tiger Attack Helicopter; the F100 Aegis Frigate and the Multi-Role armoured 
vehicle (MRAV/GTK). For criticism of the absence of U.S. participation, see Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 
139-142 
405 The Fortresses and Icebergs Study provides a list of virtually all U.S. RDT&E programmes that have a 
cooperative or international component. These include: (1) coalition warfare; (2) DIRCM; (3) Foreign Comparative 
Testing; (4) Joint Strike Fighter; (5) JTRS; (6) MEADS; (7) MIDS; (8) Missile Defence; (9) MLRS; (10) NATO 
Evolved Sea Sparrow; (11) Patriot PAC-3; (12) Rolling Airframe Missile and (13) Standard Missile. See 
Fortresses and Icebergs Study (Vol I), 145, Table 18, U.S. Cooperative RDT&E Programs in Millions of Dollars 
($)”, source derived from U.S. Department of Defense, Biennial Budget Estimates, FY 2008. The Study states that 
the above cooperative programmes, with a few exceptions, were negotiated in the 1980’s and 1990’s when the 
U.S. sought a greater degree of transatlantic defence cooperation to develop new technologies and capabilities in 
an affordable manner, and that there have been few cooperative programme starts other than Missile Defence in 
recent years. See Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 146 
406 ibid, which also observes that the same type of analysis could also be undertaken for the limited European 
R&T funding, which is also done primarily on a national basis 
407 According to the Study, this means that DoD components will seek the alternative of cooperation only if they 
really need to e.g. in order to lower costs per unit or obtain needed funding from foreign partners. A prime 
example cited in this regard is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. See Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 147 
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programmes. 408  Further, the Study indicates that due largely to budgetary 
constraints, the number of major European programmes being initiated each year 
has fallen from an average of 5 or 6 per year in 1995-1996 to only one or two per 
year today and that this alone reduces the opportunity for U.S. companies to 
compete in the European market.409  
 
5.2. Cooperative Programmes Based on Research and Development 
 
Having outlined the context of collaborative procurement, Article 13(c) provides that 
the Defence Procurement Directive does not apply to: 
 
“[…] contracts awarded in the framework of a cooperative programme 
based on research and development,410 conducted jointly by at least two 
Member States for the development of a new product and, where 
applicable, the later phases of all or part of the life-cycle of this product 
[...]” 
 
According to the Commission Report on transposition, all Member States have 
correctly transposed Article 13(c).411 The Guidance Note provides comparatively 
                                                 
408 The Study states at 148 that: “[v]irtually every major transatlantic cooperative programme has been plagued 
by a series of problems: differential levels of support for the programme in different countries; different budget 
cycles and unstable funding; changing requirements on one side or the other; serious problems over technology 
transfer, and serious cost overruns and schedule delays.” 
409 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 143 
410 Article 1(27) defines “research and development” as: “all activities comprising fundamental research, applied 
research and experimental development, where the latter may include the realisation of technological 
demonstrators, i.e., devices that demonstrate the performance of a new concept or a new technology in a 
relevant or representative environment.” See also Recital 13 
411 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on 
Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 6. The only exception in this regard concerns the obligation to inform 
the Commission upon the conclusion of an agreement foreseen under Article 13(c), on which see below 
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detailed guidance with regard to this provision.412 As indicated by its terms, Article 
13(c) refers to cooperative programmes based on R&D, conducted jointly by at least 
two Member States. However, the Guidance indicates that cooperative R&D based 
programmes with third country participation could also fall within the exclusion.413 
Certain OCCAR and NATO programmes involving third countries could therefore 
potentially be excluded.414  
 
Importantly, however, Article 13(c) is subject to the condition that the programme 
must be based on a “genuinely cooperative concept”.415 In this regard, the Guidance 
Note states that the decisive criterion for the applicability of Article 13(c) is the nature 
of the programme and its purpose, namely the development of a new product.416 This 
means that common purchases of off-the-shelf equipment cannot be excluded, even 
if technical adaptations are made to customise the equipment.417  
 
In order to ensure that Article 13(c) is applied exclusively to genuine cooperation, 
Article 13(c) further provides that on conclusion of a programme between Member 
States only, they shall notify the Commission, inter alia, of the share of R&D 
expenditure.418 Therefore, it appears that notification is not necessary if one or 
                                                 
412  For a general discussion of this exclusion, see Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive (n 125) 15-16 
413 See also Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 7, point 16 
414 See for instance Recital 28 (n 391). See also Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions (n 
413) 
415 In particular, the Guidance States that participation in a cooperative programme means more than just the 
purchase of equipment but also includes in particular the proportional sharing of technical and financial risks and 
opportunities, participation in the management of and the decision-making on the programme. See Guidance 
Note, Defence- and Security Specific Exclusions, 7, point 16 
416 ibid, 6, point 15 
417 ibid 
418 According to the Commission Report on transposition (n 302) 6, one Member State has not included this 
obligation. Further, one Member State has included an obligation to inform the Commission only when the 
cooperative programme ends 
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several third countries are involved in the programme.419 The Guidance has also 
emphasised compliance with Article 11 Defence Procurement Directive.420  
 
It is submitted therefore that most types of reciprocal trade and co-production i.e. 
those forms of cooperation most often undertaken between the U.S. and EU Member 
States cannot be excluded under Article 13(c). These forms of procurement rely 
primarily on off-the-shelf procurement and production under licence, the R&D and 
initial production phases having already been undertaken by the seller or licensor.421 
Thus, the exclusion is likely to be confined to co-development. Were a cooperative 
programme to involve third countries but only concern off-the-shelf purchases, a 
Member State may need to seek exclusion under an alternative provision, if 
possible.422  
 
5.3. Maximum Flexibility: Minimum Certainty 
 
It is submitted that Article 13(c) is unlikely to significantly affect the current status quo 
with regard to either European or transatlantic collaborative procurement. From an 
EU perspective, it has been argued that Article 13(c) will drive Member States 
towards more collaborative procurement in order to avoid compliance with the 
Directive’s provisions.423 On the one hand, this is considered a positive development 
                                                 
419 Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 7, point 17 
420 See Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 7, point 17 and Guidance Note, Research and 
development, 1, point 3, para 1. For a discussion of the potential effectiveness of Article 11, see Section 2.3 
above  
421
 In fact, a particular criticism of co-production is that the technology transfer in the case of co-production 
remains limited, as the R&D work is mostly completed before the co-production arrangement is agreed. See 
Heuninkx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe’ (394) 126. Thus, mere receipt of off the shelf 
equipment and co-production is unlikely, in most instances, to fall within the notion of a “genuinely cooperative 
concept” 
422 See Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 citing Article 12(a) as a possibility in this regard  
423 Heuninckx ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 and fn 133 citing J Robinson, “To what extent will contracts 
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on grounds that collaboration can increase the cost-effectiveness of defence 
programmes,424 although it is difficult to empirically validate the extent to which cost-
effectiveness is achieved. On the other hand, it has been argued that Member States 
may misuse the possibility to extend into later phases of all or part of the life-cycle in 
order to favour national preferences.425  
 
More fundamentally, whilst the Directive states in Recital 55 that this important field 
of procurement continues to be governed with “maximum flexibility”, collaborative 
procurement remains an area that is substantially excluded from the scope of 
application of detailed regulatory regimes. It has been argued that this development 
is problematic given the legal uncertainty into which most of these programmes are 
developed and managed. 426  For instance, prior to the adoption of Defence 
Procurement Directive, it had been suggested that Member States routinely invoked 
Article 346 TFEU for the collaborative procurement of major weapon systems.427 
Similarly, notwithstanding the predominantly intergovernmental character of 
collaborative defence procurement, the EDA has not developed substantial 
guidelines on best practices in procurement.428 In addition to the above, it is not clear 
that any notification obligation will necessarily provide an effective check against 
                                                                                                                                                        
remain outside the defence procurement regime”, presentation at the C5 Forum on EU Defence & Security 
Procurement, November 17, 2009 and B. Giles, “R&D in the Defence Directive”, presentation at the C5 Forum on 
EU Defence & Security Procurement, November 18, 2009 
424 See Heuninckx ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 
425 Center for Strategic & International Studies (“CSIS”), European Defense Trends, ‘Budgets, Regulatory 
Frameworks and the Industrial Base’, A Report of the CSIS Defense-Inudstrial Initiatives Group (November 2010) 
43 <http://csis.org/files/publication/101025_EuroDefenseTrends_web.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
426 ibid 
427 Heuninckx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe’ (394) 140 citing at fn88 Maulny et al., 
“Cooperative Lessons Learned”, Final Report for Study 06-EDA-008, IRIS/CER/DGAP/IAI (November 30, 2006) 
18-19  
428 For a discussion of the EDA initiatives generally, see Chapter 7, in particular, Section 2.3 
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abuse.429 Finally, the Commission may find it difficult to determine and prove that the 
conditions of the exclusion are met.430 The last two issues may be particularly acute 
in light of the fact that, as indicated in Section 5.2, this notification requirement is not 
necessary if third countries are involved. 
 
From a U.S. perspective, Article 13 (c) does not appear to suggest any additional 
effects on collaborative programmes in which third countries participate. It has been 
argued that programmes involving third countries would likely be excluded under 
Article 12(a),431 although, as indicated in Section 3.2.1, any emphasis placed on a 
requirement for specific procedural rules may place a constraint on the measure of 
flexibility that is perceived to be accorded to Article 12.  
 
It is therefore possible to suggest that any comparative advantage to be gained by a 
specific exclusion designed to encourage EU cooperative programmes, might, to 
some extent, be counterbalanced by the fact that it is similarly possible to exclude 
cooperative programmes involving third countries under alternative provisions. It has 
even been suggested that Member States may use Article 12 to conduct such 
collaborative procurement with third countries with the objective of circumventing the 
Directive’s primary competition objective.432 
 
                                                 
429 Although this appears to be the view of certain commentators. According to Heuninkx, this requirement was 
introduced by the European Parliament in order to verify that the exemption would not be abused by the EU 
Member States. See Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 citing at fn 136 Giles, “R&D in the 
Defence Directive”, presentation at the C5 Forum on EU Defence & Security Procurement, November 18, 2009 
136 
430 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111. Heuninckx also observes that it is not clear how the 
Commission would identify an abuse, as the exemption does not require a minimum amount of R&D. He states 
that it is, however, likely that the most obvious abuses could still be detected through this reporting  
431 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 
432 Center for Strategic & International Studies, ‘European Defense Trends, Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks 
and the Industrial Base’ (n 425) 44 
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However, it should be observed that a consequence of the exclusion is that practices 
such as juste retour continue to operate unchecked.433 Under this principle, the 
amount of work allocated to the industry of a participating State is calculated to 
match as closely as possible the State’s financial contribution to the programme.434 It 
has been argued for many years that this constitutes a discriminatory trade practice 
that is contrary to EU law.435 Importantly, such practices have been criticized not only 
by smaller EU Member States who feel that this principle is used to favour industries 
of larger Member States as a result of their founding Membership of collaborative 
procurement organizations, but also by U.S. contractors who claim that juste retour 
limits their effective participation in European programmes.436  
 
In addition, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, the ICT Directive permits Member 
States to exempt cooperative programmes from prior authorization concerning the 
transfer of defence products within EU territory.437 It also permits optional publication 
of general licences for the execution of intergovernmental cooperation 
programmes. 438  These provisions, alongside the exclusions of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, could enable the prioritization of European collaborative 
procurement through procedural relaxation of procurement and transfer rules. An 
unresolved question is the extent to which the “benefits” of enabling such exclusions 
outweigh any “costs” which could result from the possible limiting of competition 
                                                 
433 For an early discussion of juste retour, see M Trybus, European Defence Procurement Law: International and 
National Procurement Systems as Models for a Liberalised Defence Procurement Market in Europe (Kluwer Law 
International: 1999) 39-42  
434 Heuninkx, ‘A primer to collaborative defence procurement in Europe’ (394) 135 
435 See Trybus, European Defence Procurement Law (n 433) 
436 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 82 
437 Article 2(c) ICT Directive 
438 Article 5(3) ICT Directive 
  111 
through non-application of the Defence Procurement Directive.439 
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that the primary significance of Article 13(c) is 
simply its confirmation that the most organizationally complex, R&D intensive, and 
high value procurement is prima facie excluded from the Defence Procurement 
Directive.440 From a transatlantic perspective, an discernable emphasis on European 
collaboration is discernable. However, the reality is that the U.S. substantially 
excludes European contractors from U.S. R&D projects. Similarly, the extent of 
transatlantic cooperative programmes is limited. It is suggested that in the short-term, 
the Directive’s exclusions implicating NATO and government-to-government sales 
are likely to be of greater relevance to the U.S. An important question in the medium-
long term is whether the Defence Procurement Directive, the ICT Directive and EDA 
initiatives will incentivize intra-EU collaboration to such an extent that it will 
appreciably affect the U.S.  
 
 
6. Government-to-government contracts 
 
A final important exception relating to third countries concerns government-to-
government sales. As will be examined in detail in Chapters 7 and 11, government-
to-government sales constitute a significant feature of transatlantic defence 
procurement practice, in particular, for the U.S. Its distinct role in defence 
                                                 
439 According to the CSIS report (n 425) 44: “[…] the projected fiscal gains from open competition are expected 
to exceed the cost savings from such collaboration, therefore making this loophole less desirable from the 
standpoint of overall efficiency […] Nevertheless, for some states the prospect of a guaranteed work share for the 
domestic industrial base might outweigh the associated cost inefficiencies.” (footnote omitted) 
440 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 15 
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procurement is reflected by the absence of a comparable provision in the Public 
Sector Directive. 
 
Article 13(f) provides that the Directive does not apply to: 
 
[…] contracts awarded by a government to another government relating to: 
 
(i) the supply of military equipment or sensitive equipment, 
 
        (ii) works and services directly linked to such equipment, or 
 
        (iii) works and services specifically for military purposes, or sensitive  works  
and sensitive services [...]  
 
According to the Commission Report on transposition, all Member States have 
correctly transposed Article 13(f).441 
Importantly, the term “government” is defined in Article 1(9) as meaning ‘the State, 
regional or local government of a Member State or third country’.  
Further, it should be borne in mind that the exclusion only covers the contract 
between the two governments, and not any related contracts concluded between the 
selling government and an economic operator.442 
 
                                                 
441 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on 
Defence and Security Procurement (n 302), 6 
442 Guidance Note, Defence- and security specific exclusions, 10, point 26, para 2 
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6.1. Contracts for Surplus and New Material 
Article 13(f) does not define the types of equipment which may be covered by the 
exclusion. According to the Guidance Note, Article 13(f)(i) is primarily intended for 
sales of equipment delivered from existing stocks such as surplus.443 However, the 
Guidance Note also states that it also includes, in principle, purchases of new 
material.444  Articles 13(f)(ii) and (iii) concern, respectively, contracts awarded to 
provide installation or other “works” related support for equipment purchased under 
the supply contract as well as specialist training or services support and contracts for 
specialist works or services that are not related to the initial supply contract.445  
 
6.2. Purchases From Third Country Governments 
 
Whilst the Defence Procurement Directive contains no substantial reference as to the 
conduct of government-to-government contracts, the Guidance Note states that if a 
Member State purchases new military equipment from a third country government, it 
must do so with due regard to its obligation under Article 11 not to use such contracts 
for the purpose of circumventing the Directive’s provisions;446 further, that this is 
particularly relevant in situations where market conditions are such that competition 
within the internal market would be possible.447 It should be observed that the 
Commission Report on transposition singles Article 13(f) out above the other specific 
exclusions as requiring close monitoring and verification of its use in order to prevent 
                                                 
443 Ibid, point 26, para 1 
444 ibid 
445 ibid, point 25, para 2 
446 ibid 10 point 26, para 2 
447 ibid 
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circumvention of the rules of the Directive.448 
 
A number of observations can be made in this regard. Firstly, it is not clear whether, 
and if so, why, Member States would be any more or less inclined to have recourse 
to third country sales simply to avoid compliance with the Defence Procurement 
Directive.449 Secondly, the Guidance Note appears to suggest that Member States 
have an obligation to consider whether competition within the internal market would 
be possible before having recourse to a third country purchase. It is arguable that 
any competition law-style assessment of whether internal market competition is 
possible is problematic for a host of reasons. For instance, it could be difficult to 
prove as a matter of evidence. Further, the mere possibility of internal market 
competition should not necessarily preclude the acquisition of a more economically 
advantageous third country solution (howsoever determined). Most importantly, any 
such requirement is not mandated by the wording of Article 13(f) itself. 
 
6.3. Transatlantic Importance of Government-to-Government Sales 
 
It has been suggested that Article 13(f) is an important exclusion because a 
significant part of defence procurement is performed between States, for instance, 
through United States’ Foreign Military Sales (“FMS”). 450  This programme is 
administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (“DSCA”) for the 
Department of Defense (“DoD”) which enables approved countries to obtain defence 
                                                 
448 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on 
Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 6 
449 The same observation can be made in relation to the suggestion in Section 5.3 above that Member States 
could have increased recourse to third country collaboration in order to avoid compliance with the Directive 
450 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111  
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articles and services on payment through national funds or U.S. approved funds.451 
In addition, Article 13(f) could also allow open intergovernmental arrangements 
allowing States to procure from each other or exchange military equipment, for 
example, through the NATO Logistic Stock Exchange.452  Thus, the exclusion of 
government-to-government contracts is a specific recognition of the transatlantic 
importance of this type of defence trade activity. 
 
However, the potential for transatlantic trade to be adversely affected in the context 
of government-to-government contracts has also been observed. Even though 
government-to-government contracts may be excluded from the scope of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, it has been suggested that a government could still 
be a candidate or tenderer for a contract to be awarded in line with the provisions of 
the Directive, notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether 
such an award could arguably constitute provision of State aid.453 In particular, it has 
been suggested that the U.S. fears that the Directive would require EU Member 
States to reject offers made by the U.S. through its FMS arrangement when EU 
Member States intend to award contracts in line with the provisions of the Directive, 
thereby creating some form of “fortress Europe.”454  
 
A more significant issue concerns contracts related to the foreign military sale. 
Government-to-government sales may often be accompanied by so-called “offset” 
agreements which are intended to compensate the purchasing Member State for 
                                                 
451  For information on the U.S. FMS programme, see <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/fms> accessed 20 
September 2013  
452 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 
453 ibid 
454 Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the Boundaries’ (n 80) 111 citing at fn141 citing a Private communication from I. 
Maelcamp d’Opstaele, United States Mission to the European Union, November 17, 2009  
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sourcing its requirements from a foreign, as opposed to domestic, operator. As will be 
discussed in Chapters 7 and 11, offsets are generally considered to be incompatible 
with EU law. Similarly, the U.S. does not officially endorse such agreements. The fact 
that a government-government contract could legitimately be excluded raises the 
question as to whether any accompanying offset agreement could similarly be 
excluded. According to the Guidance Note on Offsets, whilst government-to-
government sales are excluded from the Directive, possible related offset 
requirements would have to be separately justified on grounds that they are 
“necessary for the protection of the essential interests of the purchasing Member 
State”.455 In light of the general significance of this issue within the wider debate on 
offsets, this issue is reserved for discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The overriding message of this Chapter is that whilst U.S. claims focus 
predominantly on the possibility for the Defence Procurement Directive to 
discriminate against U.S. contractors, the reality is that substantial forms of 
procurement are likely excluded from compliance with the competitive disciplines of 
the Directive. 
 
One U.S. legal commentator has identified that the exclusions will likely provide U.S. 
contractors with important “safe harbors against discrimination”. 456  Yet, as this 
Chapter has demonstrated, considerable legal uncertainty exists on a number of key 
issues which could conceivably impact on transatlantic defence procurement. 
                                                 
455 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7, point 24 
456 See C Yukins, ‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (n 311) 5 
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Firstly, in certain instances, there appears to be an operative assumption that the 
exclusions provide “safe harbours” because they provide automatic exclusions from 
compliance with the Directive. However, as indicated in this Chapter, certain 
conditions may limit the flexibility that is perceived to be afforded under these 
exclusions. Much depends on the emphasis to be placed on requirements for specific 
procedural rules, for example. In addition, the Guidance Notes, whilst not legally 
binding, place a particular emphasis on third countries when identifying that the 
exclusions must not be used to circumvent the Directive’s provisions. 
 
Secondly, an important question is which harbour does one choose? In a storm, the 
choice of several may seem appealing. However, as indicated in this Chapter, there 
is a considerable degree of interpretative overlap between certain exclusions, in 
particular Articles 12(a), 12(c) and 13(c). Whilst this may presume a degree of 
flexibility, it also generates legal uncertainty, in particular when combined with the 
emphasis on preventing circumvention of the Directive. 
 
Thirdly, whilst it may be argued that in certain areas the Directive preserves the 
“status quo”, the substantial exclusion of cooperative procurement under Article 
13(c), for example, means that an open question remains as to whether, in the 
broader context of EU initiatives, an incentive towards European collaboration could 
effect a particular change in procurement practices which could impact on the U.S. 
Importantly, this field continues to remain substantially unregulated. It is not clear to 
what extent (if at all) the exclusions will effectuate a shift towards greater intra-EU 
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collaboration or towards even greater individual Member State or European 
collaboration with the U.S.  
Finally, as indicated, legal uncertainty also surrounds Article 13(f) on government-to-
government sales, in particular, with regard to third countries. Given the prevalence 
of the U.S. in the field of FMS, any emphasis on third country sales is most likely 
directed towards the U.S. 
 
To this extent, whilst the prima facie exclusion of major forms of procurement may, at 
a superficial level, signal that the Directive is “without prejudice” to the conduct of 
transatlantic defence trade relations, the legitimate scope of the exclusions and 
conditions for their use is not fully defined. Further, exclusion also means that 
politically and economically contentious fields of activity continue to be subject to 
uncoordinated legal regimes. 
 
As a result, the external coherence of the EU defence procurement regime is called 
into question and which, in turn, creates significant uncertainty in the conduct of 
transatlantic defence procurement relations. 
 
This thesis now turns to the issue of third country access to the EU procurement 
market in pre-emption of the substantive analysis of the Directive’s provisions in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
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4 
Access and Treatment of Third Countries Within the 
EU Procurement Market 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Before the final text of the Defence Procurement Directive had even been adopted, 
U.S. commentary had suggested that certain provisions created a possibility of 
“implied European preferences”, which could become “subtle and disguised market 
access barriers” used by EU-based contracting authorities to “discriminate” against 
U.S. contractors and subcontractors. 457 In particular, the security of supply, security 
of information and technical specification provisions might be exploited to justify 
excluding U.S. bidders, 458  or which may provide a legitimate basis for 
discrimination.459 
 
Conversely, as indicated in Chapter 1, Section 5.1, official EU publications, 
commissioned studies and commentaries have not examined the ways in which the 
Directive relates to, or could otherwise affect, third countries. For instance, official EU 
publications merely state that the Directive is not intended to “impact” on third 
                                                 
457 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol I) (n 12) 221 
458 NATO, NIAG SG- Consultancy Advice Study, Transatlantic Defence Industrial Cooperation, Final Report, 
February 8 2008, 15, fn22 citing “Brussels Told Arms Rules will Hurt Trade”, December 5, 2007, 2 
<https://www.ncoic.org/apps/group_public/download.php/8434/> accessed 20 September 2012 
459 C Yukins, ‘Barriers to International Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis, Part II: Opening 
International Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business’ (2009) The George Washington University Law School 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 530, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 530, Int’l 2-22 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1772922> accessed 20 September 2013 
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countries, in particular transatlantic defence trade relations. 460 The stated basis for 
this determination is two-fold. The first is that arms trade with third countries remains 
governed by WTO rules.461 The second, which is said to relate to the first, is that 
Member States retain the power to determine whether or not to open competition to 
non-EU suppliers. 462  Similarly, academic commentary has suggested that the 
Defence Procurement Directive does not “directly affect” the position of third country 
economic operators, a conclusion based on the fact that the Directive does not 
specify any conditions in relation to third country access.463 It has also been stated 
that whilst third countries may fear that the Directive could be used as a protectionist 
measure to favour EU companies, this is not the Directive’s aim and does not 
introduce more opportunities for protectionism than were possible prior to its 
adoption.464 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will examine these claims. However, it is notable that the above 
does not expressly differentiate the legal basis for any “discrimination” claim from any 
de facto consequence of an otherwise legitimate application of the Directive. Further, 
whilst the emphasis has been on the absence of intentional and direct “impact”, there 
has been no focus on the possible unintentional, indirect and incidental effects. This 
Chapter will aim to clarify whether, and the extent to which, U.S. firms participating in 
                                                 
460 See Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination 
of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the 
fields of defence and security’, COM(2007) 766 final, 7; Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Annex to the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of certain public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts in the fields of 
defence and security’ (Impact Assessment) SEC(2007)1589, December 5, 2007, 56-57 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/impact_assessment_en.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013  
461 ibid. This statement is somewhat curious given the prima facie exclusion of defence procurement from the 
scope of the WTO GPA and the existence of Art. XXIII(1) WTO GPA identified in Chapter 2, Section 2.1. It is 
recalled that the Interpretative Communication similarly asserts that arms trade is governed by WTO rules, in 
particular, the WTO GPA as a basis for excluding its consideration. See Chapter 2, Section 5 
462 ibid. See also Recital 18 
463 B Heuninckx, ‘trick or treat?’ (n 252) 12 
464 Heuninckx, ‘trick or treat?’ (n 252) 27 
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contract award procedures derive legally enforceable rights under international 
agreements, arrangements, EU law and national law. Further, by expanding the field 
of enquiry to an examination of access beyond the archetype of the third country 
economic operator directly submitting an EU tender, it is possible to begin to discern 
the broader remit of EU law and its possible wider effects. As will be discussed, this 
is also necessary in order to understand how EU law may affect third countries 
through its application to subjects of EU law.465 
 
It should be borne in mind that the task of the present Chapter is necessarily 
complicated and limited by the fact that there is no substantial existent research 
which is able to provide insight into how Member State laws and policies have been 
applied in relation to third countries in the field of defence procurement. It therefore 
difficult to gauge a formative impression of the extent to which the institution of the 
Defence Procurement Directive will effectuate any change in national regulatory 
approaches and practices.  
 
 
2. Third Country Access Under The Public Sector and Defence Directives 
 
The EU has become the main legal and policy actor with regard to the conduct of 
relations between Member States and third countries in the field of public 
procurement. 466  This is largely attributable to the conclusion by the European 
                                                 
465 For instance, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, whilst the Directive may not apply directly to third countries, 
the assessment of a tender submitted by an EU economic operator may implicate considerations relating to third 
countries. EU economic operators may also impose specific requirements on third countries pursuant to the 
Directive’s provisions 
466 For general commentary on third country relations in the field of public procurement, see Arrowsmith, The 
Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) Ch 20 
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Community of the WTO GPA.467 As a matter of context, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the legal basis on which the WTO GPA was concluded.  
 
2.1. EU and Member State Competences in Defence Procurement 
 
The EU does not have a general power to legislate. Under the principle of conferral, it 
must act within the limits of competence conferred by the Member States under the 
EU Treaties for the purpose of obtaining the Treaties’ objectives.468 It is recalled from 
Chapter 3, Section 2.2 that Article 3(1) TFEU confers exclusive competence on the 
EU in a number of areas. This includes the Common Commercial Policy (“CCP”) 
under Article 207 TFEU (ex Article 133 TEC). Article 207 TFEU contains powers 
permitting the EU to take unilateral trade measures and to negotiate and conclude 
agreements with States and international organisations.469  
 
Article 207 TFEU does not provide an exhaustive definition of commercial policy but 
merely provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of measures falling within its 
scope.470 Procurement is not expressly mentioned.  
 
Whilst it is further recalled that internal market regulation of public procurement is 
said to be a shared competence, the question of whether procurement measures are 
                                                 
467 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) [1994] OJ L336/273 (n 76). The Agreement 
was approved on behalf of the European Community by Council Decision 94/800/EC of 22 December 1994 
concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of 
the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) [1994] OJ L 336/1 
468 Article 5(2) TEU (ex Article 5 TEC) 
469 Article 207(3) and (4) TFEU 
470 According to Article 207(1) TFEU, these include: (i) changes in tariff rates; (ii) the conclusion of tariff and 
trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property; (iii) 
foreign direct investment; (iv) the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation; (v) export policy and (vi) 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies 
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capable of falling within the EU’s exclusive competence under the CCP has been the 
subject of academic debate. 471  It is now generally accepted that procurement 
measures are of such type as to fall within the CCP.472 On this basis, it has been 
argued that because the provisions of the GPA to some extent fell within the then 
European Community’s exclusive competence under the CCP, the GPA was 
concluded under this provision. 473  It follows that when the CCP applies, the 
measures in question fall within the EU’s exclusive competence.474 The corollary is 
that only the EU can act; Member States are precluded from taking their own 
measures in the field of activity concerned (even if the EU has not yet exercised its 
powers, for example by adopting a common policy).475 
 
Importantly, however, there is no definitive statement of EU law regarding defence 
procurement as a competence. The adoption of a Directive to regulate trade within 
the internal market indicates a shared competence. The starting point of the Directive 
(as indicated in Recital 18) appears to be that defence procurement is not an 
exclusive competence because it is not covered by the WTO GPA, as a result of 
which Member States “retain power” to decide whether or not to invite third country 
economic operators to participate in contract award procedures. 
 
                                                 
471 For a discussion in this regard, see S Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC public procurement: an 
analysis of the legal framework’ (1995) 1 PPLR 1, 2-4, 9-10 
472 S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1314, para 20.2 and citation at fn 3 
referring to S Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC public procurement: an analysis of the legal framework’ (n 
471) 2-4 
473 Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1327, para 20.11  
474 ibid 1314 
475 S Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC public procurement’ (n 471) 1 citing at fn 1 Opinion 1/75 [1975] 
ECR 1355 at 1364; Case 41/76 Criel, nee Donckerwolke v. Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande 
Instance, Lille [1976] ECR 1921, paras 31-32; Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 
1356, para 20.35 
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In addition, Article 207(6) TFEU provides that the exercise of competences conferred 
under the CCP must not affect the delimitation of Member State and EU 
competences and must not lead to harmonization of legislative or regulatory 
provisions of the Member States in so far as the Treaties exclude such 
harmonization. 
 
It follows that, as indicated above, in areas of exclusive competence, Member States 
may not take their own measures in the area concerned unless authorised to do so 
by the EU. It has been suggested that the EU’s exclusive competence under the 
CCP means that Member States are substantially precluded from adopting their own 
measures which may discriminate against third countries.476 By contrast, it appears 
that Member States are free to adopt their own measures in the field of defence 
procurement provided they otherwise comply with EU law. However, this raises a 
number of questions which, as yet, have not been answered. 
 
Firstly, it is not clear precisely what falls within the permissible range of measures 
which Member States can take in relation to third countries. The possibility for 
variable national approaches to the issue of third country treatment could affect the 
internal coherence of the EU defence procurement regime. 
 
Secondly, a broader question is raised as to whether the EU could exercise its 
competence to regulate third country treatment in a way comparable to its role in the 
field of public procurement. It is beyond the confines of this thesis to examine the 
possibility of such a development. Notwithstanding, the asymmetry between the EU’s 
                                                 
476 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1356, point 20.35  
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current approach in the field of defence procurement and that in the field of public 
procurement raises questions as to the external coherence of the EU procurement 
regime. 
 
2.2. Third Country Provision Under the Public Sector and Defence Directives 
 
Both the Public Sector and Utilities Directives 477  provide that in view of the 
international rights and commitments devolving on the EU as a result of the 
acceptance of the GPA, the arrangements to be applied to tenderers and products 
from signatory third countries are those defined by the GPA.478 The GPA contains a 
number of obligations which, in theory, enable third countries to attain relative 
equivalence in terms of access and treatment in public contract awards.479 These 
include, inter alia, non-discrimination,480 most favoured nation treatment481 and an 
obligation to provide timely, transparent and effective challenge procedures.482  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 11 of this thesis, whilst there remain questions about 
the extent to which these obligations are adequately enforceable and enforced, at 
least some level of provision is made in contrast to the legal position of third country 
providers concerned in the award of public defence contracts. State coverage under 
                                                 
477 Directive 2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ L 134/1 (“Utilities Directive”). The Utilities Directive 
contains a number of provisions in relation to third countries. For a useful discussion see P Eeckhout, The 
European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (Clarenden 1994), 305-318 
478 Public Sector Directive, Recital 7; Utilities Directive, Recital 14 
479  On the WTO GPA generally, see Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) (n 77) 
480 Article III. For commentary, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1330-1, 
point 20.14 
481 Article III. For commentary, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1331, 
point 20.15 
482 Article XX. For commentary, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1336-7, 
20.18  
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the GPA substantially excludes matters of defence procurement.483 Similarly, the 
Defence Procurement Directive reinforces in Recital 18 that contracts relating to 
arms, munitions and war material awarded by contracting authorities/entities in the 
field of defence are excluded from the scope of the GPA.484 As will be discussed in 
Part III, a major policy question that has arisen for GPA members is whether to bring 
defence procurement within the scope of the GPA. 
 
The EU’s position of ostensible neutrality is confirmed by Recital 18, paragraph 2 
Defence Procurement Directive which provides: 
 
This exclusion means also that in the specific context of defence and 
security markets, Member States retain the power to decide whether or 
not their contracting authority/entity may allow economic operators from 
third countries to participate in contract award procedures. They should 
take that decision on the grounds of value for money, recognizing the 
need for a globally competitive European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base, the importance of open and fair markets and the obtaining 
of mutual benefits. Member States should press for increasingly open 
markets. Their partners should also demonstrate openness, on the basis 
of internationally-agreed rules in particular as concerns open and fair 
competition. 485 
                                                 
483 See for example the European Communities’ Annex I to the WTO GPA which lists the European agencies 
and products open to competition from other GPA members and which covers only part of the defence market 
484 Recital 18. Each Party to the WTO GPA defines its commitments in an appendix to the agreement. To this 
extent certain defence contracting authorities are expressly excluded  
485 It is not clear to what internationally agreed rules Recital 18(2) refers in the absence of specific international 
agreements regulating defence procurement. The reference instead likely refers to the WTO GPA which, whilst 
excluding defence contracts, may, through its coverage of public procurement, provide a point of leverage to 
encourage greater reciprocal access in relation to defence contracts 
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U.S. commentary has suggested that Recital 18 could be read to countenance 
discrimination against foreign defence contractors.486 However, it may be suggested 
that whilst not constituting a third country policy, in and of itself, Recital 18 is simply 
consistent with the EU’s longstanding policy of “reciprocity” in the context of external 
relations in public procurement.487  
It is also important to observe that despite earlier proposals for the adoption of what 
were labelled “Buy European” and “reciprocity clauses”,488 the EU has not mandated 
any formal “preferences” within the Directive.489  
 
Further, the Directive requires that in restricted procedures, negotiated procedures 
with publication and competitive dialogues, contracting authorities may limit the 
number of suitable candidates that will be invited to tender or conduct a dialogue.490 
However, the Directive prescribes that no less than three candidates must be invited, 
provided a sufficient number is available.491 U.S. observers have identified that this 
could provide increased competition and opportunities for U.S. firms due to the fact 
                                                 
486 See C Yukins, ‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (n 311), 5 
487 In a 1988 Memorandum, the Commission announced that the EC would not adopt a protectionist approach 
but rather favour conditional access to the EU market on the basis that reciprocal access to the relevant third 
country market would be guaranteed. See Commission Memorandum of 1988, “Europe 1992: Europe World 
Partner”, Commission Press Release, 17 of October 19 1988. For useful but by now dated discussions of EU 
external relations law and policy in the field of public procurement, see S Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC 
public procurement: an analysis of the legal framework (n 471) 7-9; P Eeckhout, ‘The External Dimension of the 
Internal Market and the Scope and Content of a Modern Commercial Policy in M Maresceau (ed) The European 
Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension (Martinus Nijhoff 1993), 89-90  
488 U.S. legal commentary had indicated that after the U.S. Department of Defense decided to delay a major 
aerial refueling tanker award, the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee voted in favour of a so-called 
“Buy European” and “reciprocity” clause and that, if confirmed, Member States would be legally entitled to 
discriminate against bidders from third countries. See W Hertel, F Schöning and D WBurgett, New EU Legal 
Framework For The Defense Industry (2008) Vol 5(10) International Government Contractor, 2. However, U.S. 
commentary has also acknowledged the absence of any “Buy European” policy. See M Gabriel and K Weiner, 
‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: Toward Liberalization and Harmonization of the European 
Defense Market (2010) 45(2) The Procurement Lawyer, 22. The aerial refueling contract identified above is 
discussed in Chapter 9, Section 3.3 
489 See also the discussions in Chapters 5 and 6 in this regard 
490 Article 38(3) 
491 ibid 
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that it is unlikely that for certain defence technologies three EU providers will always 
be available.492 
 
3. Transposition of the Defence Procurement Directive into National Law 
 
Member States had until 21 August 2011 to transpose the Defence Procurement 
Directive into national law.493 It appears that all Member States have now transposed 
the Directive.494 
 
According to Article 288 TFEU (ex Article 249 TEC), a Directive is binding as to the 
result to be achieved but leaves the choice of form and methods to the national 
authorities.495 Therefore, Member States are not in fact required to introduce new 
legislation; existing laws and practices can be modified accordingly.  
 
Prior to the Directive’s adoption, it had been suggested that if a Member State 
decides to extend the Directive’s application to third countries, a third country should 
benefit from the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality and equivalent 
treatment afforded to EU economic operators under EU law, including the prohibition 
on discrimination on grounds of nationality.496 The legal basis for this suggestion is 
not entirely clear. In light of the above analysis, the starting point must be that even if 
                                                 
492 I Maelcamp, ‘EU Defense Procurement Directive 2009’ (n 266) 8 
493 Article 72 
494 Initially, the Commission issued several warnings to Member States that failed to implement on time. See R 
Williams, ‘Commission takes action on implementation of defence procurement rules” (2012) 21 PPLR, 223; 
Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC on 
Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 
495 See Case 163/82 Commission v. Italy [1983] ECR 3723, 3286-3287  
496 Statements of Burkhard Schmitt at a specialist seminar entitled: “The new EU Directive Towards Market-
Based Defence and Sensitive Security Procurement’ International Chamber of Commerce, Tuesday 1 February 
2011. Notes on file with the author  
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the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 18 TFEU (ex Article 12 TEC) 
could be considered equivalent to the WTO notion of “national treatment” for 
example, the WTO GPA does not apply and, in any event, EU law only applies to 
natural and legal persons of the EU Member States.497  
 
A Member State could provide full equivalent treatment based, for example, on the 
commitments undertaken within a RDP to ensure non-discrimination and equal 
treatment. However, if such a guarantee is not given domestic legal effect such as to 
enable enforcement before a national court, its effect is necessarily limited. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 11, certain provisions in the RDPs have been given domestic 
legal effect under U.S. law, in particular with regard to U.S. buy national laws.498 
However, the RDPs do not confer legally enforceable rights against non-
discrimination and positive enforcement of rights to equal treatment more generally. 
To this extent, any reference to “discrimination” against third countries must be 
meant in a non-technical, non-legal sense. 
 
3.1. The Position of Third Countries Under National Law 
 
It is recalled from the Introduction that there is little understanding of national laws 
and practices with regard to access and treatment of third countries concerned in 
defence contracts. Further, at the time of writing, Member States have only recently 
transposed the Directive’s provisions. To this extent, it will likely be some time before 
the full extent of any modifications to national law and their effects will become 
                                                 
497 On any such equivalence generally, see P. Trepte, Regulating Procurement: Understanding the Ends and 
Means of Public Procurement Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2004), 251  
498 Chapter 11, Section 4.3.1.4 
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apparent with regard to third countries. It is nevertheless useful to compare 
transposition by the UK and France, not least because of their historic and 
contemporary role in transatlantic defence cooperation. 
 
3.1.1. Case Study 1: UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 
 
In its transposition, the U.K. has adopted a specific set of Defence and Security 
Public Contracts Regulations (“DSPCR”) distinct from the Regulations applicable to 
public sector procurement. 499  Similar to the DG Internal Market and Services 
Guidance Notes, the UK has also published a number of Chapters to provide 
guidance on interpreting and applying the provisions.500  
 
Under the Regulations, the U.K. does not confer any legal rights on third countries or 
subject the U.K. to any corresponding legal obligations with regard to the DSPCR 
which are enforceable within U.K. courts. 501  The U.K. expressly states that its 
obligation to comply with the DSPCR is solely to “potential suppliers in the Member 
States of the European Union”.502  The UK’s duty does not extend to potential 
suppliers established outside the EU, because such suppliers do not constitute 
economic operators as defined in the Regulations.503 Further, the Regulations do not 
include reference to any link which suppliers established within the EU may have with 
                                                 
499 The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, S.I. 2009/2743. The DSPCR are an adaptation 
of The Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (as amended) S.I. 1991/755  
500 There are 19 Chapters in total which are also accompanied by a detailed glossary. Reference will be made to 
relevant Chapters in this thesis where necessary. These are available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-european-union-defence-and-security-public-contracts-
regulations-dspcr-2011> accessed 20 September 2013 
501 There is not a single reference to third countries in the DSPCR 
502 The Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Chapter 1 – Overview, 2, point 12 
503 Chapter 1 – Overview (n 502), 2 point 13. According to Section 5(1): “an “economic operator” means a 
contractor, a supplier or a services provider.”  
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third countries.504 Notwithstanding, the U.K. does state that procurers should allow 
potential suppliers from outside the EU to participate in a procurement procedure as 
a matter of policy.505  
 
It follows that third countries do not have access to the UK remedies provisions 
except to the extent that procurers extend such rights contractually either expressly 
or by implication.506  
 
Whilst not entirely unequivocal, the U.K. Guidance further states that:  
 
[…] Procurers should be aware that where you seek and receive response 
to competitive tenders, an implied contract is very likely to come into 
existence where the procurer agrees to consider all tenderers fairly. This is 
very likely to apply to suppliers from outside the EU who you have allowed 
to participate in the procurement.507  
 
The precise instances in which an implied contract may be found as well as the 
conceivable scope of any obligation to consider tenderers “fairly” raises the question 
as to whether it would require the provision of treatment to third country operators 
equivalent to that provided to EU economic operators.508 Whilst it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine this issue in full, UK courts have had to consider the 
                                                 
504 Cf for example the provisions in Article 59(5) Utilities Directive discussed in Section 4.1 below 
505 At the time of writing, to the present author’s knowledge, the U.K. has not adopted or published a specific 
policy, or amended existing policy, with regard to third countries, or more specifically, the U.S. in light of the 
Defence Procurement Directive setting the conditions for participation and treatment 
506 Chapter 1 – Overview (n 502) 2-3 para 13 
507 Chapter 1 – Overview (n 502) 3 para 15 
508 The “implied tender contract” doctrine is said to derive from the case of Blackpool and Fylde Aero Club v. 
Blackpool Borough Council [1990] EWCA Civ 13, [1990] 1 WLR 1195. For a discussion of the general scope of 
this obligation, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (119) 107-110, paras 288-291  
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extent to which domestic legal obligations to consider tenders fairly should 
correspond with the EU Treaty procurement principles.509 The likelihood of such 
argument succeeding is open to question in light of the fact that its legal basis under 
English law is contentious. It is also not clear to what extent it is possible to prevent 
or limit the scope of any obligation by means of waiver or contractual exclusion. 
Nevertheless, this issue highlights just one of many which could theoretically arise as 
a result of the idiosyncratic features of each national legal system.  
 
3.1.2. Case Study 2: Code Des Marchés Publics 2006 (Consolidées 2013) 
 
Unlike the UK, France has not adopted a specific instrument to implement the 
Directive but has rather modified the Code des Marchés Publics.510 Whilst the Code 
does not explicitly preclude third country operators from tendering for contracts in 
accordance with the Directive, it has been suggested that the cumulative effect of the 
Code’s provisions is to presumptively exclude third countries from public 
procurement procedures.511 For instance, under the revised Code, if an authority 
wishes to open a procurement to third country operators, it must make its decision 
known in the notice of tender. 512  Further, the Code contains particularly broad 
accessibility criteria which include reference to the obtaining of mutual advantages 
and reciprocity.513 In addition, the signatory authority may require that third country 
                                                 
509 For a brief discussion of the potential scope of this obligation, see L R A Butler, ‘Below Threshold and Annex 
II B Service Contracts in the United Kingdom: A Common Law Approach’ in D Dragos and R Caranta (ed) Outside 
the EU Procurement Directives – Inside the Treaty? (Djøf: 2012) 310-325 and citations therein 
510 Code des marchés publics (édition 2006), Version consolidée au 28 Juillet 2013 
511 See L-X Simonel and B Touzanne, ‘Defence and security public procurement contracts : counterpoint and 
harmony (article 215-1 PPC)’, Thursday 19 January 2012 <http://www.kpratique.fr/Defence-and-security-public-
procurement-contracts-counterpoint-and-harmony-article-215-1-PPC_a94.html> 20 September 2013 
512 Article 215-I 
513 Article 215-II. These appear to directly incorporate the references in Recital 18 Defence Procurement 
Directive, discussed above. Article 218 further provides that third country operators must be able to provide all 
documents, information or evidence in support of their applications to assess whether they meet the accessibility 
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operators complete their applications within a maximum period of ten days where 
documents, information or evidence are lacking; failure to do so within the prescribed 
period will preclude further participation. 514  Finally, the signatory authority must 
establish a report containing inter alia, and as appropriate, the reasons that 
motivated its decisions relating to the third country operators’ participation in the 
procurement process.515 
 
It has been suggested that these developments will produce significant effects on 
third country operators already established in the French defence and security 
market or willing to integrate into it.516 In particular, commentary has highlighted the 
emphasis on satisfying the additional requirements to complete applications within a 
maximum period and the more fundamental observation that the number of markets 
opened to third countries will only be known a posteriori, after governmental 
decision.517 Importantly, it has also been suggested that there is a need for a precise 
definition of the notion of third country economic operators.518 It is recalled that the 
UK DSPCR similarly omits a detailed definition of economic operators. 
 
Further, French commentary has also identified the need to study the legal feasibility 
of, and/or alternatively, the signing of a general subcontracting agreement with a 
European operator, the setting up of institutionalized co-contracting or the 
                                                                                                                                                        
criteria. Article 232-II provides that the signatory authority decides on the rights of third country operators to 
participate in the procurement process, in accordance with the specified accessibility criteria. The authority then 
considers applications by third countries that have not been excluded 
514 Article 232-I 
515 Article 252 
516 Simonel and Touzanne, ‘counterpoint and harmony’ (n 511) 
517 ibid 
518 ibid 
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establishment of a European branch.519 This appears to recognize the continued 
necessity of partnering in order to leverage access into the national market.520  
 
4. Differentiating Modes of Third Country Access 
 
As indicted, the Defence Procurement Directive merely states that Member States 
retain power to decide whether or not to permit participation of “economic operators 
from third countries”. 521  This appears to envisage direct participation of a third 
country economic operator submitting a tender for a main contract subject to the 
Directive. However, for a host of reasons, certain of which are examined below, the 
reality is that direct access of this kind is unlikely to be common or, indeed, the most 
effective way of accessing the EU market. Further, whilst the Directive emphasizes 
ostensible neutrality with regard to third countries, it nevertheless contains specific 
provisions which make reference to third countries and, which, if applied directly to 
EU economic operators, may affect those third countries.522 
 
To this extent, as indicated in the Introduction, whilst EU official publications and 
legal commentary refer to the absence of direct impacts, these determinations do not 
identify the indirect effects which may result and which can be discerned (if not 
measured) when third country access is viewed from a broader perspective. It is 
necessary to clarify at a relatively basic level of understanding the various ways in 
which third countries may access the EU market. 
                                                 
519 ibid 
520 For a discussion in this regard, see Section 4.4. below 
521 Recital 18 
522 As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these issues arise, in particular, when examining the Directive’s application 
to EU contractors which rely on third country supply chains 
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4.1. Third Country Economic Operators 
 
The archetypal scenario which appears to be envisaged in official and other 
publications concerns the instance in which a third country economic operator 
submits a bid and also proposes to, or if awarded the prime contract, use either third 
country subcontractors, EU subcontractors or a combination.523 As indicated above, 
in this case, the legal position is likely to depend on the relevant Member State’s 
decision as to whether or not to accord rights to third country operators which are 
enforceable under national law. 
 
One important aspect which is not specified by the Directives nor the implementing 
national legislation concerns precisely what distinguishes an EU economic operator 
from a third country economic operator.524 By contrast, the Utilities Directive, for 
example, contains a specific provision originally included to enable the future 
suspension or restriction of the award of service contracts where it had been 
determined that third countries had not provided reciprocal access to EU economic 
operators.525 The Utilities Directive distinguishes between: (i) undertakings governed 
by the law of a third country;526 (ii) undertakings affiliated to those governed by the 
law of a third country, which have their registered office in the EU but no “direct and 
effective link” with the economy of a Member State 527  and (iii) undertakings 
submitting tenders which have as their object services originating in the third 
                                                 
523 Of course, those subcontractors may be prime contractors on a different contract  
524 According to Article 1(14) Defence Procurement Directive: “‘economic operator’ means a contractor, supplier 
or service provider. It is used merely in the interests of simplification[.]” 
525 59(5) Utilities Directive 
526 Article 59(5)(a) 
527 Article 59(5)(b). According to this category, the links which such firms have with third countries may cause 
them to “import” services, so that despite their EC nationality, there is no benefit to the EC economy. For a 
discussion in this regard, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1359, para 20.37 
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country.528 The rationale supporting this definition is readily apparent in light of the 
possibility to provide services from a location without a physical presence in EU 
territory.  
 
However, it is not clear what precludes a similar definition being adopted by both the 
Public Sector and Defence Procurement Directives. It is likely that the place of 
establishment will be decisive for determining the scope ratione materiae of the 
Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions. Nevertheless, as will be discussed 
below, the fact that third country operators may establish EU subsidiaries means that 
EU law may, in its direct application to subjects of EU law, also affect third country 
operators. Further, beyond determining the applicability of the Directive, the issue of 
establishment is also relevant to substantive assessments of tenders. For instance, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 5, Section 7.2.1, the Guidance Notes on the Directive 
contain specific references to the establishment of economic operators and 
“dependence” on third country supply chains.  
 
In light of the above, questions arise regarding the extent to which degrees of 
ownership, affiliation and other links are, or ought to be, relevant in application of the 
Directive. It is suggested that the Directive, or at the least the Guidance Notes, might 
have better defined and delineated these aspects.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
528 Article 59(5)(c). This category focuses on the nature of the service rather than the service provider. See S. 
Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 527) and citations therein 
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4.2. EU Subsidiary of a Third Country Company 
 
As indicated above, another form of access may involve an EU subsidiary of a third 
country parent company which submits a tender providing goods, works or services 
all or part of which originate from a third country or the EU. It is recalled that the 
Directive does not classify the origin of third country providers and makes no 
reference to State of nationality, establishment, degree of affiliation or other “direct 
and effective link”.  
 
In correspondence with the position under the Public Sector and Utilities Directives, 
an EU subsidiary of a third country company will be considered (at least formally) 
equivalent to an EU economic operator for the purposes of EU law. Whilst it is not 
clear to what extent, if at all, U.S. establishment of subsidiaries within the EU will be 
affected by the introduction of the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives, U.S. 
companies with EU subsidiaries are likely to continue to take advantage of EU 
establishment in order to provide an important point of leverage into the EU 
procurement market in a way that has become vital for the success of the limited 
number of European defence companies that also operate within the U.S. market. 
 
The result of this status is that whilst a third country parent cannot directly enforce 
EU law for the reasons explained above, a third country parent may be indirectly 
affected by the application of EU law to the EU subsidiary. The corollary of this 
position is that because the EU subsidiary will be able to challenge a decision under 
EU law, its third country parent may nevertheless derive a measure of incidental 
protection under EU law as a result.  
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With regard to a subcontractor, it has been observed that in case subcontracting 
obligations are part of the tendering process under the Directive, it is uncertain if a 
subcontractor of the tenderer would have a right to challenge procurement decisions 
of the contracting authority under the Directive, for instance, if the contracting 
authority rejects its selection by the tenderer.529 However, it has been submitted that 
subcontractors would have a right of challenge as they probably fit within the 
definition of “person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract 
who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement”.530 In any case, a 
subcontractor could not rely on the remedies provisions against a subcontracting 
decision of the tenderer itself.531 To this extent, it may be possible to argue that an 
EU subsidiary of a third country economic operator acting as a subcontractor to an 
EU operator or other EU subsidiary of a third country economic operator may be able 
to challenge the decision of a contracting authority under the Directive. However, it is 
unlikely that a third country economic operator acting as subcontractor to either an 
EU operator or EU subsidiary of a third country parent could similarly challenge a 
decision under the Directive.532 
 
As indicated in Section 3, it may be possible for a Member State to provide full 
equivalent treatment as a matter of national law but this does not affect the prima 
                                                 
529 B Heuninckx, ‘trick or treat?’ (n 252) 26 
530 Article 55(4) provides that: “Member States shall ensure that review procedures are available, under detailed 
rules which Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a 
particular contract who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.” 
531 Article 55(1)  
532 Again, this may expose a degree of legal uncertainty. On a broad reading, a third country subcontractor may 
constitute a person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract who has been or risks being 
harmed by an alleged infringement. However, it appears that a third country operator acting as a subcontractor 
could not challenge a decision of a contracting authority under the Directive simply by the fact of its constituting a 
“third country”. It could be argued that such a third country operator is incapable of having any legally enforceable 
rights under EU law and so cannot have an interest or suffer any harm that is legally recognised 
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facie position with regard to the scope of the Directive in its application to subjects of 
EU law. 
 
4.3. EU Economic Operator Proposes Third Country Subcontractor 
 
The preceding sections have considered the possibility of third country economic 
operators and EU subsidiaries of third country operators tendering for contracts. 
However, an EU economic operator with no apparent third country ownership or 
other affiliation may also submit a bid and proposes to, or if awarded the prime 
contract, use third country subcontractors, EU subcontractors (which may be EU 
subsidiaries of third country operators) or a combination. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, an EU economic operator may be affected by the Directive’s provisions 
where, for example, a contracting authority takes into account issues relating to an 
EU tenderer’s supply chain or imposes certain conditions on subcontracting.  
 
4.4. Teaming Arrangements, Joint Ventures and Consortia 
 
It has been suggested that notwithstanding the increasing encouragement of third 
country contractor participation in contract award procedures, Member States have 
expressed, and are likely to continue to express, informal preferences for tenders to 
include the involvement of local industries.533 Consequently, in order to avoid the risk 
of an unsuccessful individual tender, third country contractors may have no other 
credible option than to submit a joint bid with a local partner under a teaming 
arrangement.  
                                                 
533 See Van Bael & Bellis, ‘White Paper on the Competition Law Assessment of Joint Bidding in European 
Defence Markets’, 5 January 2011, 1 and 5 (on file with the author)  
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However, the Directive does not contain any specific provisions in relation to joint 
ventures, teaming or consortia bids.534 Whilst there is limited understanding of the 
application of EU procurement law to teaming arrangements in defence procurement, 
an EU competition law analysis nevertheless provides a useful insight into the 
complexities of the legal issues faced. 535 
 
For instance, it has been questioned whether a teaming arrangement involving a 
third country partner would infringe EU competition law. 536  This determination 
requires an assessment of whether, absent the arrangement, the parties would be 
actual or potential competitors in the relevant market. 537  If not, the teaming 
arrangement is likely to be permitted. 538  The determining factor in establishing 
whether the non-EU supplier would be a potential competitor is whether there is a 
“quasi-legal bar” to the supplier’s independent entry in the form of an unstipulated 
                                                 
534 Recital 13 simply states that: ‘contractor’, ‘supplier’ and ‘service provider’ means any natural or legal person 
or public entity or consortium of such persons and/or bodies which offers on the market to execute works, supply 
products and provide services, respectively. Article 41(3) concerning economic and financial standing further 
provides: “[u]nder the same conditions, a consortium of economic operators as referred to in Article 4 may rely on 
the capacities of participants in the consortium or of other entities 
535 The relevance of anti-trust considerations in teaming arrangements in the defence context is also consistently 
raised as an issue in the U.S. For example, see W B Burnett and W E Kovacic, ‘Reform of United States 
Weapons Acquisition Policy: Competition, Teaming Arrangements, and Dual-Sourcing’ (1989) 6 Yale Journal on 
Regulation 249; W E Kovacic, ‘Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures and Teaming Arrangements Involving 
Government Contractors’ (1990) 58 Antitrust Law Journal 1059; W E Kovacic, ‘Merger Policy in a Declining 
Defense Industry’ (1991) 36 Antitrust Bulletin 543; J Kattan, ‘The Declining Defense Sector and Federal Antitrust 
Enforcement’ (1993) 23 Pub Cont LJ 21; G R. Spratling, ‘Will Teaming Be a Problem?’ (Spring 1995) 
Procurement Lawyer 23; D A Yao and S S DeSanti, ‘‘Antitrust Analysis of Defense Industry Mergers’’ (1994) 24 
Public Contract Law Journal 379; M Shwartz, Note, ‘The Not-So-New Antitrust Environment for Consolidation in 
the Defense Industry: The Martin Marietta-Lockheed Merger’’ (1996) Columbia Business Law Review 329  
536 The relevant provisions on EU competition law are contained in Articles 101-106 TFEU. For an authoritative 
work on EU competition law, see R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law  (7th ed. OUP 2012) 
537 Van Bael & Bellis observe that non-EU suppliers will not currently be actual competitors of local suppliers in 
countries where, until now, they have not been permitted to participate in procurement procedures and where, 
therefore, they have been completely excluded from local markets. However, the White Paper notes that the more 
difficult determination to be made is whether non-EU suppliers could nonetheless be regarded as potential 
competitors of local suppliers in local markets to the extent that: (i) the non-EU suppliers are likely to be already 
active in the same relevant product markets in other aspects of the world and (ii) the non-EU suppliers are now at 
least nominally able to participate in procurement procedures in local markets. See Van Bael and Bellis, White 
Paper (n 533) 3 
538 ibid 3 
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government preference for local suppliers to maintain a local defence industry.539 On 
one hand, it could be argued that a non-EU supplier would be reasonably entitled to 
conclude that where a contracting authority has expressed such a preference, an 
individual bid would be commercially pointless, thereby necessitating a teaming 
arrangement.540 On the other hand, it has been argued that where preferences for 
local suppliers are non-transparent, competition authorities could question their true 
impact and whether barriers for third countries in fact continue to exist.541 There is 
also a risk that when investigated, contracting authorities could downplay the 
importance of having a local partner. 542  These factors may lead a competition 
authority to legitimately question whether a local partner and thus a teaming 
arrangement was in fact necessary or whether a third country contractor is capable of 
independent entry into the relevant market.  
 
Finally, it has been observed that even if the possibility remains for Member States to 
invoke Article 346 TFEU to justify the teaming arrangement, it would have to be 
proven that a Member State required or encouraged the arrangement.543 Further, as 
an “ex-post immunization” it would not provide the kind of ex-ante legal certainty 
which suppliers seek.544  
 
                                                 
539 ibid 5 
540 ibid 3 
541 The White Paper also suggests that if Member State governments invite or encourage a non-EU company to 
submit a bid, this could be construed as an indication that barriers to entry are diminishing. See ibid 6 
542 ibid 
543 ibid 
544 ibid 7 
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Therefore, again, on a broader understanding of third country access, it is possible to 
discern particular issues of legal uncertainty in light of the adoption of the Defence 
Procurement Directive. 
 
4.5. Products of Third Country Origin in Free Circulation 
 
The primary focus of this analysis has concerned access of the economic operator. 
However, third country access also includes the provision and circulation of third 
country products. Prior to the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, 
academic commentary had considered the conceivable scope of application of EU 
law to third country products in tenders for contracts awarded in accordance with the 
Public Sector Directive.545 The Public Sector Directive contains no express provisions 
to deal with the treatment of third country products and so does not contain any 
provision precluding authorities from imposing conditions that prohibit the inclusion of 
third country products.546  
 
Notwithstanding, it has been argued in the public procurement context that even if it 
could be suggested that Member States continue to have some measure of 
discretion to adopt discriminatory policies against third countries, entities may not 
exclude such products from their procurement, inter alia, on grounds that it would be 
contrary to the free movement of goods.547 Article 29 TFEU (ex Article 24 TEC) 
provides that third country products must be considered to be in free circulation in a 
Member State if they comply with the relevant formalities and applicable customs 
                                                 
545 See S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1352-1357, paras 20.32-20.35 
546 This must be contrasted with the provisions contained in Article 58 Utilities Directive. For commentary, see  
Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1352-1353, para 20.33 
547 ibid 1354-1357, paras 20.34-20.35 
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duties and will therefore become subject to EU law.  It follows that a product of U.S. 
origin that has been legally imported and complies with all necessary requirements 
for sale on the market of a Member State is a product in free circulation.548 Therefore, 
another Member State may not restrict access of that product to its market (i.e. 
exclusively on the basis of its third country origin) because to do so would be 
contrary to the free movement of goods.549 Importantly, this does not prevent an 
authority from discriminating against third country products imported directly. 550 
However, it has been argued that suppliers of third country products could evade 
such a policy by the simple expedient of offering products imported through other 
Member States.551 Whilst this analysis might provide a possible solution for ordinarily 
commercial items, restrictions placed on defence products may not make this 
practicable, for example, where a Member State insists on the use of directly 
imported goods for security or other reasons.552 This issue may also be compounded 
by any restrictions placed on third country products as a result of third country laws 
and policies.553 
 
It should be observed that the Defence Procurement Directive does not contain any 
provision in relation to the determination of product origin. Further, given that third 
country products may circulate freely under EU law, their exclusion from a tender as 
well as any restriction on movement within the EU can only be justified by a 
                                                 
548 ibid 1352, para 20.32 
549 For a more detailed discussion in this regard, see S Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC public 
procurement’ (n 471) 13-16 
550 For example, the Government could (subject to relevant international agreements) refuse to purchase 
products of U.S. origin imported through the discriminating Member State, since this does not affect trade in that 
product within the Community. See Arrowsmith, ‘Third country access to EC public procurement’ (n 471) 14 
551 ibid 
552 See e.g. Case C-367/89 Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessoies Scientifiqes SNC 
[1991] ECR I-4621 and generally I Govaere and P Eeckhout, ‘On dual-use goods and dualist case law: the Aimé 
Richardt judgment on export controls’ (1992) 29(5) CML Rev 941  
553 A prime example that will be discussed in Chapter 5 concerns U.S. export control restrictions 
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recognized exception under EU law. Therefore, access of third country products 
raises a host of additional questions which could give rise to legal uncertainty.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Whilst the Public Sector Directive imposes obligations on Member States with regard 
to third countries as a result of incorporation of the WTO GPA, there is no equivalent 
under the Defence Procurement Directive. To this extent, the national laws will 
substantially determine the legal position of third countries. A cursory analysis of the 
Directive’s transposition within UK and French law provides an indication of the 
potential variability of national legal approaches. Further, whilst the absence of any 
direct impact of the Defence Procurement Directive has been highlighted, on a 
broader conception of third country access, there is a possibility for EU law to 
indirectly affect third countries in a number of ways.  
 
Nevertheless, the reality is that, historically, very little is known about national legal 
approaches to third country access and treatment in the field of both public and 
defence procurement. It is suspected that irrespective of whether or not national laws 
have formally regulated third country relations in the field of defence procurement, 
much procurement will have been conducted without regard to any applicable legal 
framework. 
 
It is therefore uncertain what effect, if any, the Defence Procurement Directive will 
have on national legal approaches to third countries. For instance, it is unclear 
whether Member States will confer any legally enforceable rights on third countries or 
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continue to apply national policies. Under either option, it is not clear whether 
provision for third countries will result in equal, less, or more favourable treatment 
than that provided prior to the Directive. 
 
It is also unclear whether the fact that the same regulatory regime will apply to 
domestic and EU economic operators will have any discernable effect on the ratio of 
third country : EU competition. Emphasis has been placed on the potential for the 
Directive to discriminate against third countries. However, in the public procurement 
context it has been suggested that given that the procurement Directives already 
constrain the freedom of Member State action, it must be seriously questioned 
whether Member States would place further limitation on their choices by 
discriminating against third countries. 554 
 
The above analysis therefore provokes the interesting question of whether the 
exercise of EU external relations competences in the field of defence procurement 
may become necessary or desirable. At present, there is a clear asymmetry in the 
external regulation of public and defence procurement. It should not be overlooked 
that U.S. contractors are currently required to comply with 28 national legal and 
policy regimes in the field of defence procurement.  
 
Recently, the EU proposed a Regulation on access of third country goods and 
services to the EU’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting 
negotiations on access of EU goods and services to third country public procurement 
                                                 
554 See S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 1353, para 20.33, fn 71 
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markets. 555 The proposal is said to respond to “manifold restrictive procurement 
practices” faced by EU suppliers in many of the EU’s major trading partner 
countries.556 Certain observations about the necessity for, and timing of, the proposal 
are pertinent to the observations made in this Chapter. For instance, an important 
rationale which is said to necessitate the Regulation is that the Public Sector and 
Utilities Directives do not provide a general framework for dealing with bids 
containing foreign good and services and that EU-based contracting authorities do 
not understand the scope of the EU’s international commitments.557 The International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Task force responded to the Proposal by 
recommending that before adopting a Regulation, more in-depth analysis is 
necessary in order to assess how far Member States are open to third country 
tenders and to what extent they are legally able to reject bidders from countries who 
are yet to sign any trade agreements.558 Specifically, there should be greater focus 
on the production of significantly more guidance for contracting authorities and 
bidders about the legalities of accepting tenders from non-EU countries.559 These 
                                                 
555 See Commission ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of 
third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting 
negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries (2012) 
COM(2012) 124 final. For a useful summary of the proposal, see R Williams, ‘Commission Proposals in Relation 
to Third Country Access, Legislative Comment‘ (2012) 4 PPLR 169-173. See also CCMI/082, ‘Opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee on Third Country State-Owned Enterprises in EU Public Procurement 
Markets’ (own initiative opinion), Brussels, 4 May 2011 
556 ‘Proposal for a Regulation’ (n 555) 2. The proposal cites that some €352 billion of EU public procurement is 
open to bidders from WTO GPA States. By contrast, it cites, inter alia, the fact that the value of U.S. procurement 
offered to foreign bidders is currently just €178 billion. The proposal also indicates that this figure is just €27 billion 
for Japan. It also identifies that only a fraction of the Chinese public procurement market is open to foreign 
business. It projects that as a result only €10 billion of EU exports (0.08% of EU GDP) come from global 
procurement markets with an estimated €12 billion unrealized  
557 According to the Impact Assessment, 28% of all contract award notices contain erroneous assessments of 
the coverage of the GPA. See Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing rules on the access of third 
country goods and services to the European Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures 
supporting negotiations on access of European Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of 
third countries (Impact Assessment) COM(2012) 124 final 
558 International Chamber of Commerce Task Force, Response to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the European Union’s internal 
market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on the access of Union goods and services 
to the public procurement markets of third countries (COM (2012) 124 final), Paris 24 July 2012, 2, para 1 
559 ICC Task Force (n 558) 4, para 7 
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observations corroborate the limitations of existing evidence identified in this thesis 
as well as the need for further research. 
 
From the perspective of transatlantic defence procurement, it is submitted that an 
important issue that will need to be confronted concerns the extent to which the 
absence of a coordinated EU legal approach to the procurement relations of Member 
States with third countries is detrimental to the more effective functioning of a 
competitive transatlantic defence market. Of course, this raises a host of complex 
questions which fall beyond the intended aims of this thesis.560 However, at the very 
least, it is submitted that the EU should accord the same priority to third country 
issues in the field of defence procurement as it does to third country issues in the 
field of public procurement. 561  The external coherence of the EU defence 
procurement regime has a direct causal correspondence with the internal coherence 
of the regime. For the reasons identified in this Chapter and throughout this thesis, 
this issue is of specific concern to the development of the transatlantic defence 
market. 
 
This thesis now turns to examine the substantive application of the Defence 
Procurement Directive. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
560 The EU would have to decide to what extent (if at all) the EU would privilege the conduct of transatlantic 
defence procurement relations, in turn, necessitating confrontation of core issues about the division between 
Member State and EU competences, and, more fundamentally, how States see their defence (as distinct from 
their trade) objectives realised. Notwithstanding, if coherence and coordination of regulatory regimes could be 
deemed essential objectives of a transatlantic defence market, a serious question must be asked about whether 
the EU can or should develop an external relations policy which also covers defence procurement   
561 See also Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 29 
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5 
Security of Supply  
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is recalled that U.S. commentary has identified the possibility for certain of the 
Directive’s provisions to be used to discriminate against U.S. contractors and 
subcontractors. Particular emphasis has been placed on the security of supply and 
technical specifications provisions which form the subject of analysis in this and the 
following Chapter.562 
 
This Chapter begins by examining the conceptual and definitional underpinnings of 
“security of supply”. The Chapter then provides a brief overview of relevant U.S. 
export control laws as necessary context for the remaining Sections. As will be 
demonstrated, U.S. claims are largely predicated on concerns about the extent to 
which such laws and their effects will impact on security of supply assessments. 
Finally, the Chapter examines security of supply as a relevant factor in the 
assessment of a tenderer’s supply chain. 
 
At the outset, it must be qualified that the following analysis is based primarily on a 
textual analysis of the provisions and informed by the Guidance Notes, major studies 
and discussions with relevant officials. To this extent, any analysis must be cautious 
                                                 
562 It is recalled that U.S. commentary has also identified the possibility for the Directive’s security of information 
provisions to discriminate against U.S. contractors. These claims are considered in Chapter 9, Section 3.1 
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to appreciate the existing limitations of understanding of the correspondence 
between the prescription of formal legal rules and their use and effect in practice.563  
Unsurprisingly, this and the following Chapter do not reveal an overt attempt by the 
EU legislator to mandate particular “preferences” through the provisions. Rather, the 
focus is on whether the Directive’s provisions have a latent potential to be utilised in 
a particular way so as to appreciably affect third countries, in particular, the U.S. e.g. 
through particular wording, conferred discretions or even guidance on how to apply 
the relevant provisions. This must be differentiated from any effects which may result 
to third countries from an otherwise legitimate application of ostensibly neutral 
provisions which reflect genuine considerations. 
 
Whilst it is recognized that it will be some years before it will be possible to develop a 
clearer understanding of how the Defence Procurement Directive may affect 
transatlantic defence procurement practice, this should not detract from the 
importance of early assessment of the kind undertaken here. 
 
2. Legislative Scheme of the Defence Procurement Directive 
 
It is recalled that the Defence Procurement Directive is broadly modelled on the 
Public Sector Directive but is tailored to the specificities of defence procurement 
contracting.564  
                                                 
563 One side of the contracting equation, it is difficult to discern how contracting authorities exercise their 
decision-making, the factors which legitimately and contextually inform their decisions and the relative weight they 
accord to such factors. It also follows that it simply cannot be presumed that provisions will be utilised as 
expected by certain actors or in a particular way, or that there will be uniformity of practice in their use, especially 
in the individual circumstances of each procurement. On the other side of equation, is also difficult to discern how 
(and how accurately) economic operators and industries perceive the decision-making exercised by contracting 
authorities and act accordingly. To this extent, caution must be observed when there is any reference to an 
emerging “trend” or the “development” of a “preference” which is said to reflect a consensus of opinion 
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At the outset, it is important to emphasise that, by definition, the Directive’s 
provisions are directory. Whilst mandatory, they constitute general minimum 
obligations. They cannot be compared to a regulatory code similar to the U.S. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation that will be examined in Part II. 
 
The Directive comprises 5 Titles and 8 Annexes. Title I concerns the Directive’s 
general scope and identifies, inter alia, the types of defence and security contracts to 
which the Directive applies.565 It also specifies a set of procurement principles which 
are increasingly accepted as generally applicable to all forms of procurement under 
EU law;566 these principles provide that contracting authorities must treat economic 
operators equally, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner.567  
 
Title II governs rules on contracts. These concern, in particular, thresholds, 568 
contracts and framework agreements awarded by central purchasing bodies, 569 
                                                                                                                                                        
564 For general commentary on the Directive, see A Georgopoulos, ‘The European Commission proposal for the 
enactment of a Defence Procurement Directive’ (2008) 17 PPLR 81; T Briggs, ‘The New Defence Procurement 
Directive’ (2009) 18 PPLR 129; M Gabriel and K Weiner, ‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: Toward 
Liberalization and Harmonization of the European Defense Market’ (n 488); B Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the 
Boundaries’ (n 80); C Kennedy-Loest and N Pourbaix, ‘The new Defence Procurement Directive’ (2010) 11 ERA 
Forum 399; B Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252); M Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive’ (n 125); M Trybus, ‘The hidden Remedies Directive: review and remedies under the EU 
Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (2013) PPLR 4 135 
565 Article 2  
566 These principles were discussed in Chapter 3, Section 2.1 
567 Article 4  
568 Article 8. The Directive only applies to contracts above certain thresholds. The thresholds are periodically 
adjusted. For 2012, the Directive applies to contracts which have a value exceeding VAT of no less than € 
400,000 for supply and service contracts and € 5,150,000 for works contracts. See Commission Regulation (EU) 
No 1251/2011 of 30 November 2011 amending Directives 2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the 
awards of contract, Text with EEA relevance [2011] OJ L 319/43, Article 3  
569 Article 10. For general commentary, C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 355 
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excluded contracts,570 technical specifications,571 conditions for the performance of 
contracts572 and subcontracting.573  
 
A specific innovation concerns the provisions on security of information,574  and 
security of supply,575 in recognition of the implication of these interests in defence 
contracts.  
 
Title II also sets out the applicable procedures. Unlike the Public Sector Directive, the 
open procedure is not available.576 A contracting authority may opt to use either the 
restricted procedure or the negotiated procedure with publication of a contract 
notice.577 The negotiated procedure with publication is the “default” procedure578 and, 
unlike the Public Sector Directive, does not require justification for its use.579 The 
omission of an open procedure has been described as “strange”. 580 It is possible that 
the EU legislator has simply determined that defence contracts are too complex for 
its use.581 However, it is possible for such a procedure to be used in practice and 
                                                 
570 Articles 11-13. For a discussion of certain of these exclusions, see Chapter 3 
571 Article 18. For a general commentary on the technical specifications provisions, see Trybus, ‘The tailor-made 
EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive (n 125) 21-22. For a further discussion of these provisions, see 
Chapter 6 
572 Article 20 
573 Article 21 
574 Article 22. For guidance on this provision, see Guidance Note, Security of Information, Directorate General 
Internal Market and Services. For general commentary, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 21-22. These 
provisions are examined briefly in Chapter 9, Section 3.1 
575 Article 23. For generally commentary, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 22-25. These provisions are 
examined in detail in this Chapter 
576 The open procedure is contained in Article 1(11)(a) Public Sector Directive. For a comparison in this regard, 
see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 14. On the open procedure generally, see C H Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (n 171) 229-30 
577 Article 25. See also T Briggs, ‘The New Defence Procurement Directive’ (n 564) 135  
578 See Recital 47. For general commentary on the negotiated procedure and its use relative to the restricted 
procedure, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 14-15; Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 18 
579 See Article 26; Article 30 Public Sector Directive. On the negotiated procedure with publication under the 
Public Sector Directive, see C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 231-36 
580 see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 14 
581 ibid 
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would, in any event, accord with the objective to open the market to EU wide 
competition.582 As will be discussed in Chapter 9, U.S. law does not formally preclude 
the use of open tendering for defence contracts. 
 
Further, similar to the Public Sector Directive, certain contracts may, in some cases, 
be awarded on the basis of the competitive dialogue or the negotiated procedure 
without publication of a contract notice.583 The competitive dialogue procedure may 
be used for particularly complex contracts584 if the contracting authority considers 
that using the restricted procedure or the negotiated procedure with publication will 
not allow the award of the contract. 585  U.S. commentary has expressed surprise at 
what is considered to be a slight reluctance to allow use of the competitive dialogue 
in light of the fact that the equivalent use of competitive negotiations in the U.S. is 
considered to be the norm in advanced weapons systems.586 
 
The negotiated procedure without publication may be used in certain very specific 
circumstances, when the use of the negotiated procedure with publication is 
impossible or entirely inappropriate.587 As will be discussed in Chapter 10, certain 
                                                 
582 See Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 20 
583 Article 25 
584 The definition of “particularly complex contract” is the same as that of the Public Sector Directive. See Article 
1(21) Defence Procurement Directive and Article 1(11)(c) Public Sector Directive and the procedure is the same 
under the two Directives. See, respectively, Article 27 and Article 29  
585 Article 27 Defence Procurement Directive contains the relevant provisions on the competitive dialogue. For 
commentary on this provision, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 15-16. Article 29 Public Sector Directive 
contains the relevant provisions on the competitive dialogue. For a general commentary on the competitive 
dialogue procedure, see C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 236-41 
586 C Yukins, The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective (n 311) 4  
587 Article 28 Defence Procurement Directive contains the relevant provisions on the negotiated procedure 
without publication. See also and Recital 50. For commentary on this provision, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 
252) 16-17; Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 19. Article 31 
Public Sector Directive contains the relevant provisions on the negotiated procedure without publication. For a 
general commentary on the negotiated procedure without publication, see C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement 
Law (n 171) 255. See also the discussion of the Agusta helicopters litigation in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Section 
4.3 
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circumstances correspond with those legitimating non-competitive procurement 
under U.S. law. 
 
Specific provision is also made for the publication of contract notices,588 time limits,589 
information contained in invitations to tender, negotiate or participate in a dialogue,590 
and information for candidates and tenderers.591  Title II also specifies rules on 
communication,592 and conduct of the procedure, including criteria for qualitative 
selection593 and contract award,594 as well as use of electronic auctions.595  
 
Finally, Title III provides for detailed additional rules on subcontracting.596 Their 
inclusion is, in part, intended as a strategic attempt to open up supply chains to 
competition as well as to mitigate the potential for recourse to the practice of 
“offsets”, discussed in Chapter 7.597  
 
Title IV sets out the scope, availability and requirements of review procedures.598 
                                                 
588 Article 30. Article 32 governs the form and manner of publication of contract notices. The equivalent 
provisions in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Articles 35 and 36. For generally commentary, see C H 
Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 113-118 
589 Article 33. The equivalent provisions in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 38. For general 
commentary, see C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 119-120 
590 Article 34. The equivalent provision in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 40 
591 Article 35. The equivalent provision in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 41 
592 Article 36. The equivalent provision in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 42  
593 Articles 39-46. Certain of these requirements will be examined in this Chapter. The equivalent provision in the 
Public Sector Directive can be found in Articles 45-52. For general commentary, see C H Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (n 171) 129-156 
594 Article 47. Certain of these requirements will be examined in this Chapter. The equivalent provision in the 
Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 53. For general commentary, see C H Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (n 171) 273-288 
595 Article 48. The equivalent provision in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 54. For general 
commentary see C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 265-267 
596 Articles 50-54. For commentary on the subcontracting provisions, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 19-
21. The equivalent provision in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Article 60 
597 For a further discussion of subcontracting under the Defence Procurement Directive in light of U.S. legal 
commentary, see Chapter 9, Section 5.1 
598 Recital 72 and Articles 55-64. For commentary on these provisions, see Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 
136; M Trybus, ‘The hidden Remedies Directive’ (n 564). The equivalent review and remedies provisions for 
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Finally, Title V contains miscellaneous provisions on statistical obligations, executory 
powers and final provisions.599  
 
3. Defining Security of Supply 
 
Before examining U.S. claims concerning the potential discriminatory application of 
the Directive’s security of supply provisions, it is first necessary to put the 
assessment of security of supply in context. 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, it had been argued that 
one of the disadvantages of the Public Sector Directive with regard to the public 
award of defence contracts had been the lack of specific provisions to ensure 
security of supply.600 In R v. Secretary of State for Home Department Ex p Evans 
Medical 601  and EVN AG and Wienstrom AG, 602  the ECJ had determined that 
“reliability of supplies” is one of (or can number amongst) the award criteria which 
may be taken into account in order to determine the most economically 
advantageous tender. 603  However, these judgments did not specify what 
                                                                                                                                                        
public sector procurement are to be found in a separate Directive. See Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 
December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the 
application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L 395/33 as 
amended by Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] OJ L335/31 
599 Articles 65-75. The equivalent provisions in the Public Sector Directive can be found in Articles 75-84 
600 See Commission, ‘Communication on the results of the consultation launched by the Green Paper on 
Defence Procurement and on the future Commission initiatives COM’ (n 233). For a general commentary, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘Commission's Communication on the Results of the Consultation Process on European Defence 
Procurement’ (n 233)  
601  C-324/93 R v Secretary of State for Home Department Ex p Evans Medical (n 286). For general 
commentary, see S Arrowsmith, Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) 334-5, para 6.92; Trybus, European 
Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 216-9 
602 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom AG [2003] ECR I-4527 
603 C-324/93 Evans Medical, para 44-45; Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom AG, para 70 
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requirements may or may not be defined for security of supply.604 As a result of legal 
uncertainty, Member States appear to have exercised considerable discretion on this 
issue.605 It has been suggested that insistence on security of supply has provided a 
means to justify awards exclusively to national companies. 606  In particular, 
commentators point to a “short-sighted” need to enforce security of supply as one of 
the most likely causes of the current EDEM fragmentation.607 There have only ever 
been very limited instances where security of supply has posed an issue between EU 
Member States.608 It should be observed that a NATO study has levelled the same 
criticism at the U.S.609 
 
As this Chapter will discuss, the Defence Procurement Directive provides for the 
assessment of security of supply at various phases of a procedure. In doing so, the 
provisions should not be seen as conferring additional freedom to contracting 
authorities but rather subjecting security of supply assessments to more transparent, 
principled and verifiable determination.610 Under the Defence Procurement Directive, 
security of supply requirements are used as a basis for: selecting suitable tenderers 
and candidates; examining whether the tenders meet the mandatory security of 
supply requirements set by the contracting authority; and evaluating, on the basis of 
specific contract award criteria, which tender offers the best performance in terms of 
                                                 
604 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23 
605 ibid 
606 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23 and citations at fn 132 
607 Heuninckx ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23 and citations at fn 134 
608 A notable but isolated example concerned Belgium’s refusal to supply the U.K. during the first Gulf War 
609 See NIAG SG-114 Consultancy Advice Study, ‘Trans-Atlantic Defense Industrial Cooperation, Final Report’ 
(n 458) 13 which states: “NATO allies regularly exercise certain exclusionary policies of “national preference” 
through various legislative or regulatory authorities, often invoking the principle of “security of supply” to direct 
procurements to host industries and block foreign suppliers. Although NATO is founded on the bedrock principle 
of collective defense, “logistics” has tended to remain a national responsibility, and there is a marked absense of 
effective security of supply arrangements between NATO allies. In the United States, “security of supply” 
arguments have underpinned the maintaining of, and in some cases extension of, items controlled by the “Buy 
America” Act and the “Berry Act” […].” The Buy American Act is examined in Chapter 10, Section 2.1 
610 See Heuninckx ‘Trick or Treat’ (n 252) 23 
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security of supply.611 Contracting authorities must specify their security of supply 
requirements in the contract documentation. These requirements may typically take 
the form of conditions for the performance of a contract.612 They can also be used in 
the award procedure as selection criteria or award criteria.613 
 
3.1. Security of Supply as a Concept 
 
Whilst the Defence Procurement Directive considers “security of supply” to be 
particularly important,614 it does not in fact define this term. The Guidance Note 
states that this “broad concept” covers a wide range of different industrial, 
technological, legal and political aspects and can generally be defined as: 
 
[…] a guarantee of supply of goods and services sufficient for a Member State 
to discharge its defence and security commitments in accordance with its 
foreign and security policy requirements […] This includes the ability of 
Member states to use their armed forces with appropriate national control and, 
if necessary, without third party constraints.”615 
 
As a multi-faceted concept, it is difficult to subject security of supply to precise 
definition. However, three specific aspects have been usefully identified in academic 
                                                 
611 See Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 4, point 12  
612 Recital 41 and 42 and Article 20 
613 Articles 23, 39, 42. See Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, para 6  
614 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 1, point 1, para 1, fn2 citing Recitals 8 and 9 (although, in fact, Recital 8 
makes no reference to security of supply). See also Recitals 42 and 44. Its importance is perhaps also evidenced 
by the fact that the Guidance Note on Security of Supply is the most comprehensive of the Guidance Notes, 
comprising 22 pages  
615 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 1, point 1, para.1 (footnote omitted)  
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commentary.616 The first is longer-term or strategic security of supply i.e. the stability 
and continuity of the supply chain over the life of military equipment.617 The second is 
the geographical aspect of operational security of supply i.e. the ability of the supply 
chain to provide for the armed forces in theatres of operations outside home 
territory.618 The third is the short-term or time aspect of operational security of supply 
i.e. the ability of the supply chain to cope with surges in requirements in times of 
crisis.619  
 
According to the Guidance Note, with regard to the practical considerations of 
contracting authorities in determining whether a tender meets security of supply 
requirements, a number of variables must be factored into account. These include, 
inter alia, the supplier’s dependence on its own industrial capacities to ensure timely 
delivery and the supplier’s dependence on national authorisations to transfer 
equipment and services across borders to the purchasing or requesting State.620 The 
Guidance Note observes that this issue is rendered even more complex when the 
prime contractor’s supply chain is organised internationally, in particular, that 
suppliers established in the EU but which use sub-systems and components from 
non-EU sources may be obliged to comply with export restrictions imposed by third 
countries.621 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 7 below. The 
Guidance Note states that this means that security of supply will not just be an 
industrial, but also a political issue which is, by definition, difficult to resolve in the 
                                                 
616 B Heuninckx, ‘Towards a Coherent European Defence Procurement Regime?’ (n 85) 14; Heuninckx, ‘Trick or 
treat’ (n 252) 23  
617 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 22. See also Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 1, point 1, para 2 
618 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23 
619 ibid 
620 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 1, point 2. As the Guidance Note observes, this is the case not only for 
the initial purchase, but also for all follow-on supplies and services which occur until the end of the life cycle of a 
product 
621 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 1, point 2 
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Directive itself.622 
 
3.2. Security of Supply as a Legal Construct 
 
The Defence Procurement Directive does not define the material content of security 
of supply requirements, providing only a general indication of the areas that such 
requirements might cover.623 For the most part, the Directive describes information 
and commitments which may be required of tenderers.624 According to the Guidance 
Note, this provides contracting authorities with the necessary degree of flexibility to 
define and adapt their security of supply requirements to the specific circumstances 
and supply risks of each intended procurement.625 
 
The EU legislator’s decision to opt for generic information and commitment 
provisions at this stage is understandable. As an unprecedented legal development, 
the EU legislator may observe a period of monitoring in order to see how the 
provisions are applied and interpreted through EU case law. However, in the longer 
term, the EU legislator may have to give serious consideration as to how the 
Directive can better ensure that security of supply determinations are based on a 
candid determination of need. U.S. legal commentary has identified that the EU is 
confronted with a choice about how to define security of supply requirements and 
which can, to some extent, draw on U.S. experience.  
                                                 
622 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, point 3 
623 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 3, point 6, para 2. Recital 44 is the closest to providing specific examples. 
Recital 44 states: “[s]ecurity of supply can imply a great variety of requirements, including, for example, internal 
rules between subsidiaries and the parent company with respect to intellectual property rights, or the provision of 
critical service, maintenance and overhaul capacities to ensure support for purchased equipment throughout its 
life-cycle.” 
624  Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2-3, point 6, para 2 
625 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2-3, point 6, para 3 
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For instance, U.S. law prescribes a number of restrictions on specialty metals which 
can be required for use in defence procurement.626 U.S. law has established the U.S. 
DoD Strategic Materials Protection Board to monitor “materials critical to national 
security”.627 A controversial issue has concerned the legal question of how to define 
the term “materials critical to national security.” In 2008, the Board published a report 
which defined “materials critical to national security” as strategic material for which: 
(1) the DoD dominates the market; (2) the Department’s full and active involvement 
and support are necessary to sustain and shape the strategic direction of the market; 
and (3) there is significant and unacceptable risk of supply disruption due to 
vulnerable U.S. or qualified non-U.S. suppliers.”628 This approach was apparently 
based on the assumption that the U.S should impose a domestic preference for 
strategic materials only where the DoD does, in fact, play a substantial role in the 
market and, where the Department does not dominate the market, an attempt to 
ensure security of supply through a domestic preference may not prove effective.629 
U.S. legal commentary had identified that, for foreign trade purposes, this narrow 
definition is an important bulwark against misuse of the “security of supply” principle 
to discriminate in international trade.630 
 
However, the Defense Fiscal Authorization Act for 2011 redirected the Strategic 
Materials Protection Board in two respects.631 First, the new statute amended the 
Board’s mission to call for the Board to develop a strategy to “ensure a secure supply 
                                                 
626 For a discussion of domestic source restrictions generally, see Chapter 11, Section 2.1 
627 10 U.S.C. 187 
628 See Report of Meeting: Department of Defense Strategic Materials Protection Board, Held on Dec. 12, 2008 
<www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/report_from_2nd_mtg_of_smpb_12- 2008.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
629 C R Yukins, ‘Barriers to International Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis, Part II: Opening 
International Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business’ (n 459) Int’l 2-24 
630 C R Yukins and K E Ittig, ‘Feature Comment: The Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011 – A Bounded Step 
Forward for Acquisition Reform’ (2011) 53(2) The Government Contractor, 4 
631 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 Pub. L. 111-383, § 829 
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of materials”, rather than a strategy “to ensure the domestic availability of materials” 
under the former provision. This suggested that non-domestic sources could also be 
considered. 632  Secondly, at the same time, however, the statute amended the 
definition of “materials critical to national security” to mean materials: (A) upon which 
the production or sustainment of military equipment is dependent; and (B) the supply 
of which could be restricted by actions or events outside the control of the 
Government of the United States.633 It has been contended that this definition is too 
broad on the basis it could conceivably cover everything from steel to rubber bands 
in light of the fact that both are material on which military equipment “depends” and 
the supply of which could be restricted.634 Therefore, under this new definition, the 
DoD’s assessment of the need to protect specialty metals will be driven by general 
concerns regarding “vulnerability” of supply as opposed to an assessment of the 
DoD’s market position with regard to those materials.635 
 
In response to suggestions that the Directive’s security of supply provisions could 
provide a ground for discrimination, U.S. legal commentary asks what course the EU 
should take; more specifically, it questions whether the EU should allow “loosely” for 
domestic preferences for the purposes of security of supply under the Directive, or, 
whether it should follow the DoD’s earlier lead and require candid security of supply 
assessments.636 It has been suggested that so that U.S. exporters do not suffer “new 
discrimination” in Europe, it will be important that the U.S. set a good example, that 
U.S. policy follow a considered path, such as that initially suggested by the Board, 
                                                 
632 Yukins and Ittig, ‘A Bounded Step Forward for Acquisition Reform’ (n 630) 3 
633 ibid 
634 ibid 
635 Yukins, ‘Barriers to International Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis, Part II’ (n 459) Int’l 2-24 
636 ibid 
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and that the U.S. not abuse the principle of security of supply.637 It should be 
observed that EU commentary has similarly argued that in light of the dramatic 
change in the geopolitical situation of Europe after the Cold War alongside increased 
European integration, the concept of security of supply within Europe clearly requires 
(re)evaluation.638 
 
This discussion provides a useful early indication in this thesis of the necessity for 
comparative assessment of regulatory approaches to security of supply. At the very 
least, the above asks whether the conceptual basis of security of supply within 
Europe and the U.S. requires re-evaluation. Further, it may be questioned whether 
the Directive could or should subject security of supply assessments to more 
economically oriented assessments.639 
 
4. International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
 
A recurrent issue in transatlantic defence trade discourse concerns U.S. law 
applicable to the export of defence-related articles. As the following Sections will 
demonstrate, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations640 (“ITAR”) have been 
cited by official EU publications as providing a rationale for legislative intervention 
and as relevant to the interpretation of the Directive’s security of supply provisions. 
                                                 
637 Yukins and Ittig, ‘A Bounded Step Forward for Acquisition Reform’ (n 630) 4 
638 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23 
639 It is of course accepted that the U.S. example above concerns the scenario of generally maintaining 
capability as opposed to an individual procurement decision. It necessarily follows that while a market based 
assessment is appropriate in the former case, an exclusive market-oriented focus is not necessarily appropriate 
for application to the kind of scenario in which a contracting authority needs to ensure (as far as possible) that 
what it procures will delivered. Notwithstanding, this constitutes just one instance in which the comparative 
experiences of EU and U.S. practice may provide a basis for thinking more critically about regulatory approaches 
to discrete issues such as security of supply 
640 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Title II of Pub. L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (codified at 22 U.S.C. 2778)  
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Further, U.S. legal commentary has placed particular emphasis on the possibility for 
ITAR compliance to affect security of supply assessments such as to discriminate 
against U.S. contractors. To this extent, it is necessary to firstly briefly outline the 
applicable U.S. legal framework on export-controlled content.641  
 
The U.S. Military List (“USML”)642 provides categories of listed defence items, the 
export of which is controlled.643 Although the U.S. President is charged to exercise 
this authority, it has been delegated to the U.S. Secretary of State.644 The U.S. 
Department of State administers the regime through the Directorate of Defense 
Trade Controls (“DDTC”).645 The Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) provides for the 
promulgation of implementing regulations which include ITAR.646 
 
ITAR regulates, inter alia, the “export” 647  of “defense articles”, 648  “defense 
services”649 and “technical data”650 relating to defence articles and defence services. 
For the purposes of ITAR, an “export” includes more than simply the sending or 
taking of a defence article outside the U.S.651 ITAR also regulates the transfer of 
controlled data or technology to foreign persons irrespective of their location.652 This 
includes: transferring registration, control or ownership to a foreign person whether in 
                                                 
641 For a definitive practitioner guide to ITAR, see A Irwin, E Krauland and J Hayes, International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations Handbook (West 2008). For a useful introduction to U.S. export control laws, see J R Liebman and K 
J Lombardo, ‘A Guide to Export Controls for the Non-Specialist’ (2006) 28 Loy LA Int’l & Comp L Rev, 497 
642 22 CFR §121.1 
643 22 U.S.C. 2778 
644 Executive Order 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,311 (Jan. 18 1977), as amended 
645 22 CFR § 120.1 
646 22 CFR 120-130 
647 22 C.F.R.§120.17 
648 22 C.F.R. §120.6 
649 22 C.F.R. §120.9 
650 22 C.F.R. §120.10 
651 § 22 C.F.R. §120.17 
652 ibid  
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the U.S. or abroad;653 disclosing or transferring in the U.S. any defence article to an 
entity of a foreign government;654 disclosure or transfer of technical data to a foreign 
person whether in the U.S. or abroad;655 and performing defence services in the U.S. 
or abroad on behalf, or for the benefit of, a foreign person.656 A prime example of the 
extra-territorial reach of ITAR is its application to items of U.S. origin even if a foreign 
person is in possession of the item or where the item has been incorporated for use 
in another product.657 To this extent, ITAR covers, inter alia, exports, transfers and 
re-exports. It therefore follows that ITAR controls may limit the possibility to fully 
utilise the general and global licensing regimes of the ICT Directive to transfer ITAR 
controlled products within the EU without extensive prior authorisations. The ICT 
Directive is discussed in Section 6.1 below. 
 
In addition to the above controls, before engaging in munitions manufacturing 
brokering, importing, exporting or furnishing defence articles or defence services, it is 
necessary to register with the Department of State.658 Further, licenses are also 
required to provide defence services or to enter into technical assistance or 
manufacturing license agreements, even if no article or technical data is exported.659 
Therefore, generally, no defence article, defence service or technical data may be 
                                                 
653 § 22 CFR 120.17(a)(2) 
654 § 22 CFR 120.17(a)(3) 
655 § 22 CFR 120.17(a)(4) 
656 § 22 CFR 120.17(a)(5) 
657 § 123.9 
658 22 C.F.R. § 122.1(a) 
659 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.15; 123.16. Since obtaining a license from the Department of State requires considerable 
resources and substantial time and effort, the company must allow adequate lead time between the date the 
company accepts an order for goods and the date upon which the company is to deliver the goods. See J R 
Liebman and K J Lombardo, ‘A Guide to Export Controls for the Non-Specialist’ (n 634) 504 
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exported or re-exported without prior approval (e.g through a licence) from the U.S. 
Department of State.660 
 
For a number of years, a consistent debate between industry and the U.S. 
Government has concerned potential reform of the U.S. export control regime, in 
particular, ITAR.661  
 
As will be discussed below, specific criticisms concern the excessive controls placed 
on export, re-export and transfer of defence articles and the delays and risks incurred 
as a result for contractors.  
 
Relevant to the present analysis, the impact of ITAR on transatlantic defence trade 
has been given specific priority in two recent U.S. and EU studies, both of which 
identify the significance of ITAR as an obstacle to liberalised transatlantic defence 
trade, aspects of which will be considered in later sections of this Chapter.662 
 
 
5. Exclusion of Tenderers Through Qualitative Selection 
 
It is recalled that whilst there are a number of references to security of supply in the 
                                                 
660 J R Liebman and K J Lombardo, ‘A Guide to Export Controls for the Non-Specialist’ (n 641) 504 citing at fn 40 
P S Rhoads, The International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Compliance and Enforcement in the Directorate of 
Defense Trade Controls U.S. Department of State, reprinted in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; 
EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW (Practising Law Institute 2003) 495-
96 
661 See Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol II) (n 12) 693 which identifies that there were more than 60 reports by 
various private and governmental groups on export controls in the period 1997-2007 
662 The first is the U.S. Fortresses and Icebergs study. The second is DG Enterprise and Industry, Aerospace 
Industries, GMES, Security & Defence (Commissioned study), ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with 
the United States for European Defence Industries’, Final Report, December 2009, No ENTR 08/040 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/final_report_trans_en.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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Defence Procurement Directive, U.S. commentary has focused primarily on Article 23 
which stipulates security of supply requirements. The content of this provision will be 
examined in Sections 6 and 7. As will be discussed, Article 23 is intended to form the 
basis for the imposition of contract performance conditions and award criteria. It 
follows that there has been little focus on whether the Directive could potentially 
facilitate the exclusion of third countries as early as qualitative selection. 
 
Articles 38 to 46 Defence Procurement Directive govern the criteria for qualitative 
selection.663 In restricted procedures, negotiated procedures with publication of a 
contract notice and competitive dialogues, qualitative selection ordinarily occurs at 
the point at which candidates are selected for the purposes of inviting tenders.664 
Whilst the Defence Procurement Directive contains a number of grounds for 
excluding candidates and tenderers, Articles 39(2) (d) and (e) contain two exhaustive 
exclusion criteria related to security of supply.665 The first is where an economic 
operator has been guilty of ‘grave professional misconduct’ e.g. such as breach of 
obligations regarding security of information or supply during a previous contract.666 
The second is where an economic operator has been found, on the basis of any 
means of evidence, including protected data sources, not to possess the “reliability 
                                                 
663 Article 38 concerns verification of the suitability and choice of participants and award of contracts. Article 39 
concerns the personal situation of the candidate or tenderer. Article 40 concerns the candidate’s suitability to 
pursue the professional activity. Article 41 concerns the economic operator’s economic and financial standing. 
Article 42 concerns technical and/or professional ability. Articles 43 and 44 concern quality and environmental 
management standards. Article 45 concerns additional documentation and information. Article 46 concerns official 
lists of approved economic operators and relevant certification. For a general commentary on the provisions on 
qualitative selection, see Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive (n 125) 23-4; 
Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 18-19 
664
 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 2, point 6 
665 Therefore, it would not be possible for Member States or contracting authorities to exclude a candidate or 
tenderer on the basis of other criteria relating to their professional qualities. See Case C-213/07 Michaniki AE v. 
Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikrateias [2008] ECR I-9999 cited by the Guidance Note, 
Security of Supply, 7, para 21 
666 Article 39(d). See Guidance, Security of Supply, 7, point 19. For a discussion of this exclusion, see 
Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 28 
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necessary to exclude risks to the security of the Member State”.667 According to 
Recital 65, such risks could derive from certain features of the products supplied by 
the candidate, or from the shareholding structure of the candidate.668 
 
With regard to the first basis for exclusion, given that a finding of “grave professional 
misconduct” pertains to the individual conduct of the tenderer, this does not 
adversely affect U.S. contractors to a greater extent than EU operators. However, the 
second exclusion is more problematic. The Guidance Note on Security of 
Information, for instance, recognizes that “reliability” is a “vague concept” which 
confers both a considerable degree of flexibility in its assessment but also a “special 
responsibility to handle it with care.”669 On its own terms, there is no credible basis 
for suggesting that U.S. tenderers or EU tenderers reliant on U.S. sources will be 
more likely to fail any “reliability” assessment (howsoever determined). However, the 
reference to “risks to security” in Recital 65 is less certain. Recital 65 identifies “risks” 
deriving from “certain features of the products supplied by the candidate”, or from the 
“shareholding structure of the candidate”. The basis for this statement is not clear.  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in Section 7, the Guidance emphasizes that it is 
particularly important to distinguish selection criteria clearly from award criteria.670 
More specifically, at the selection stage, what matters is the standing, qualifications 
and professional capacity of the candidate or tenderer; the assessment must not 
                                                 
667  Article 39(2)(e) is said to address the link between security of supply and the reliability of the candidate or 
tenderer. See also Recital 67 and the Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 7, point 20  
668 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 7, point 20. It should be observed that references to features of the 
products supplied by the candidate and the shareholding structure of the candidate do not feature in the 
dedicated security of supply provision in Article 23 
669 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 6, point 13, para 2 
670 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 5-6 point 15 citing at fn 9 C-532/06 Emm. G. Lianakis AE v Dimos 
Alexandroupolis [2008] E.C.R. I -251. For a discussion of this case, see A Georgopoulos, ‘Greek jurisprudence: 
Lianakis v Dimos Alexandroupolis, No.1794/2008 of the Council of State (Simvoulion tis Epikrateias)’ (2009) 3 
PPLR, 98 
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concern the characteristics of specific equipment which they may offer. 671  Yet, 
Recital 65 makes reference to “features of the product supplied”. Therefore, it is not 
clear whether such a feature could include the fact that a product may be subject to 
ITAR, for example. 
 
Further, the reference to “shareholding structure” is not specified. It is not clear 
whether the degree to which a third country may exercise control could become 
relevant e.g. through nationality requirements for directors, percentage shareholding, 
voting requirements and prior authorizations from the home State in relation to key 
investments, for example. 
 
In addition, the evidential threshold appears to be low, merely requiring any means of 
evidence. In considering the contracting authority’s “special responsibility”, the 
Guidance Note states that the contracting authority must be prepared to 
demonstrate, if necessary, in special review procedures that there are “objective and 
verifiable elements indicating a lack of reliability that causes risks to the security of 
the State”.672  To this extent, whilst any means of evidence appears to be admissible, 
it must be sufficiently material to justify the determination made. However, the extent 
of the necessary causal relation between reliability and risk is not specified. For 
example, a risk may result in a determination of “unreliability” even though the risk is 
only remote.  
 
                                                 
671 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 5, point 15 
672 The Guidance Note, Security of Supply states at 7, point 20, para.3 that: “In any case, point (e) does not give 
unlimited discretion to contracting authorities/entities. Any exclusion of a candidate or tenderer must be based on 
risks to the security of the Member State. The contracting authority/entity must be prepared to demonstrate, if 
necessary in special review procedures, that there are objective and verifiable elements indicating a lack of 
reliability that causes risks to the security of the State.”  
 
  168 
Ultimately, it is submitted that whilst interpretative nuances of these generic 
provisions could possibly suggest a basis for excluding tenderers or candidates 
which rely on U.S. sources, there is no credible reason beyond the fact that a 
contractor may have to comply with U.S. export controls that would place a U.S. 
contractor or EU contractor reliant on U.S. sources at a comparative disadvantage. 
As will be discussed below, the proper basis for assessing “risks” of this kind is in 
accordance with Articles 23(a) and (b) which constitute specific requirements under 
the dedicated security of supply provision. Further, as will be discussed, there is also 
an overriding question regarding the extent to which issues such as ITAR are, in 
reality, likely to affect tenders involving U.S. sources.  
 
Notwithstanding, as will also be discussed in Section 7.1 below, Article 39(2)(e) is not 
the only provision on qualitative selection which takes account of security of supply 
considerations pertaining to third countries. To this extent, the risk of exclusion 
through qualitative selection cannot be entirely eliminated. 
 
 
6. Discrimination Through Application of Award Criteria 
 
Contracting authorities decide whether to award a contract to the lowest priced or 
most economic economically advantageous tender.673 Given the typical complexity of 
defence contracts, award decisions will generally be determined on a most 
economically advantageous tender basis. 674  The contracting authority is free to 
                                                 
673 Article 47  
674 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 17 point 47. According to Article 47(1)(a), various criteria linked to the 
subject matter of the contract can be taken into consideration when assessing the most economically 
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choose its award criteria in reaching this determination provided that those criteria 
are linked to the subject matter of the contract, do not give unrestricted freedom of 
choice for the award,675 allow the information provided by tenderers to be effectively 
verified676 and must comply with principles of EU law.677 Article 47(1)(a) now makes 
explicit the possibility to use the fulfilment of security of supply requirements as an 
award criterion as distinct from “reliability of supplies” as identified in the ECJ’s 
previous judgments. Although, as indicated above, “reliability” is a concept which is 
still being utilised in the language of the Guidance Notes and academic 
commentary.678 
 
As will be discussed in Sections 6.3 - 6.5 below, the main provisions identified as a 
concern by U.S. commentators in this regard are Articles 23(a) and (b) which provide 
the basis for contract performance conditions and award criteria. Article 23(a) 
provides that a contracting authority may require that the tender contain: 
 
certification or documentation demonstrating to the satisfaction of the 
contracting authority/entity that it will be able to honour its obligations 
regarding the export, transfer and transit of goods associated with the 
                                                                                                                                                        
advantageous tender. These include for example: quality, price, technical merit, functional characteristics, 
environmental characteristics, running costs, lifecycle costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical 
assistance, delivery date and delivery period or period of completion, security of supply, interoperability and 
operational characteristics. See also Recital 71. For a general discussion of the most economically advantageous 
tender criteria under the Defence Procurement Directive, see Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 23-25  
675 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 17, para 49 citing Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finlandia Oy Ab v. 
Helsingin Kaupunki et HKL-Bussiliikenne, [2002] ECR 7213, para 61 
676 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 17-18, para 49 citing C-448/01, EVN AG, Wienstrom GmbH and Republik 
Österreich [2003] ECR I-14527, para 52 
677 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 18, para 49 citing Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus (n 675), para 63 
678 C-324/93 R v. Secretary of State for Home Department Ex p Evans Medical (n 286) 44-45; Case C-448/01 
EVN AG and Wienstrom AG (n 596), para 70. See Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 23; M Trybus, ‘The tailor-
made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 25 
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contract, including any supporting documentation received from the 
Member State(s) concerned.  
 
Article 23(b) provides that a contracting authority may require that the tender contain: 
 
the indication of any restriction on the contracting authority/entity 
regarding disclosure, transfer or use of the products and services or any 
result of those products and services, which would result from export 
control arrangements.  
 
The Guidance Note on Security of supply observes that Article 23(a) is 
complemented by Article 23(b) in the regard that the requirements contained within 
Article 23(a) concern security of supply risks which derive from the possible refusal, 
withdrawal or delay of relevant export and transfer authorisations whereas Article 
23(b) concerns any restrictions regarding disclosure, transfer or use of defence 
material (or any result thereof) which would result from export control or security 
arrangements.679  
 
This Section will subject U.S. commentators’ claims to further analysis. However, it 
should be observed that these claims are largely predicated on the potential 
cumulative impact of the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives on security of 
supply assessments. As a matter of context, it is therefore necessary in the following 
                                                 
679 According to the Guidance Note, 12, point 36, para 2: “[c]ontracting authorities/entities can combine the two 
instruments: under Article 23(a), they may require the tenderer to demonstrate that he will in all likelihood obtain 
the necessary export, transfer and transit licences with conditions that enable him to fulfil his mandatory 
contractual obligations. In addition, they can require, under Article 23(b), a list of all other restrictions, so that they 
can deal with them during the negotiation phase and/or take them into account during the award phase (provided 
the issue is covered by appropriate contract award criteria).” 
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two Sections to briefly outline the ICT Directive regime as well as the general basis 
for U.S. claims before examining those claims in more detail. 
 
6.1. Intra-Community Transfers Directive 
 
Articles 34 and 35 TFEU prohibit quantitative restrictions (and measures of 
equivalent effect) on imports and exports of goods. Restrictions on the internal 
movement of defence goods within the EU are no exception. In its 2003 
Communication, ‘European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues, Towards an EU 
Defence Equipment Policy’, the Commission identified the internal transfer of 
defence-related products as an area in need of specific action.680 Until recently, each 
Member State regulated the intra-EU transfer of defence products in accordance with 
national licensing procedures.681  
 
A detailed 2005 EU commissioned study revealed a number of common obstacles to 
the effective licensing and transfer of defence goods. In particular, Member States 
formally treated intra-EU transfers and exports outside the EU without distinction out 
of a general concern to control their end-use or final destination especially to third 
                                                 
680 Commission, ‘European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues’ (n 231) 3. Prior to the adoption of the ICT 
Directive, there had been limited efforts by certain EU Member States to simplify licensing arrangements in the 
context of the LoI FA. These included: simplified export licensing arrangements concerning transfers made in the 
course of joint development and production programmes; the development of lists of permitted export destinations 
for jointly produced military goods; and the introduction of the Global Project Licence. The latter was designed to 
remove the need for specific authorisations to destinations permitted by the licence in order to simplify the 
arrangements for licensing military goods and technologies between the LoI FA partners participating in 
collaborative projects. However, the LoI proposals were never fully executed in practice and have yielded limited 
results. See Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of 
defence-related products within the Community, Impact Assessment (Impact Assessment) SEC (2007), 1593, 9 
and 18 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007SC1594:EN:NOT> accessed 20 
September 2013 
681 For a useful summary of the applicable national laws and regulations for 25 EU Member States and three 
EEA States, see Unisys, ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’ (n 122) Table C, 163-167  
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countries.682 According to EU statistics, whilst an estimated 11,500 transfer licenses 
are issued annually, not a single request has been formally denied since 2003.683 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the mere theoretical risk of refusal has meant 
that Member States generally prefer to source sensitive military equipment from a 
national producer.684 It has been reported that the need for compliance with lengthy 
approval procedures e.g. licences, certification, delivery verifications and end-user 
certifications has resulted in delays and inefficiency.685 
 
It is recalled that in 2009 the EU adopted the ICT Directive in order to simplify the 
terms and conditions pertaining to the intra-Community transfer of defence-related 
products.686 Member States had until 30 June 2011 to transpose the Directive into 
national law; however, the Directive was not due to take effect until 30 June 2012.687 
According to the Commission Report on transposition of the Directive, at the date of 
effect, not all Member States had confirmed transposition.688 
 
The ICT Directive introduces a new licensing and certification regime which is 
designed to reduce disproportionate pre-transfer controls through more extensive 
licensing authorizations whilst ensuring effective control through a certification 
                                                 
682 It has been observed that in practice the scrutiny level for export applications within the EU (or destined to 
NATO countries) is no doubt lower than for exports to third countries; however, the requirements for submitting an 
application are formally the same regardless of the country of destination. See Commission, ‘European Defence – 
Industrial and Market Issues’ (n 231) 13 and 14  
683 Impact Assessment (n 680) 4  
684 Ibid, 4-5 
685 See Unisys, ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’ (n 122) 59-64 and 145 
686 Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying terms and 
conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2009] OJ L 146/1 (n 21) 
687 Article 18 
688 See Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition 
of Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within the EU’ 
COM (2012), 359 final, 5 
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system and post-transfer monitoring. The ICT Directive mandates the use of three 
types of licence: the general, global and individual licence.689 
 
The general licence is the preferred option and is mandatory in certain cases.690 A 
general licence is a specific authorization granted by a Member State to a supplier 
established on its territory to perform transfers of defence-related products to 
recipients located in another Member State.691 Member States are required to publish 
general transfer licences. It follows that unlike for individual or global licences, a 
certified undertaking will not be required to specifically request its use.  
 
According to the ICT Directive, Member States should grant a global licence where a 
general licence cannot be published.692 In contrast to a general licence, a global 
licence is only granted upon request by an undertaking for a period of three years, 
with a possibility of renewal.693 The main advantage of global licences is said to be 
the fact that they are not specific to a precise shipment and thus can be used several 
times to covers similar transfers.694  
 
                                                 
689 For the reasons underlying the specific policy and legislative choices for opting for a combination of all three 
licences as opposed to general licences or global licences only, see Impact Assessment (n 680) Impact 
Assessment, 34-36  
690 The ICT Directive identifies four instances in which the publication of a general licence is mandatory. The first 
is where the recipient is part of a Member States’ armed forces or a contracting authority in the field of defence, 
purchasing for the exclusive use of the armed forces (Article 5(2)(a)). The second is where the recipient is an 
undertaking certified in accordance with the Directive (Article 5(2)(b)). Article 9 concerns the certification of 
recipients of defence-related products. This second instance recognizes that common certification criteria should 
reduce the need for excessive procedural controls and lead to greater optimisation of supply chains and 
economies of scale through greater cooperation and integration of undertakings (Recital 23). The third is where 
the transfer is made for the purposes of demonstration, evaluation or exhibition (Article 5(2)(c)). The final instance 
is where the transfer is made for the purposes of maintenance and repair, if the recipient is the originating 
supplier (Article 5(2)(d))  
691 Article 5(1) 
692 Recital 26  
693 Rectial 26 and Article 6(2) paragraph 2  
694 Impact Assessment (n 680) 35-6 
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Finally, in an attempt to circumscribe their use in practice, the Directive only permits 
use of individual licenses in exceptional circumstances.695 An individual licence is a 
specific authorization granted at the request of an individual supplier, permitting one 
transfer of a specified quantity of specified defence-related products to be transmitted 
in one or several shipments to one recipient only.696 Under existing national laws, the 
individual licence has been the most common but restrictive form of licence.697 
 
As indicated, the ICT Directive also establishes common criteria for the certification 
of recipients of defence products under a general licence.698 DG Enterprise displays 
all certified companies on a certified register.699 To date, although the number of 
certified companies is relatively small, it should be observed that a number of 
companies are of U.S. origin.700 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the extent to which the ICT Directive 
constitutes an effective transfer regime. However, its relevance to the present 
analysis is that the ICT Directive is, at least, intended to facilitate the progressive 
harmonization of national licensing and certification procedures, in turn, making it 
                                                 
695 According to the ICT Directive, the licence can only be granted in the following exceptional and exhaustive 
circumstances: (1) the request is limited to one transfer ((Article 7(a)); (2) it is necessary for the protection of the 
Member State’s essential security interests or on grounds of public policy ((Article 7(b)); (3) it is necessary for 
compliance with Member States’ international obligations and commitments (Article 7(c)) ; or (4) a Member State 
has serious reason to believe that the supplier will not be able to comply with all the terms and conditions 
necessary to grant it a global licence (Article 7(d))  
696 Article 7 
697 Impact Assessment (n 680) 26 and 34  
698  Article 9. The Commission has recently issued a Recommendation designed to ensure convergent 
application of the certification requirements. See Commission Recommendation of 11 January 2011 on the 
certification of defence undertakings under Article 9 of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2011] 
OJ L 11/62 
699  DG Enterprise and Industry, CERTIDER, Certified Enterprises Register. See: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider/index.cfm?fuseaction=undertakings.detail&id=172&count
ry=DE&ref=UND%5FDE%5F0003> accessed 20 September 2013 
700  Examples include Raytheon Deutschland GmbH and Northrop Grumman LITEG GmbH. See: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider/index.cfm?fuseaction=undertakings.detail&id=172&count
ry=DE&ref=UND%5FDE%5F0003>  accessed 20 September 2013 
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easier for suppliers to demonstrate their ability to satisfy security of supply 
requirements in a contract award procedure.701 The intended effect is to facilitate 
greater procedural efficiency in the transfer of defence-related products, saving costs 
and time. Both Directives should therefore be in the mindset of the procurement 
officer when assessing tenders in a contract award procedure. As will be discussed 
below, an important issue concerns the extent to which the availability of the ICT 
regime likely to be a discriminating factor in defence contract awards. 
 
U.S. observers have questioned whether the Defence Procurement Directive and the 
ICT Directive could have the combined effect of discriminating against U.S. 
contractors, an issue to which this Chapter now turns. 
 
6.2. General Bases of the “Discrimination” Claim 
 
It is recalled that the U.S. ITAR regime has come under particular criticism in the 
U.S.. Prior to the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, the Fortresses and 
Icebergs Study contended that, in general, the nature of ITAR licences are such that 
parties cannot reasonably provide strong assurances especially regarding re-exports 
and that, as a result, this will affect security of supply assessments made under 
Article 23(a).702 As a result, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study has suggested that 
European firms may be better situated in the regard that the combined operation of 
                                                 
701 Impact Assessment (n 680) 21 
702 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 222. For instance, it has been observed that a licence to export a 
subsystem does not necessarily mean, for example, that the final produced system would be licensable to all 
destinations 
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the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives could potentially discriminate against 
U.S. firms.703 It is worth reciting in full the scenario identified by the Study as follows:  
 
[…] For example, imagine a national procurement where one bidder is a 
European supplier with a supply chain wholly within the EU operating 
under export licences issued under the EC Transfer Directive (e.g. the 
global704 licences). A second bidder might also be a European supplier 
but its supply chain might include U.S. firms that would need ITAR 
authorizations of various types to participate in the programme and for 
re-export of resulting systems in some cases. Needless to say, a national 
authority might very well grade the bidder with the EU supply chain as 
more “secure” because of the reliance on the new EC Transfers 
Directive, and the bidder with the U.S. subcontractors more insecure 
because of the uncertainty of obtaining ITAR authorizations (which 
typically will not be in place at the time that the bid is submitted).705  
 
Therefore, it has been argued that the security of supply provisions could put U.S. 
companies at a “comparative disadvantage” based on ITAR which “could be judged 
negatively with regard to security of supply”.706  
However, it is necessary to question certain of these basic premises and which will 
inform the remainder of the analysis of this Chapter.  
 
                                                 
703 ibid 
704 It is not clear whether the Study actually intended to refer to general licences here 
705 ibid, 222-3 
706 See D J Berteau, Senior Adviser and Director, Defense Industrial Initiatives, CSIS, Statement before the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs “A 
STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC REVIEW OF AEROSPACE EXPORTS”, 9 December 2009, 3 
<http://csis.org/files/ts_091209_berteau.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013  
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6.2.1. Complexity of Bidder and Bidding Scenarios 
 
Whilst the above example is no doubt for illustrative purposes only, it is submitted 
that caution must be exercised against relying too heavily on overly simplistic 
representations of bidder and bidding scenarios as typical scenarios in transatlantic 
defence procurement. For instance, whilst it is difficult to determine the number of 
contractors that are likely to operate under such circumstances, the above scenario 
is predicated on the scenario of a European bidder relying exclusively on European 
sources and global licences. This is likely to represent only limited classes of bidder 
and defence material and, most probably, only the majority of lower tiers of the 
market which do not provide final weapons systems.707 Further, the above suggests 
that the primary beneficiaries of a liberalised licensing regime under the ICT Directive 
will be European. Whilst this is inevitable the case, the ICT Directive enables legal or 
natural persons established in the EU to transfer defence-related products in 
accordance with the ICT regime.708 As indicated in Section 6.1 above, a number of 
EU subsidiaries of U.S. defence companies have been certified for use of licences 
under the ICT regime.  
 
With regard to bidding arrangements, it is recalled from Chapter 4 that there may 
often be more than two bidders and/or more complex bidding arrangements involved 
e.g. teaming arrangements.709 On the one hand, the presence of both EU and third 
                                                 
707 As the Impact Assessment (n 680) observes at 34: “[i]t has been objected that facilitated intra-EU transfers 
could bump against ITAR restrictions, thereby damping the facilitation potential. However, ITAR rules essentially 
concern final weapons systems that account for a slight minority of intra-EU transfers (the probability that a 
transferred good includes a US ITAR-flagged component grows with the number of components and technologies 
that it integrates, and is thus higher for complete weapon systems). Conversely, transfers of components are little 
affected by ITAR rules (unless the component itself stems from an US supplier).”  
708 Article 3(3) ICT Directive 
709 See Chapter 4, Section 4.4  
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country operators on a bid may be perceived to constitute a security of supply risk in 
the assessment. On the other hand, this dual presence may equally mitigate such 
concern.  
 
6.2.2. Extent of ITAR’s “Obvious Restrictive Impact”  
 
The above scenario also presumes that ITAR will affect security of supply 
assessments. To an extent, certain assumptions about the impact of ITAR are 
understandable, if not wholly justified. For instance, concerns regarding third country, 
in particular, U.S. restrictions on the export and transfer of defence material have 
been an important consideration underlying the adoption of the ICT Directive. The so-
called “Impact Assessment” accompanying the proposal for an ICT Directive 
identified ITAR as the most prominent example of the “indirect impact” of restrictions 
imposed by third countries on intra-EU transfers of defence material.710 In particular, 
the Impact Assessment referred to the “lengthy and burdensome ITAR approval 
procedure” and that its intrinsic extraterritorial nature has an “obvious restrictive 
impact” for EU integrators both on market access to third countries and on intra-EU 
transfers insofar as prior U.S. agreement has to be sought for intra-EU transfers 
containing ITAR components.711 The document also identified that the expected 
benefits of the ICT Directive to a fully functional EDEM from a demand side 
perspective is that greater security of supply on EU-defence related products would 
favour European goods compared to goods sourced from third countries.712  
 
                                                 
710 Impact Assessment (n 680) 17 
711 ibid 
712 Ibid 21. Emphasis added 
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In addition, the Impact Assessment also purported to assess the “foreign trade 
impact” of an EU initiative facilitating Intra-EU transfers.713 It indicated that it would 
provide European integrators with a further incentive to work with EU rather than third 
country suppliers because of the purported improved guarantee on security of supply 
that will result when European integrators source components in the EU. 714 
According to the document, this would be consistent with current efforts of some EU 
defence companies to promote “ITAR-free” initiatives in order to elude the complexity 
and restrictive impacts of U.S. ITAR rules, and thereby enlarge their access potential 
on third markets.715 Further, that this is also mirrored in the EU governments’ new 
momentum looking for greater autonomy.716  
 
The Chapter will return to the discussion of so-called “ITAR free solutions” after an 
analysis of the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions. At this stage, it is 
important to debunk certain of the statements contained in the Impact Assessment. 
Firstly, the dedicated 2005 study on intra-EU transfers identified in Section 6.1 above 
did not give any detailed consideration to the impact of ITAR on the internal 
movement of defence material within the EU.717 The extent of any “obvious restrictive 
impact” has not therefore been fully discerned. Secondly, as will be discussed below, 
it is by no means clear that the ICT Directive will be a decisive factor in security of 
supply assessments. Nor is it clear that it will enable greater assurances of security 
                                                 
713 ibid 33 
714 ibid 
715 ibid 
716 ibid, citing at fn32 EDA, ‘A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, Brussels’, 
14 May 2007, 2: “[t]his EDTIB must also be more closely integrated with the wider, non-defence European 
technological and industrial base, with less European dependence on non-European sources for key defence 
technologies.” See also the specific reference to the US at 5. Although, it should be observed that according to 
the Fortresses and Icebergs Study Vol I (n 13) 231 during the course of interviews for the Study, EDA and EC 
officials expressed the position that the EU is not acting against ITAR. Rather, in their view, ITAR forms its own 
barriers  
717 Unisys, ‘Intra-Community Transfers of Defence Products’ (n 122) 
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of supply or, in fact, improve security of supply. Finally, it is also not clear what is the 
precise basis is for asserting that European goods will be favoured above those 
sources from third countries as a result of the ICT Directive. 
 
Therefore, as the remaining Sections of this Chapter will demonstrate, it is important 
to recognize the extent to which ITAR has increasingly permeated the legislative 
policies underlying the adoption of EU defence trade legislation. However, absent a 
clear empirical basis substantiating the effects of ITAR in practice, it is quite another 
to assume that it similarly impacts on contracting authorities and contractors in the 
ways, and to the extent, suggested. 
 
6.3. Uncertainty of Obtaining ITAR Authorisation to Export 
 
It is recalled that a major issue raised by U.S. commentary concerns uncertainty of 
obtaining relevant ITAR authorisations and its potential effect on the security of 
supply assessment under Article 23(a). However, Article 23(a) merely stipulates an 
evidential requirement demonstrating a tenderer’s ability “to honour obligations 
regarding export and transfer of goods associated with the contract”. At the outset, it 
is submitted that the inherent generality and discretion imported by such provisions is 
a risk to all non-domestic operators. To this extent, much will depend on the 
individual circumstances of each case.  
 
There appears to be no evidence to verify how many applications are made each 
year to export, transfer and re-export specific types of ITAR controlled products in 
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satisfaction of public defence contracts awarded within the EU.718 It is also not 
possible to identify the exact numbers or percentages of authorizations refused, 
delayed or withdrawn each year. In light of these evidential limitations, it is only 
possible to draw on existing studies which provide some anecdotal evidence 
regarding expressed attitudes towards ITAR in practice and which must, necessarily, 
be treated with caution in deriving any general conclusions. 
 
6.3.1. Experiences of ITAR within the EU 
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has examined the experiences of a number of 
EU Member States with regard to the operation of ITAR from both Western and 
Eastern European Member States. One issue identified by the Study appears to 
concern the risk of licensing denials. According to the Study, France was the only 
country to specifically identify the risk of licensing denials as creating a general state 
of unpredictability.719 However, it is not clear whether it is merely the risk, or the 
additional fact, of any denials or both which has raised concern.720  
 
Another issue which the Study identified concerns lengthy delays in obtaining export 
approvals. According to the Study, Germany, Sweden and the UK all identified 
lengthy delays. More specifically, the experience of German market participants was 
                                                 
718 For example, it is not clear whether formal records of licensing decisions (including refusal and requests) are 
kept and periodically monitored and reviewed 
719 Fortresses and Icebergs (Vol. II) (n 12) 353 
720 This distinction is particularly important. It is recalled from Section 6.1 above that whilst there had been no 
formal denials of transfer licences prior to the adoption of the ICT Directive, it was reported that the mere risk of 
denials was considered alone sufficient to encourage Member States to source defence material domestically. 
See Impact Assessment (n 680) 4-5 
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that even when Technical Assistance Agreements (“TAA”) 721  are issued in 
accordance with ITAR, the delays imposed by the process make it difficult to rely 
upon U.S. companies as suppliers on time-critical projects.722 Sweden also reported 
that it simply takes too long to obtain required licenses and agreements, whether 
TAA’s, Manufacturing License Agreements (“MLA”)723 or DSP-5 Export Licenses. 724 
In addition, the Study identified that a significant issue for U.S. defence firms seeking 
to access the UK market is the growing level of frustration and concern with ITAR.725 
In particular, the Study highlighted technology release and procedural issues with 
respect to the Joint Strike Fighter (“JSF”) programme.726 The Study reports that the 
UK has more broadly faced mounting issues of delays and uncertainties posed by 
U.S. export licensing and their adverse implications for development and delivery 
schedules.727  
 
 
                                                 
721 A TAA can exempt the communication of technical data to a foreign partner. 22 CFR §120.22 defines a 
“technical assistance agreement” as: [a]n agreement (e.g., contract) for the performance of a defense service(s) 
or the disclosure of technical data, as opposed to an agreement granting a right or license to manufacture 
defense articles. Assembly of defense articles is included under this section, provided production rights or 
manufacturing know- how are not conveyed […].” For more detail in this regard, see 22 CFR Pt 124. See also 
‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 662) 48 
722 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 369 
723 22 CFR §120.21 defines a “manufacturing license agreement” as: “[a]n agreement (e.g., contract) whereby a 
U.S. person grants a foreign person an authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad and which involves 
or contemplates: (a) The export of technical data (as defined in § 120.10) or defense articles or the performance 
of a defense service; or (b) The use by the foreign person of technical data or defense articles previously 
exported by the U.S. person. For more detail in this regard, see 22 CFR Pt 124 
724 A DSP-5 licence is a licence for the permanent export of an item. The licence takes the shorthand name of 
the application form which is required to be submitted. See 22 CFR §123.1(a)(1) 
725 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 623 
726 ibid 573 and citations at fns 516 – 518. See also more generally, D M Moore, S Young, P Ito, K Burgess, P 
Antill, ‘U.S. Export Controls and Technology Transfer Requirements – A United Kingdom Perspective’ (2010) 3 
International Journal of Defense Acquisition Management 23. The JSF programme is a development and 
acquisition programme that is intended to replace a range of existing fighter aircraft and develop the next 
generation of serviceable aircraft for the US, U.K., Canada, Australia and the Netherlands. For more details, see 
<http://www.jsf.mil/program/index.htm> accessed 20 September 2013 
727 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 623-4 which states: ““UK and EU trust in the U.S. slid way down”, 
according to one UK government official interviewed for this study. As he noted, “the nations or firms spend 
millions or even billions of dollars on a program but cannot be guaranteed an export license. How can we say we 
have security of supply with the U.S.?” Like elsewhere in Europe, UK firms and government representatives 
report that waiting for U.S. export licensing is creating unacceptable risk in their product and system development 
and delivery schedules.”  
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6.3.2. EU Experiences of ITAR within the U.S. 
 
At the time of the adoption of the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives, the EU 
published a commissioned study entitled ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to 
Trade with the United States for European Defence Indstries.’728 The Study focused 
primarily on U.S. technology control policy and practice and the experiences of EU 
companies seeking access to the U.S. market.729 To this extent, the Study is less 
useful for discerning the impact of ITAR on contracting authorities in the EU. It 
nevertheless provides a European perspective on the administration of the ITAR 
system. According to the Study, the latest audits from the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (“GAO”) repeatedly indicated that the DDTC has not met its 
objectives in terms of processing licences.730 Further issues identified included a lack 
of accurate record keeping of what had been licensed and why, leading to repetition 
of approval procedures. 731  These findings appear to be corroborated by the 
Fortresses and Icebergs Study which identifies a licensing culture at the U.S. 
Department of State that encourages firms to apply for narrower licenses in order to 
get approvals rather than “return without action” determinations.732 One consequence 
of a narrow scope license is an increased volume of new license applications to 
cover exports of articles, technical data and services outside the original narrow 
scope.733  
In addition to the above, the Studies have identified a number of additional criticisms 
                                                 
728 ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 662) 
729 In this regard, see ibid, Part 4 (on the U.S. export control regime) and Part 5 (on European strategies and 
“models” for accessing the U.S. market) 
730 ibid 55 
731 ibid 
732 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 693 
733 ibid 
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regarding ITAR. The following are merely illustrative and include inter alia: the 
breadth of ITAR regulation in terms of technology and information covered;734 lack of 
transparency in ITAR determinations which has been described as opaque and 
arbitrary;735 the risks to European industry with regard to commingled technology 
from Europe and the U.S; 736  the ability to maintain correspondence with U.S. 
government contacts;737 and the control of performance parameters going forward 
which result in certain items becoming ITAR controlled that were previously 
uncontrolled.738 
 
6.3.3. The “Trade-Off”: ITAR Management 
 
Whilst the above has highlighted general criticisms of ITAR, as indicated, it is 
important to discern more precisely the extent to which ITAR is likely to affect the 
decision-making of contracting authorities in their assessment of security of supply, in 
particular, with regard to the ability of tenderers to honour their export and transfer 
obligations. The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has identified that ITAR restrictions 
are a significant issue for both the German government customer and German 
companies doing business with U.S. companies.739 The Study reported that German 
officials readily conceded that European procurement authorities could use the 
                                                 
734 see ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 
662) 48 
735 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 369; see also ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the 
United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 662) 48 which observes that it offers very little visibility and 
induces extreme caution on the part of U.S. industry 
736 ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 662) 
51. It has been suggested that European industry is generally hesitant to bring technology to the U.S. because of 
the risk of losing control over it if it is modified or commingled with ITAR-controlled US technology 
737 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 559, identifying that Swedish companies have found it difficult to 
maintain an open dialogue with their U.S. government contact, whether it is someone at DDTC or DoD 
738 ibid 
739 ibid 356 
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Directive’s security of supply provisions to discriminate against bidders relying on 
ITAR controlled technology.740 The Study also identified that Swedish companies 
confirmed that ITAR restrictions are a factor in choosing suppliers.741 
 
However, again, caution must be exercised against drawing any generalised 
conclusions. Whilst the above refer to issues identified by both contracting authorities 
and companies, the Studies do not clearly differentiate between the effects of ITAR 
on the choices of contracting authorities and the choices of prime contractors 
selecting subcontractors in fulfillment of the main contract. It cannot be presumed 
that these correspond such that a negative impact of ITAR on a contractor will 
negatively impact a contracting authority’s overall determination. 
 
Further, it follows that it is not clear the precise circumstances in which ITAR would 
likely be a significant factor in any choice of supplier either by a contracting authority 
or a prime contractor in the selection of a subcontractor, nor how contracting 
authorities may use the Directive’s provisions to discriminate.  
 
In light of the above, it is submitted that, at present, there is a risk that the distinction 
between ITAR as a general management issue (in most cases) and ITAR as 
“security of supply” risk is elided. For example, U.S. legal commentary has asserted 
that managing a product with U.S. components will become more complicated and 
more expensive and will present more security of supply concerns than an equivalent 
                                                 
740 Ibid 397  
741 ibid 559 
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product outside the U.S. export control regime.742 Yet, as will be discussed below, 
there are clear instances in which it is possible to manage ITAR as part of the 
procurement process (e.g. through conditions imposed on contract start date) without 
it significantly affecting the basis of assessment of the tender itself. Here, 
management (which may include an assessment of risk) is separated from a 
qualitatively distinct assessment of “security” of supply as a risk. It is further 
submitted that the conflation between management and risk and security of supply 
and risk is exacerbated by the terms used in the Defence Procurement Directive 
itself. As indicated in the introduction to this Section, issues of “reliability” appear to 
be considered synonymous with issues of “security” of supply. Whilst the two notions 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, it may be questioned whether issues such as 
delay and inconvenience are matters which only affect “reliability” and should not, in 
and of themselves, generally provide a basis for rendering a bid “insecure” on 
grounds of “security of supply”, unless there is some additional operative factor.  
 
In addition, it should not be overlooked that companies which are also experienced in 
submitting bids in both the U.S. and EU will have ITAR management strategies in 
place.  
 
6.4. Prior Authorisations to Export and Transfer 
 
It is recalled that a further issue identified in the Fortresses and Icebergs Study 
concerns the likelihood that ITAR authorisations will not typically be in place at the 
                                                 
742 See N Tushe, ‘U.S. Export Controls: Do they Undermine the Competitiveness of U.S. Companies in the 
Transatlantic Defence Market?’ (2011-2012) 41 Pub Cont LJ 57,69 who goes on to state that: “It is little wonder, 
then, that there is a growing belief that Europeans may increasingly avoid U.S. involvement in defense work 
whenever possible” 
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point at which a bid is submitted.743 Again, existing studies provide no real indication 
of the extent to which contracting authorities consider prior authorizations to export or 
transfer items to be a decisive factor in their decision-making. 
 
The Guidance Note observes that at the moment when the tender is prepared, the 
authorisation to transfer the equipment which is to be supplied will (usually) not yet 
have been granted.744 However, it also states that the “situation will change” in light 
of the ICT Directive because no prior individual authorization requests will be 
necessary for those products subject to a general licence.745 To this extent, U.S. 
officials have considered that general licences provide a “trump card” that will provide 
an incentive to “buy European”.746  
  
Again, caution must be exercised. Firstly, it is recalled that EU subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies are eligible to be certified to use general licences under the ICT regime. 
Secondly, the significance of general licences must not be overstated. It is recalled 
from Section 6.1 that the ICT Directive limits the mandatory use of general licences 
to certain defined circumstances.747 Further, whilst the intention of the ICT Directive 
is to limit recourse to individual licensing, the fact of its retention as well as its 
wording may provide for a more extensive use than envisaged. 748  Importantly, 
                                                 
743 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 223 
744 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 10, point 30 
745 ibid 
746 See I Maelcamp, Commercial Specialist, U.S. Mission to the European Union, ‘Recent EU developments in 
Defense Procurement & Reform of Arms Transfer Licenses’, Presentation to the North Alabama International 
Trade Association, May 19, 2011. 
<http://www.naita.org/docs/Isabelle%20Maelcamp%20NATO%20Pres%20May%202011.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013 
747 See Article 5(2)(a)-(2) identified above (n 690) 
748 For instance, Article 7(b) restricts its use to the instance in which it is necessary for the protection of the 
essential security interests of the Member State. See also Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, point 3. This 
incorporates the wording of Article 346 TFEU and may legitimate a similarly restrictive interpretation (on which 
see Chapter 2 of this thesis). However, Article 7(b) also enables the use of individual licences on “grounds of 
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therefore, the fact that the ICT Directive does not create a “licence-free zone” should 
be emphasized.749 Thirdly, as the Guidance Note indicates, for tenders involving 
transfers and/or products not covered by a general licence, contracting authorities 
will only be able to require a tenderer to provide elements indicating that they will be 
able to obtain the required licences if the contract is awarded to them.750 To this 
extent, an EU tenderer will only be able to provide a relevant assurance as opposed 
to any guarantee. 
 
In addition to these arguments, it is recalled that it should be cautioned not to place 
excessive emphasis on ITAR as necessarily constituting a “security of supply” risk, 
especially where that risk merely pertains to the fact that ITAR authorizations may 
not typically be in place at the point of tender. For instance, the Guidance Note states 
that for equipment not covered by a general licence under the ICT Directive, in order 
to ensure that contractors correctly process licences expeditiously, contracting 
authorities may require tenderers to provide evidence showing their planning and 
resources for obtaining any necessary transfer and/or export licences.751 Moreover, 
they can insert into the contract documents conditions which will improve and 
expedite the export licensing process.752 The Guidance Note states that this could 
include a requirement for the contractor to notify all licensing requirements or other 
transfer restrictions applicable to the products to be delivered and to any parts, sub-
                                                                                                                                                        
public policy”, where it is necessary to comply with international obligations and commitments of Member States 
and where a Member State has serious reason to believe that the supplier will not be able to comply with all the 
terms and conditions necessary to grant it a global transfer licence. The reference to “serious reason” could 
require strict justification in accordance with the general ECJ jurisprudence identified in Chapter 2. However, the 
Directive does itself not specify an exhaustive or illustrative list of possible circumstances that may constitute a 
“serious reason”, thereby importing a degree of subjectivity 
749 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, point 3 
750 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 10, point 30 
751 ibid 
752 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 11, point 31 
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systems thereof, in particular if these have to be provided from third countries.753  As 
indicated in Section 6.3.3 above, these appear to constitute issues pertaining to ITAR 
management only. 
 
As expected, there are examples of published contract notices for procurements 
undertaken in accordance with the Defence Procurement Directive which stipulate 
early disclosure of ITAR implications as well as the ability of any selected contractor 
to comply with ITAR at the contract start date.754  
 
6.5. Restrictions On Disclosure, Transfer and Use 
 
U.S. commentary has not differentiated any possible effects for third countries which 
may result from the separate application of Articles 23(a) and (b).755 It is recalled that 
the Guidance Note differentiates Article 23(a) and (b) on the basis that the former 
pertains to a requirement to demonstrate that the contractor will “in all likelihood” 
obtain the necessary export, transfer and transit licences with conditions that enable 
it to fulfil mandatory contractual obligations whilst the latter pertains to a requirement 
to list all other restrictions to which an exported item is subject so that they can be 
dealt with during the negotiation phase, and or as part of the evaluation in the award 
phase.756 
                                                 
753 Other conditions include requirements to: notify the contracting authority of export-controlled content; institute 
timely action to obtain export licences; liaise fully with the contracting authority and/or other relevant authorities on 
the  export licensing process to ensure that all requirements are met and ensure that contractual requirements 
are passed down to any subcontractor  who may have to apply for export/transfer licences. See Guidance Note, 
Security of Supply, 11, point 31 
754 See for example, Chinook Engine Support Arrangement, Contract Notice published in the OJEU (2011/S 62-
101005) <http://www.government-online.net/chinook-engine-support-arrangement/> accessed 20 September 
2013  
755  As consistently observed throughout this thesis, the technical imprecision of many of the Directive’s 
provisions leaves them susceptible to interpretational overlap and raise issues of legal certainty 
756 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 36, para.2  
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The Guidance Note states that Article 23(b) concerns, in particular, so-called “black 
boxes” or anti-tamper devices which it describes as components and sub-systems 
which cannot be accessed or modified by the customer.757 With specific regard to the 
U.S., the Guidance Note expressly refers to the fact that Article 23(b) also concerns 
items covered by export control regimes or special end-use monitoring such as ITAR, 
identifying the requirement to obtain specific authorisation from the US for export to 
other countries, including transfers between Member States. 758  Both black box 
restrictions and special end use monitoring have one common feature, namely a 
concern to prevent further unauthorized re-exportation and/or use of material. 
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has identified the use of “black boxes” and other 
“ring-fence” or management systems as limiting the ability of Member States to 
operate freely with their military systems and that these are limitations which these 
countries are reluctant to accept.759 According to the Study, the UK, as well as 
France and Italy, expressed strong concerns about this issue, in particular regarding 
their overall effect on autonomy and flexibility (operational sovereignty), in particular 
with regard to sales to foreign partners.760  
 
Similarly, the Study identified re-transfers and re-exports as a significant issue. 
Germany indicated specific risks to third country exports arising from ITAR. 761 
Germany also identified issues related to such matters as end-use certificates 
                                                 
757 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 35, para 1 
758 ibid 
759 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 113 
760 ibid 353 
761 ibid 356. However, these risks were not specified in the Study 
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needed for re-transfers.762 This issue was also specifically reported by Sweden. 
According to the Study, because Swedish systems have often contained a high 
percentage of U.S.-origin parts and components, re-export restrictions imposed by 
the ITAR is a constant issue confronting the Swedish Inspectorate of Swedish 
Products and Swedish defence firms.763 The Study reported that the requirement to 
obtain re-export authorization from the U.S. Department of State’s DDTC prior to the 
transfer or sale of a Swedish product containing U.S.-origin components to a third 
party is “an irritation that is not only inconvenient, but inevitably leads to delays.”764 It 
was reported that, to this extent, ITAR restrictions serve as a trade barrier for U.S. 
companies, particularly lower tier companies that are not selling sophisticated 
systems or subsystems.765 
 
Beyond the existing available evidence of general concerns expressed, it is not clear 
to what extent such restrictions or further conditions on use are decisive in contract 
awards in practice. Again, the Guidance Note expressly emphasizes effective 
planning in this regard. In particular, the Guidance identifies the importance of early 
disclosure as fundamental not only to ensuring that the contracting authority’s/entity’s 
security of supply requirements can be met, but also to maintaining the possibility to 
award in competition contracts for downstream equipment support.766 Whilst it is 
difficult to discern whether early disclosure could override inherent reservations on 
the part of contracting authorities regarding their autonomy to use products, 
nevertheless, as indicated by the practice outlined above, early disclosure may, at 
                                                 
762 ibid 397 
763 ibid 558 
764 ibid 558-9 
765 Ibid. The Study does not, however, elaborate as to why this would have a more substantial impact on lower 
tier suppliers. This may be due to the ability of those providing more sophisticated systems and subsystems to 
absorb the costs or better manage ITAR issues 
766 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 35, para 2  
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the least, enable adequate planning in order to take account of, or mitigate to the 
extent possible and practicable, any ITAR restrictions. This also seems to be 
consistent with the fact that the Guidance Note states that all the tenderer has to do 
to in order to satisfy the condition in Article 23(b) is to provide complete and 
sufficiently detailed information about such restrictions (if any). 767  It could be 
suggested that if such issues were perceived to be potentially decisive, more than an 
informational requirement may have been specified.768 
 
More generally, it should be added that EU officials and commentators have 
identified the potential role which the ICT Directive could have in mitigating the extent 
to which the U.S. deems it necessary to place restrictions on re-exports. A principal 
motivation that continues to drive ITAR (and militate against reform) concerns the 
ability of EU Member States to safeguard against re-export risks of illicit technology 
transfer and which is said to be considered by U.S. authorities to be a pre-requisite 
for any softening of ITAR.769 The U.S. continues to harbour concerns that the degree 
of liberalization intended by the ICT Directive will further increase such risks.  
 
It has been argued by EU officials that the certification provisions of the ICT Directive 
could contribute to providing the U.S. with greater assurance against the risk of illicit 
technology transfer in the event of collaboration with European companies, thus 
                                                 
767 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 36, para 1 
768 Although, as will be discussed in Section 7.1 below, the Guidance has placed emphasis on the potential for 
such informational provisions to provide a legitimate basis for exclusion of tenderers at the qualitative selection 
stage. Therefore, any weight to be attached to a particular requirement should not necessarily be presumed  
769 H Ingels, ‘The intra-EU defence trade directive: positive goals’ in A JK Bailes and S Depauw (ed) ‘The EU 
defence market: balancing effectiveness with responsibility’, Conference Report, Flemish Peace Institute, 
Brussels, 15 September 2011, 64 
<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/research/armaments/transfers/publications/other_
publ/other%20publications/conference-report-eu-defence-market-flemish-peace-institute> accessed 20 
September 2013. 
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enhancing mutual trust.770 For example, the ICT Directive requires Member States to 
determine all the terms and conditions of transfer licences including limitations on the 
export of defence-related products to third countries and may request end-use 
assurances including end user certificates.771  
 
Similarly, in evidence given to the UK Parliament, U.S. concerns about possible risks 
in relation to re-exports arising as a result of the ICT Directive have been 
acknowledged.772 However, it has also been stated that if Europeans want the US to 
take part and take more “ambitious steps in dismantling barriers to transatlantic 
defence cooperation”, existing trust issues must be addressed. 773  It has been 
suggested that the best way to reassure the U.S. about the inadequate technical 
standards of export controls within some European countries is for EU governments 
to implement thoroughly the ICT Directive, as a result of which the U.S. will feel more 
confident about exploring possible synergies.774 
 
In light of the above, whilst it is difficult to validate the extent to which subsequent 
restrictions on use of defence products are decisive in practice, a critical issue which 
must be addressed concerns perceived and actual risks of re-exportation. Longer 
term export reform initiatives may alter U.S. practices in relation to re-exports which, 
                                                 
770 ibid 
771 Article 4(6). Although, it should be recognized that the ICT Directive has been criticized on grounds that it 
does not provide for any systematic means whereby receiving Member States are routinely informed about 
relevant re-export conditions (i.e. it is up to the certified recipient company to comply with, and alert its 
government to, any export restrictions associated with the original transfer licence). It has been suggested that 
this could create a significant risk of unauthorised export in cases where companies either wilfully or inadvertently 
neglect to inform their authorities of any re-export restrictions that apply to particular defence- related products. 
See See C Taylor, ‘EC Defence Equipment Directives, Standard Note SN.IA/4640’, 3 June 2011, 1-22, 20 citing 
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Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls 2009, HC 178, Session 2008-09 
772 C Taylor, ‘EC Defence Equipment Directives, Standard Note SN.IA/4640, 3 June 2011, citing at 21, fn 51 C 
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773 ibid 
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in turn, may reduce the attributed significance of restrictions on re-export as a basis 
for assessing security of supply under the Defence Procurement Directive. 
 
6.6. “ITAR-Free”: Cost of Freedom 
 
Both the Fortresses and Icebergs and EU Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade 
Studies identify the development of so-called “ITAR-free” initiatives which are said to 
have been undertaken by U.S. and EU companies and endorsed by certain EU 
Member States.775 Whilst there is no official EU ITAR free policy or initiative, the 
Fortresses and Icebergs study identifies national policies and informal guidance 
encouraging avoidance of ITAR as well as tangible evidence in this regard, in 
particular, the use and procurement of “design arounds” or “design outs”.776 Further, 
the Study specifically identifies that German industrial and Government 
representatives suggested that the security of supply and global licence provisions of 
the Defence Directives had the potential to “jump-start” an ITAR-free initiative within 
Europe that would amount, in fact, to a European preference in defence 
procurement.777 U.S. legal commentary has identified a number of instances which 
apparently provide “compelling” and “systemic” evidence of U.S. disadvantage”, in 
light of which EU Member States’ ability to use the Defence Procurement Directive to 
discriminate against U.S. suppliers is a cause for concern.778 
 
Whilst it is important to give due credence to very serious statements made in 
                                                 
775 As The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries 
Study (n 662) observes at 53, the concept was turned into a kind of “buzz word” and used for a political purpose. 
See also Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 113-117 
776 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 114 
777 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n12) 369-70 
778  Tushe, ‘U.S. Export Controls: Do they Undermine the Competitiveness of U.S. Companies in the 
Transatlantic Defence Market?’ (n 742) 
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relation to ITAR concerns, it is also important to understand the observable limits of 
this phenomenon. The same U.S. legal commentary itself identifies that it is very 
difficult to quantify the impact of export controls on U.S. companies.779 Further, the 
Fortresses and Icebergs Study identifies anecdotal evidence which suggests caution 
on the part of EU Member States in adopting ITAR free initiatives.780 For instance, 
Germany has not gone so far as to make ITAR-free an element of German 
procurement policy for a number of reasons.781 One stated reason is that it is 
impractical at the present time because it could cost more and take longer to develop 
ITAR free solutions. 782  Another stated reason is that the result could be less 
capability in relation to the investment.783 Similarly, Sweden reported that ITAR 
issues will not prohibit the Swedish government from purchasing advanced U.S. 
equipment because ultimately advanced technology and capabilities decide which 
systems will be purchased.784 In particular, it stated that in most cases, U.S. suppliers 
will continue to be the supplier of choice for systems and subsystems because in the 
final analysis Sweden will purchase the best product available.785 Further, as the 
Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the U.S. Study observes, it is at least 
possible to argue that it would not be reasonable to believe that Europe has the 
capacity or the political will and objective to replace U.S. technology to a significant 
extent.786  
                                                 
779 ibid 69 at fn97 and citations therein 
780 Whilst Tushe (n 742) relies extensively on references to the Fortress and Icebergs Study throughout, the 
findings of the Fortresses and Icebergs Study on this issue are not included 
781 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 369-70 
782 ibid 397 
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785 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) ibid 
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Further, in principle, there can be no objection to instances in which a contracting 
authority chooses an ITAR-free product where there is an ITAR equivalent if, in the 
trade-off, the-ITAR free solution provides a better security of supply assurance, even 
if at reduced capability, for example. It may simply constitute a genuine economic 
expedient to select European solutions in this instance.787  
 
In summary, it is clear that ITAR increasingly factors into the underlying policy 
debates, rationales and even Guidance supporting EU legislation. Whilst the 
preceding Sections have sought to offer a rational assessment of the Defence 
Procurement Directive’s possible interaction with ITAR in light of experiences prior to 
the Directive, the Defence Directives signal a change in the EU regulatory 
environment the likely effects of which in light of the continued operation of ITAR is, 
admittedly, uncertain. Whilst inconvenience may be tolerated at present, it may 
become less tolerable and may result in ITAR becoming an increasingly relevant 
factor which discriminates between (as opposed to against) tenders on grounds of 
security of supply.  
 
These concerns are, at least to some extent, also recognized within the U.S. As the 
Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the U.S. Study observes, generally 
speaking, both the underlying policy and the processes regarding the U.S. export 
control regime are in “disarray” in that “the very balance between protecting sensitive 
technology and promoting legitimate commerce is often judged to be out of kilter”.788  
                                                 
787 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 401 expressing the views of a senior Italian Government official 
Similarly ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 
655) states at 53 that European entities are not making a political statement about ITAR but are simply motivated 
by logical business practices on a case-by-case basis 
788 ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’ (n 662) 
58; Fortresses and Icebergs: Vol. II (n 13) 694-7 
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In 2010, the Obama Administration announced the Export Control Reform Initiative 
following an interagency review of the export control system and which found that the 
current export control system was overly complicated, redundant, and in trying to 
protect too much, diminishes U.S. efforts to focus on the most critical national 
security priorities.789 The Initiative aims to consolidate four aspects by developing a 
single control list, a single licensing agency, a single information technology system 
and a single main enforcement agency.790 The extent to which these reforms could 
result in a reduction in export controls that will affect European choices will remain to 
be seen. 
As will be discussed in Part III, despite initial political resistance in the U.S., the U.S. 
and U.K. have ratified a U.K.-U.S. defence trade treaty permitting a licence waiver for 
certain technologies, thereby attempting to reduce the restrictive effects of ITAR and 
which has been proposed as a model for the adoption of a “transatlantic general 
licence” applicable to all EU Member States.791  
 
7. Security of Supply in the Supply Chain 
 
The preceding Section focused on the assessment of security of supply with regard, 
principally, to the issue of export, transfer and use of goods. By contrast, this Section 
                                                 
789 For more information on the background to the initiative, see <http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_047329.asp> 
accessed 20 September 2013 
790 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘President Obama Lays the Foundation for a New Export 
Control System to Strengthen National Security and the Competitiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and 
Technology Sectors’ (August 30 2010) Press Release 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/30/president-obama-lays-foundation-a-new-export-control-
system-strengthen-n> accessed 20 September 2013 
791 Treaty Between The Government of The United States of America and The Government of The United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, June 21, 2007  
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brings into focus the observations of Chapter 4 regarding the potential for EU law to 
impact on third countries indirectly through an assessment of an EU economic 
operator’s supply chain. U.S. legal commentary has not examined this aspect. 
However, as will be discussed, the Defence Procurement Directive and Guidance 
contain a number of additional references to third countries. This Section examines 
the assessment of the supply chain at the qualitative selection and award stages. 
 
7.1. Exclusion Through Qualitative Selection: Indication of Location 
 
It is recalled that Section 5 examined certain grounds for excluding candidates or 
tenderers at the qualitative selection stage.792 Another basis on which candidates or 
tenderers may be excluded is on grounds of their technical and professional 
capacity.793 Article 42(1) describes different means by which operators may provide 
evidence of their technical abilities and which can, in turn, be used by contracting 
authorities as a basis for establishing their selection criteria.794  
One form of evidence identified by Article 42(1)(h) refers to:  
 
[…] a description of the tools, material, technical equipment, staff numbers 
and know-how and/or sources of supply — with an indication of the 
geographical location when it is outside the territory of the Union — which 
the economic operator has at its disposal to perform the contract, cope 
with any additional needs required by the contracting authority/entity as a 
                                                 
792 See Article 39(2) 
793 For general commentary on these requirements under the Public Sector Directive, see C H Bovis, EU Public 
Procurement Law (n 171) 133-140 
794 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 8, point 22, para. 2. As the Guidance observes, according to Article 38, 
contracting authorities/entities are permitted to use selection criteria in two ways: (a) to require candidates to meet 
minimum capacity levels (provided those levels are related and proportionate to the subject matter of the contract) 
and (b) as the basis for their ranking if they decide to limit the number of suitable candidates they invite to tender 
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result of a crisis or carry out the maintenance, modernisation or adaptation 
of the supplies covered by the contract. 
  
The above appears to refer to ostensibly objective factors with the exception of 
“sources of supply”. In this regard, it is worth reciting the Guidance in relevant part: 
 
[…] The explicit reference to the ‘indication of the geographical location 
when it is outside the territory of the Union’ implies that location in third 
countries can be relevant for the assessment of a candidate’s or 
tenderer’s capability to perform the contract. A contracting authority/entity 
can therefore exclude a candidate or tenderer from the procedure if it 
considers that the geographical location of non-EU sources could 
compromise their ability to comply with its requirements, in particular those 
related to Security of Supply. In addition, if a successful tenderer is obliged 
to award subcontracts in accordance with the rules set out in Title III of the 
Directive, any sub-contractor can be excluded on the same grounds. 
However, any such decision has to be based on the individual 
circumstances of each procurement case and must be proportionate and 
related to the subject matter of the contract.795 
 
It is observed that there is no definitive CJEU judgment on factors pertaining to the 
assessment of the location of a contractor/subcontractor. 796  Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to question the emphasis placed by the Guidance on distinguishing 
                                                 
795 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 8-9, point 24, para 2 
796 For a limited instance in which the Court has considered such factors and which is, in any event, 
distinguishable from the present scenario, see Case C-315/01 Gesellschaft für Abfallentsorgungs-Technik GmbH 
v Österreichische Autobahnen und Schnellstraßen AG [2003] ECR I-6351 
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sources of supply (in particular from third countries) from the other considerations 
listed in Article 42(1)(h). Firstly, whilst the UK DSPCR, for example, directly 
transposes Article 42(1)(h) in this respect,797 the UK Guidance on supplier selection 
does not identify sources of supply as a relevant form of evidence and makes no 
reference to geographical indication of the location of the supply chain when it is 
outside the EU. 798 Therefore, to the extent that there is any emphasis at all, it may be 
variable between Member States. Secondly, Article 42(1)(h) merely emphasises the 
need for an “indication” of sources of supply. Whilst the above Guidance appears to 
suggest that this indication could provide a basis for exclusion, it is recalled from 
Section 6.5 the similar reference to an indication in Article 23(b), namely that all that 
a tenderer has to do to fulfil that condition is to provide complete and sufficiently 
detailed information. In light of the above, it is suggested that the Guidance Note 
places an emphasis on the provision that is not necessarily mandated by its wording.  
 
This issue is rendered even more uncertain by the fact that Article 42(1)(h) is not the 
only reference to the location of sources of supply contained in the Directive. As will 
be discussed in Section 7.2 below, Article 23(c) provides that a contracting authority 
may require certification or documentation demonstrating that the organisation and 
location of the tenderer’s supply chain will allow it to comply with the contracting 
authority’s security of supply requirements. 
                                                 
797 See Regulation 25(2)(j) DSPCR 
798 The only relevant reference to third countries relates to Article 41(c) Defence Procurement Directive which 
refers to: “a description of the technical facilities and measures used by the economic operator to ensure quality 
and the undertaking’s study and research facilities, as well as internal rules regarding intellectual property [.]” See 
also Recital 44 to the Directive. In this regard, the UK Guidance states that this requirement is to inform the 
procurer if the supplier’s internal rules require the transfer of IPR to another party e.g. a parent or sister company 
located in another Member State or outside the EU and that this may have an impact on a supplier’s capability to 
meet security of supply requirements. See Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Ch. 14, 
Supplier Selection, 6-7 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27664/dspcr_c14_supplier_selecti
on_apr12.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013  
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It is also recalled from Section 5 that the Guidance Note expressly states that it is 
particularly important to distinguish selection criteria clearly from award criteria.799 
The basis for this distinction is sound in theory and has been endorsed by the 
ECJ. 800  However, reinforcing the earlier observation in Section 5, this relation 
between Article 42(1)(h) and Article 23(c) arguably raises the issue of whether the 
distinction between capability to perform the contract and characteristics of the 
product itself can be retained such as to act as a safeguard against the early 
exclusion of tenderers with third country elements. 
 
The Guidance Note has not provided any useful indication of the type of enquiry that 
may be undertaken when determining whether to exclude a candidate or tenderers 
on the grounds of capability to perform the contract, and more specifically, on the 
basis that geographical location of non-EU sources may compromise their ability to 
comply with security of supply requirements. In contrast, as will be discussed in 
Section 7.2 below, the Guidance Note has discussed the issue of geographical 
location and its relevance to security of supply under Article 23(c). Suffice to state 
that it cannot be excluded that contracting authorities may take into account a host of 
more subjective factors under Article 42(1)(h) which are not exclusively related to 
capability. 
 
Again, the above observations are based on nuanced legal interpretations. There are 
a number of possible arguments which may militate against the likelihood of early 
exclusion of economic operators on the basis of third country supply chain 
                                                 
799 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 5-6 
800 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 5-6. As the Guidance Note itself observes: “[e]specially in the case of off-
the-shelf procurement, contracting authorities/entities may often already have an idea of the products that could 
fulfil their requirements. However, at this stage of the procedure the assessment does not concern the products, 
works or services to be procured, but the tenderer’s or candidate’s ability to perform the contract in question.” 
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considerations in practice. Firstly, as discussed above, it is possible that an indication 
of sources of supply may be just that, indicative, rather than decisive. Secondly, it is 
recalled that any decision by a contracting authority to exclude a candidate or 
tenderer must be: (i) based on the individual circumstances of the case; (ii) 
proportionate and (iii) related to the subject matter of the contract.801 Whilst it is not 
clear to what extent factors such as ITAR, for example, could be included in the 
assessment under Article 42(1)(h), U.S. commentary has not identified the possibility 
for such a requirement to discriminate against U.S. contractors. 
 
7.2. Location and Organisation of the Supply Chain 
 
The location and organisation of a tenderer’s supply chain can form the basis of a 
contract performance condition or award criterion. It is recalled that Article 23(c) 
provides that a contracting authority may require: 
 
certification or documentation demonstrating that the organisation and location 
of the tenderer’s supply chain will allow it to comply with the requirements of 
the contracting authority/entity concerning security of supply set out in the 
contract documents, and a commitment to ensure that possible changes in its 
supply chain during the execution of the contract will not affect adversely 
compliance with these requirements […]. 
 
Unlike Article 42(1)(h), Article 23(c) does not make any reference to geographical 
location of sources of supply when outside the EU. According to the Guidance Note, 
                                                 
801 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 6, point 16 
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the organisation of the tenderer’s supply chain covers all the resources and activities 
necessary to deliver the supplies, services, or works.802 The analysis of the supply 
chain has to be based on objective, performance-oriented considerations.803 In this 
regard, contracting authorities may require evidence that the supply chain is “reliable” 
and “stable”.804 Further, the Guidance states that contracting authorities may wish 
tenderers to identify key components or potential single points of failure so that 
measures can be adopted to manage these risks.805 However, the Guidance further 
elaborates as follows and which is worth reciting in full: 
 
[…] In this context, it is particularly important to avoid any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality when assessing the ‘location’806 of the tenderer’s 
supply chain. For all production sites and facilities established in the EU, 
geography may play a role but only in terms of distances and delivery 
times not in terms of national territory. Security of supply requirements 
therefore have to be based exclusively on objective, performance-oriented 
considerations. They may concern, for example, time-limits and conditions 
for the availability of spare parts, other materials or maintenance services. 
The tenderer would then have to submit elements demonstrating that the 
location and organisation of his supply chain allows him to make the 
                                                 
802 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 13, point 37 
803 ibid 
804 ibid 
805 ibid 
806 It is unclear why location is placed in inverted commas. It may suggest a degree of underlying conceptual 
uncertainty regarding precisely what is to be considered as part of this assessment. As indicated above, the 
Guidance merely states that “geography may play a role but only in terms of distances and delivery times not in 
terms of national territory”. It is not clear what is meant by “in terms of national territory”. The reference implicitly 
suggests that “national territory” could incorporate a range of factors other than ostensibly objective performance 
oriented considerations, in particular, subjective determinations about broader (unspecified) risks pertaining to the 
relevant locality or localities (and even any risk arising from any relation between localities if more than one 
locality comprises a tenderer’s supply chain) and which could, otherwise, be used as a basis for discriminatory 
assessment 
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necessary deliveries and/or provide the requested services within the 
required timeframe under the terms and conditions defined in the contract 
documents […]807 
 
Importantly, the Guidance Note appears to suggest that this emphasis on avoiding 
nationality discrimination and use of ostensibly objective performance oriented 
considerations does not necessarily apply to third country supply chains. Again, 
similar to the Guidance on Article 42(1)(h), the Guidance clearly seeks to differentiate 
non-EU sources of supply. For instance, the Guidance states:  
 
The situation is somewhat different with respect to supply chains which are 
(partly) established in or depend on third countries. To safeguard security 
interests, the contracting authority/entity may require the tenderer to use only 
reliable sub-contractors from allied countries, for example, or to avoid 
subcontractors which have to comply with specific export control regimes in 
third countries. Such conditions, however, must be appropriate and 
proportionate.”808 
 
This emphasis on third countries is even more stark in light of the fact that, unlike 
Article 42(1)(h), Article 23(c) contains no reference to non-EU sources. It is 
necessary to discuss this aspect in more detail. 
 
 
 
                                                 
807 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 13, point 38, para 1 
808 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 13, para 38, para 1 
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7.2.1. Partial Establishment and Dependence on Third Countries 
 
The Guidance is not clear on what is meant by supply chains which are “partly 
established” in or “depend” on third countries. As indicated in Chapter 4, Section 4, 
there are a variety of ways in which an economic operator may relate to a third 
country e.g. through ownership, affiliation etc. Further, it is not clear how 
“dependence” is qualitatively and quantitatively determined. To this extent, it is 
difficult to know how these aspects could be accurately and objectively assessed. For 
instance, given the general prevalence of concerns about foreign ownership in the 
defence sector, in particular, in relation to the need for operational sovereignty and 
autonomy, it is not clear whether such an assessment might enable subjective 
decision-making based on factors which do not, in fact, affect the tenderer’s ability to 
supply the product. Again, it is not clear to what extent such factors are likely to be 
decisive in practice.   
 
7.2.2. Reliable Sub-Contractors from Allied Countries 
 
As indicated, the Guidance Note also refers to a possible requirement of the tenderer 
to use only “reliable sub-contractors” from “allied countries” or “avoid subcontractors 
which have to comply with specific export control regimes in third countries”.809 
Again, it should be observed that the UK Guidance, for example, makes no reference 
to the possibility to impose conditions of this kind.810 There is also a fundamental 
uncertainty as to precisely when such a requirement would be incorporated. 
                                                 
809 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 13, para 38, para 1 
810 See Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Chapter 13 – Subcontracting under the 
DSPCR 
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In terms of the substance of any such requirement, there is an inherent difficulty in 
the reference to the use of “reliable subcontractors from allied countries”. Firstly, as 
indicated in preceding Sections, whilst “reliability” is referred to at a number of points 
in the Directive, “reliability” is not defined and may import highly subjective 
determinations.811 Secondly, the notion of an “allied country” is not clear. Most 
Member States would likely agree that a State party to NATO constitutes an “allied 
country”. However, a further question arises as to whether allied countries should be 
confined to NATO countries. Certain Member States may also prioritise neighbouring 
or regional alliances above NATO. There is also a possibility for alliances and their 
strengths to vary over time. As indicated in Chapter 2, Member States have different 
defence solutions based on different threat scenarios and security interests, which 
may be highly relevant to procurement acquisitions.812  
 
It may also be questioned whether such a requirement is consistent with one of the 
core rationales underlying the Directive’s subcontracting provisions, namely to drive 
competition into the supply chain of prime contractors.813 The provisions of Articles 
21 and Title III are an exhaustive description of the possible ways in which a 
contracting authority can oblige a successful tenderer to subcontract a certain share 
of the contract to third parties and/or to intervene in the way successful tenderers 
select their subcontractors. 814  This responds to a particular concern regarding 
                                                                                                                                                        
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27663/dspcr_c13_mandating_sub
contracting_3rd_parties_apr12.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
811 See for instance, Recitals 65 and 67 and Article 39(2)(e)  
812 See Aalto, ‘Interpretations of Article 296’ (n 81) 34. See Chapter 2, Section 5.2 
813 Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 1, para 2. For a discussion of the subcontracting provisions, see  
Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive (n 125) 27-29 
814 Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 2, para.6 which states that this results from the restrictive wording of the 
relevant provisions such as, for example, Article 21(4)) and also from the principle expressed in Article 21(1) that 
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systemic practices of contracting authorities to dictate the award of subcontracts to 
local industries.815 For instance, one of the subcontracting provisions of the Directive 
enables a contracting authority to allow a successful tenderer to determine which 
share and which parts of the main contract to subcontract, and the potential sub-
contractors with whom it wishes to subcontract, subject only to a possible verification 
of its selection criteria.816  Whilst the Directive provides that contracting authorities 
may place some limitations on successful tenderers, the Guidance Note on 
Subcontracting confirms the importance of the principle of non-discrimination, in 
particular that a contracting authority may not require the successful tenderer to 
award subcontracts to specific subcontractors or to subcontractors of a specific 
nationality. 817  Therefore, the possibility for a contracting authority to require a 
tenderer to use only reliable sub-contractors from allied countries not only constitutes 
an incursion on a successful tenderer’s discretion in this regard but also nationality 
alone could provide a basis for discriminating in favour of the use of a sub-contractor 
on grounds that it is from an “allied” country. 
 
There is also a more general sense of inconsistency of approach under EU law to the 
issue of the relevance of alliances in contract award procedures. It is recalled from 
Chapter 2, Section 5.3 that in its Interpretative Communication on Article 296 TEC, 
the Commission downplays the relevance of alliance commitments when seeking to 
invoke Article 346 TFEU.818 Yet the Guidance suggests that it is permissible to rely 
                                                                                                                                                        
“the successful tenderer shall be free to select its subcontractors for all subcontracts that are not covered by the 
requirement referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of that Article”  
815 Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 1, para 3 
816 In accordance with Article 21(5). See Article 21(1) and (2). See also Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 3, 11 
817 Article 21(1). See also Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 2, para 4 
818 ‘Interpretative Communication on the Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence 
procurement’ (n 234) 9 
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on the same as a basis for awarding a contract under the Directive and limiting that 
award to specific subcontractors.  
 
Again, it is important to question the likely significance of the above in practice. The 
reality is that U.S. contractors would likely satisfy such conditions. However, the 
apparent flexibility to choose third country subcontractors from allied countries must 
be juxtaposed against a possible requirement to avoid subcontractors subject to 
specific third country export control regimes, to which this Chapter now turns.  
 
7.2.3. Avoidance of Sub-Contractors Subject to Third Country Export Controls  
 
It is not clear whether the reference to “specific third country export control regimes” 
is a reference to ITAR, which, it is recalled, is so referenced elsewhere in the 
Guidance.819 Again, a number of observations can be made in this regard.  
 
It is recalled that any such conditions must be appropriate and proportionate. On the 
wording of the Guidance, it is not clear whether the simple fact that a third country 
has to “comply” with a specific export control regime would be considered sufficient 
to avoid such subcontractors. Whilst it is possible that contracting authorities could 
take into account subjective and extraneous factors unrelated to the subject matter of 
the contract, the possibility for an alternative subcontractor to provide a comparable 
ITAR free solution might be a consideration. However, reinforcing the earlier 
observations above, the Guidance is not mandatory. Further, any such requirement 
is inconsistent with the flexibility otherwise accorded to EU tenderers under the 
                                                 
819 See Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 35, para 1 
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subcontracting provisions. Most importantly, as indicated in Section 6, it must be 
questioned to what extent ITAR would likely be a decisive factor that would force a 
contracting authority to require avoidance of U.S. subcontractors. 
  
Were such a measure to be challenged, it is not clear whether or not a Member State 
would be able to invoke Article 346 TFEU to justify any decision to require an award 
to a particular subcontractor(s) or avoid use of a third country subcontractor(s). The 
Guidance Note appears to simply suggest, without more, that the above conditions 
can be taken to “safeguard security interests”.820 
 
More generally, it may be questioned whether the Guidance fully reflects or 
appreciates the commercial realities of defence contracting in presuming that 
tenderers are able to readily make alternative subcontracting choices. It cannot be 
presumed that a contractor can simply switch to alternative suppliers.821 A civil 
contractor operating in the public sector may be able to rely more easily on 
alternative suppliers it uses in private sector contracts. However, this may not be 
possible for defence contractors providing defence material exclusively under public 
contracts. Defence contractors may have invested heavily in developing a particular 
supply network e.g. establishing a permanent base in the country of supply, incurring 
significant costs in obtaining relevant licensing, transfer, export, security and 
intellectual property agreements, all of which are designed to maintain regular supply 
and repeat business with a limited number of trusted suppliers and which may be 
                                                 
820 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 12, point 38, para 2 
821 See e.g. the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Chapter 13, Subcontracting under 
the DSPCR (n 810) which states at 4, para 23: “[…] you should consider carefully any action that may alter the 
successful tenderer’s proposed supply chain and satisfy yourself that action you take is objective and justified. 
You should also consider the effect on the tender and the timescales for performance recognising that the 
successful tenderer may have based its tender on a presumption of sourcing work from particular suppliers.” 
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prejudiced in future if a tenderer is required to use an alternative source. In addition, 
switching to another supplier may result in increased costs passed on to the prime 
contractor or Government consumer.822 Long term, strategic relationships across 
supply networks is therefore a necessary and significant consideration.823  
It is important to recognize that the references in the Guidance do not feature in the 
terms of Article 23(c) itself. Therefore, contracting authorities should be free to 
undertake any assessment exclusively according to performance oriented 
considerations without reference to determinations made on the basis of non-EU 
sources of supply. However, the above observations expose the extent to which it is 
possible to differentiate EU and third country supply in a way that results in 
considerable legal and practical uncertainty. Again, U.S. commentary has not 
identified Article 23(c) as creating a possibility for discrimination against U.S. 
contractors. 
 
7.3. Additional Needs in a Crisis 
 
A final set of provisions which have been considered by U.S. commentators are 
Articles 23(d) and (e) and which provide, respectively, that a contracting authority 
may require: 
 
[…] a commitment from the tenderer to establish and/or maintain the 
capacity required to meet additional needs required by the contracting 
                                                 
822 As the UK Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Ch. 13, Subcontracting under the 
DSPCR  (n 810) observes at 6, para 31: “[a]ny attempt by the procurer to alter the tenderer’s subcontract network 
(or supply chain) may lead to an increase in cost and introduce delays. It may also increase the procurer’s 
liability.” 
823 Ibid, which observes at 3, para 16 that procurers must consider whether to ask the tenderer at the start of the 
procedure to provide information on long term strategic relationships in place across potential supply networks 
that may affect or extend beyond the requirement in question 
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authority/entity as a result of a crisis, according to terms and conditions to 
be agreed; 
[…] any supporting documentation received from the tenderer’s national 
authorities regarding the fulfillment of additional needs required by the 
contracting authority/entity as a result of a crisis [.] 
 
From a purely practical perspective, U.S. commentary has argued that these 
provisions could pose challenges for the U.S. Government because these matters 
are normally left to case-by-case determination and that the U.S. would probably be 
unwilling to commit long in advance to ensuring supply in writing. 824  Before 
examining the U.S. claim in more detail, it should be observed that EU commentators 
have similarly argued that contracting authorities within the EU may be reluctant to 
provide such documentation.825  
 
7.3.1. Security of Supply “Guarantees” Through Existing Arrangements 
 
U.S. commentary has placed particular emphasis on the purported ability of Member 
States to provide stronger guarantees of security of supply based on the fact that EU 
Member States have concluded an international agreement on security of supply 
                                                 
824 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 223. The Study also identifies a similar issue with regard to Article 
23(h) which provides that a contracting authority may require: “[…] a commitment from the tenderer to provide the 
contracting authority/entity, according to terms and conditions to be agreed, with all specific means necessary for 
the production of spare parts, components, assemblies and special testing equipment, including technical 
drawings, licenses and instructions for use, in the event that it is no longer able to provide these supplies.” For 
guidance on Article 23(h), see Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 16, point 45 
825 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 24 citing at 140 M Bowsher, ‘How to Meet the Security of Supply Criteria 
and Avoid the Disqualification of your Bid’, presentation at the C5 EU Defence and Security Procurement 
Conference, Brussels, November 17, 2009 
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under the Letter of Intent initiative.826 The Guidance Note places a similar emphasis 
stating that assurances under Articles 23(d) and (e) could typically be based on the 
Letter of Intent initiative827 and EDA security of supply arrangements.828 In particular, 
the Guidance identifies that such arrangements could establish prioritisation systems 
which enable the execution of the requesting State’s order before the supplying State 
can meet its other orders, or alternatively, include “general commitments” to make 
best efforts to satisfy urgent needs of partners.829 
 
The Letter of Intent Framework Agreement (“Loi-FA”) calls, inter alia, for the 
establishment of measures to achieve security of supply, none of which should result 
in unfair trade practices or discrimination.830 Importantly, Parties must not hinder the 
supply of defence articles and services to other Parties, and must seek to further 
simplify and harmonise existing rules and exchange procedures.831 Provision is made 
for Parties to retain key strategic activities, assets and installations on national 
territory for “national security reasons”.832 Reconstitution of facilities, however, must 
                                                 
826 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n12) 223 
827 See the Letter of Intent between 6 Defence Ministers on Measures to facilitate the Restructuring of the 
European Defence Industry signed in London, 6 July 1998. Six Working Groups were established to assess the 
restructuring of European industries, the findings of which led to a legally binding Framework Agreement (“LoI-
FA”). See Framework Agreement between The French Republic, The Federal Republic of Germany, The Italian 
Republic, The Kingdom of Spain, The Kingdom of Sweden and The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the European Defence Industry 
signed during the Farnborough Air Show on 27 July 2000. The Framework Agreement entered into force on 2 
October 2003. The objective of the LoI-FA is to facilitate restructuring of the European defence industrial base. 
The Framework Agreement focuses on the following key areas: (1) security of supply; (2) export procedures; (3) 
security of classified information; (4) defence related research and technology; (5) treatment of technical 
information, and (6) harmonization of military requirements. For a discussion of the LoI, see Fortresses and 
Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 185-6 
828 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 14, point 42. See EDA Steering Board Decision No. 2006/17 on 
Framework Arrangement for Security of Supply Between Subscribing Member States (sMS) in Circumstances of 
Operational Urgency 
829 ibid 
830 LoI FA (n 827), Articles 4 and 5 
831 ibid, Articles 6.1 and 6.2 
832 ibid Article 8.1. and 8.2  
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be a “method of last resort”.833 In cases of emergency requests, the Parties must 
immediately consult together to enable priority in ordering, supply reallocation, or 
modification of existing equipment for a new role.834 The requested Party will ensure 
timely delivery, and consult with a view to providing, if required, items from its own 
stocks.835 However, it is important not to place excessive emphasis on the LoI FA. 
The LoI FA is not applicable between all EU Member States. Further, its initiatives 
have not been significantly developed.  
 
In 2007, the EDA approved a framework arrangement on security of supply in 
circumstances of operational urgency.836 According to this arrangement, subscribing 
Member States (“sMS”) agreed that they will do everything possible, consistent with 
national law and international obligations to assist and expedite each others’ 
contracted defence requirements, particularly in circumstances of pressing 
operational urgency, and to work to increase the level of mutual confidence amongst 
themselves, in particular, by improving the predictability of their policies.837 If, in times 
of emergency, crisis or armed conflict, a sMS requests defence goods or services 
from other sMS, they will engage in immediate consultation with the aim of ensuring 
that the need is met as expeditiously as possible.838 In addition to taking all possible 
steps to expedite its administrative processes, each sMS will also, if so requested, 
engage with suppliers on its territory to help ensure that an appropriate priority is 
given to the needs of the requesting sMS, and will consider, “urgently and 
                                                 
833 ibid 
834 Articles 10.2(a) and (b).  By contrast, Article 10.1 provides that the Parties agree that prioritisation of supplies 
in peace time will be according to schedules negotiated under normal commercial practices 
835 ibid, Articles 10.2(a), (b), (c) and 11.1 
836 EDA Steering Board Decision on a Framework Arrangement for Security of Supply (n 828) 
837 ibid 1 
838 ibid. 1-2 
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sympathetically” any request for provision of defence goods from its own stocks, 
mainly on a re-imbursement basis.839  
 
However, this document is just over 1 page in length. The provisions are generic and 
compliance is dependent on the good faith of the sMS. Even though they clearly 
constitute an attempt to foster EU-wide security of supply, it remains to be seen how 
they will be implemented.840 Moreover, these provisions only concern “short-term” 
security of supply in case of urgent operational need. It has been argued that this is 
relatively uncontroversial, as any sMS would ordinarily recognise in principle that 
they should provide support in these cases.841 However, a key issue with this form of 
security of supply concerns practical priorities: if such instance arises, many, if not 
all, sMS are likely to be involved in urgent operations simultaneously, therefore 
imposing conflicting demands on the defence industry.842 It has been observed that 
no generic arrangement can satisfactorily resolve the allocation of scarce resources 
to multiple customers.843  
 
More recently, in 2011, the EDA launched a designated Portal on Security of 
Supply.844 The Portal is designed to publish Member State policies, procedures and 
priorities connected to security of supply. However, at the time of writing, Member 
                                                 
839 ibid 
840  See Heuninckx, ‘Towards a coherent European defence procurement regime?’ (n 85) who observes at 14 
that it is unclear, for instance, how this commitment would be applied, if at all, in situations where some sMS 
participate in an operation that other sMS oppose (e.g. the second Iraq war) 
841 ibid 
842 ibid. See also Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) who states at 24: “[e]ven from a strategic security of supply 
point of view, it is unclear what could be done if the supply chain would be disturbed by an embargo, which is 
something that is not only possible when the contractor is from a non-European State, but also something that EU 
Member States could enforce against each other on the basis of art.346 TFEU. In case of a conflict or an 
embargo, it is likely that the contractor could claim force majeure, and any security of supply provision would 
become ineffective.” 
843 ibid  
844 The portal is operational and can be found at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/sosweb/> accessed 20 September 
2013 
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States have only provided very basic, partial or no information.845 Entries by certain 
Member States provide a clear indication that security of supply continues to present 
a significant issue even between EU Member States. In particular, France has 
indicated that whilst the ICT Directive is a step in the right direction towards 
improving security of supply, to reach the goal of transnational long-term security of 
supply, a harmonised quality of control of foreign investment in the defence industry 
appears as a prerequisite.846 In any event, the Portal also identifies that in addition to 
any existing NATO/NAMSA arrangements which include security of supply elements, 
certain Member States have concluded bilateral security of supply arrangements with 
the U.S. and include Italy847 and Sweden.848 Further, as will be discussed in Part II, 
the RDPs concluded between the U.S. and certain EU Member States also include 
specific provision on security of supply. Thus, to the extent that any meaningful 
emphasis can be placed on security of supply arrangements, the U.S. is able to 
demonstrate broadly equivalent assurances. 
 
7.3.2. Control Exercised by Contractors over Security of Supply 
 
A pertinent but recurring observation of this Chapter is the fundamental fact that 
there are demonstrable limits to a tenderer’s ability to provide any guarantee in 
satisfaction of any security of supply obligation. This inherent limitation substantially 
                                                 
845 Member States which have not yet provided any published information are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden  
846 France states categorically that no member state will ever accept mutual dependencies if defence companies 
located in another Member State it relies upon are not adequately protected from foreign take over that could 
jeopardise its security of supply. See <http://www.eda.europa.eu/sosweb/France.aspx> accessed 20 September 
2013 
847 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of Italy and the Department of Defense of 
the United States of America for Meeting National Defense Requirements – Security of Supply, 2006  
848  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Sweden Relating to the Principles Governing Mutual Cooperation in the Defence 
Procurement Area 2003 
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qualifies any comparative advantage which is said to accrue to EU economic 
operators. 
 
Firstly, it has been argued that it is questionable how practically enforceable the 
security of supply provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive could be because 
they only represent the intent of the tenderer at the time of tender, and more 
importantly, only on the basis of available evidence.849 Prior to the adoption of the 
Defence Directives it had been argued that certain security of supply requirements 
are simply beyond the economic operator’s sphere of control (whether European or 
third country) because of external factors such as the refusal of an export licence 
from the government of the country of origin, for example.850 On this view, the only 
suppliers which arguably can guarantee security of supply are domestic suppliers.851 
For this reason, it had been argued that parameters such as security of supply could 
not form a basis of assessment under the most economically advantageous tender 
principle under a revised Public Sector Directive.852  
 
7.3.3. Limitations of the ICT Directive 
 
The preceding sections have cautioned against overstating the possible impact of the 
ICT Directive with regard to third countries. In addition to the limitations already 
identified, as the Guidance Note itself acknowledges, requirements under Articles 
23(d) and (e) are limited by licensing obligations of suppliers from other Member 
                                                 
849 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 24 
850 Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Procurement Integration: Proposals for Action within the European Union’  
(n 75) 101 
851 ibid, 102 
852 ibid 
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States.853 In particular, a tenderer may not be required to obtain a commitment from 
a Member State that would prejudice its freedom to apply its national export, transfer 
or transit licensing criteria in accordance with relevant international or EU law.854  
 
It has been argued that whilst the ICT Directive represents a first step towards 
ensuring greater security of supply, the only instrument that would help ensure 
security of supply within the EU sufficient to substantiate such assurances would be 
a binding commitment of EU Member States not to prevent the transfer of defence 
and security supplies and services within the EU under any circumstances.855 As 
indicated above, the existing LoI-FA and EDA initiatives are not sufficient in this 
regard.  
 
In light of the above, it is suggested that U.S. is not placed at a comparative 
disadvantage with regard to the commitments under Article 23(d) and (e). 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sought to provide a balanced analysis of U.S. claims concerning 
the latent discriminatory potential of the Directive’s security of supply provisions. It is 
recalled that U.S. legal commentary has warned of the potential need for a more 
critical approach to the definition of security of supply requirements. Any comparison 
would need to take account of fundamental similarities and differences in the 
                                                 
853 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 15, point 42, para 2 
854 Article 23, para 3 and Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 15, point 42, para 2 
855 Heuninckx, ‘Trick or treat’ (n 252) 25 
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conceptualization of security of supply, the core interests which may be protected by 
such notions and their function, all of which impact on their definition. Security of 
supply is a key consideration in instruments regulating defence procurement. To this 
extent, it is important to emphasise the overriding point that, irrespective of claims 
regarding the discriminatory potential of security of supply provisions, there is a basis 
for constructive transatlantic engagement on fundamental issues of definition, scope 
and function. 
 
With regard to claims concerning the Directive’s potential to discriminate against the 
U.S., this Chapter has identified the possible bases on which the Directive could be 
utilized to exclude third countries at the point of qualitative selection, in particular, in 
consideration of the organization and location of an economic operator’s supply 
chain. However, a rational assessment of Articles 39(2)(e) and 42(1)(h) questioned 
the extent to which the provisions are likely to discriminate against U.S. contractors, 
in particular, U.S. subcontractors. 
 
Further, focusing specifically on U.S. claims in relation to Articles 23(a), (b), (d) and 
(e), the preceding analysis has sought to place the Directive’s provisions in their 
wider context. Firstly, it has acknowledged the role which ITAR has played even to 
the extent of purportedly informing the basis for the adoption of the ICT Directive. 
However, the reality is that the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions on 
security of supply are limited. U.S. claims have to draw on the alleged cumulative 
impact of the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives in order to substantiate the 
notion that EU bids will likely be rendered more “secure”. This Chapter has 
questioned a number of underlying assumptions regarding the ICT Directive and 
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other security of supply arrangements in this regard. It has also sought to provide a 
balanced assessment of the extent to which ITAR is likely to constitute a 
discriminatory, as opposed to discriminating, factor in EU defence procurement 
based on the findings of existing studies. The reality is that on either view, it is not 
clear to what extent ITAR is, or will likely become, a decisive factor in contract 
awards. 
 
The Chapter has even gone beyond U.S. claims and addressed the discriminatory 
potential of other references to third countries. However, these references are 
arguably more significant for the fact that they reveal a state of uncertainty on the EU 
legislator’s part regarding appropriate regulatory approaches to third countries in the 
field of defence procurement. 
 
The reality is that it is important to differentiate the nuances of legal interpretation 
(which are themselves based on interpretative Guidance Notes which are not legally 
binding interpretations of EU law) from the effect of legal institutions in practice. The 
above analysis would be fundamentally inaccurate were it to fail to recognize the 
limitations of precisely what is known about how such legal requirements are likely to 
be utilized by contracting authorities to engineer a particular outcome or their effects 
on economic operators. This absence is compounded when the limited empirical 
evidence available is used by official sources as a predictor of behaviour in an 
unprecedented regulatory climate. This creates a risk of drawing specific conclusions 
based on generalised and incomplete understandings of perceived trends. 
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Fundamentally, the most accurate observation to make is the simplest: the provisions 
of the Defence Procurement Directive are not such that would necessarily lead 
contracting authorities to place greater or lesser emphasis on U.S. sources in their 
procurement decisions than they had prior to the Directive’s adoption.  
 
However, U.S. claims about the Directive’s potentially discriminatory application 
cannot simply be ignored. As indicated, an important question is whether, 
irrespective of the Directive’s ostensible neutrality with regard to third countries, the 
Directive takes adequate account of third country considerations necessary to ensure 
legal certainty, in particular, given the realities of an increasingly globalised defence 
procurement practice. Whilst official publications emphasise the absence of direct 
impact on third countries, the Directive cannot operate in a vacuum. It should not be 
overlooked that the Directive contains specific references to third countries which are 
clearly intended to enable a formal prima facie distinction to be drawn between EU 
and third country economic operators. This Chapter has raised questions about the 
legitimacy and propriety of these references and the extent to which any differences 
are justifiably emphasized as well as their potential effects. 
 
Ultimately, the Directive is intended to be an instrument of EU defence procurement 
liberalization as opposed to one of transatlantic defence procurement liberalisation. 
However, the former is integral to the latter. The Directive also operates alongside 
historically preceding bilateral transatlantic defence procurement relations between 
the U.S. and individual Member States. To this extent, consistent with the 
observations of the preceding Chapters, there is a need to concurrently monitor the 
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Directive’s application to economic operators where decision-making includes third 
country considerations. 
 
This thesis now turns to examine the technical specifications provisions under the 
Defence Procurement Directive. 
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6 
 Technical Standards and Specifications 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Standards and specifications can act as barriers in public procurement contracts in a 
number of ways. For instance, contracting authorities may use apparently differing 
systems of standards and specifications as an excuse for the disqualification of 
tenderers.856 Standardisation and specification requirements can also be restrictively 
defined in order to exclude products or services of a particular origin, or to limit the 
field of competition amongst tenderers.857  
 
As this Chapter will discuss, the Defence Procurement Directive contains specific 
provisions on technical specifications which broadly correspond with those contained 
in the Public Sector Directive. However, U.S. commentary has identified that whilst 
on their face these provisions do not mandate discrimination against U.S. 
contractors, there is a risk that they could become an intended or unintended 
“disguised market access barrier”. 858  This Chapter begins with a discussion of 
technical standards and specifications within the broader scheme of defence 
standardisation initiatives. It then proceeds to examine U.S. claims in detail. 
 
 
                                                 
856 See C H Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law (n 171) 124-5 
857 ibid 125 
858 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 225 
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2. Background and Recent Initiatives 
 
It is important to clarify at the outset the difference between technical “standards” and 
“technical specifications”. A standard may be defined as a technical specification 
approved by a recognised standardisation body for repeated or continuous 
application. 859  A “technical specification” is a document defining the required 
characteristics of a product or service, such as quality, performance, use, production 
method and procedure.860 Therefore, it is possible for a contracting authority to draw 
up a technical specification which relies on a particular standard as an indicator of 
quality or performance. 
 
2.1. European Standardization Organisations 
 
Regulation 1025/2012 provides the legal basis for standardization within the EU.861 
There are three main civil standardization organizations in operation at the EU level. 
The first is the European Committee for Standardisation (“CEN”).862 The second is 
                                                 
859 Annex II(2) Defence Procurement Directive defines a “Standard” as: “a technical specification approved by a 
recognised standardisation body for repeated or continuous application, compliance with which is not compulsory, 
from one of the following categories: —  international standard: a standard adopted by an international standards 
organisation and made available to the general public, —  European standard: a standard adopted by a European 
standardisation body and made available to the general public, —  national standard: a standard adopted by a 
national standards organisation and made available to the general public […]”  
860 A more comprehensive definition is provided in Annex III to the Defence Procurement Directive. Annex 
III(1)(a) and (b) differentiate between technical specifications in the case of works contracts and supply and 
service contracts, respectively. With regard to supply contracts, “technical specification” is defined as: “a 
specification in a document defining the required characteristics of a product or service, such as quality and 
environmental performance levels, design for all requirements (including accessibility for people with disabilities), 
and conformity-assessment, performance, use of the product, its safety or dimensions, including requirements 
relevant to the product as regards the name under which the product is sold, terminology, symbols, testing and 
test methods, packaging, marking and labeling, user instructions, production methods and procedures, as well as 
conformity assessment procedures[…]”. 
861 Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 of 25 
October 2012 on European standardisation, amending Council Directives 89/686/EEC and 93/15/EEC and 
Directives 94/9/EC, 94/25/EC, 95/16/EC, 97/23/EC, 98/34/EC, 2004/22/EC, 2007/23/EC, 2009/23/EC and 
2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Decision 87/95/EEC and 
Decision No 1673/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, L 316/12 
862 Information on CEN is available at: <https://www.cen.eu/cen/pages/default.aspx> accessed 20 September 
2013 
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the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (“CENELEC”).863 The 
third is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (“ETSI”). 864  Most 
standards are prepared at the request of industry. The European Commission can 
also request the standards bodies to prepare standards. With the move towards the 
greater use of civil standards in defence procurement, stakeholders now seek to 
influence the initiation and development of civil standards.865 With specific regard to 
defence standardisation, in 2007, the EDA established the European Defence 
Standardization System (“EDSIS”).866 EDIS’ primary function is to enable EDA pMS 
and industry to advertise defence material standards which are currently in 
development or modification.867 Its stated objective is to contribute to the reduction in 
dependency on use of national defence standards.868 
 
2.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Standards 
 
NATO also creates military standards in support of its missions. These standards are 
ordinarily known as standardization agreements (“STANAGs”) and Allied Publications 
(“APs”) but also include designations such as Multinational Publications (“MPs”). 
These are produced in three domains: (1) “operations”; (2) “materiel” and (3) 
                                                 
863 Information on CENELEC is available at: <http://www.cenelec.eu> accessed 20 September 2013 
864 Information on ETSI is available at: <http://www.etsi.org/standards> September 2013 
865 EDA (Commissioned) ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of 
Standards’, July 2009, EDA ref. 08-ARM-003, 58  
<http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/Study_into_the_Role_of_European_Industry_in_the_development_a
nd_Application_of_Standards.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
 
866 Information on EDSIS can be found at: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/edsisweb/Default.aspx> accessed 20 
September 2013. 
867  Information on EDSIS’ main functions can be found at: 
<http://www.eda.europa.eu/edsisweb/Introduction.aspx> accessed 20 September 2013 
868 For a discussion of EDSIS within the wider development of EDA standardization initiatives see, EDA, ‘All at 
sea? Standardization explained’ European Defence Standardization Journal, Autumn 2007, available for 
download at: 
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDEQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.eda.europa.eu%2Fedsisweb%2FFileView.aspx%3Fid%3D157&ei=GhM_Up7nBIaW0QW0h4DoDA&usg=AF
QjCNEJZiiwaytzX-74SrKRwI9u51t9PQ&bvm=bv.52434380,d.d2k> accessed 20 September 2013 
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publications in support of administrative matters of the Alliance.869 The production of 
NATO standards is guided by principles specified in the NATO Policy for 
Standardization.870  Approximately 1700 STANAGs and 500 APs are listed in a 
dedicated database, the “NATO Standardisation Documents Database”, an 
information technology tool that is administered by the NATO Standardization 
Agency (“NSA”).871 
 
2.3. Use of Technical Standards and Specifications in Practice 
 
The issue of co-ordinated standardisation has consistently been identified alongside 
procurement and Intra-EU transfers as a priority for the development of an EU 
defence market.872 Yet, whilst official EU publications have sought to particularise 
issues confronting procurement and transfers of defence material in practice, there 
has only been a limited focus on the discrete effects of defence standards. The 
Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal to the Defence Procurement 
Directive provides a limited insight in this regard. A particular issue identified has 
concerned the general availability and proliferation of standards which project 
managers face when selecting and setting out technical specifications in contract 
documents.873 As will be discussed below, these standards can include, inter alia, 
national civil standards, national civil standards which incorporate European 
                                                 
869 For more information see P-L Bertrand, J0-L Laqua and C Urbanovsky, ‘Shifting the NATO Standardization 
Documents Development Paradigm or Revising the AAP-03’, 13 in European Defence Standardization Journal, 
Issue 2, 2009. Available for download from 
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2F
www.eda.europa.eu%2Fedsisweb%2FFileView.aspx%3Fid%3D161&ei=5hE_Up33O6fO0QWv8YG4Cg&usg=AF
QjCNFeLVOaSlRV2sVTBoOOropKBAC89w> accessed 20 September 2013 
870 ibid 
871 ibid 
872 See for example, Commission, ‘European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues, Towards an EU Defence 
Equipment Policy’ (n 231) 3 
873 Impact Assessment, ‘Annex to the Proposal for a Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 123) 20 
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standards, international civil standards, national defence standards and international 
defence standards. A prominent example of the latter includes the NATO “STANAG” 
identified above which define minimal common requirements in order to guarantee 
interoperability between armed forces.874 As a result, Member States have often 
developed hierarchies of standards which vary from one Member State to another.875 
According to the Impact Assessment, in defence procurement, European civil 
standards are generally the first choice followed by a defence standard which is 
generally mentioned only when no equivalent civil standard exists.876 However, the 
Impact Assessment also identifies that other Member States consider defence 
standards to have priority.877 
 
EU commissioned studies have provided a more detailed insight into their use in 
practice. According to an EDA commissioned Study into the Role of European 
Industry in the Development and Application of Standards, issues identified included, 
inter alia, the use of inappropriate standards, referencing obsolete standards, and the 
use of defence standards where civil standards would provide better procurement 
management and value for money.878 Whilst the Study indicated a lack of industry 
willingness to elaborate on problems encountered with standards during invitations to 
tender and negotiations, it found on the basis of the limited evidence available, that 
industry does not experience direct problems with standards in the tender and pre-
                                                 
874 Ibid 
875 ibid 
876 ibid. 21. According to the Impact Assessment, some take up the hierarchy set up in EC law, even when 
applying Article 296 TEC  
877 ibid 
878 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 91. This 
study was preceded by a significant study commissioned by the European Commission (EC DG III – Enterprise) 
in 1998 entitled ‘On the Standardisation Systems in the Defence Industries in the European Union (EU) Member 
States and the USA’ led by the University of Sussex and often referred to as the “Sussex Study” 
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contractual phases; rather the principal issue concerns the selection process of the 
right standards for a specific procurement venture.879 
 
In response to general issues regarding the proliferation of standards, the EU has 
sought to centralize standardization efforts. In its 2003 Communication, the 
Commission identified the development of a European Defence Standardisation 
Handbook containing common references to standards and standard-like 
specifications commonly used to support defence procurement contracts as well as 
guidelines on the optimum selection of such standards.880 The Handbook was titled 
the ‘European Handbook on Defence Procurement’ (“EHDP”) and took the form of a 
database. On its handover from the Commission to the EDA in 2011, the Handbook 
was renamed the European Defence Standards Reference System (“EDSTAR”).881 
As a result, an increasingly coordinated European approach to standardization has 
emerged over the last decade. As will be discussed in Section 5 below, a primary 
focus is on ensuring compatibility and comparability with standardization processes 
in NATO. 
 
3. Specifications under the Defence Procurement Directive 
 
Article 18 Defence Procurement Directive contains the relevant provisions on 
technical specifications.882 Article 18 broadly corresponds with the provision in the 
                                                 
879 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 91-2 
880 Commission, ‘European Defence – Industrial and Market Issues, Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’ 
(n 231) 13 
881 For more information, see < http://www.eda.europa.eu/EDSTAR/home/history.aspx> accessed 20 September 
2013 
882 For a general discussion of technical specifications under the Defence Procurement Directive, see M Trybus, 
‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’, (n 125) 21-22 
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Public Sector Directive with minor additions that will be discussed below.883 This may 
explain why DG Internal Market and Services has not published a specific Guidance 
Note in contrast to other key aspects of the Directive. 
 
The Directive provides that technical specifications must be set out in the contract 
documentation.884 Similar to the Public Sector Directive provisions, the technical 
specification provisions are prefaced by the broad obligation to ensure that they must 
afford equal access for tenderers and must not have the effect of creating “unjustified 
obstacles to the opening up of procurement to competition”.885 
 
Article 18 requires that technical specifications must be drawn up using one of four 
prescribed methods.886 
 
3.1. Method 1: Technical Specifications by Reference to an “Order of Preference” 
 
The first option is to draw up technical specifications in order of preference to: (i) 
national civil standards transposing European standards;887 (ii) European technical 
approvals;888 (iii) common civil technical specifications;889 (iv) national civil standards 
                                                 
883 See Article 23 Public Sector Directive. For general commentary on the Public Sector Directive provisions, see 
Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (n 119) Ch 17; S Arrowsmith and P Kunzlik, ‘EC 
Regulation of Public Procurement’ in Arrowsmith and Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009) 59- 67; P A Trepte, Public Procurement in the 
European Union (OUP 2007) 272-292; C H Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case Law and Regulation (OUP 
2006) 397–399  
884 Contract documentation includes contract notices, contract documents, descriptive documents or supporting 
documents. See Recital 39 and Article 18(1) 
885 Article 18(2). See Article 23(2) Public Sector Directive 
886 See Article 18(3)(a)-(d) 
887 Annex III(2) defines a national standard as: “a standard adopted by a national standards organisation and 
made available to the general public [.]” 
888 Annex III(4) defines a ‘European technical approval’ as: “a favourable technical assessment of the fitness for 
use of a product for a specific purpose, based on fulfillment of the essential requirements for building works, by 
means of the inherent characteristics of the product and the defined conditions of application and use. European 
technical approvals are issued by an approval body designated for this purpose by the Member State [.]”  
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transposing international standards;890  (v) other international civil standards; (vi) 
other technical reference systems891 established by the European standardisation 
bodies, or, where these do not exist, other national civil standards, national technical 
approvals or national technical specifications relating to the design, calculation and 
execution of the works and use of the products; (vii) civil technical specifications 
stemming from industry and widely recognised by it892 or (viii) the national ‘defence 
standards’893 and defence materiel specifications similar to those standards.894  
 
It is observed that the Defence Procurement Directive adds defence standards to the 
preference list. Prior to the adoption of the Directive, it was observed that it seemed 
that the Public Sector Directive did not offer a sufficient degree of flexibility in 
procurement because of its exclusive focus on civil standards.895 The significance of 
this addition will be discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
889 Annex III(5) defines a ‘Common technical specification’ as: “a technical specification laid down in accordance 
with a procedure recognised by Member States which has been published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union [.]”  
890 Annex III(2) defines an ‘International standard’ as: “a standard adopted by an international standards 
organisation and made available to the general public [.]”  
891 Annex III(6) defines a ‘Technical reference’ as: “any product produced by European standardisation bodies, 
other than official standards, according to procedures adapted to developments in market needs.”  
892  This may include, for example, ASD-Stan (Aerospace Defence Standards), Institution of Engineering 
Technology (IET) standards, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards 
893 Annex III(3) defines a ‘Defence standard’ as: “a technical specification the observance of which is not 
compulsory and which is approved by a standardisation body specialising in the production of technical 
specifications for repeated or continuous application in the field of defence [.]”  
894 Article 18(3)(a) 
895 For instance, the Public Sector Directive replicated the definition contained in Council Directive 98/34/EC of 
22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services [1998] OJ L204/37, as amended which recognized only 
civil standards developed by the (civil) standardizing bodies listed in the Annex of Directive 98/34/EC. See Impact 
Assessment, ‘Annex to the Proposal for a Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 123) 17, fn 30 
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3.2. Method 2: Technical Specifications by Reference to Performance/Function 
 
The second option available under the Directive is to draw up technical specifications 
through performance or functional requirements.896  
 
3.3. Method 3: Performance/Function with Reference to the Order of Preference 
 
The third option allows for technical specifications to be drawn up in performance or 
functional terms (as in method 2) with reference to the specifications identified in the 
order of preference as a means of presuming conformity with such performance or 
functional requirements.897  
 
3.4. Method 4: Order of Preference and Performance/Function for Certain 
Characteristics 
 
The fourth option is to draw up technical specifications by reference to the 
specifications mentioned in the order of preference for certain characteristics, and by 
reference to the performance or functional requirements for other characteristics.898 
 
4. Application of Specifications in Relation to Third Countries 
 
U.S. observers have identified that the Directive’s technical specifications provisions 
have raised concern among industry and non-European government stakeholders.899 
                                                 
896 Article 18(3)(b) 
897 Article 18(3)(c) 
898 Article 18(3)(d) 
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Specifically, it has been suggested that contractual requirements to meet specific 
technical standards could operate to discriminate against U.S. contractors.900 U.S. 
commentary has gone even further and claimed that any preference may 
discriminate against U.S. products built around non-European and non-international 
standards.901 It is therefore necessary to examine these claims in more detail. 
 
4.1. An “Order of Preference” Based on a “Hierarchy of Standards”  
 
It is recalled that Article 18 provides for the possibility to draw up technical 
specifications “in order of preference”. U.S. commentary suggests that this creates a 
“hierarchy of standards” which appears to prioritise European approved standards 
and which could lead to an “intentional or unintentional disguised U.S. trade 
barrier”.902 
 
However, a number of observations counter claims regarding the possible effect of 
any such “hierarchy”. Firstly, it presumes that Member States will develop uniform 
practices in the selection of European standards. Yet, it has been observed that 
whilst Member States have developed hierarchies in response to the proliferation of 
standards, there is still no common practice in the way that Member States set out 
specifications and resort to standards and that hierarchies vary significantly from one 
Member State to another.903 Secondly, one U.S. official has identified that a general 
                                                                                                                                                        
899 I Maelcamp, ‘EU Defense Procurement Directive: 27 Teams Under One League?’ Defense Standardization 
Program Journal, October/December 2011, 21 
<http://www.dsp.dla.mil/APP_UIL/content/newsletters/journal/DSPJ-10-11.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
900 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 225 
901 C Yukins, ‘The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (n 311) 6  
902 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 225 
903 Impact Assessment, ‘Annex to the Proposal for a Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 123) 20; 
‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 42 
  232 
“link” to origin is apparent in the order of preference and which may seem an 
apparent contradiction to the NATO Framework for Civil Standards.904 The latter 
emphasises the focus of the selection of civil standards according to availability, 
accessibility, effectiveness, relevance, market acceptance and technical excellence 
as opposed to their region of origin.905  However, as the same observer identifies, the 
order of preference under the Directive has not been specifically designed for the 
defence sector, having been derived from the Public Sector Directive which 
substantially uses the same language.906 To this extent, the Defence Procurement 
Directive does not intend to institute a qualitative change.907 Thirdly, as indicated 
above, a technical specification cannot refer to a specific origin with the effect of 
favouring or eliminating certain undertakings or certain products.908 
 
Finally, it is possible to question the extent to which origin is, itself, a decisive factor 
in determining technical specifications. According to the EDA commissioned study on 
the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards, a 
particular criticism identified by industry is that most tenders and defence projects 
include too many standards from different origins.909 Therefore, it may be suggested 
that contracting authorities may often use standards indiscriminately irrespective of 
origin. The choice to adopt hierarchies may be a response to a proliferation of 
standards. However, this does not necessarily equate to a hierarchy predicated on 
origin but rather may simply be a result of practical necessity. 
 
                                                 
904 I Maelcamp, ‘EU Defense Procurement Directive: 27 Teams Under One League?’ (n 899) 24 
905 ibid 
906 ibid. See Article 23(a) Public Sector Directive 
907 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 22 
908 Article 18(8) 
909 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (865) 91 
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On the issue of practicality, a broader question is whether, in fact, it is appropriate for 
the EU legislator to identify an order of preference that prioritises national civil 
standards transposing European standards. It had been argued two decades ago in 
relation to the Public Sector Directive provisions that in light of the absence of a 
common external policy in the public procurement Directives, the emphasis on 
European standardization is defensible; since the Directives only apply to tenders 
submitted by undertakings established within the EU, a preference for international 
standardization would be “rather surprising” in that it would almost amount to “an 
official declaration of lack of confidence in the work done by the European 
standardization bodies”.910 However, it is observed that this is defensible only to the 
extent that the European standard would be technically more suited than any other 
standard. 
 
4.2. Choice between Order of Preference or Performance or Function 
 
Another basis on which it is possible to limit recourse to a hierarchy of standards 
based on origin is through the exercise of the option to draw up technical 
specifications according to performance or function. It is becoming an increasingly 
standard feature of defence procurement practice to determine specifications based 
on the use of functional or performance requirements. 911  For instance, it may be 
difficult for new market entrants to acquire an understanding of, and access to, the 
range of available standards without extensive experience. In addition, unlike pre-
determined specifications, performance and function-based requirements may be 
                                                 
910 Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (n 477) 324 
911 Interestingly, whilst the Directive does not specify a preferred method of drawing up specifications, Recital 38 
identifies establishment of technical specifications on the basis of performance and functional requirements 
before it identifies reference to the use of standards 
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more transparent. According to the study on the Role of European Industry in the 
Development and Application of Standards, a number of EDA participating Member 
States have taken to the “doctrine” that requirements should be specified in 
performance terms rather than in a prescriptive manner.912 Indeed, the Study also 
observes that “romancing the performance based standard” has become a world-
wide trend.913  
 
However, the same Study has also identified the limits of what is known about the 
use of performance and functional requirements and highlighted certain views that 
performance based contracting can, in some respects, be as problematic (if not more 
so) than simply identifying the standard or specification at the outset.914 Further, 
researchers have yet to subject performance-based standards to close empirical 
scrutiny.915 In addition, the Study has identified that the use of performance-based 
standards has remained less frequent than might be expected.916 Most standards will 
specify particular behaviours, technologies, procedures or processes rather than 
setting a wider and more “esoteric” performance target which provides industry with 
the necessary flexibility to meet the designated objective.917 To this extent, the Study 
                                                 
912 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 109. 
Similarly, the EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, 3 has also emphasised the formulation of 
specifications according to function and performance, as far as possible  
913 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 116 
914 ibid 109 and 119-125 
915 ibid 
916 ibid 
917 ibid. The Study states at 116-117: “[t]here may be good reasons why public and private regulators alike and at 
all levels – national, regional and international – do not rely more extensively on performance targets: 
[p]erformance-based standards depend on the ability of the responsible “organisations/agencies” to specify, 
measure, and monitor performance, but reliable and appropriate information about performance may sometimes 
be difficult if not impossible to obtain […] When implemented in the wrong way, or under the wrong conditions, 
performance-based standards will function poorly, as will any regulatory instrument that is ineffectually deployed.” 
For a specific discussion of issues arising with regard to their use in the defence context, see the Study’s findings 
at 118-121 
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expresses caution that general claims about the advantages and disadvantages of 
performance based standards need to be assessed concretely.918  
 
Further, the Impact Assessment on the Defence Procurement Directive indicated that 
stakeholders consistently identified the technological intricacies of defence 
equipment which make it difficult for procurement authorities to ‘translate’ at the 
outset a functional requirement into a detailed specification as a reason for the need 
for flexible procedures.919 It was suggested that the standard procedures of the 
Public Sector Directive (the open and restricted procedures) are based on an 
assumption that the contracting authority is able to specify from the outset all 
technical specifications.920 Both procedures require finalised technical specifications 
when the contract is advertised and prohibit negotiations.921 However, the flexibility 
introduced by the procedures under the Defence Procurement Directive, in particular, 
default use of the negotiated procedure with publication may reduce the practical 
importance of technical specifications as a means to discriminate against tenders.  
Therefore, it must be acknowledged that there continues to be limited evidence 
regarding the extent to which the use of performance and functional requirements 
may be utilised to discriminate against foreign contractors. 
 
4.3. National Defence Standards 
 
As indicated, the Defence Procurement Directive provides for the possibility to select 
national defence standards and defence materiel specifications. It has been 
                                                 
918 ibid 119 
919 Impact Assessment, ‘Annex to the Proposal for a Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 123) 15 
920 ibid, 16 
921 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’, (n 125) 18 
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suggested that if such standards are set arbitrarily, they could potentially be used as 
non-tariff barriers to protect domestic producers.922 
 
However, again it is possible to question the extent to which such standards are 
prevalent in defence procurement practice in preference to civil standards. It has 
been identified that there is an increasing emphasis on the use of civil standards in 
defence procurement within the EU. 923 This is reflected in the order of preference. A 
similar emphasis has been placed on the use of international standards. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 9, Section 3.2, this trend is also apparent in the U.S with 
increasing recourse to the use of civil standards and performance and function-based 
specifications in preference to military standards and specifications. 
 
Nevertheless, it will always be necessary for certain items to be developed according 
to defence standards and specifications. To this extent, it has been observed that 
defence standards are not and will not be redundant in future.924  
 
Importantly, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study indicated that it did not identify any 
specific problems or discriminatory treatment faced by foreign defence firms with 
respect to technical standards, in contrast to the foreign defence firms entering the 
U.S. market.925  
 
                                                 
922 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 118 
923  According to the ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ 
(n 865) 83-84, depending on the sector of activity, the percentage use of civil standards can be as high as 90% 
for naval projects, approximately 75% in aeronautics and aerospace and about 70% in the land sector  
924 ibid, 88 
925 ibid,119. For a discussion in this regard, see Chapter 9, Section 3.2 
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In light of the above, national defence standards are unlikely to constitute a 
significant basis for discriminating against U.S. contractors to any greater extent than 
they would discriminate against EU economic operators. 
 
4.4. Equivalence and Interoperability 
 
It is submitted that U.S. claims regarding the emphasis on “origin” should also be 
tempered on the basis of the priority accorded by the Directive to the possibility of 
relying on “equivalents”. Similar to the Public Sector Directive, the Defence 
Procurement Directive provides that every reference to one of the standards 
identified must be followed by the expression ‘or equivalent’.926 Again, similar to the 
Public Sector Directive, the Defence Procurement Directive also provides that 
technical specifications must not refer to a specific make or source, or a particular 
process, or to trade marks, patents, types or a specific origin or production with the 
effect of favouring or eliminating certain undertakings or certain products, unless 
justified by the subject-matter of the contract.927 Any such reference must only be 
permitted “on an exceptional basis” where a sufficiently precise and intelligible 
description of the subject-matter of the contract is not possible under any of the 
above stated methods. Any such reference must be accompanied by the words ‘or 
equivalent’.928 
 
                                                 
926 Article 18(3)(a). The equivalent provision can be found in Article 23(a) Public Sector Directive. This 
requirement was confirmed in Case 45/87, Commission v Ireland ("Dundalk") [1988] ECR 4929. See also Case C-
359/93, Commission v Netherlands ("UNIX") [1995] ECR I-157  
927 Article 18(8). The equivalent provision can be found in Article 23(8) Public Sector Directive. This requirement 
was confirmed in Case C-359/93, Commission v Netherlands ("UNIX") [1995] ECR I-157 
928 Article 18(8) 
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It is unlikely that a U.S. contractor will be unable to meet a relevant European or 
international standard for the relevant product(s) offered. In addition, it is important to 
observe that the Defence Procurement Directive itself acknowledges that 
equivalence can also be assessed in particular with regard to interoperability.929 The 
drawing up of technical specifications is without prejudice to the technical 
requirements to be met by the Member State under international standardisation 
agreements in order to guarantee the interoperability required by those 
agreements.930 To this extent, full accord should be given to common U.S. and EU 
interests in this regard. 
 
4.5. Reciprocal Defence Procurement MoUs 
 
Finally, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study has identified that the RDPs afford 
signatories some protection against arbitrary discrimination on the basis of regulatory 
standards.931 An Annex to the RDP’s provides specific procedures to ensure that 
defence articles and services meet mutual government quality assurances.932 A 
purchasing government has the option to request that the other government 
independently test and provide a certification of conformity for defence articles 
produced by suppliers of the selling country. As will be discussed in Chapter 11, 
Section 4, it is generally unclear to what extent the RDP provisions are effectively 
                                                 
929 Recital 38 
930 Article 18(3)  
931 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol II) (n 12) 626 
932 See for example, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Relating to the Principles Governing 
Cooperation in Research and Development, Production, Procurement And Logistics Support of Defense 
Capability, December 16 2004, Annex II <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/paic/MOU-
United%20Kingdom%20(Dec%202004).pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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utilized. Notwithstanding, this provides at least a means to enable certification and 
conformity and thus compatibility. 
 
 
5. Developing EU Initiatives in the Field of Standardization 
 
The preceding Sections indicate that it is difficult to form a coherent overall view of 
the extent to which the Directive’s technical specifications provisions may 
discriminate against U.S. contractors. This raises a question as to whether what 
really motivates U.S. claims about potential discrimination is a more general concern 
about the increasing coordination of European standardization efforts and their 
compatibility with international standardization initiatives.  
 
For instance, it was observed two decades ago in relation to an analysis of the 
technical specification provisions of the Public Sector Directive that, ultimately, any 
effect on third countries will be the result of the relationship between European and 
international standardization.933 More specifically, it was argued that to the extent that 
European standardization duly respects the work done within international 
standardization bodies, and that international standards are relied upon as much as 
possible, the negative effects on the competitive position of third country products will 
be limited.934 It was suggested that the “impact” of the preference given to European 
standardization in the public procurement Directives depends entirely upon the 
direction which European standardization policies take. 935  In addition, the EDA 
                                                 
933 Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (n 477) 324 
934 ibid 
935 ibid 
  240 
commissioned Study on the Role of European Industry in the Development and 
Application of Standards recognises the potential for incompatibility and advises on a 
movement towards integrating NATO STANAGs into the EHDP936 (now EDSTAR) as 
well as advocating working to analyse and screen U.S. military specifications and 
NATO derived standards for their potential usefulness within a European 
procurement database.937  To this extent, U.S. concerns may necessitate closer 
engagement with EU standardization bodies to ensure consistency and coherence in 
the scope of coverage of standards. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Consistent with the findings of Chapter 5, U.S. claims about the potential 
discriminatory application of the technical specifications provisions must be tempered 
on a number of grounds. Firstly, claims about a “hierarchy of standards” must be 
appropriately qualified. Secondly, this Chapter has acknowledged the increased 
prevalence accorded to the use of performance and functional requirements. Thirdly, 
the Directive contains important safeguards based on equivalence and 
interoperability. Finally, it has been suggested that the principal concern relates not 
to the Directive’s provisions on technical specifications but rather the general 
incompatibility of EU and international standardisation initiatives as these bodies 
develop their competences.  
 
This Chapter concludes a substantive assessment of the main provisions of the 
Defence Procurement Directive identified by U.S. commentators as creating a 
                                                 
936 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 865) 90 
937 ibid 137 
  241 
potential for discrimination. However, it should be observed that Part II will also 
engage discussion of other key provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive 
within the context of an analysis of comparable provision under U.S. procurement 
law. This thesis now turns to an assessment of the intergovernmental dimension of 
EU defence procurement law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  242 
7 
“Offsetting” Supranationalism and 
Intergovernmentalism in EU Defence Procurement 
Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The preceding Chapters have demonstrated that U.S. claims regarding the Defence 
Procurement Directive’s potential to discriminate against U.S. contractors are largely 
predicated on, and bolstered by, a sense of the emerging coherence of the EU 
defence procurement and defence trade regimes. However, whilst two supranational 
Defence Directives are intended to bring internal market discipline, the Directives do 
not operate in a political or legal vacuum. It is recalled from Chapter 3 that the 
Defence Procurement Directive may exclude from its scope of application certain 
forms of procurement conducted on an intergovernmental basis. This would include 
collaborative procurement organisations such as OCCAR. However, in addition, the 
EDA, which, it is recalled from Chapter 3 may be the subject of an exclusion under 
the Defence Procurement Directive, also purports to exercise procurement 
competences by governing (as opposed to regulating) procurement which Member 
States have determined to fall outside the scope of the EU Treaties on the basis of 
Article 346 TFEU. 
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As indicated by the title, the final Chapter of this Part examines the EU’s attempt to 
balance its supranational and intergovernmental features in the field of defence 
procurement. Through an examination of the most systemic feature of international 
defence procurement practice, namely “offsets”, this Chapter reinforces the 
importance of EU institutional debates on the internal and external coherence of EU 
defence procurement governance to a transatlantic defence procurement analysis. 938 
 
This Chapter begins by setting out the key institutional features of the EDA including 
its procurement initiatives. The Chapter then outlines international, regional and 
national approaches to offset regulation as background context to the examination of 
the legal issues surrounding third country offset provision. 
 
 
2. The European Defence Agency 
 
Historically, defence procurement and cooperation within Europe has been 
conducted within the framework of intergovernmental initiatives.939 The LoI FA and 
OCCAR are characteristic in this regard. It is recalled from Chapter 5, Section 7.3.1 
that the LoI FA is a legally binding treaty but does not specify detailed regulation. 
Similarly, it is recalled from Chapter 3, Section 4.4.1 that the OCCAR Convention is 
                                                 
938 Certain of the issues explored in this Chapter were the subject of a paper presented at the 5th Public 
Procurement Research Students Conference, University of Nottingham, 12-13 September 2011. See L R A 
Butler, ‘Considering the External Implications of Internal European Defence Procurement Regulation: The 
Practice of Offsets’. On file with the author. I am grateful to members of the Public Procurement Research Group 
at the University of Nottingham and Dr. Aris Georgopoulos, in particular, for views expressed on the paper 
939 Examples of which include the Western European Union (“WEU”), Western European Armaments Group 
(“WEAG”) and Western European Armaments Organisation (“WEAO”) whose functions have now ceased. The 
Western European Union was established by a Protocol (with Exchange of Letters) Modifying and completing the 
Brussels Treaty, signed 23 October 1954, 211 UNTS 342. For a general discussion of these initiatives, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘The European Armaments Policy: A conditio sine qua non for the European Security and Defence 
Policy?’ (n 54) 206-8 
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designed to regulate the management of European collaborative procurements as 
opposed to regulating procurement within the market.940 However, it is also recalled 
that in 2004, the EDA was established.941 Article 42(3) paragraph 2 TEU identifies 
the EDA as an agency “in the field of defence capabilities development, research, 
acquisition and armaments”. 942  One key EDA objective is to adopt effective, 
compatible procurement methods.943 Its characteristic intergovernmental features are 
reflected by its initial establishment under the Second Pillar of the TEU, supervision 
by the Council and the limited involvement of EU supranational institutions, namely 
the Commission, European Parliament and the CJEU. This configuration has been 
criticised on grounds that the EDA suffers from both a democratic and rule of law 
deficit.944 
 
 
 
                                                 
940 For an extensive discussion in this regard, see Heuninckx, ‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement 
Through International Organisations in the European Union’ (n 272) 121-150 esp. 121-6 
941 Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of July 12, 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency 
[2004] O.J. L245/17. For a useful overview of the historical, political, legal, economic and industrial background to 
the EDA, see M Trybus, ‘The New European Defence Agency: A Contribution to A Common European Security 
and Defence Policy and A Challenge to the Community Acquis?’ (2006) 43 CML Rev, 667, 668-677; A 
Georgopoulos, ‘The new European Defence Agency: major development or fig leaf’ (2005) 2 PPLR 103; S N 
Ferraro, ‘The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?’ (n 261) 570-
578 
942 Article 42(3) TFEU provides as follows: “Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their 
military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and 
armaments (hereinafter referred to as ‘the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, 
shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, 
implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, 
shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in 
evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.” More specifically, Article 45(1) TEU provides as follows: “[t]he 
European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its 
task to: (a)  contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance 
of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b)  promote harmonisation of operational needs and 
adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c)  propose multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in 
terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and 
management of specific cooperation programmes; (d)  support defence technology research, and coordinate and 
plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; (e)  contribute 
to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and 
technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure  
943 Ibid. For a discussion of the compatibility of the EDA’s procurement methods in this regard, see Heuniinck, 
‘The Law of Collaborative Defence Procurement Through International Organisations’ (n 272) 182-204 
944 See Trybus, ‘The New European Defence Agency’ (n 939) 686  
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2.1. Member State Participation in Collaborative Projects 
 
All EU Member States except Denmark participate in the EDA. Due the fact that the 
EDA has legal personality, it is able to conclude contracts on behalf of participants 
and contributing member States in the case of specific ad hoc projects, as well as be 
a party to legal proceedings. The EDA is not expressly intended to replace, but rather 
to complement, its Members’ defence procurement agencies. 
 
Participation in EDA projects is organized into two categories. “Category A” 
participation concerns collaborative projects where participation of all EDA Member 
States is presumed. 945  “Category B” concerns collaborative projects where 
participation of all EDA Member States is not presumed. 946  
 
2.2. EDA Relations with Third Countries 
 
The EDA may enter into administrative arrangements with third States, organizations 
and entities.947  This requires that the EDA respect the EU’s single institutional 
framework and decisional autonomy.948 Importantly, the Council must approve each 
arrangement concluded by its Steering Board by unanimity.949  Working relations 
between the EDA and relevant NATO bodies are envisaged,950 as well as possible 
                                                 
945 Article 20(I) Joint Action. Those not wishing to participate will inform the Chief Executive accordingly  
946 Article 21(1) and (2) Joint Action. Here, Member States wishing to collaborate inform the Steering Board and 
other Member States can decide whether to participate 
947 Article 25(1) Join Action. Such arrangements will cover: (a) the principle of a relationship between the Agency 
and the third party; (b) provisions for consultation on subjects related to the Agency’s work; (3) security matters 
948 Article 25(1) paragraph 2 Joint Action  
949 Ibid. This seeks to guarantee that the consent of all Member States is given as to whether an agreement with 
a third party is in conformity with the single institutional framework of the EU and their national interests 
950 Article 25(3) Joint Action 
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participation with other organisations, entities951 and third countries.952 The EDA has 
a Consultative Committee open to participation by non-EU European NATO 
members on request. 953  European legal commentary has suggested that such 
provision counters any possibility of the establishment of a “Fortress Europe”, 
foreseeing consultative and cooperative frameworks with the USA, Japan, Russia 
and China.954 Whilst the EDA could constitute a potentially vital and significant 
consultative institution, the full effectiveness of the EDA’s cooperative measures has 
not been fully discerned.  
 
2.3. EDA Procurement Codes of Conduct 
 
Initially, the EDA developed its Codes of Conduct in response to data which indicated 
that more than 50 per cent of defence procurement by EU governments was 
undertaken outside the EU Treaties pursuant to Article 346 TFEU.955 To date, the 
EDA has adopted four Codes of Conduct, three of which predate the adoption of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. The first is the Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement. 956 The second is the Code of Best Practices in the Supply Chain. 957 
                                                 
951 Article 25(4) Joint Action 
952 Article 25(5) Joint Action. A plain reading of Article 25(2),(3),(4) and (5), suggests that a distinction is to be 
drawn between working relations with NATO on the one hand and other organisations, entities, and third 
countries on the other 
953 Article 25(7) Joint Action  
954 A Georgopoulos, ‘The new European Defence Agency: major development or fig leaf’ (n 941) 103, 111 
955 EDA Steering Board Decision No.2005/03/EDA, June 2005 on European Defence Equipment Market. For a 
discussion in this regard, see Chapter 2, Section 3 
956
 EDA, The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement of the EU Member States Participating in the European 
Defence Agency, 21 November 2005. For a discussion of the Code, see A Georgopoulos, ‘The European 
Defence Agency’s code of conduct for armament acquisitions: a case of paramnesia?’ (2006) 2 PPLR, 51; 
Heuninckx, ‘Towards a coherent European defence procurement regime?’ (n 85) 5-8; Ferraro, ‘The European 
Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?’ (n 261) 597-603 
957 EDA, The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, 27 April 2006. For a discussion of the Code, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘European Defence Agency: the new Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain’ (2006) 5 PPLR, 
145; B Heuninckx, ‘Towards a coherent European defence procurement regime?’(n 85) 8-9 
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The third is the Code of Conduct on Offsets. 958 Most recently, the EDA published a 
Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing, although the latter concerns planning as 
opposed to procurement.959 
 
The key features of the three procurement Codes are as follows. Firstly, the Codes 
are only intended to apply once a sMS has invoked Article 346 TFEU, although the 
Codes do not provide guidance on the circumstances in which Article 346 TFEU can 
be invoked. Secondly, the Codes are not legally binding and therefore rely for their 
enforcement on institutional peer pressure exerted between sMS. Thirdly, whilst the 
Codes have been symbolised as important political statements, the reality is that they 
are short (2-3 page) documents substantially comprised of generic statements 
encouraging best practice.  Whilst any initiatives in the field of defence procurement 
are welcome, their practical effect is difficult to discern and should not be overstated. 
 
Most importantly, the Code on Defence Procurement and the Code on Best Practice 
in the Supply Chain substantially exclude third countries from their personal scope. 
At the time of adoption, a number of commentators had apparently questioned 
whether the exclusion of the U.S. from the Code on Defence Procurement would 
promote EU protectionism.960 However, this criticism is predicated on the Codes’ 
ability to exert a significant effect in practice and which has not been evidentially 
substantiated. In contrast, as will be discussed in Section 4 below, the EDA Offsets 
Code makes several references to third countries. Whilst similar caution should be 
                                                 
958 EDA, A Code of Conduct on Offsets Agreed by the EU Member States Participating in the European Defence 
Agency, 3 May 2011. For a discussion of the Code, see A Georgopoulos, ‘Revisiting offset practices in European 
defence procurement: the European Defence Agency’s Code of Conduct on Offsets’ (2011) 1 PPLR, 29 
959 EDA Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing, 19 November 2012 
960 See C Taylor, ‘European Security and Defence Policy: Developments Since 2003’ International Affairs and 
Defence Section, Research Paper 06/32, 8 June 2006, House of Commons Library, 47 cited in Ferraro, ‘The 
European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?’ (n 261) 605, fn 323 
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expressed regarding the practical significance of the Offsets Code, the Code does 
stand apart from the Defence Procurement and Best Practice Codes. As will be 
discussed below, unlike the latter which are somewhat overshadowed by more 
detailed regulation in the Defence Procurement Directive, the absence of regulation 
of offsets under the Directive renders the Offset Code even more politically 
contentious. 
 
At the time of writing, the EDA has approved an analysis of a possible 
intergovernmental arrangement to replace the Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement and has also commissioned a review of the Code of Best Practice in 
the Supply Chain.961  
 
2.4. Other Procurement-Related EDA Initiatives 
 
It is recalled that the EDA has developed a host of other initiatives. Until recently, the 
EDA operated an Electronic Bulletin Board (“EBB”), a portal designated for 
government defence contract opportunities and industry subcontract opportunities.962 
However, the EBB was closed in 2013 and replaced by the EDA Defence 
Procurement Gateway.963 The EDA has also set up a reporting and monitoring 
system under an offsets portal which provides information on a range of matters 
including, inter alia, the legal basis of national offset laws and practices, the 
objectives of individual offset policies, the role of offsets in the procurement 
procedure, thresholds, offset requirement criteria, multipliers used and fulfilment 
                                                 
961  For details, see: <http://www.eda.europa.eu/procurement-gateway/information/eda-codes-arrangements> 
accessed 20 September 2013 
962 For a discussion of the portal, see generally B Heuninckx, ‘The European Defence Agency Electronic Bulletin 
Board: a survey after two years’ (2009) 2 PPLR, 43 
963 For details, see <http://www.eda.europa.eu/procurement-gateway> accessed 20 September 2013 
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periods.964 In addition, it is recalled from Chapter 6, Section 2.1 that EDSTAR has 
taken over the EHDP. 
 
Other initiatives include a non-binding framework arrangement on security of supply 
in circumstances of operational urgency, discussed in Chapter 5, Section 7.3.1. The 
EDA Steering Board has also approved common minimum standards on industrial 
security. 965  The EDA has also established a Capability Development Plan and 
European Armaments Cooperation Strategy, and has additional EDA initiatives in 
progress, including the development of a detailed European defence industrial base 
strategy. 966 
 
3. Offset Regulation 
Before examining the Offset Code’s provisions, it is first necessary to provide a brief 
outline of offset practices and the current legal issues surrounding their operation.967 
It should be observed at the outset that a comprehensive analysis of offsets would 
necessitate several theses. This Chapter simply provides the legal context for a more 
detailed discussion of offset provision by third countries under EU law.  
 
 
                                                 
964  Details regarding the web portal can be found at <http://www.eda.europa.eu/offsets/> accessed 20 
September 2013 
965 EDA Steering Board Decision No. 2006/18 on “Security of Information between Subscribing Member States 
(sMS). For a discussion of this initiative, see B Heuninckx, ‘Towards a coherent European defence procurement 
regime?’ (n  85) 15-16 
966 For a useful analysis of this plan see B Heuninckx ‘The European Defence Agency Capability Development 
Plan and the European Armaments Cooperation Strategy’ (2009) PPLR 4, 136 
967 For a useful insight into offsets in practice, see S Verma, ‘National Offsets in the Defence Sector: Next Steps 
for Improving Integrity & Effectiveness in Defence Offset Contracts’ 24 June 2013, Presented to the Public 
Procurement: Global Revolution VI Conference, Nottingham 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2288312> accessed 20 September 2013; S Verma, ‘Offset 
Contracts Under Defense Procurement Regulations in India: Evolution, Challenges, and Prospects (2009) 
Summer, NCMA Journal of Contract Management 17, <http://www.ncmahq.org/files/articles/jcm09%20-%2017-
32.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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3.1. International Offset Regulation 
 
There is no uniform classification or definition of an “offset”. At the risk of 
oversimplification, an “offset” can be understood in one form as a compensation 
either offered by, or required of, a seller to compensate for the fact that the buyer has 
not awarded a contract to its domestic industry. 968 Offsets can either be direct or 
indirect. 969 
 
The WTO GPA expressly prohibits offsets. Article XVI (1) GPA provides that: 
 
Entities shall not, in the qualification and selection of suppliers, products or 
services, or in the evaluation of tenders and award of contracts, impose, seek 
or consider offsets.970  
 
However, it has been argued that offsets could otherwise be justified pursuant to the 
essential security interests derogation contained in Article XXIII(1).971 It has been 
suggested that this provision has led to a de facto categorical exemption of 
                                                 
968 Article XVI footnote 7 defines offsets in government procurement as: “measures used to encourage local 
development or improve the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of 
technology, investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements”  
969 “Direct offsets” can generally be described as offset transactions that are directly related to the defence items 
or services imported by a State. These are usually in the form of co-production, subcontracting, training, 
production, licensed production, or possibly technology transfer or financing activities. By contrast, “indirect 
offsets” can generally be described as offset transactions that are not directly related to the defence items or 
services imported by a State. The kinds of offsets that are considered ‘indirect’ include purchases, investment, 
training, financing activities, marketing/exporting assistance, and technology transfer. Indirect offsets can be 
further subdivided into “defence (related) indirect offsets” and “non-defence (related) indirect offsets”. For a useful 
taxonomy, see EDA (Commissioned), ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence 
Industry and Market’, 12 July 2007, Executive Summary, Final Report of 06-DIM-022, 14-18  
970 This is subject to a limited exception in Article XVI(2) GPA permitting the use of offsets for developing 
countries acceding to the WTO GPA. See WT/DS1 63/7, Document (00-4679), 6 November 2000 
971 For the relevant terms of Article XXIII(1), see Chapter 2, Section 2.1. U.S. legal commentary has also raised 
the question of whether indirect offsets should be required to qualify under this exception. See M J Nackman, ‘A 
Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defence Procurements: Policy Options for the United States’ 
(2011) 40(2) Pub Cont LJ, 511, 518, fn 44 and citations therein 
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armaments from the GPA and its prohibition of offsets.972  Moreover, Article XXIII(1) 
GPA is not applicable in any event to parties which have already excluded 
armaments in their Annexes.973 Further, for those parties who have not already 
excluded armaments in their Annexes, it has been argued that offsets could 
potentially be justified on public interest grounds. 974  Thus, for major defence 
contracting countries such as the U.S. and the EU, offsets can be excluded from the 
WTO GPA’s scope of application. To date, there has only been one reported 
challenge relating to offsets.975 
 
3.2. Offset Regulation under EU Law 
 
Neither the EU Treaties nor the Defence Procurement Directive expressly prohibit or 
regulate offsets. In addition, there is no definitive CJEU judgment on offset practices. 
The fact that a specific Guidance Note on Offsets has been adopted is therefore 
indicative of the significance of offsets in practice. 976 However, it has been suggested 
that as the Guidance Note is not legally binding, the EU legislator has missed an 
opportunity to expressly prohibit offsets within the legislation.977 
                                                 
972 See ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (n 969) 
24 
973 See S Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (n 77) 148  
974 Article XX(7)(a). For a discussion in this regard, see C H Bovis, ‘Public-Private Partnerships in the Defence 
Sector: How Offset Agreements interface between the private and public stakeholders’ (2008) 4 Eur. Pub. Private 
Partnership L Rev 200, 210 
975 See WT/DS163/1, Document (99-0676), 22 February 1999; WT/DS163/7 Document (004-4679, 6 November 
2000, cited by Bovis, ‘Public-Private Partnerships in the Defence Sector’ (n 974) 205-206 and fns 23 and 24 
976 The Guidance Note does not provide a working definition of offsets. However, the Guidance Note does 
identify examples of offset practices. As the Guidance Note, Offsets, 1, para 1 observes: “[i]n some cases, offsets 
are of a military nature and concern the subject-matter of the contract directly (for example, industrial participation 
of local companies in the production of the equipment procured). In other cases, they are indirect, but limited to 
the military sphere (for example, sub-contracts awarded by the supplier to local defence companies for other 
military products), or indirect and non- military (for example, the supplier’s commitment to mobilise foreign 
investment in civil sectors of the buying country’s economy or to purchase civil goods in that country).” 
977 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 27 who suggests that this 
is possibly because the resulting strong opposition from the offsets establishment in many Member States might 
have delayed or even derailed the Defence Directive as a whole 
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The Guidance serves two principal functions. Firstly, it emphasises the legal 
argument that offsets are prima facie incompatible with the EU Treaties and which 
therefore provides the justification as to why the Directive “cannot allow, tolerate or 
regulate them.”978 Prior to the Directive’s adoption, it had been argued that offsets 
represented clear violations of the core free movement regimes relating to goods, 
services and establishment as well as the general prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality.979 The Guidance Note confirms this view suggesting that 
offset practices could potentially violate a number of EU Treaty provisions.980 The 
Guidance Note also identifies certain provisions of the Defence Procurement 
Directive that would preclude the use of offset requirements as part of an award 
procedure.981  
 
Secondly, the Guidance Note states that security related justifications for offsets and 
offers are accommodated within the Directive’s security of supply and subcontracting 
provisions.982 These provisions are considered to be “non-discriminatory alternatives” 
to offsets that will drive competition into the supply chain of successful tenderers.983 
According to one EU legal commentator, subcontracting is seen as a “substitute” for 
offsets.984 Offsets can often take the form of subcontracting to ensure industrial 
participation of favoured contractors. To this extent, by enabling the use of 
                                                 
978 Guidance Note, Offsets, 1, para 2. Indeed, it has been suggested that perhaps neither the TFEU nor the 
Defence Directives mention offsets because it is so obvious that they make an open, transparent and competitive 
procurement procedure without discrimination very difficult or entirely impossible. See M Trybus, ‘The tailor-made 
EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 26. See also B Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat?’ (n 252) 25 
who states that offsets are not mentioned in the Defence Procurement Directive because of their illegality: “an EU 
legal instrument cannot possibly regulate a practice that is by definition in breach of EU law.”  
979 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (n 969) 27 
980 These include Articles 18, 34, 35 and 56-62 TFEU. See Guidance Note, Offsets, 2, paras 5-8. 
981 These include Articles 4, 20, 38 to 42 and Article 47. See Guidance Note, Offsets, 2, paras 9-17 
982 ibid 
983 ibid  
984 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 28 
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competitive procedures and visibility of subcontracting decisions, the objective is to 
facilitate EU-wide industrial participation by other means. 
Therefore, according to the Guidance Note, the combined effect of the EU Treaties 
and the Defence Procurement Directive is that contracting authorities may not 
“require or induce by whatever means” tenderers to commit themselves to: (1) 
purchase goods or services from economic operators located in a specific Member 
State; (2) award sub-contracts to operators located in a specific Member State; (3) 
make investments in a specific Member State or (4) generate value on the territory of 
a specific Member State.985 Furthermore, tenderers may not be required to mobilise 
other undertakings to make such purchases, subcontracting or investments whether 
related to those undertakings or not.986 The predominant focus in the Guidance 
therefore is on offsets required of EU economic operators, although the references to 
“related” to “other undertakings” is not as specific. 
Notwithstanding, whilst emphasising the prima facie illegality of offsets, the Guidance 
Note appears to acknowledge a legitimate application of Article 346 TFEU to justify 
offsets.987 The Guidance Note makes a number of important statements in relation to 
the potential use of Article 346 TFEU to justify offset requirements. First, because the 
measure must be necessary for security interests, economic or employment related 
interests are not accepted.988 Hence, (economic) return on investment made abroad 
                                                 
985 Guidance Note, Offsets, 5, point 19 
986 Guidance Note, Offsets, 6, point 19, para 2 
987 The Guidance Note Offsets, 6, point 21, para 2 observes that where a Member State intends to rely on Article 
346 TFEU to require offset and related compensation practices, the Member State must be prepared to: (a) 
specify the essential security interest that makes the specific requirement necessary; (b) demonstrate that this 
requirement is an appropriate means to protect that interest, and (c) explain why it is not possible to achieve the 
same objective by less restrictive means 
988 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7, point 22. For a discussion of the relation between security and economic interests, 
see Chapter 2, Section 5.1   
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is not sufficient to justify use of Article 346 TFEU.989 Second, because the justification 
must always concern the specific measure in question, a justified derogation from the 
Directive for a particular security reason does not also implicitly authorize, or 
automatically legitimate, use of an offset which must be justified separately.990 The 
Guidance Note states unequivocally that a Member State must be able to prove that 
the specific requirement is itself “indispensable” to protect its essential security 
interest.991 
An important remaining question, therefore, is whether it is possible to conceive of 
any circumstances in which offsets would be permissible. To date, official EU 
publications and commentary have not provided a detailed analysis of hypothetical 
instances in which an offset could theoretically be justified. However, whilst the 
suggestion has been that offsets are difficult to justify under Article 346 TFEU 
because they normally meet economic as opposed to security considerations, it has 
been observed that economic considerations will not always be at the centre of an 
offset agreement.992 Further, in accordance with the discussion engaged in Chapter 
2, Section 5.2, it is possible to conceive of an instance in which a Member State may 
seek to invoke Article 346 TFEU where its interests cannot be protected either within 
the EU or NATO.993 Irrespective of the issue of their (il)legality, it appears to be 
                                                 
989 ibid 
990 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7, point 23 
991 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7, 23. It is interesting that the Guidance Note refers to “indispensable”. Strictly 
speaking, EU law imposes no such requirement, the wording of Article 346 TFEU only using the word 
“necessary”. As indicated in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, this term is used in Art.XXIII(1) WTO GPA. This may 
constitute an attempt to promote a convergent interpretation with a view to preventing possible variability in 
justifications for offsets between international trade law regimes 
992 See Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 26 citing at fn 195 the 
observation made by Heuninckx who states that requiring licensed production facilities in an offset agreement, for 
example, could be considered necessary to create a local maintenance capability that could be relied on to repair 
the military equipment in cases where the supply chain is disrupted by conflict. On this view, offsets that clearly 
aim at ensuring national security and meet the test of Article 346 TFEU could still be justified, just like any other 
Member State measure 
993 For instance, consider the following hypothetical. Cyprus (an EU Member State) does not have a formal 
offsets policy. However, suppose that it did. Cyprus considers itself at risk of a credible military threat by Turkey (a 
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accepted that offsets are likely to continue in some form. 994  Indeed, the EDA 
continues to recommend the use of offsets.995 
 
3.3. National Offset Regulation 
 
According to the Commission Report on transposition, historically, 18 Member States 
maintained offset policies requiring offsets from non-national suppliers when they 
procured defence equipment abroad.996 Prior to the Directive’s adoption, Member 
States varied in requiring specific offset laws, national policies or no official offset 
policies.997  
 
Before the publication of the Guidance Note on Offsets, it had been argued that any 
national regime would be incompatible with EU law if based on a legally binding, 
automatic and abstract offsets requirement for all defence procurement contracts 
because of the need for a ‘case-by-case’ determination of the decision to invoke 
                                                                                                                                                        
non-EU NATO member State). However Cyprus is subject to a NATO embargo. In this instance, Cyprus requires 
security of supply of its military equipment, which is otherwise restricted by the embargo. Security of supply might 
be achieved through offset requirements such as local manufacturing. Even though such cases would be rare, it 
could possibly be argued that offsets could be justified especially considering the length of time it takes to build up 
an industrial capacity. I am grateful to Dr Baudouin Heuninckx for providing this example during the course of 
private correspondence on this issue. Dr Heuninckx’s views were not given in a professional capacity and do not 
necessarily represent the views of his employers. Correspondence on file with the author 
994 See Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 29. See also B 
Heuninckx, ‘Trick or Treat?’ (n 252) 26 
995 See generally, EDA (Commissioned), ‘Study on the innovative and competitive potential of the defence-
related supplier base in the EU12’, Final Report, 2009, 74-5 <http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/eu-institutions-
services/pdf/EDA-study-june-2011.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
996  See Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 
2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 8  
997 See ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (969) 
29-31; Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n12), 343 (France); 388 (Germany); 432 (Italy); 479-481 (Poland); 
Romania (518-519); 554-555 (Sweden); 610-611 (UK) 
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Article 346 TFEU.998 This view has subsequently been confirmed by the Guidance 
Note on Offsets.999 
 
The Report on transposition indicates that the Commission has, therefore, been in 
close contact with the 18 Member States concerned and indicates that most have 
now either abolished the respective rules or revised their legislation.1000 According to 
the Report, “major legal changes” have, therefore, been implemented. 1001  An 
important question remains as to whether such practices will continue irrespective of 
those legal changes and, if so, in what form. 
  
 
4. EDA Offset Code and Third Countries 
 
It is recalled from Section 2.3 above that whilst the EDA Codes substantially exclude 
third countries from their scope, the Offsets Code contains specific references to third 
countries as well as practices which could conceivably include third countries. For 
instance, the Code states that its principles and guidelines will be applied equally to 
all bidders from sMS and non-sMS, including third countries.1002 Further, the Code 
identifies offsets as a global phenomenon and that while addressing offset on the EU 
level, cognizance will need to be taken of the global practice of offset and, in 
particular, the involvement of third parties and their effect on European industry 
                                                 
998 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (n 969) 27 
999 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7-8 para 26 
1000 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC 
on Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 9 
1001 ibid 
1002 EDA Code on Offsets, 2 
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competitiveness.1003  In addition, the Code also envisages its application not only to 
offsets but all compensation practices, of which government-to-government off-the-
shelf defence sales are included.1004  
 
The EDA offsets Code contains two sets of guidelines. The first concerns 
transparency. In particular, the Code requires sMS to provide information on national 
offset practices and underpinning policies, where they exist, including the percentage 
and types of accepted offset, whether part of the procurement contract or agreed 
upon otherwise. 1005 However, the Code does not expressly stipulate whether this 
includes information on third country offset provision. The second set of guidelines 
contains six stipulations designed to “evolve” offset use.1006 The first provides that 
sMS requiring offsets will clearly stipulate the requirements in the contract notice.1007 
The second is that the offset accepting sMS will make clear at the outset if offsets are 
a factor considered in a bid.1008 The third is that offsets will be considered of “less 
significant weight” (or used as a subsidiary criteria in case of offers with the same 
weight) when used as a criterion for tenderer selection or contract award in order to 
ensure that the procurement process is based on the best available and most 
economically advantageous solution.1009 The fourth is that offsets will not exceed the 
value of the procurement contract.1010 The fifth is that the sMS will allow foreign offset 
                                                 
1003 ibid 
1004 ibid. It is recalled that government-to-government sales are prima facie excluded from the Defence 
Procurement Directive under Article 13(f). See Chapter 3, Section 6.3. For a brief discussion of foreign military 
sales in U.S. defence procurement practice, see Chapter 11, Section 3 
1005 EDA Code of Conduct on Offsets, 3 
1006 ibid 
1007 ibid, 4 
1008 ibid 
1009 ibid. However, it has been observed that it is not clear precisely what is meant by “less significant weight”. 
This necessitates a comparison but it is not clear to what offsets could or should be compared. See A 
Georgopoulos, ‘Revisiting offset practices in European defence procurement’ (n 958) 35 
1010 ibid. In practice, many offset regimes apply a “multiplier” to the contract. A multiplier is a factor applied to the 
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suppliers to select the most cost effective business opportunities within the buying 
country to enable fair competition within supply chains where it is efficient, practical 
and economically or technically appropriate.1011 The final guideline is that the sMS 
will use wherever practicable and on a voluntary basis, mutual abatements to reduce 
reciprocal offset commitments.1012 With specific regard to the last issue, an EDA 
Study on abatement practices has specifically identified the need to address 
abatements, in particular, through developing what it describes as an “EDA-U.S. 
Government Offset Dialogue”.1013 
 
An important question, therefore, is how significant could the Offset Code be for the 
U.S? As indicated above, the Code is, by nature, limited in terms of content. 
However, the above provide indications that the EDA regime could potentially have a 
role in engaging the U.S. on offset issues. This raises two more fundamental issues. 
The first concerns the continued scope of the EDA regime in light of the adoption of 
the Defence Procurement Directive. The second is whether, in light of the prima facie 
illegality of offsets, third country offset requirements are similarly incompatible with 
EU law. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
actual value of certain offset transactions to calculate the credit value earned (i.e. the nominal value attributed to 
the actual value of the offset). Contracting authorities use multipliers to provide firms with incentives to offer 
offsets that benefit targeted areas of economic growth. For an example of the use of a multiplier, see A 
Georgopoulos, ‘Revisiting offset practices in European defence procurement’ (n 958) 36. Offset multipliers can 
generally range from around 100% to 135% of the contract value in some cases. See ‘Study on the effects of 
offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (n 969) 21-22  
1011 EDA Code of Conduct on Offsets, 4 
1012 ibid. See generally EDA, ‘Abatements: A Pragmatic Offset Tool to Facilitate the Development of the 
European Defence Equipment Market’, 2010 
1013 Ibid 18. Also observed by A Georgopoulos, ‘The European Defence Agency’s code of conduct for armament 
acquisitions’ (n 956) 39 
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4.1. Complementarity and Conflict 
 
With regard to the first issue, specifically jurisdiction, prior to the adoption of the 
Offsets Code, the Commission and EDA stated that their initiatives are 
“complementary” and “without prejudice” to each other.1014 Indeed, the Commission 
considered the development of the Directive and the EDA Code of Conduct on 
Armaments as complementary to the Interpretative Communication on Article 296 
TEC.1015 However, EU legal commentary has questioned whether complementarity is 
possible.1016 A host of arguments have been raised in this regard, not least that it is 
difficult to reconcile a Member State’s decision to exclude a contract from compliance 
with the EU Treaties on the basis of Article 346 TFEU in protection of essential 
security interests only to then proceed to publish a contract notice for the same 
contract on the EDA bulletin board.1017  
 
The Guidance Note on Offsets devotes specific attention to the Offsets Code.1018 
First, the Guidance Note reiterates the Code’s stipulation that its provisions have to 
be implemented within the framework of EU law.1019 It reaffirms that the Code is part 
of the intergovernmental regime on defence procurement to which participating 
Member States subscribed “without prejudice to their rights and obligations under the 
                                                 
1014 See Article 1(2) and 5(1) EDA Joint Action  
1015 On the differences of view regarding the significance of the respective timing of the publication of the 
Interpretative Communication and the EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, see Aalto, ‘Interpretations 
of Article 296’ (n 81) 29; Ferraro, ‘The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming 
Fortress Europe?’ (n 261) 595 
1016 See Trybus, ‘The New European Defence Agency’ (n 941) 687-691; Georgopoulos, ‘Revisiting offset 
practices in European defence procurement’ (n 958) 53; Heuninckx, ‘Towards a coherent European defence 
procurement regime?’ (n 85) 16-20 
1017 A Georgopoulos, ‘The Commission’s Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 EC’ (n 
234) 49 
1018 Guidance Note, Offsets, 8, points 27-28 
1019 Similarly, the Offsets Code, 1 refers to the need to evolve offsets in a way which is “compatible with EU law”. 
It also states at 2, as part of its “overarching principles”, that the subscribing Member States commit themselves 
to implement the Code “within the framework of EU law” 
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Treaties.”1020 Second, the Guidance Note states: 
 
However, it is important to note that the application of the Code does not 
of itself make offset requirements compatible with EU law. In every award 
procedure, contracting authorities/entities first have to ensure that all their 
requirements comply with the provisions of the Treaty and/or the Directive. 
On that basis, they may then decide to apply the Code on offsets, 
provided that this does not put the award procedure in conflict with the 
Treaty and/or the Directive. In other words: the only legal criterion for the 
assessment of offset requirements is compliance with EU primary and 
secondary law.”1021 
 
Given that it was stated that it is difficult to conceive of many circumstances in which 
offset practices can be justified under Article 346 TFEU, the purported legal effect of 
such a position should, in theory, confirm that the legitimate scope of the EDA Code 
is secondary to a primary assessment of EU law and in any event extremely limited. 
Nevertheless, by recognising (at least theoretically) that the EDA Code could apply, 
the Guidance Note accepts that it may be possible to justify offsets under Article 346 
TFEU.  
 
A 2011 NIAG Study has indicated that many European defence industry associations 
conclude that offsets should be dealt with on an intergovernmental level through the 
                                                 
1020 Guidance Note, Offsets, 8, points 28 
1021 ibid 
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EDA.1022 According to those industry associations, offsets deal with aspects closely 
related to national sovereignty and therefore the question of offsets in its entirety is 
not within the European Commission’s purview.1023 As a result, the Study indicates 
that these association encourage the EU not to promote the Guidance Note on 
Offsets and to support the EDA’s work in this field.1024 
 
At the time of writing, the EDA states that it is currently addressing the 
complementarity of the EDA regime and the Defence Procurement Directive and 
adapting the EDA regime to the “post-directive environment”.1025 An important issue 
will concern to what extent the EDA focuses specifically on the issue of offsets. 
 
4.2. Compatibility of Third Country Offsets with EU Law 
 
In 2007, the EDA commissioned a Study on the effects of offsets in the development 
of a European defence industry and market.1026 As part of its industry questionnaire, 
the Study asked: “[d]oes offset tend to favour EU-based companies vs. non-EU 
based companies or is it neutral in this regard?”1027 The overall conclusion was that 
the findings on offset effects on the competitiveness of European versus overseas 
competitors on European defence equipment markets were “rather inconclusive”.1028  
                                                 
1022  High Level Advice Study No 154, ‘Developments in Europe to Reform Export Control and Defense 
Procurement Processes’ (n 60) 14 
1023 Ibid 
1024 ibid 
1025 For more information, see <http://www.eda.europa.eu/projects/projects-search/intergovernmental-regime-on-
defence-procurement> accessed 20 September 2013 
1026 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (n 969). 
The study was restricted to an analysis of defence contracts with EDA pMS as a customer but which did include 
third countries as suppliers 
1027 Ibid 44 
1028 ibid 48 
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Most respondents stated that offsets were “neutral”.1029According to the Study’s 
interpretation of the data gathered, direct and indirect military offsets are seen by 
some as advantageous to U.S. primes as a result of their greater economies of scale 
and scope.1030 By contrast, the Study found that it may be easier for European firms 
to offer indirect civil offsets in light of the fact that they are geographically and 
culturally closer with more developed European industrial networks.1031 The Study 
also identified that U.S. regulations on technology transfer presented a more 
fundamental advantage to European industries, although the Study also identified 
that there were indications that U.S. firms were more forthcoming in sharing their 
technologies than European firms. 1032  Further, according to the Study, such 
differences in offset provision would not necessarily affect the attractiveness of the 
offered offset package.1033 
 
However, another important finding of the Study was that several respondents 
pointed to, and warned against, the potentially “negative effects” of “a future offset 
regime banning intra-European offsets but allowing them for extra-European 
players.”1034  
 
This issue is now brought into sharp resolution in light of the Defence Procurement 
Directive. It is therefore necessary to re-examine the legal position of third countries. 
 
                                                 
1029 The Study observed that several pMS answered with reference to the claimed neutrality of their own 
procurement practices 
1030 ibid, 44-45, 48 
1031 Ibid 45, 48 
1032 ibid, 45 fn41. For a discussion of U.S. export controls laws in light of recent developments in EU law, see 
Chapter 5 
1033 The Study states that rather one should expect that U.S. tenderers would have to accept a lower profit 
margin. ibid, 45 
1034 ibid, 45. These “negative effects” were not specified 
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4.2.1. Third Country Operators 
 
In light of the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive, it has been argued that 
where a contracting authority permits a third country operator to participate in a 
contract award procedure in accordance with the Directive, a contracting authority 
cannot require offsets.1035 By contrast, it has been suggested that as a consequence 
of the prohibition on the receipt of offsets by EU contractors, EU contracting 
authorities could be compelled to prefer non-EU contractors to EU contractors and 
that this would place third country contractors at a comparative advantage.1036  
 
According to one EU legal commentator, whether the general prohibition of offsets in 
light of the Directive can be implemented through subcontracting depends, inter alia, 
on the development of offsets with third countries, and especially with the U.S.1037 
This could be taken to suggest that the offset prohibition does not prima facie apply 
to third countries, or, alternatively, if it does, Member States may nevertheless 
continue to seek such offsets from third countries in contravention of EU law.1038 
  
The above 2007 EDA commissioned Study proceeds on the basis that to the degree 
that offsets are illegal, this illegality “lies on the receiving side irrespective of whether 
                                                 
1035 Statement made by Mr. Burkhard Schmitt, panellist at the International Chamber of Commerce conference: 
“The new EU Directive: Towards Market-based Defence and Sensitive Security Procurement’, Paris, France, 
Tuesday 1 February 2011. The author has retained notes on file 
1036  Statement made by Mr. Michael Abels, Partner, Oppenhoff & Partner (Germany), panellist at the 
International Chamber of Commerce conference: “The new EU Directive: Towards Market-based Defence and 
Sensitive Security Procurement’, Paris, France, Tuesday 1 February 2011. The author has retained notes on file 
1037 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 29 
1038 For instance, this may be due to a perceived lesser risk that the Commission would seek to investigate 
offsets provided by third countries whereas it would be more inclined to investigate offsets provided by EU 
economic operators, in particular, if the issue is politically highly sensitive and could engage a dispute with the 
home State of the third country offset provider 
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suppliers are European or not or where they reside”.1039 The Study further states that 
this is in line with Interpretative Communication on Article 296 which is “entirely 
geared to what the internal market demands from potential receivers of offset – 
irrespective of whether suppliers are European or non-European”.1040 In fact, the 
Study goes even further by stating that a prohibition of offsets for EU contractors 
whilst still allowing offsets for third country contractors does not exclude a solution 
such that pMS cease to accept offset regardless of origin.1041 
 
The legal basis for such a general EU and third country offset prohibition is not 
unequivocal. The reference to illegality lying on the “receiving side” may derive from 
Article 18 TFEU which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality. It could be 
argued that a third country offset requirement requires industrial compensation to the 
requiring Member State’s national industry thereby placing the Member State and its 
industry at a comparative advantage.1042  On this basis, it could be considered 
analogous to a “buy national” requirement that would otherwise be contrary to EU law 
unless justified. Alternatively, it could be argued that by enabling third country 
companies to provide offsets whereas EU operators would be prohibited, third 
country operators derive a comparative advantage e.g. by improving their ability to 
tender for contracts in other Member States.1043 Further, the Offsets Code only 
applies to contracts excluded in accordance with Article 346 TFEU. Therefore, it 
                                                 
1039 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (969) 11, 
47 
1040 ibid. 45. It should be observed that there is, in fact, no such express or implied reference to the receipt of 
offsets by third countries in the Interpretative Communication. This may constitute further indicative evidence of a 
discernable trend towards the “Europeanised” conception of Article 346 TFEU. For a discussion in this regard, 
see Chapter 2, Section 5.2 
1041
 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (969) 11 
1042 Again, I am grateful to Dr. Baudouin Heuninckx for bringing this possibility to my attention during the course 
of discussions. Again, these views were given in a personal capacity and do not necessarily represent the views 
of his employer 
1043 I am grateful to Dr. Baudouin Heuninckx for bringing this possibility to my attention during the course of 
discussions. Again, these views do not necessarily represent the views of his employer 
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could be argued that given the reference to third countries in the Code, the Code 
implicitly subscribes to the position that third country offset requirements are similarly 
prima facie incompatible with EU law. However, in the absence of a definitive CJEU 
judgment, considerable legal uncertainty will continue to exist on this issue. 
 
The authors of the EDA Study indicated that an outcome whereby offsets were 
prohibited for EU contractors but permitted for third countries is “hardly a policy 
advocated by any European actors” and is “not likely to become a European 
policy”.1044 However, as indicated in Chapter 4, the EU has not adopted a coherent 
policy regarding the legal position of third countries in the field of defence 
procurement. Therefore, an important question is whether a contracting authority can 
continue to require the provision of offsets by third country contractors in either 
circumstance that a third country is permitted to participate in a contract award 
procedure prescribed by the Defence Procurement Directive or otherwise in 
accordance with national law and policy. 
 
4.2.2. Third Country Governments 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 3, Section 6.3 that Article 13(f) Defence Procurement 
Directive provides for the exclusion of government-to-government contracts. 
However, the question was raised as to whether an offset accompanying the sale 
could similarly fall under the exclusion. As indicated, the Directive does not expressly 
regulate offsets. The Guidance Note on Offsets states that whilst government-to-
government sales are excluded from the Directive, possible offset requirements 
                                                 
1044 ‘Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and Market’ (969) 11, 
47 
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related to such sales would have to be justified separately as “necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of the purchasing Member States”.1045 Whilst not 
unequivocal, the latter appears to refer to the need to invoke Article 346 TFEU.1046  
 
In this regard, the Guidance Note does not explicitly differentiate between a Member 
State-to-Member State sales contract with an accompanying offset and a Member 
State-to-third country sales contract with an accompanying offset. Both options are 
possible in light of the fact that Article 13(f) also purports to apply to third country 
governments. According to this view, whilst the Directive permits a Member State to 
exclude a sale conducted with a third country, if a Member State requires an offset 
from that third country, the Member State will have to separately justify that offset by 
reference to its essential security interests (and which will necessarily implicate 
consideration of the circumstances of the third country and/or third country 
operator(s)). This interpretation would also appear to be consistent with the general 
view expounded above, namely that offsets are prohibited irrespective of whether 
required from an EU or third country economic operator. 
 
However, an additional issue arises with regard to government-to-government sales 
contracts in light of the Offsets Code. As indicated, the Guidance Note appears to 
indicate that a sales contract can be legitimately excluded under Article 13(f). The 
implication is that it is only the offset agreement that will have to be separately 
justified in accordance with Article 346 TFEU. However, the Offsets Code states that 
                                                 
1045 Guidance Note, Offsets, 7, point 24 
1046 It has not been suggested that a Member State can rely on one of the other exclusions of the Directive or 
one of the free movement exceptions in the EU Treaties  
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it applies to both offsets and government-to-government sales.1047 It may be possible 
to reconcile Article 13(f) and the Offsets Code on the basis that whilst Article 13(f) is 
a legal basis for excluding a sale from compliance with the Directive, this does not 
preclude the possibility for Article 346 TFEU to provide a further legal basis for 
excluding a sale from compliance with the EU Treaties as a whole. This could be on 
the grounds that the sale may not, itself, be compatible with EU law. Alternatively, it 
could be on the grounds that the offset is integral to the sale and which therefore 
necessitates additional exclusion of an otherwise prima facie legitimate sale. 
 
This raises a broader question regarding the extent to which EU law is able to 
convincingly discriminate between a legitimate sale and an illegitimate offset.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sought to highlight at least three important issues that are relevant 
to a transatlantic defence procurement analysis. Firstly, the EDA is developing 
increasing initiatives in the field of defence procurement. For instance, it has 
promulgated a set of procurement Codes. It maintains a procurement Gateway. It 
has developed initiatives which are intended to support procurement functions e.g. in 
relation to security of supply, security of information and technical standards. It is 
also beginning to cohere its initiatives on the pooling and sharing of capabilities. An 
increasing emphasis on EU cooperative procurement is reinforced by the flexibility 
accorded by Article 13(c) Defence Procurement Directive as well as the licensing 
                                                 
1047 EDA Offsets Code, 2 
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provisions of the ICT Directive. An important question concerns the extent to which 
the EDA will become a primary forum for engagement with the U.S. and transatlantic 
international organisations such as NATO. 
 
Secondly, it should be emphasised that the issue of the compatibility and 
complementarity of EU law and the EDA regime is not simply a matter for internal 
institutional and legal debate within the EU. As the preceding Chapters have 
demonstrated, both the internal and external coherence of European defence 
procurement regulation is of direct import to the transatlantic defence market. U.S. 
legal commentary has specifically identified that the use of varying procurement 
methods and organisations outside the EU constitutes a real challenge for the U.S., 
not least because of the lack of transparency which may result.1048  
 
Thirdly, reinforcing the observations in Chapter 3 concerning the Directive’s 
provisions on excluded contracts, the discussion of offsets is symptomatic of the 
extent to which the most economically and politically significant forms of procurement 
are conducted absent a clear legal framework. 
 
In reality, it should be recognized that a legal prohibition will not simply eradicate 
offsets. As will be discussed in Chapter 11, offsets provide a vital point of leverage 
for the U.S. to enter the EU market. Whilst this Chapter has not sought to subject 
offset practices to a comprehensive legal analysis, it has provided a sufficient 
indication that EU law and the EDA Codes are unlikely to radically alter Member 
State practices in the short term even with a robust Commission enforcement stance, 
                                                 
1048 Ferraro, ‘The European Defence Agency: Facilitating Defense Reform or Forming Fortress Europe?’ (n 261) 
611 and 615 
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Further, the Commission, itself, will have to determine whether it accords equal 
priority to the investigation of EU and third country offset provision. 1049  
 
An important question is whether legal institutions could play a more substantial role 
in managing offsets, even accepting any prima facie illegality. This issue will need to 
be candidly confronted in transatlantic defence trade debates going forward.  
 
This Chapter concludes the discussion of EU defence procurement law. This thesis 
now crosses the Atlantic to examine U.S. defence procurement law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1049 According to the Commission Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of 
directive 2009/81/EC on Defence and Security Procurement (n 302) 9, the Commission is convinced that “a rapid 
phasing out of the discriminatory practice of offsets is necessary to create a truly European Defence Equipment 
Market” and that it will take appropriate action where this is not the case. It will also do so where Member States 
continue to have offset rules that are clearly incompatible with EU law. Importantly, the Commission does not 
distinguish between EU and third country offset provision  
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8 
Sources of U.S. Federal Defence Procurement Law 
 
1. Introduction 
For a host of reasons, the early 1990s saw increased focus on the extent to which 
the U.S. and EU markets were open to foreign competition in the field of 
procurement. 1050  It had been observed that there were a number of legal and 
structural impediments” which resulted in “considerable obstacles to foreign firms” 
attempting to enter the U.S. procurement market, certain of which will be examined in 
this Part.1051 Interestingly, at the time, and thus prior to the significant debates which 
subsequently arose regarding the role of Article 346 TFEU in defence procurement, it 
was observed that of all the legal and structural impediments to the U.S. market, the 
most obvious was national security restrictions.1052 In fact, it had been observed by 
U.S commentators that:  
To be fair to the United States the restrictions are very similar to Article 
223 EEC which allows for protectionism on national security grounds for 
E.C. Member States. In the absence of a resolve amongst E.C. Member 
                                                 
1050 This was likely due, inter alia, to the following factors. Firstly, the U.S. and EU had been engaged in a trade 
dispute regarding Article 29 of the then newly implemented Utilities Directive and the supposed discrimination 
against goods of non-Community origin. For a discussion, see P-A Trepte, ‘The E.C.-United States trade dispute: 
negotiation of a partial solution’ (1993) 4 PPLR 82; M E Footer, ‘External aspects of the Community’s public 
procurement policy in the utilities sectors’ (1994) 6 PPLR, 187; M E Footer, ‘Case Comment C360/93 on the 
Community’s external powers in the area of public procurement’ (1996) 5 PPLR, 148. Secondly, the U.S. and EC 
were involved in negotiations regarding the scope of coverage of the GPA in advance of the next revision. For a 
discussion in this regard, see G De Graaf, ‘EC-United States agreement on Government procurement’ (1994) 5 
PPLR 179; A Halford, ‘An overview of EC-United States trade relations in the area of public procurement’ (1995) 1 
PPLR 35; For earlier commentary, see D V Anthony and C K Hagerty, ‘Cautious Optimism as a Guide to Foreign 
Government Procurement’ (1979) 11 (1979) Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1301 
1051 A Cox and S Greenwold, ‘The legal and structural obstacles to free trade in the United States procurement 
market’ (1993) 5 PPLR 237, 251 
1052 ibid, also observing at 237 that: “[t]he resolve of the United States government to open up its own 
procurement market is overshadowed by national security interests and at 238 that: “[w]hile the United States can 
leigitmately [sic] preclude imports on grounds of national security, it sometimes does so simply to curb foreign 
competition and to protect weak domestic companies.” 
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States to eradicate national preference in defence procurement there can 
be little scope for this barrier's being rescinded internationally.1053 
The idiom, “history repeats itself”, is apposite given the renewed focus which U.S. 
commentary now brings to an assessment of the Defence procurement Directive and 
which this thesis now brings to bear on an assessment of U.S. procurement law.  
It is recalled that the source of EU defence procurement law derives principally from 
the Defence Procurement Directive which, in turn, derives its legal basis from, and 
operates within, the broader matrix of EU Treaty provisions (as interpreted by the 
case law). By contrast, the sources of U.S. federal procurement law are numerous. 
Prior to undertaking a substantive analysis of U.S. law, it is therefore necessary to 
get a sense of the scale of the U.S. defence procurement edifice.1054 This will provide 
the context for Chapters 9 and 10 which examine the statutory framework regulating 
full and open competitive and non-competitive procurement. Chapter 11 examines 
the specific field of international contracting under U.S. foreign acquisition law. 
 
It should be observed at the outset that this Part is not intended to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of the U.S. legal and institutional framework, U.S. federal 
acquisition law, 1055 or full comparative analysis of U.S. law and EU law.1056 Rather, in 
                                                 
1053 ibid, 251 
1054 For a useful but now dated description of U.S. federal procurement law with specific regard to foreign 
contractors, see M J Golub and S L Fenske, ‘U.S. Government Procurement: Opportunities and Obstacles for 
Foreign Contractors 20’ (1986-1987) Geo Wash J Int’l L & Econ 567 
1055 The number of practitioner volumes on each acquisition phase exemplifies the complexity of the field. For 
authoritative treatises on the law regulating contract awards, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (4th edn, CCH, 2011); J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, 
Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (3rd edn, CCH 2011). For a specific treatment of discrete 
aspects of procurement, see J Cibinic Jr and R C Nash Jr, Cost Reimbursement Contracting (3rd edn CCH 2004); 
R C Nash Jr and L. Rawicz, Intellectual Property in Government Contracts (6th edn CCH 2008). For an 
authoritative treatise on contract administration, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash and J F Nagle, Administration of 
Government Contracts (4th edn CCH 2006); see also C S Dees, ‘Enforcing the bargain: contract administration’ 
(2002) 2 PPLR, 131 
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accordance with the objectives identified in Chapter 1, its purpose is to provide a 
frame of reference for further research. For instance, the following are just some 
examples of the complexities that would need to be considered in any significant 
comparative analysis of U.S. and EU defence procurement law. 
 
Firstly, the legislative processes concerned in the formulation of U.S. and EU law are 
very different, the resulting impact of which on the nature, form and function of 
defence procurement legislation itself has yet to be fully discerned.1057  
 
Secondly, U.S. acquisition law is significantly broader than the scope of the EU 
procurement Directives. In addition to the conduct of contract award procedures, U.S. 
law also regulates the equally, if not more important, acquisition planning and 
contract administration stages. The determination and statement of a contracting 
authority’s needs, the identification of potential sources and the adequacy of planning 
are areas of broadly regulated decision-making which may significantly affect foreign 
competition from the outset. It has been observed that accurate and penetrating 
                                                                                                                                                        
1056 Whilst transatlantic comparative legal scholarship on defence procurement issues is limited, there exists a 
more developed literature in the field of public procurement although much of which is not comparative in its 
methodology. A representative and non-exhaustive list includes: J Whelan, ‘An introduction to the United States 
Federal Government system of contracting’ (1992) 3 PPLR 207; J Whelan, ‘Some current problems in United 
States procurement’ (1992) 4 PPLR 308; B Udis, ‘Weapons procurement in the United States’ (1992) 6 PPLR 
455; J Whelan, “Public law 103-355: "streamlining" federal acquisition in the United States” (1995) 3 PPLR 64; P J 
Carrier, ‘New policy regarding arbitration of government procurement disputes in the United States’ (1996) 3 
PPLR 74-80; J Linarelli, ‘The proposed Freedom from Government Competition Act of 1997’ (1997) 5 PPLR, 208; 
P H Wittie, ‘Transnational concerns: domestic preferences’ (2002) 2 PPLR 145; W E Wittig, ‘A brief survey of U.S. 
procurement reform in the E.U. context’ (2002) 2 PPLR 33; M Steinicke, ‘Public Procurement and the Negotiated 
Procedure – A Lesson to Learn from US law?’ (2001) 8 European Competition Law Review, 331; J-J Verdeaux, 
‘Public Procurement in the European Union and in the United States: A Comparative Study’ (2002-2003) 32 Pub. 
Cont. L. J. 713; J I Schwartz, ‘Learning from the United States’ procurement law experience: on “law transfer” and 
its limitations’ (2002) 2 PPLR, 115; G S Hayken, ‘Comparative study: the evolution of organizational conflicts of 
interest law in Europe and the United States’ (2006) 3 PPLR 137; C Yukins, ‘Are IDIQs Inefficient? Sharing 
Lessons with European Framework Contracting’ (2007-2008) 37 Pub. Cont. L.J. 545; M Kidalov and K F Snider, 
‘Once more, with feeling: federal small business contracting policy in the Obama administration’ (2013) 1 PPLR, 
15; W E Kovacic and R D Anderson, ‘Competition policy and international trade liberalisation: essential 
components to ensure good performance in public procurement markets’ (n 24) 
1057 To date, there has been no detailed research examining the role and effect of Congressional or the EU 
“trialogue” processes on the formulation of public and defence procurement legislation. For a discussion on the 
link between the “rule-makers” and appropriated funds, see W E Wittig, ‘A brief survey of U.S. procurement 
reform in the E.U. context’ (n 1056) 
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comparative law analysis is significantly undermined by differences of scope and 
coverage.1058 In any event, as comparative scholars observe, direct comparisons of 
discrete features of different legal systems in isolation risk being unreliable or even 
misleading even when those features appear to fulfill parallel functions.1059  
 
Thirdly, the U.S. and EU procurement systems proceed from different starting points. 
In the U.S., military procurement predates, and therefore historically conditions, the 
U.S. federal public procurement architecture. 1060 Conversely, the EU Public Sector 
Directives predate the Defence Procurement Directive. Whilst an adaptation of the 
Public Sector Directive, the Defence Procurement Directive seeks to differentiate 
itself in a separate instrument. Basic choices of this kind are significant. It has been 
argued that there may be “substantial adverse consequences when military 
procurement is not engrossed in emerging national and international public 
procurement regulatory regimes”.1061 As will be discussed in Part III, this issue is also 
pertinent in light of the fact that it has been debated whether defence procurement 
should fall within the scope of the WTO GPA, an issue of particular significance for 
transatlantic defence procurement relations. 
 
Fourthly, U.S. defence procurement is primarily a federal competence. 1062  By 
contrast, EU defence procurement is both a matter of EU and Member State 
                                                 
1058 J I Schwartz, ‘The Centrality of Military Procurement: Explaining the Exceptionalist Character of United 
States Federal Public Procurement Law’, The George Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper No. 111, October 17 2004, 8 <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607186 > accessed 20 
September 2013 
1059 J I Schwartz, ‘The Centrality of Military Procurement: Explaining the Exceptionalist Character of United 
States Federal Public Procurement Law’ (n 1058) 12 and see citations at fn14 therein 
1060 For an important discussion in this regard, see ibid 
1061 ibid 122-124 
1062 For a discussion of the U.S. federal structure in terms of its effect with regard to foreign competition at the 
level of individual U.S. States, see A Cox and S Greenwold, ‘The legal and structural obstacles to free trade in the 
United States procurement market’ (n 1051) 248-9 
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competence. It is recalled from Chapters 2 and 4 that this gives rise to a host of 
complex legal issues not least because of the existence of 28 national legal regimes 
applying the Defence Procurement Directive.  
 
It follows that whilst U.S. and EU defence procurement laws share certain objectives 
common to all forms of public procurement, they also prioritise different objectives 
and which affect the form and content of legislation. The raison d’être of the 
procurement Directives is to substantially prohibit national discrimination and to 
provide access and equal treatment to foreign i.e. EU economic operators. However, 
the legislation nevertheless makes concesssions to national interests. By contrast, 
whilst U.S. procurement law is designed with an intention to ensure competition in 
most cases, it was not expressly designed with non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of foreign operators in mind. To this extent, even though U.S. law in fact 
permits participation of foreign competitors in defence contract awards, 
fundamentally, U.S. law is politically and legally configured with a specific focus on 
national interest, in particular, the U.S. national security interest.1063 It follows that its 
exclusions and exceptions to full and open completion are generally broader in 
scope. Therefore, as will be demonstrated, whilst there may be fundamental 
similarities in provisions of U.S. and EU law, subtle differences may, in fact, reflect 
fundamental differences in their underlying objectives.  
 
                                                 
1063 For instance, as will be discussed in Chapters 9 and 10, whilst certain U.S. exclusions and exceptions are 
comparable to the Directive’s provisions permitting use of the negotiated procedure without publication, U.S. 
exclusions and exceptions are largely unrestrained in the fact that they are not circumscribed by certain limiting 
conditions on their use in the way that is perceived necessary by the EU legislator in order to prevent their misuse 
by Member States. Further, it is recalled from Chapter 5 that the Directive incorporates specific provisions on 
security of supply in order to bring greater transparency to the use of security of supply as a discriminating as 
opposed to discriminatory factor in defence procurement. By contrast, U.S. law simply enables the use of security 
of supply as a broad ground for excluding or precluding competition 
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Finally, perhaps most importantly, within the EU, legislation is seen as an 
instrumental and integral tool for the achievement of competition and is driven by an 
existential concern about the continued ability of the EU to remain competitive in the 
field of defence trade. By contrast, as the World’s largest defence market, the U.S. 
has largely been self-sustaining without the need for foreign competition. To this 
extent, whilst U.S. law is seen as a vital tool to improve competition, all hopes do not 
rest on the ability of a single instrument to radically alter the competitive dynamics of 
a market. It is therefore unsurprising that U.S. laws and regulations limiting 
competition are not subject to the same intensive scrutiny as is the case with EU 
defence procurement legislation.1064  
 
However, as the following Chapters will demonstrate, it does not necessarily follow 
that there are no points of relation or comparison between U.S. and EU law that 
could provide a basis for examining possibilities to improve the role of legal 
institutions in pursuit of transatlantic defence trade objectives. 
 
2. Sources of U.S. Federal Defence Procurement Law 
 
In the U.S., the exercise of procurement competence is shared between the 
Executive and Legislative branches. The Executive branch has the constitutional 
power to execute laws and enters into contracts whilst Congress enacts statutes 
authorizing programmes or activities and their funding.1065  
                                                 
1064 However, as will become evident in this Part, the emphasis in the U.S. on accountability in public spend 
means that procurement in practice is subject to much more extensive public scrutiny, transparency and 
accountability mechanisms than is the case in the EU generally and specifically in the field of defence 
procurement 
1065 For a discussion of the legal basis for, and requirements governing, the federal government budget and 
appropriations processes, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 
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2.1. Statutory Sources: ASPA, FPASA, OFPPA, DPA and CICA 
 
There is no single statute which regulates federal procurement. The two main 
statutes covering most government procurement are the Armed Services 
Procurement Act 1948 (“ASPA”)1066 and the Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act 1949 (“FPASA”),1067 both of which have been subject to revision since 
their enactment.1068 The ASPA grants authority to the Secretaries of the armed 
services to make procurement decisions. ASPA also provides general guidelines 
under which such decisions are to be made.1069 The ASPA applies to procurement of 
all property (other than land) and services undertaken by the DoD, the Department of 
the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the Coast 
Guard and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”). 1070  In 
addition to the ASPA and FPASA, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act 
(“OFPPA”) contains a number of procurement rules covering almost all government 
agencies. 1071 This includes the DoD1072 and the military departments (Army, Navy 
and Air Force).1073 The OFPPA created the Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
(“OFPP”) within the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). Congress 
established the OFPP in 1974 to provide overall direction for government-wide 
                                                                                                                                                        
1055) 38-58. The final stage of the process is the passage of the annual appropriations statutes, an example of 
which is the annual DoD Appropriations Act. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 43-45 
1066 10 U.S.C. §2302 et seq  
1067 41 U.S.C. § 251 et seq 
1068 The ASPA has been modified extensively but the FPASA tends to be modified infrequently. See J Cibinic Jr, 
R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 27 
1069 The FPASA grants authority to the heads of the non-military departments and agencies 
1070 10 U.S.C. § 2303. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 
1055) 29. In contrast, the FPASA applies to procurement undertaken by “executive agencies” with the exception 
of the DoD, the Coast Guard, and NASA. See 41 U.S.C. § 3101(c)(A) 
1071  41 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 33 
1072 41 U.S.C. § 403(1)(A) 
1073  4.1. U.S.C. § 403(B) 
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procurement policies, regulations and procedures and to promote economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness in acquisition processes.1074 However, the above have 
largely been superseded by more detailed regulation discussed below. 
 
In addition, the Defense Production Act (“DPA”)1075 provides the President with a 
broad set of authorisations to ensure that domestic industrial capabilities can meet 
“national defense” 1076  requirements. 1077  The DPA authorizes or mandates the 
President inter alia to: (1) require acceptance and priority performance of contracts 
and orders in support of national defense;1078 (2) provide financial incentives and 
assistance for industry to expedite production and deliveries or services under 
Government contract and to provide for maintenance, improvement, and expansion 
of production capabilities needed for national defense purposes; 1079  (3) provide 
antitrust protection for voluntary agreements between competitors to enable 
cooperation to plan and coordinate measures to increase the supply of materials and 
services needed for national defense purposes1080 and (4) review national security 
impact of foreign investment in firms based in the U.S.1081 The DoD continues to be 
                                                 
1074  Pub. L. No. 93-400, 88 Stat. 796. Further information on the OFPP can be found at 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement_default> accessed 20 September 2013 
1075 Pub. L. No. 81-774 (1950); codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§2061-2171, as amended 
1076 Section 702(14) defines “national defense” as: “programs for military and energy production or construction, 
military or critical infrastructure assistance to any foreign nation, homeland security, stockpiling, space, and any 
directly related activity. Such term includes emergency preparedness activities conducted pursuant to title VI of 
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. § 5195 et seq.] and critical 
infrastructure protection and restoration.”  
1077 For a useful overview of the DPA, see D H Else, ‘Defense Production Act: Purpose and Scope’ 14 May 2009 
Congressional Research Service <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501341> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1078 Title I (Priorities and Allocations). For a discussion of the provisions under this Title, see D H Else, ‘Defense 
Production Act: Purpose and Scope’ (n 1077) 2 
1079 Title III (Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply). For a discussion of the provisions under this Title, 
see D H Else, ‘Defense Production Act: Purpose and Scope’ (n 1077) 3 
1080 Title VII (General Provisions). For a discussion of the provisions under this Title, see D H Else, ‘Defense 
Production Act: Purpose and Scope’ (n 1077) 4-5 
1081 An inter-Agency body comprised of the heads of federal acquisition Departments and Agencies, the Defense 
Production Act Committee (“DPAC”) was established under Section 722 of the DPA and is charged with providing 
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the primary user of the authorities provided.1082 However, this power is not frequently 
exercised.1083 
 
Finally, the Competition in Contracting Act 1984 (“CICA”)1084 imposes a positive 
statutory obligation on contracting authorities to achieve competition in federal 
procurement.1085 By setting a particular level of competition as the objective, an 
appropriate contracting technique i.e. procedure can then be selected.1086 
 
CICA applies to most contracts, excluding only those subject to procurement 
procedures authorized by a particular statute. 1087  CICA categorizes competition 
according to three forms: “full and open competition”; “full and open competition after 
exclusion of sources”; and “other than full and open competition”. These forms will be 
discussed in Chapters 9 and 10. 
 
CICA also requires competition when using simplified acquisition procedures for low 
value purchases,1088 and for the award of so-called task order and delivery order 
(“TO/DO”) contracts, the equivalent of “framework” agreements under EU law.1089 
                                                                                                                                                        
advice to the President on the effective use of the DPA as well as making recommendations to Congress if 
legislative actions are required. See <http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/dpac.html> accessed 20 September 2013 
1082 Government Accountability Office, Defense Production Act: Agencies Lack Policies and Guidance for Use of 
Key Authorities, June 2008, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-08-854 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08854.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1083 S W Feldman, Government Contract Guidebook (4th edn Federal Publications 2011) § 2:7 
1084  Pub. L. No. 98-369, 31 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq 
1085 CICA was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, §§ 2701-2753, 98 Stat. 1175 
(1984). CICA amended the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947; Federal Property and Administrative 
Services Act of 1949; Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974. It also created a statutory basis for the 
bid-protest function of the GAO (discussed in more detail in Section 4 below). CICA’s competition requirements 
took effect on 1 April 1985. For a commentary on CICA in its historical context, see W S Cohen, ‘The Competition 
in Contracting Act’ (1983-1984) 14 Pub Cont LJ 1 
1086 W S Cohen, ‘The Competition in Contracting Act’ (n 1085) 2 
1087 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)(A) & 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1) 
1088 10 U.S.C. § 2304(g)(1)(A) & 41 U.S.C. § 253(g)(1)(A) 
1089 10 U.S.C. §§2304(a)-(d) and 41 U.S.C. §§ 41 U.S.C. 4104-06. However, the issuance of task or delivery 
orders under “TO/DO” contracts are not subject to CICA. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.001(e)-(f). For a discussion of this 
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CICA has been implemented in Part 6 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) 
and Sub Part 206 of the Defense Federal Acquisiton Regulation Supplement 
(“DFARS”). It is to these provisions which this Chapter now turns.  
 
2.2. Regulatory Sources: Federal Acquisition Regulation and Supplements 
 
Whilst Congress has not enacted a single statute governing all agencies, there is a 
single Government-wide Regulation.1090 This detailed regulation is called the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”).1091 The FAR is written by the Defense Acquisition 
Regulation Council (“DAR”) 1092  and the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council 
(“CAA”).1093 The FAR is issued and maintained by the Secretary of Defense, the 
Administrator of General Services and the Administrator of NASA.1094 The FAR is 
subject to frequent revision.1095 Specific to defence, the DAR also recommends 
revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”).  
 
All of the major agencies with procurement functions issue supplementary 
regulations to implement the FAR.1096 The most significant set examined in this Part 
                                                                                                                                                        
form of contracting, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 
1331-1336 and 1386-1406; C R Yukins, ‘Are IDIQS Inefficient? Sharing Lessons with European Framework 
Contracting’ (n 1056). For a further discussion in this regard, see Chapter 10, Section 3.3 
1090 41 U.S.C. § 1121(b) 
1091 The FAR came into effect on 1 April 1984  
1092 The DAR Council is composed of representatives of the Secretary of Defense and each of the military 
departments, the Defense Logistics Agency (“DLA”), and NASA. Further information on the DAR can be found on 
the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (“DPAP”) website at  
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/about.html> accessed 20 September 2013 
1093 The CAA Council is chaired by a representative of the Administrator of General Services. The CAA’s 
membership comprises representatives from the civilian agencies (the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Energy, and Treasury, for example). See FAR 1.201-1 
1094 41 U.S.C. § 1303(a) 
1095  The latest version of the FAR (updated 3 September 2013) can be found at  
<http://www.acquisition.gov/far/> accessed 20 September 2013 
1096 A diagrammatic representation of the FAR System and a table of issued supplements can be found in J 
Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 35-37 at Figures 1-3 and 1-
4 respectively  
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is the DFARS. 1097  The military departments have also issued separate 
supplements.1098 In 2004, the DoD issued “Procedures, Guidance and Information” 
(“PGI”), a companion resource to the DFARS which contains mandatory and non-
mandatory internal DoD procedures, non-mandatory guidance, and supplemental 
information. 1099  In limited circumstances, deviations from the DFARS are 
permitted.1100 The DFARS is also occasionally supplemented by the issuance of 
Defense Acquisition Circulars1101 and Departmental Letters.1102  
 
3. Exercise and Oversight of the Procurement Function 
 
The national Ministries of Defence of the EU Member States will typically procure 
through their designated agencies. However, as indicated by the number of FAR 
supplements, in the U.S., procurement will be undertaken at various operational 
levels within a decentralized structure. Further, it is recalled that in the EU the 
Commission will exercise the primary oversight and enforcement function. By 
contrast, as this Section will demonstrate, the U.S. exercises a much more 
substantial oversight function through a well-resourced Congress. 
                                                 
1097 The latest version of DFARS (updated 9 September 2013) can be found at 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfarspgi/current/index.html> accessed 20 September 2013 
1098 These include the Engineer Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) 
(“EFRS”); Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“NMCARS”) (48 CFR 52); Army FAR 
Supplement (“AFARS”) (48 CFR 51); Air Force FAR Supplement (“AFFARS”) (48 CFR 53); Defense Logistics 
Acquisition Directive (“DLAD”) (48 CFR 54); Special Operations (“SOFARS”) and Transportation Command 
(“TRANSFARS”). These are listed in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 36-37 
1099 See 69 Fed. Reg. 63326. The latest version of the PGI (updated 9 September 2013) can be found at < 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfarspgi/current/index.html > accessed 20 September 2013 
1100 Deviations from the FAR are allowed only if authorized and approved by a designated official (FAR subpt. 
1.4). The same is the case for deviations from the DFARS (DFARS 201.402). All class deviations from the 
DFARS existing at the time of writing can be found at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/class_deviations.html > 
accessed 20 September 2013 > On deviations generally, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 69-71. 
1101 In addition to DFARS revisions, a Defense Acquisition Circular may include policies, directives, and 
information items 
1102 DFARS 201.304(6) 
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3.1. Procurement by the DoD and Military Departments 
 
The DoD is one of the largest individual purchasing agencies in the federal 
Government.1103 The DoD includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, the unified commands, and other agencies 
that the Secretary of Defense establishes to meet specific requirements, such as the 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”) and the DLA. 
 
Procurement is generally managed at the secretarial level by an Under Secretary 
(e.g. Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). Procurement operational responsibility 
is generally decentralised.1104 Organisation is influenced by the manner in which 
procurement authority is delegated.1105 Responsibility for research, development, and 
acquisition of hardware and other logistics aspects is generally delegated to major 
commands.1106 Below the command level exist hundreds of field organizations. Each 
of the three military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) purchases supplies, 
services, and construction to support its respective functions but other DoD 
component organizations also have a significant role in the procurement process.1107  
 
Within each DoD department, the Agency Head e.g., the Secretary of each Military 
Department or chief official of any other defence component or Agency has the 
                                                 
1103 Total spend for FY 2012 was $366,020,420,809. For a statistical breakdown of contract spend see 
<http://www.usaspending.gov/index.php?typeofview=detailsummary&overridecook=yes&carryfilters=on&q=node
%2F3&maj_contracting_agency=9700&maj_contracting_agency_name=Department+of+Defense&fiscal_year=20
12&tab=By+Agency> accessed 20 September 2013 
1104 Feldman, Government Contract Guidebook (n 1083) § 2:16  
1105 ibid 
1106 ibid 
1107 For example, the DLA provides consumable supply items and logistics services common to the military 
departments. Separate DLA supply centres exist for the handling of items associated with construction, 
electronics, fuels, general supplies, personnel support supplies, and industrial supplies. The DCAA, formerly a 
branch of DLA but now a separate agency, provides contract administration and support services for the DoD. 
See Feldman, Government Contract Guidebook (n 1083) § 2:16 
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authority and responsibility to contract for authorized supplies and services.1108 The 
Agency Head may also establish contracting activities and delegate broad authority 
to manage the Agency’s contracting functions to Heads of such contracting 
activities. 1109  Individual contracting offices within a contracting activity award or 
execute a contract and perform post-award functions. 
 
The Defence Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office (“DPAP”) is responsible for 
all acquisition and procurement policy matters in the DoD.1110 The DPAP Contract 
Policy and International Contracting Directorate (“CPIC”) is the focal point for 
developing and improving acquisition policies.1111 As will be discussed in Chapter 11, 
DPAP has an international contracting staff assigned to deal with matters of U.S. 
foreign acquisition law.1112 
 
3.2. Executive and Legislative Oversight of Federal Procurement  
 
In addition to the promulgation of the FAR and Agency specific supplements, the 
Executive branch may exercise further control over the procurement process through 
the issuance of additional regulations. 1113  Executive Orders issued by the 
                                                 
1108 For a useful overview of defence acquisition generally, see M Schwartz, Defense Acquisitions: How DOD 
Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process (Congressional Research Service) January 
2013 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34026.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1109 See FAR 1.601(a). DoD contracting activities are listed in the definition of “contracting activity” in DFARS 
202.101 
1110 DPAP serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics and the Defense Acquisition Board on acquisition/procurement strategies for all major weapon systems 
programmes, major automated information systems programmes, and services acquisitions. The DPAP website 
provides a useful overview of U.S. federal defence procurement and acquisition policy, see 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/> accessed 20 September 2013 
1111 For more information, see <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/> accessed 20 September 2013 
1112 For more information, see <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/about.html> accessed 20 September 2013 
1113 See generally, J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 58-
62 
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President,1114 OMB Circulars and OFPP Policy Letters deal with matters having 
broad application throughout the Executive Branch. These regulations may be 
published to implement statutes or may be based on Executive branch policies.  
Further, certain agencies are increasingly using guidance documents which are not 
issued following the rules governing the issuance of formal regulations.1115 A prime 
example in this regard is the DoD PGI identified above. It has been suggested that 
documents of this kind are unlikely to be given the legal status of formal 
regulations.1116 
 
In addition, the Inspector General Act of 1978 1117  established the authority of 
Inspectors General in a number of departments and agencies which include the 
DoD.1118 The Inspectors General have broad investigatory powers which are required 
to be exercised without agency influence.1119 Generally, Inspector Generals have 
played a significant role in auditing and investigating the effectiveness of the 
procurement activities of executive agencies.1120 
 
                                                 
1114 An example is Executive Order 12526, The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 
July 15, 1985. The Commission was established to analyse and improve defense management practices, 
specifically including acquisition 
1115 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 59 
1116 For a discussion in this regard see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055)  60-61  
1117  5 U.S.C. App. §2 
1118 A list of covered departments and agencies can be found at 5 U.S.C. App. § 11. The primary duties and 
responsibilities of the Inspectors General are set out at 5 U.S.C. App. §4(a). For a discussion in this regard, see J 
Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 62-64 
1119 In accordance with 5 U.S.C. App. § 3(a), Inspectors General may conduct investigations when they consider 
necessary or desirable with access to all agency programme and operation records (5 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1)). This 
includes power to issue subpoenas to obtain relevant evidence (5 U.S.C. App. §6(a)(4)). In addition, the 
Inspectors General must submit a semi-annual report to the relevant Head of the Agency who is, in turn, required 
to submit the report to the appropriate Congressional committee (5 U.S.C. App. § 5(a)). Limitations on the scope 
of the DoD Inspector General’s investigative and reporting roles for classified and other sensitive matters are 
contained in 5 U.S.C. App. §8 
1120 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055)  65 citing, inter 
alia, DoD IG Rep’t D-2004-015, Contracts for Professional, Administrative and Management Support Services 
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Whilst Congress exercises considerable control over procurement through its 
appropriation and authorization powers, Congress enables continuing oversight in at 
least two other significant respects. Firstly, the Budget and Accounting Act of 
19211121 established the General Accounting Office (now General Accountability 
Office1122) and Comptroller General under whose control and direction the GAO 
functions.1123 As will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11, the GAO and Comptroller 
General have assumed particular prominence in the oversight of defence 
procurement. Currently, the GAO audits government Agencies and their contractors, 
decides so-called contract award “controversies” and other procurement-related 
disputes, settles government financial accounts and prescribes Executive Agency 
accounting principles.1124 Again, the GAO has a number of powers at its disposal in 
the performance of its audit function.1125 In exercising its powers, the GAO regularly 
issues audit reports evaluating various Agencies’ implementation of the procurement 
process and recommending improvements.1126 As will be discussed in Chapters 10 
and 11, the GAO has monitored the use of CICA exceptions, domestic source 
restrictions, the implementation of the RDP MOU’s, International collaborations, 
export processes, licensing exceptions and ITAR waivers. Importantly, CICA also 
conferred power on the GAO to make recommendations on award controversies and 
                                                 
1121 42 Stat. 20  
1122 Effective July 7, 2004, the GAO changed its name from the “General Accounting Office” to the “Government 
Accountability Office” to better reflect its expanding competences. See GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811  
1123  The Comptroller General is appointed by the President for a single 15 year term, with some qualifications. 
See 31 U.S.C.A. § 703(b). For commentary, see Feldman, Government Contract Guidebook (n 1083) § 2:5 
1124 For commentary on the GAO’s functions, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 67 
1125 GAO has access to all government records and each Agency is required to supply information GAO requires 
(31 U.S.C. § 716). This statute also grants GAO subpoena power to compel the production of documents. In 
addition, GAO has the right to audit directly the pertinent books and records of contractors that are awarded 
negotiated contracts (10 U.S.C. § 2313(B) and 41 U.S.C. § 4706(d)). J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 67  
1126 For a list of examples of GAO Reports relating to defence acquisition, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R 
Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 67 
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to require agencies to stay a procurement until a protest has been decided.1127  
Secondly, Congress exercises additional oversight through the investigations and 
hearings of its committees. An example relevant to defence is the Armed Services 
Committee of the Senate and House.1128  
 
4. Review under U.S. Federal Procurement Law 
 
Whilst the Commission and CJEU have competence, respectively, to investigate and 
enforce EU procurement rules, there is no specifically designated EU procurement 
review institution under the EU procurement Directives comparable to an 
administrative review board, tribunal or court. The Public Sector and Utilities 
Directives provide for separate Directives on remedies which permit aggrieved 
tenderers to initiate proceedings against contracting entities within national courts 
and review bodies.1129 In contrast, whilst the Defence Procurement Directive contains 
specific provisions on review procedures, 1130  there is no separate remedies 
Directive.1131 To this extent, EU procurement law must be enforced through national 
                                                 
1127 In Ameron Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3rd Cir. 1986), CICA was held not to 
violate the U.S. Constitution because the protest procedure neither gives GAO executive power nor “interferes 
impermissibly with the Executive’s performance of its procurement duties”. See Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R 
Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 68 
1128  Whilst such Committees do not establish binding rules, Agencies generally accord them respect in 
formulating contracting policies. These Committees also supplement the GAO’s activities. The Committees have 
responsibility for reviewing GAO reports, making recommendations to Congress and conducting their own studies 
of government procurement projects. Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 65 
1129 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in 
the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors [1992] OJ L 76/14 as amended by Directive 
2007/66/EC [2007] OJ L335/31; Council Directive 89/664/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the coordination of the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of 
public supply and public works contracts [1989] OJ L 395/31 as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC [2007] OJ 
L335/31. For commentary on these provisions, see C H Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case Law and Regulation 
(n 883) 402-444; S Treumer and F Lichère (eds.), Enforcement of the EU Public Procurement Rules 
(Copenhagen: Djøf Publishing, 2011) 299–328 
1130 See Title IV, Articles 55-64 
1131 For a discussion in this regard, see Trybus, ‘The hidden Remedies Directive’ (n 564)  
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courts and recognized review bodies in the first instance. It is recalled from Chapter 4 
that the idiosyncratic features of each national legal system may variably impact 
upon the extent to which U.S. companies may seek effective judicial redress.1132 
 
By contrast, the U.S. has an extensive review system.1133 It is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to engage a full analysis of the operation of the U.S. review and remedies 
system with regard to foreign contractors. To date, existing studies and reports have 
not focused extensively on this aspect of foreign treatment. However, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 9, Section 3, even a cursory analysis of the GAO bid protest 
mechanism provides interesting insights which could provide the basis for further 
research. This Section simply provides an explanatory overview of the review and 
remedies system in context. 
 
There are currently three main institutions concerned in the review of procurement: 
the procuring Agencies, the Comptroller General (head of the GAO) and the Court of 
Federal Claims. Recourse to the boards of contracts appeals and district courts are 
possible; however, these generally lack the necessary jurisdiction.1134  
 
In the first instance, all Agencies provide administrative procedures for resolving bid 
protests.1135 The Agency protest procedure is regulated by the FAR and is based on 
guidance modelled on GAO protest procedures.1136 The FAR is not clear on the 
                                                 
1132 See Chapter 4, Section 3 
1133 For a useful overview, see F J Lees, ‘Resolving differences: protests and disputes’ (2002) 2 PPLR 138 
1134 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1673-1674 
1135 For commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 
1055) 1681-1685 
1136 ibid 1683 
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standards of review that will be used.1137 The formal Agency protest procedure is 
considered broadly comparable to an assessment of whether the actions of the 
contracting Agency are “reasonable”, as that concept is construed by the GAO and 
courts.1138 If a protest is brought to the Head of an Agency using the FAR Agency 
protest procedure, the Agency can take any action that could have been 
recommended by GAO.1139  This can include payment of appropriate costs and 
reimbursement of Government costs by the awardee where a protest is 
sustained. 1140  In addition, Agencies can designate Ombudsman and alternative 
dispute resolution.1141 The DPAP has a designated Ombudsman whose functions 
include dealing with foreign contractors who consider that they have been unfairly 
excluded from a procurement. Importantly, however, as will be discussed in Chapter 
11, Section 4.6.2, it is difficult to discern the adequacy and effectiveness of this form 
of redress. 
 
An alternative means of redress is the GAO which has statutory authority to hear bid 
protests.1142 Whilst bid protests have generally been in decline in the U.S,1143 the 
GAO continues to be the most widely used forum in light of its expertise and relative 
inexpense compared to full judicial proceedings. On receipt of a protest, an Agency 
                                                 
1137 Ibid 1685-6 
1138 FAR 33.103(d). For commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 1683-4 
1139 FAR 33.102(b). For commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 1686-1687 
1140 FAR 33.102(b)(2) and (3) 
1141 For a useful overview of the use of federal Ombudsman, see W R Ginsberg and F M Kaiser, ‘Federal 
Complaint-Handling, Ombudsman, and Advocacy Offices’, Congressional Research Services, 24 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34606.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1142 31 U.S.C. § 3551. For extensive commentary on the GAO’s jurisdiction and procedural requirements relating 
to a GAO application, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 
1688-1717 
1143 For a useful discussion of the reasons explicating possible trends, see S L Schooner, ‘Pondering the decline 
of federal government contract litigation in the United States’ (1999) 5 PPLR 242 
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can either take corrective action1144  or defend the protest.1145  The GAO review 
process permits the possibility of a hearing on its own initiative or at the request of 
one of the parties and can include the oral examination of witnesses.1146 With regard 
to the standard of review applied, as an administrative protest body, the GAO is not 
permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the Agency.1147 The GAO will review 
an Agency’s action to determine if it “complies with statute or regulation.” 1148 
According to this standard, a protester must establish that the Agency has 
prejudicially violated a statute or regulation or has taken a discretionary action 
without a rational basis. 1149  It has been observed that the GAO has provided 
Agencies with a considerable degree of latitude in applying the rational basis 
standard.1150 This appears to incorporate an assessment of the “reasonableness” of 
the Agency’s determination.1151 In terms of prejudice, the protester must establish 
that but for the Agency’s actions, it would have had a substantial chance of receiving 
the award.1152 As will be discussed in Chapter 9, Section 3.3, recent reports on GAO 
bid protests have provided useful insights into reviews of protests involving major 
acquisitions, certain of which are of potential significance to foreign contractors. 
 
                                                 
1144 For a discussion of this option, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 1717-1720 
1145 For a discussion of this option, see ibid,1721-1724 
1146 ibid 1728-1729 
1147 Unisys Corp v. Department of the Air Force, GSBCA 13119-P, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27, 622, rev’d, 98 F 3.d 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 
1732-1733 
1148 31 U.S.C. §3554(b)(1) 
1149 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1732 
1150 ibid 
1151 The Boeing Co., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-311344, 2008 CPD ¶ 144 
1152 Armorworks Enters., LLC, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-400394.3, 2009 ¶ 79 cited in  J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C 
R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1735. For a discussion of this requirement, see 1735-
1740 
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In terms of remedies, the GAO can make recommendations to an Agency. The GAO 
does not have authority to require any Agency to take action; however, Agencies 
rarely fail to follow these recommendations.1153 The GAO can also recommend that 
the Agency: refrain from exercising any option under the contract; re-compete the 
contract; issue a new solicitation or terminate the contract; and award a legitimate 
contract.1154 The GAO can also permit recovery of protest costs and bid costs but 
prohibits anticipated profits.1155  
 
Finally, the Court of Federal Claims has confirmed jurisdiction to hear procurement 
protests.1156 However, the GAO is generally perceived to be the most popular bid-
protest forum, not least because it reaches decisions faster than the Court of Federal 
Claims and at substantially lower cost.1157  
 
To date, there is no consolidated evidence or analysis that is able to provide an 
indication of the extent to which foreign contractors seek redress through the U.S. 
procurement review system, nor the treatment of disputes involving foreign 
contractors. Foreign contractors are unlikely to pursue formal bid protest 
mechanisms independently for a host of reasons. Notwithstanding, there are 
instances in which U.S. subsidiaries of European firms will seek to access the U.S 
review system. As indicated, whilst existing studies have focused on issues of access 
                                                 
1153 For commentary in this regard, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 1740 and cases cited therein 
1154 31 U.S.C. §3554(b)(1). For commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 1741-1743 
1155 Baker Servs. Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-256192.3, 95-1 CPD ¶ 75 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R 
Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1743. For commentary, see 1743-1753 
1156 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). For commentary on jurisdiction, standing, procedures and standard of review, see J 
Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1762-1790 
1157 R S Metzger and D A Lyons, ‘A Critical Reassessment of the GAO Bid-Protest Mechanism’ (2007) Wis. L. 
Rev 1225 
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and treatment with regard to contract awards, the issue of review and remedies has 
not been the subject of any examination. As will be discussed in Chapter 11, Section 
4.6, U.S. legal commentary has placed particular emphasis on the potential role and 
importance of effective review and remedies provisions in the reform of transatlantic 
defence procurement. To this extent, this aspect ought to be accorded sufficient 
priority in future research on transatlantic defence procurement issues. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is apposite to revisit the observation of one U.S. commentator in Chapter 1 that the 
legal regimes governing public contract formation often erect “a dense, twisted web 
of rules, which may impede (and frequently intimidates) potential foreign 
entrants”.1158 Whilst certain larger foreign defence firms may be equipped with the 
resources and expertise to navigate the U.S. acquisition system, studies have 
identified its sheer complexity as a major obstacle to foreign market penetration, 
especially for medium and small firms, in particular in terms of the need to employ 
specialized personnel.1159 
 
The following Chapters will provide only the most provisional assessment of certain 
of the core statutory and regulatory requirements which govern federal defence 
procurement law. It must be recognized that it cannot be presumed that there is 
uniformity of attitudes, approaches and practices between DoD components in terms 
of their treatment of foreign competition through the decentralized application of U.S. 
                                                 
1158 Yukins and Schooner, ‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to A Global Procurement Market’ (n 29), 
530 
1159 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 627 and 654 
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laws and policies. To this extent, any and all conclusions drawn on the basis of 
available evidence recognize the necessary limitations of observation. 
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9 
Full and Open Competition under U.S. Federal 
Procurement Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is recalled that the Competition in Contracting Act 1984 (“CICA”) prescribes “full 
and open competition”, “full and open competition after exclusion of sources” and 
“other than full and open competition”. It has been suggested that current U.S. 
procurement rules encourage the consideration of foreign participation and make it 
more difficult than in the past to avoid open and competitive bidding on defence 
contracts, in particular, because specific written justifications are required to limit 
sources.1160 However, it has also been identified that statutory exceptions to full and 
open competition effectively provide programme managers with relatively broad 
discretionary authority to exclude foreign participation on a range of grounds.1161  
 
Before examining these exceptions, it is first necessary to examine the extent to 
which CICA enables full and open competition (including after the exclusion of certain 
sources) with regard to foreign contractors. This Chapter begins with a contextual 
overview of competition rates within the U.S. based on available evidence. Having 
placed the issue of foreign competition in context, the Chapter examines the extent to 
which foreign competition is affected even within the ostensible circumstance of full 
                                                 
1160 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 663 
1161 ibid 662-3 
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and open competition. Finally, the Chapter examines the extent to which industrial 
mobilization and small business set asides provide a statutory basis for exclusion of 
foreign competition through the CICA exclusions. 
 
2. Competition in U.S. Federal Defence Procurement 
 
Before conducting a more detailed legal analysis, it is important to identify the 
evidential limitations of existing data. At the outset it should be observed that most 
official sources and studies do not specifically define “foreign competition” in a way 
that differentiates nationality according to the basis of establishment, the use of 
subsidiaries or, more generally, between competition from the EU and other foreign 
competition. 
 
2.1. Competition in Federal Procurement: General Depiction of Recent Trends 
 
In light of the emphasis placed on accountability in public spend in the U.S., U.S. law 
specifically requires evidence to be obtained and reviewed regarding the level of 
“competition” (broadly construed) that is achieved in procurement.1162 
 
2.1.1. Federal Procurement Competition Rates 
 
In a recent 2013 Report, the GAO identifies that the competition rate for all contract 
obligations has generally declined from 62.6% in 2008 to 57.1% in 2012.1163 In 2012, 
                                                 
1162 As indicated in Chapter 8, Section 3.2, this is largely attributable to the influence and oversight exercised by 
Congress in the procurement process. See also Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 663  
1163 Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase Competition GAO-13-
325 (Washington D.C. March 2013) <http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653404.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013, 
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the DoD obligated $205.3 billion on competitive awards from a total of $359.7 billion 
for all contract obligations.1164 This decline appears to be broadly consistent with the 
findings of other studies. 1165  According to the Fortresses and Icebergs Study, 
between 2006-2008, only 13% ($34.4 billion) of major programme awards were 
made through “open and competitive” procurement; 22% ($60.3 billion) were offered 
through “limited” competition, which the Study identifies as not open to foreign 
participation; 5% ($15 billion) involved international cooperative programmes; and the 
remaining 60% ($163 million) were awarded on a sole source basis.1166 
 
Whilst the DoD does not systematically identify, track, and consider the specific 
factors that are affecting competition when setting its annual competition goals, the 
GAO Report identifies three principal factors which appear to be affecting the DoD’s 
competition rate. 1167  The first concerns reliance on an original equipment 
manufacturer throughout the lifecycle of a programme because of a previous 
decision not to purchase proprietary technical data.1168 The second concerns the 
general uncertainty of the budget environment resulting in continued non-competitive 
awards to maintain existing equipment as opposed to planning new awards for new 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 citing at 9 Figure 1: DoD ‘Competition Rate for All Contract Obligations from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012’ 
(source: GAO analysis of Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation (“FPDS-NG”) data) 
1164 ibid 
1165  This corresponds with the findings of the Fortresses and Icebergs study. According to the latter, 
approximately 62% by value of all DoD prime contracts were awarded competitively in 2006. See Fortresses and 
Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 658, Table 75 ‘Competition in U.S. Defense Contract Awards, Fiscal Year 2006’ based on 
U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of Procurement Awards – October 2005 - September 2006 
1166 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 658, Figure 146 (source: Documental Solutions, 2006-2008) 
1167 Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase Competition (n 1163) 
13  
1168 ibid 13-14 
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equipment.1169 The third concerns the amount of non-competitive foreign military 
sales that are awarded.1170  
 
2.2. Foreign Competition in Federal Procurement: General Depiction of Trends 
 
According to the Fortresses and Icebergs Study, whilst U.S. law, policy and practice 
emphasise competition in defence contracts as the norm as opposed to the 
exception, the DoD has, to a large degree, precluded foreign participation in the 
competitive process, especially at the prime level.1171 In particular, the Study states 
that the reality is that the U.S. market has been “competitive but not that “open”” but 
suggests that an increasing number of programmes are now open to foreign 
competition.1172 The Study states that available data confirms this reality.1173 The 
Study identifies that a high percentage of spending flows to a small number of large 
defence firms (approximately 69% of major programme contracts), a fact which the 
Study also attributes to the high percentage spend on legacy programmes and the 
post-Cold War consolidation of the market to a few select primes.1174 
 
According to the latest DoD Report to Congress on purchases from foreign entities, 
DoD procurement actions recorded for Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2011 totalled approximately 
                                                 
1169 ibid 14 citing at fn 15 United States Government Accountability Office, Continuing Resolutions: Uncertainty, 
Limited Management Options and Increased Workload in Selected Agencies GAO-13-325 (Washington D.C. 
March 2013) <http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/295970.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1170 Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting: Actions Needed to Increase Competition (n 1163) 
15 
1171 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 658 
1172 ibid 
1173 ibid 
1174 According to the Study, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin gained approximately 57% of all 
major programme awards. If General Dynamics’ awards (approximately 12% of the market) are included, the DoD 
awards 69% of its major programme contracts to four firms. See Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 660-661 
citing Figure 150 (source: Documental Solutions) 
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$374 billion.1175 Of that amount, approximately, $24 billion, or 6.4% was expended on 
purchases from foreign entities.1176 The Report indicates that defence equipment 
constitutes approximately 18% of the purchases from foreign entities.1177 The Report 
separately indicates the dollar value of items for which the Buy American Act was 
waived pursuant, inter alia, to an RDP.1178 The findings will be discussed in Chapter 
11, Section 4.7. 
 
2.2.1. Exclusions of Foreign Competition: Limited Competition and Sole Sourcing 
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study states that with regard to the data on more 
recently initiated programmes, 86% ($53 billion) were awarded competitively “in 
some manner”, although the Study observes that only 45% were open to foreign 
competition. 1179  Further, approximately 32% of new purchases were awarded 
through “limited” rather than open competition which the Study identifies as excluding 
foreign participation.1180 The Study identifies that as a result of limited competition 
and sole source buying, approximately 52% of programme dollars were not 
accessible to foreign competitors. 1181  The remaining 6% were awarded on 
cooperative programmes which also included some foreign participation.1182  
 
                                                 
1175 Report to Congress on Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Purchases from Foreign Entities, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2. The Report was prepared Pursuant to section 
827 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L104-201), as amended, and section 
8028(b) of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10) 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/cp/docs/DoD_FY_2011_Purchases_from_Foreign_Entities_(Authorization_Ma
y_10,_2012).pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1176 ibid. According to the report, the $24 billion covers military hardware, subsistence, fuel, construction, 
services and other miscellaneous items that are for use outside the United States 
1177 ibid 
1178 ibid  
1179 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n12) 660-661 citing Figure 149 (source: Documental Solutions) 
1180 Ibid 661 citing Figure 149 (source: Documental Solutions) 
1181 ibid 
1182 ibid 
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2.2.2. DoD Prime Contracts for Defence Items and Components 
 
According to one U.S. Report based on an assessment of DoD prime contracts 
valued at over $25,000 for defence items and components exclusively, in FY 2008, 
the DoD awarded contracts to foreign suppliers for defence items and components 
totaling approximately $3.15 billion.1183 This constitutes less than 1% of all DoD 
contracts and only approximately 1.8% of all DoD contracts for defense items and 
components.1184 Resultantly, the Report indicates that the DoD procures very few 
defence items and components from foreign suppliers.1185 Further, the DoD employs 
foreign contractors and subcontractors “judiciously” and “in a manner consistent with 
national security requirements”.1186 Notwithstanding these findings, the same Report 
reiterates that the DoD is not acquiring military material produced oversees to the 
detriment of U.S. national security or its defence industrial base, that focused 
analyses have shown that the DoD employs a small number of non-U.S. suppliers 
and that the use of those suppliers does not negatively impact the long-term viability 
of the national technological industrial base.1187 Finally, the Report indicates that 
there has been no difference in “reliability” between the DoD’s U.S. and non-U.S. 
suppliers.1188 In particular, the Report identifies that in order for there to be a foreign 
“vulnerability” there must a “significant, credible and unacceptable risk of supply 
                                                 
1183 Foreign Sources of Supply FY 2008 Report, Annual Report of United States Defense Industrial Base 
Capabilities and Acquisitions of Defense Items and Components Outside the United States, Report Required by 
Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136), as amended by 
Section 841 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), 
October 2009, Executive Summary, ii 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/docs/Foreign_Sources_of_Supply_812_Report_to_Congress_(FY08).pdf.> 
accessed 20 September 2013 
1184 ibid 
1185 ibid 
1186 ibid  
1187 ibid 4  
1188 ibid  
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disruption due to political intervention by the host country”.1189 The Report continues 
that the U.S. is not presently aware of any foreign vulnerabilities within its supply 
chains, although it has been observed that the DoD does not have complete visibility 
of its supplier base.1190  
 
2.2.3. Foreign Competition at Sub-Contract Level  
 
Based on a sample of 232 major U.S. RDT&E procurements (exceeding $100 million 
dollars) the findings of the Fortresses and Icebergs Study indicate that foreign 
participation appeared to be almost exclusively European but which was also limited 
to the position of suppliers to a U.S. prime contractor.1191  
 
With regard to subcontracts, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study indicates that whilst 
little data is available on the degree of competition in subcontract awards, there is a 
“fair degree of competition”.1192 At the sub-tier level, the Study identifies that the DoD 
has increasingly devolved responsibility to the prime contractor in sub-tier 
selections.1193 It also indicates that the pressure on primes to focus on best value 
and the need to consider foreign products where more affordable or capable should 
                                                 
1189 The Report states that DoD dependence on foreign suppliers for certain items does not equate to foreign 
vulnerability in the same way that dependency on reliable domestic suppliers does not result in vulnerability. In 
this regard, the Report cites DoD Handbook 5000.60 H Assessing Defense Industrial Capabilities in its 
assessment of “foreign dependency” and identifies at 4-5 instances in which foreign sources may constitute 
“unacceptable foreign vulnerability”. See Foreign Sources of Supply FY 2008 Report, Annual Report of United 
States Defense Industrial Base Capabilities and Acquisitions of Defense Items and Components Outside the 
United States (n 1183) 4 
1190 ibid 5 
1191 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 664-665, Table 76: ‘Top U.S. Defense Programs, 2006-2008 
(Millions of Dollars - $)’ (source: Documental Solutions). Of the 51 programmes listed, only three involved a 
European supplier to a U.S. prime contractor on a contract awarded under competition 
1192 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 662. The Study indicates that DoD policies, while not always easy to 
enforce, are intended to dissuade non-competitive vertical sub-tier solutions in favour of best value, competed 
solutions even where the prime holds a capable business unit in-house 
1193 ibid 670 
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mean that the market is more open to foreign competition.1194 However, the Study 
also identifies that primes recognize the difficulties in dealing with foreign contractors 
including problems associated with obtaining ITAR licences.1195 On this basis, it has 
been suggested that primes only tend to seek foreign sources where domestic 
sources are unavailable or are uneconomic.1196 
 
In 2004, the DoD published a Study on the impact of foreign sourcing of systems.1197 
The Study evaluated twelve programmes focusing on first, second and third tier 
subcontractors.1198 It concluded that foreign suppliers provide limited amounts of 
materiel for the systems and that using those foreign subcontractors does not impact 
long-term military readiness or the economic viability of the U.S. technology and 
industrial base. 1199  For the systems studied, foreign subcontracts collectively 
represented approximately 4% of the total contract value.1200 
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study suggests that how the data is viewed is a matter 
of perspective.1201 The Study indicates that the fact that historically 45% of new 
procurements are open to foreign competition is “somewhat remarkable” given a 
legacy of relatively closed markets. 1202  It also observes that there remains a 
significant portion of the market off-limits but qualifies this observation on the grounds 
                                                 
1194 ibid 
1195 ibid. For a discussion of ITAR, see Chapter 5, Sections 4 and 6.3.2 
1196 Fortresses and Icebergs: Vol. II (n 12) 670 
1197 See Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, Study on Impact of Foreign 
Sourcing of Systems, January 2004, Executive Summary, iv-vi. The Study follows the 2001 Study on Impact of 
Foreign Sourcing of Systems mandated by section 831 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2001 <http://www.acq.osd.mil/mibp/docs/study_impact_foreign_sourcing_of_systems.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2013 
1198 ibid iv 
1199 ibid v 
1200 ibid iv 
1201 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 670 
1202 ibid 
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that some of the market is off limits for “legitimate security-related reasons”.1203 
Whilst not entirely unequivocal, the Study suggests that the latter is attributable, at 
least in part, to the use of the CICA exclusions and exceptions, the content and use 
of which will be examined in Section 4 below and Chapter 10.  
 
3. Full And Open Competition 
 
According to CICA, the Agency Head must obtain “full and open competition” and 
use the competitive procedure or combination of procedures best suited under the 
circumstances.1204 Full and open competition is to be used unless circumstances 
exist that would permit non-competitive procedures.1205 In addition, FAR Part 34 
(supplemented by DFARS Part 234) contains a designated policy on major 
system1206 acquisition, according to which a programme manager must promote full 
and open competition throughout the acquisition process, as it is economically 
beneficial and practicable to do so.1207 More specifically, it provides that foreign 
contractors, technology, and equipment may be considered when it is “feasible and 
permissible to do so”.1208  
 
                                                 
1203 ibid 
1204 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)(A) and (b) & 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A)  
1205 ibid 
1206 According to DFARS Subpart 234.70, “major weapon system” means: a weapon system acquired pursuant 
to a major defense acquisition program, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2430 to be a program that— (1) Is not a highly 
sensitive classified program, as determined by the Secretary of Defense; and (2)  Is designated by the Secretary 
of Defense as a major defense acquisition program; or (3)  Is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an 
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than $300,000,000 (based on 
fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) or an eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than $1,800,000,000 
(based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) 
1207 This includes a requirement to promote full and open competition and sustain effective competition between 
alternative major system concepts and sources. See FAR 34.005-1(a). This is consistent with OMB Circular A-
109 Major System Acquisitions, April 5, 1976 
1208 ibid 
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“Full and open competition” is achieved when all “responsible” 1209  sources are 
permitted to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals. 1210  “Responsibility” is 
broadly equivalent to a determination that qualitative selection requirements are met 
under the EU procurement Directives.1211 
 
There are several main procedures which are deemed to constitute “competitive 
procedures”. 1212  The first is sealed bidding which is broadly equivalent to the open 
procedure under the EU procurement Directives.1213  The introduction of CICA in 
1984 ended the formal preference for sealed bidding by equalising use of competitive 
negotiation in fulfilment of statutory competition requirements.1214 The second is 
competitive proposals which are broadly equivalent to negotiated and competitive 
dialogue procedures under the EU Directives. 1215  Finally, CICA provides for a 
                                                 
1209 A responsible source is a prospective contractor who: (1) has adequate financial resources to perform the 
contract, or the ability to acquire such resources; (2) is able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or 
performance schedule; (3) has a satisfactory performance record; (4) has a satisfactory record of integrity and 
business ethics; (5) has the necessary organization, experience, technical skills, and accounting and operational 
controls, or the ability to obtain them; (6) has the necessary production, construction, and technical equipment 
and facilities, or the ability to obtain them; and (7) is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under 
applicable laws and regulations. See 41 U.S.C. § 403(7) 
1210 41 U.S.C. § 107  
1211 For commentary on the responsibility determination, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 409-437 
1212 CICA also specifies five additional procedures that are competitive procedures meeting the statutory 
requirement for full and open competition. See 10 U.S.C. § 2302(2)(A) – (E) and 41 U.S.C. § 152. For a detailed 
discussion of these procedures, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) Chs 7 and 8  
1213 Contracting officers must use sealed bidding if: (i) time permits the solicitation, submission, and evaluation of 
sealed bids; (ii) the award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related factors; (iii) it is not necessary 
to conduct discussions with the responding sources about their bids; and (iv) there is a reasonable expectation of 
receiving more than one sealed bid. See § 2304(a)(2)(A) and 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(1). See Defense Logistics 
Agency, 67 Comp. Gen. 16 (B-227055.2), 87-2 ¶ 365, discussed in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 332-333. The requirements for sealed bidding are implemented in 
FAR Part 14 and DFARS Part 214. For a comprehensive discussion of sealed bidding, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash 
Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 501-656 
1214 It is estimated that less than 10% of federal procurement dollars are spent in sealed bid procurements. See 
J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 501 
1215 The requirements for competitive negotiation are implemented in FAR Part 15 and DFARS Part 215. For a 
detailed discussion of competitive negotiation, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 334-336, 673-995 and the accompanying text J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R 
O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 
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combination of procedures.1216 In this regard, U.S. law prescribes “two-step sealed 
bidding” (a combination of sealed bidding and competitive proposals).1217 With the 
general decline of sealed bidding and increase in negotiated procurement, two step-
sealed bidding is rarely used.1218  
 
3.1. Exclusion of Foreign Competition through Requests for Proposals 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, it is imperative to question the relation or correspondence 
between the role of legal institutions and their effects in practice. As will be discussed 
in Section 4 and Chapter 10, U.S. commentary has acknowledged the possibility for 
statutory exclusions and exceptions to restrict foreign competition. However, the 
reality is that whilst these provisions exercise a vital gate-keeping function in 
determining whether foreign competition is even admissible, beyond these basic 
legal requirements, it is not clear how any other rules and their interpretation and 
application “impact” on a tenderer that is admitted to a contract award procedure. For 
instance, there is little empirical research available which is able to shed light on how 
competitive negotiation has operated with regard to foreign contractors e.g. through 
the formulation and application of technical specifications, selection and award 
criteria. As will be discussed in Section 3.3 below, a recent review of U.S. Air Force 
acquisitions (certain of which have involved foreign competition) has highlighted not 
                                                 
1216 See 10 U.S.C. §2304(a)(1)(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 3301(a)(2) 
1217 In the first step, the Agency publishes a Request for Technical Proposals (“RFTP”). Bidders then submit one 
or more unpriced technical proposals to satisfy these requirements and discussions may be held with the offerors. 
Only those offerors who have submitted acceptable technical proposals are invited to submit step-two sealed bids 
on price. Offerors bid only on their own proposals under rules similar to sealed bidding. Award is made to the low 
responsible bidder submitting a responsive bid. For a discussion of two-step sealed bidding, see J Cibinic Jr, R C 
Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 656-672  
1218 See Feldman, Government Contract Guidebook (4th edn Federal Publications 2011) (n 1083) § 5:42 citing 
‘Two-Step Sealed Bidding: The Curse of the Responsiveness Rule’, 17 Nash & Cibinic Rep. 36 (June 2003); ‘Two 
Step Sealed Bidding: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed’, 1 Nash & Cibinic Rep. 34 (April 1987) 
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only the complexity but also considerable subjectivity of decision-making in this 
regard.1219  
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has suggested that acquisition officials also have 
the “informal ability, if not the authority”, to preclude foreign participation without the 
use of formal legal exceptions.1220 The Study indicates that there is “some credible 
history” of situations where authorities have used their discretionary authority to 
effectively precluded foreign participation at the prime contract level on a number of 
major defence programmes1221 through a variety of means, in particular through the 
specific terms of the Requests for Proposals (“RFP”) and informal guidance.1222 It 
has been stated that this has been the case even though officials have not sought 
justification under government contracting rules for these types of informal 
decisions.1223  
 
The Study indicated that the reasons for these decisions were often not well 
developed or vague.1224 Further, it was identified that these reasons probably reflect 
an “outright hostility to foreign participation” in some cases and an “undifferentiated 
mix of reasons” in other cases, of which industrial base considerations and national 
                                                 
1219 For a useful insight into the decision-making of contracting officials in two high-profile U.S. Air Force awards 
(CSAR-X and KC-X) and the GAO review of those decisions, see T Light, F Camm, M E Chenoweth, P A Lewis 
and R Rudavsky, Analysis of Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections over 
the Past Two Decades, RAND, 2012 (cited with the kind permission of RAND) 
< http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB603.html > accessed 20 September 2012; F Camm, M E 
Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests 
in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary, RAND 2012 (cited with the kind 
permission of RAND) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/DB603.html> accessed 20 September 
2013 
1220 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 666 
1221 These major programmes were not expressly identified in the Study 
1222 ibid 666 
1223  ibid. Whilst the Study does not explicitly identify such justifications, U.S. law does prescribe legal 
requirements pertaining to the use of determinations and findings (“D&F”) and formal justifications and approvals 
(“J&A”) for limiting/excluding competition. These are examined in Section 4.1.1 below and Chapter 10, Section 2 
1224 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 666 
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security were cited.1225 Importantly, the Study further suggested that these informal 
exclusions are probably the most significant barrier to the U.S. market because such 
informal exclusions are less legal or regulatory in nature than institutional, cultural 
and decentralized, in turn, making them more difficult to address.1226 The study 
reported that while there is some sense among those interviewed that they are 
encountering less of this type of conduct now as compared to five or ten years ago, it 
is nevertheless still present.1227  
 
Therefore, it is important for a thesis on legal aspects of defence procurement to 
recognize the point at which legal institutions find their limitations in the exercise of 
culturally informed political discretions and which also ought to be the subject of 
proper study by lawyers. Nevertheless, it is submitted that even acknowledging the 
inherent limitations of rules in light of the possibility for their discretionary 
interpretation and application, these observations raise a question as to whether 
legal institutions could better regulate broadly conferred discretions in the defence 
procurement context through what might be termed a “negative restraint” on their 
use.1228  
 
Returning to the discussion of how such discretionary authority has been apparently 
used through RFP requirements, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study has identified a 
                                                 
1225 ibid. As will be discussed in Section 4.1 below and Chapter 10, these reasons may provide the basis for use 
of a statutory exclusion or exception; however, even if foreign competition is not excluded through the use of one 
of the exceptions, such broader concerns may incentivise a national award even if foreign competitors are 
admitted to a competition 
1226 ibid 
1227 Ibid 
1228 By this, it is simply meant that even if, by nature, defence procurement rules have to be sufficiently broad so 
as to respect the exercise of certain competences and to give recognition to legitimate interests (on which there is 
scope for debate), these institutions could be subject to better regulated restraints on their use, either through the 
terms of the provisions themselves or through use of accountability mechanisms. As will be discussed in Chapter 
10, so called J&As may provide a sufficient but by no means adequate legal control on the exercise of discretion 
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number of ways to exclude foreign tenderers.1229  Firstly, the RFP can include 
requirements such as “no foreign personnel allowed” or “NOFORN”.1230 Secondly, it 
is possible to impose a requirement to hold a facility security clearance1231 which 
foreign firms cannot obtain unless they have a cleared U.S. subsidiary.1232 More 
generally, the Study notes that several firms observed situations where a programme 
was designated “U.S. Eyes Only” even though the matters were not classified and 
there was no legitimate basis for such restriction.1233 Thirdly, it has been suggested 
that foreign firms can also be effectively excluded through very short timelines 
between RFP release and proposal submission.1234 It has been suggested that this is 
generally not a problem for U.S. companies, whose business development 
departments maintain close contacts with sponsoring Agencies and thus know the 
general content of an RFP weeks in advance.1235 However, the situation for foreign 
companies is said to be very different not least because of their inability to maintain a 
                                                 
1229 On the rules regulating RFPs under U.S. law, see generally J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 727-749; J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, 
Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 304-360 
1230 The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (“NISPOM”),  Section 3, 9-303 defines “Not 
Releasable to Foreign Nationals” (“NOFORN”) as: “classified information that may not be released in any form to 
foreign governments, foreign nationals, foreign organizations, or non-U.S. citizens without permission of the 
originator.” See The National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, February 2006, Incorporating 
Change 1 March 28 2013, DoD 5220.22-M. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/nispom/nispom2006.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013. The National Industrial Security Program (“NISP”) was established by Executive Order (E.O.) 
12829 (reference (a)) for the protection of information classified under E.O. 13526 (reference (b)), or its successor 
or predecessor orders, and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (reference (c)). See Section 1-101  
1231  FAR 4.403 requires contracting officers to ensure that any contractor has the appropriate security 
clearances when classified information is required for contract performance. If any prospective contractors have 
not obtained clearances under the Defense Industrial Security Program, they will be unable to participate in any 
competition. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source 
Selection Process (n 1055) 185-186. This issue must be addressed in the acquisition planning process in order to 
enable contractors to become part of the programme and obtain security clearances. See ibid 186 
1232 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 667 
1233 ibid 
1234 FAR 5.203(c) requires that the response time for actions over the simplified acquisition threshold must be at 
least 30 days after the issuance of the solicitation. FAR 5.203(e) provides that for research and development 
procurements, the required waiting period for the closing date for receipt of proposals is 45 days. See According 
to J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 
1055) 363, these requirements only prescribe minimum periods and that many procuring Agencies have found 
that extending the periods increases competition 
1235 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 11) 667 
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continuous presence at U.S. military development centres.1236 In this regard, the 
Study identifies an example in which, on one large development programme, the 
U.S. lead integrator called for proposals in 30 days but that given the ITAR lead times 
involved in securing licenses, the company was effectively precluded from 
competing.1237  
 
In light of the above, it is necessary to consider how issues such as personnel 
restrictions, facility security clearances and submission timeframes are dealt with 
under the EU Defence Procurement Directive. 
 
3.1.1. No Foreign Personnel 
 
With regard to the issue of “no foreign personnel allowed”, the EU Guidance Note on 
Security of Information identifies contracts for which all staff involved in the contract’s 
execution are required to have personal security clearances and be citizens of the 
procuring Member State because security clearances of other Member States are not 
deemed sufficient.1238 According to the Guidance Note, such a ‘national eyes only’ 
condition infringes the principle of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality and 
can only be justified on the basis of Article 346 TFEU, the possibility for which is 
likely to be significantly reduced in light of the Directive.1239 Instead, the Guidance 
Note advocates either limiting national personnel requirements through a specific 
contract performance condition justified on the basis of Article 346 TFEU or award a 
                                                 
1236 ibid 
1237 ibid 
1238 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 12, point 32 
1239 ibid, 12-13. See Recital 16 of the Defence Procurement Directive and the general discussion of Article 346 
TFEU in Chapter 2. See also Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 
14, 23 
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separate contract to the main contract for those aspects requiring national 
personnel.1240 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the practicability and 
likelihood of such a proposal. However, there is at least a question as to whether 
contracting officials would, in the majority of cases, be prepared to take such 
measures to enable foreign participation, in particular, going as far as to award an 
entirely separate contract. In the absence of further empirical evidence, it is difficult to 
see whether contracting officials would, in the majority of cases, prefer to simply 
avoid foreign contractors. Notwithstanding, this approach at least aims to consider 
possible ways in which to mitigate discrimination that could result through national 
personnel requirements. 
 
3.1.2. Facility Security Clearances 
 
For the purposes of qualitative selection, Article 42(1)(j) Defence Procurement 
Directive enables a contracting authority to require evidence of the ability to process, 
store and transmit classified information at the level of protection required by the 
contracting authority.1241 Article 42(1)(j) further provides that in the absence of EU 
harmonisation of national security clearance systems, Member States may require 
that this evidence has to comply with the relevant provisions of their respective 
national laws on security clearance. 1242  According to Recital 43, it is for the 
contacting authorities or Member States to determine whether they consider security 
clearances issued in accordance with the national law of another Member State as 
equivalent. However, Article 42(1)(j) specifies that Member States must recognize 
                                                 
1240 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 13, point 32, para 2 
1241 Article 42(1)(j) para 1 
1242 Article 42(1)(j) subparagraph 2. See also Recital 68 
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security clearances which they consider equivalent to those issued under their 
national law, notwithstanding the possibility to conduct further investigations of their 
own if necessary.1243 Further, Recital 68 states that even where Member States have 
bilateral agreements or arrangements on security of information, it is possible to 
verify the capacities of economic operators from other Member States with regard to 
security of information. In particular, such verification can normally be performed by 
the designated authority of the Member State in which the economic operator is 
located.1244 In this regard, Article 42(1)(j) also provides that the contracting authority 
may ask the designated authority of the candidate’s Member State to undertake 
relevant checks.1245 Such verification should be carried out in accordance with the 
principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment and proportionality. 1246  Finally, 
Article 42(1)(j) provides that a contracting authority may grant candidates which do 
not yet hold security clearances additional time to obtain them.1247 In particular, the 
Guidance Note emphasises that contracting authorities should make use of this 
possibility wherever possible in order to broader the supply base to include non-
established operators.1248 
 
To this extent, a Member State is able to continue to legitimately require an operator 
to otain a facility security clearance where it does not deem an existing clearance 
                                                 
1243 Article 42(1)(j) subparagraph 2 and Recital 68. As the Guidance Note, Security of Information, 4, point 12, 
para 1 observes: “[i]n many cases, Member States have bilateral security agreements or arrangements 
concerning the equivalence of security classifications and security requirements, such as security clearances for a 
company’s facilities or personnel. In such cases, contracting authorities/entities shall accept security clearances 
granted by National/Designated Security Authorities of another Member State as evidence of a candidate’s 
capacity to ensure the security of classified information in accordance with national security laws and regulations 
and the bilateral agreements or arrangements.” For commentary on this provision, see Trybus, ‘The tailor-made 
EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 24 
1244 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 5, point 12, para 2 
1245 Article 42(1)(j) 
1246 Recital 68 
1247 Article 42(1)(j) subparagraph 3 
1248 Guidance Note, Security of Information, 5-6, point 12, para 3 
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issued by another Member State to be equivalent. However, the Directive 
nevertheless emphasises the primary importance of assessing evidence in order to 
determine equivalence, recognition of equivalence where this is possible and the 
need to enable sufficient time to obtain clearances for new market entrants, although 
it is observed that the Directive does not specify a time limit for obtaining a security 
clearance in this regard.  
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has identified the possibility of the Directive’s 
provisions on security of information to generate a risk of potential discrimination 
against U.S. contractors on two grounds.1249 The first is if an EU information security 
arrangement1250 is established which could be utilised as a discriminator by national 
source selection authorities in grading bids. 1251  The second is that even if no 
arrangement is established, the Directive affords significant discretion to the national 
authorities because the Directive requires compliance with national provisions on 
security clearances, which could be used to discriminate against foreign bidders or 
their subcontractors whether from the EU or third countries.1252  
 
However, as the Study itself acknowledges, one would expect U.S. firms to be able 
to satisfy security of information requirements given their experience in meeting DoD 
requirements as well as the existence of bilateral security arrangements between the 
                                                 
1249 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 224. 
1250 See Recital 9 which states: “[…] an [sic] Union-wide regime on security of information, including the mutual 
recognition of national security clearances and allowing the exchange of classified information between 
contracting authorities/entities and European companies, would be particularly useful. At the same time, Member 
States should take concrete measures to improve security of supply between them aiming at the progressive 
establishment of a system of appropriate guarantees.” 
1251 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 224 
1252 ibid 
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U.S. and EU countries.1253 Further, as yet, the EU has not adopted an EU-wide 
security arrangement. Even if it did, there is no suggestion that U.S. contractors 
would be less able to satisfy contracting authorities of their ability to meet these 
requirements. The Fortresses and Icebergs Study states that EU officials may seek 
to model an EU approach on the LoI FA, an initiative that is “having a real effect and 
being adopted EU wide”. 1254  Yet, as Chapter 5, Section 7.3.1 suggested, real 
questions must be asked about the effectiveness of any such initiative in practice. In 
addition, it has been questioned whether these provisions will radically alter the 
existing position with regard to the treatment of EU economic operators from other 
Member States in the absence of full mutual recognition of security clearances.1255 
 
3.1.3. Time Limits 
 
Finally, with regard to the issue of limited time between the issuance of the RFP and 
proposal submission, the Defence Procurement Directive contains a specific 
provision on time limits for receipt of requests to participate and for receipt of 
tenders. 1256  However, there does not appear to be any indication that U.S. 
companies (and more likely EU established subsidiaries) would experience particular 
difficulties in meeting such deadlines. 
 
As indicated, there is substantially no evidence or analysis examining individual EU 
Member State approaches to issues such as RFP formulation and associated 
                                                 
1253  ibid. Although, Chapter 5, Section 7.3.1 highlighted the inherent limitations of reliance on bilateral 
arrangements as providing any form of guarantee with regard to security of supply. The same observation applies 
to security of information 
1254 ibid 
1255 Trybus, ‘The tailor-made EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive’ (n 125) 23; Heuninckx, ‘Trick of 
Treat?’ (n 252) 21-22 
1256 See Article 33 
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requirements. Nevertheless, the above suggests possible ways in which to mitigate 
the potential effects of such requirements albeit that questions may be asked as to 
their utility. 
 
3.2. Exclusion through Technical Standards and Specifications 
 
It is recalled that Chapter 6 examined U.S. claims that the Defence Procurement 
Directive’s provisions on technical specifications could potentially discriminate 
against foreign contractors. It has similarly been observed in the U.S. that the 
specificity of U.S. technical standards for defence products has posed challenges for 
foreign firms, in particular, the detailed system of military specifications (“MIL-
SPECs”) and standards (“MIL-STDs”) which are detailed specifications and 
performance standards.1257 
 
Historically, the DoD used thousands of military specifications and standards in its 
procurement. 1258  According to the Fortresses and Icebergs Study, the the U.S.’ long 
association with NATO  means that U.S. military products are tied to NATO 
STANAGs where these exist; however, due to the number of product specifications 
and standards developed by the DoD beyond the STANAG level or outside their 
setting, even European products that meet STANAGs do not necessarily meet other 
                                                 
1257 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 698. For an overview of the historical development of US MIL-
SPECs, see ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 866) 
36-38  
1258 For a discussion of U.S. military specifications generally, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 368-369; J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, 
Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 166-175 
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U.S. standards that would allow them to readily compete in the transatlantic 
market.1259 
 
However, it has been observed that the possibility for standards to become trade 
barriers is mitigated to a certain extent. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 
4.5, the RDPs contain agreements concerning certification of conformity covering 
products manufactured by suppliers of the selling nation.1260 Whilst the extent of the 
use or effect of the RDP provisions in practice is not precisely clear, it has been 
suggested that this type of provision helps facilitate mutual recognition of testing and 
standards.1261 Secondly, it has been suggested that an increasing move away from 
procurement based on military standards and specifications towards a greater 
reliance on commercial standards and specifications (with recourse to military 
requirements only when necessary), as well as a commercialisation of defence 
procurement generally, may begin to mitigate their use and, by implication, their 
effect in practice.1262 A modern solicitation must describe the Agency’s needs with 
performance or non-government standards.1263 As indicated in Chapter 6, Section 
4.2 this is similarly reflected in the prescribed methods for drawing up specifications 
identified in the Defence Procurement Directive. Thirdly, in practice, the Fortresses 
and Icebergs Study did not learn of any specific situations where technical standards 
were used to protect domestic producers and markets against foreign defence 
                                                 
1259 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 697 
1260 Ibid. 
1261 ibid 
1262 ibid 698. This shift was precipitated by a DoD policy issued by the then Defense Secretary William Perry 
mandating greater use of performance and commercial specifications in place of military specifications. See The 
Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments (June 29, 1994) cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C 
R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 368; see also G M Marks and N J Fry, ‘Commercialization 
in Defense Sourcing and Other Responses to Post-Cold War Defense Industry Transformation’ (2006-2007) 38 
Geo J Int’l L 577, 610 
1263 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 369 
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products.1264 Finally, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 5, consideration has been 
given to the possibility for the screening of U.S. MIL-SPECs to ensure compatibility 
with European standardization efforts.1265 
 
Therefore, whilst the absence of detailed empirical research on the use of technical 
specifications renders it difficult to assess the precise effects on foreign competition, 
a general shift towards the use of performance and functional requirements may 
further reduce the significance of national standards. As indicated in Chapter 6, an 
important issue concerns the extent to which compatibility is achieved between 
standardization initiatives within the EU, US and NATO.  
 
3.3. KC-X Aerial Refuelling Tanker Contract 
 
As indicated above, it is not possible on the basis of available evidence to conduct an 
extensive review of competitive awards made to foreign contractors. However, a 
notable example that will be discussed in this Section concerns the 2008 KC-X aerial 
refueling tanker award. As will be discussed, the contract has attracted attention from 
U.S. and EU legal commentators. Further, it is recalled from Section 3.1 above that in 
2008 the U.S. Air Force and the Office of Secretary of Defense commissioned a 
detailed review of U.S. Air Force source selection policies and practices in large 
acquisitions.1266 The review was precipitated, in large part, by the conduct of the KC-
X contract which was a highly visible, openly competed award and which resulted in 
                                                 
1264 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 698 
1265 ‘Study into the Role of European Industry in the Development and Application of Standards’ (n 866) 38 
1266 T Light, F Camm, M E Chenoweth, P A Lewis and R Rudavsky, Analysis of Government Accountability 
Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections over the Past Two Decades, RAND, 2012; F Camm, M E 
Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests 
in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary, RAND 2012 (n 1219) 
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a sustained GAO bid protest. Whilst it is beyond the confines of this thesis to engage 
a detailed examination of the Review’s findings, these will inform the discussion 
which follows.  
 
3.3.1. Background to the Award 
 
The U.S. Air Force has an ageing tanker fleet consisting of the medium-sized KC-135 
and larger KC-10.1267 The Air Force intended to replace the older KC-135 tankers 
through its procurement of the KC-X, a contract conservatively estimated at 
approximately $35 billion in value.1268 A lease and purchase contract was overturned 
in 2004 after it was confirmed that U.S. officials had engaged in corruption.1269 In 
2007, a full competition for the contract was conducted. The solicitation provided that 
award of the contract would be on a “best value” basis, and stipulated a detailed 
evaluation scheme that identified technical and cost factors and their relative 
weights.1270 The Air Force received proposals and conducted several rounds of 
                                                 
1267 The KC-135 aircraft currently has an average age of 46 years and is the oldest combat weapon system in 
the Agency’s inventory 
1268  For a useful overview of this contract see J Gertler, ‘Air Force KC-46A Tanker Aircraft Program’ 
(Congressional Research Service) May 14 2013 < http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34398.pdf> accessed 
20 September 2013; C Bolkcom and W Knight, ‘Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Aircraft Acquisition Program’ 
(Congressional Research Service) 4 August 2008 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486067> 
accessed 20 September 2013; R O’Rourke, ‘Air Force KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress’ (Congressional Research Service) 23 October 2009 
<http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34398_20091023.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013; N Hensel, ‘Globalization 
and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base: the Competition for a New Aerial Refueling Tanker: What are the Real 
Issues?’ Business Economics, October 2008 
1269  See C R Yukins and S L Schooner, ‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public 
Procurement Market’ (n 29) 547-555. Whilst this thesis does not examine the issue of corruption, the following 
observations of the authors at 549 are pertinent: “[f]or our purposes here, the Druyun case is interesting because 
she improperly and corruptly favoured Boeing, a domestic supplier, over a foreign supplier, European Aeronautic 
Defense and Space Company (“EADS”) (footnote omitted). But it was not discrimination against a foreign supplier 
that landed Ms. Druyun in prison. Rather, it was the corruption, her personal self-dealing that triggered the 
discrimination and landed Ms. Druyun in jail. Indeed, any dicscriminatory favoritism Ms. Druyun afforded Boeing 
would have been against a backdrop of fervent domestic support for Boeing, a leading U.S. manufacturer 
(footnote omitted). What the Druyun case illustrates is that an anti-corruption legal regime – even one as strong 
as that of the United States’ – can attack only corruption, and can do little (if anything) to dissipate anti-foreign 
discrimination that can, in effect, block access to a procurement market [...]” See also J Branstetter, ‘Darleen 
Druyun: An Evolving Case Study in Corruption, Power and Procurement’ (2005) 34 Pub Cont LJ 443 
1270 For a discussion of these various requirements and their assessment by the GAO, see F Camm, M E 
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negotiations with Boeing and Northrop Grumman, both of which are U.S. owned 
companies. Boeing had previously supplied the Air Force’s needs for airborne 
refueling capacity for over 50 years. The Northrop Grumman bid was a consortium 
bid which also comprised the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company 
(“EADS”) – the parent of Airbus Industries. On February 29 2008, the Agency 
selected Northrop Grumman’s proposal. To date, the contract is the largest ever 
awarded by the US military to a supplier partially based in Europe.  
 
Certain commentators had welcomed the award as a flagship contract that could 
achieve two principal objectives. Firstly, EU legal commentary had indicated that the 
decision could have reduced concerns about alleged favouritism displayed by U.S. 
authorities for U.S. contractors as well as tempered calls for a more protectionist 
European market in response.1271 Secondly, it was suggested that the decision could 
have created a positive precedent for the development of closer transatlantic 
industrial partnerships.1272 Similarly, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study identified that 
the decision could have provided anecdotal evidence of a possible change in 
attitudes in the U.S. acquisition community, providing a “salutary prospect that a 
Transatlantic defence market could evolve” on the basis of best value rather than 
nationality or employment considerations.1273 However, Boeing filed a bid protest at 
the GAO challenging the award to Northrop Grumman on grounds that the Air Force 
did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation 
criteria identified in the solicitation.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests 
in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 65-91 
1271 See A Georgopoulos, ‘US Air Force air tanker contract: revisiting American protectionism in defence 
procurement?’ (2008) 17 PPLR, 162, 163 
1272 ibid 
1273 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol I) (n 12) 87 
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3.3.2. Bid Protest: Government Accountability Office Findings 
 
The GAO sustained Boeing’s protest, finding a number of significant errors in the Air 
Force’s technical and cost evaluation and that the Agency had conducted misleading 
and unequal discussions with Boeing.1274  
 
Firstly, the RFP did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with 
the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order 
of importance for the various technical requirements. The Agency also did not take 
into account the fact that Boeing offered to satisfy more non-mandatory technical 
"requirements" than Northrop Grumman, even though the solicitation expressly 
requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical "requirements" as 
possible.1275  
Secondly, the Air Force used the fact that Northrop Gruman proposed to exceed a 
key performance parameter objective relating to aerial refueling to a greater degree 
than Boeing. This was inconsistent with the solicitation which provided that "no 
consideration will be provided for exceeding [key performance parameter] 
                                                 
1274 Press Release, GAO Sustains Boeing Bid Protest: Agency Recommends Air Force Reopen the Bid Process, 
Washington, DC, June 18, 2008 <http://www.gao.gov/press/press-boeing2008jun18_3.html> accessed 20 
September 2013; GAO, United States Government Accountability Office, Decision in the Matter of The Boeing 
Company, File: B-311344; B-311344.3; B-311344.4; B-311344.6; B-311344.7; B-311344.8; B-311344.10; B-
311344.11, document for public release, June 18 2008 <http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2013; United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the Air and 
Land Forces Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Air Force Procurement, 
Aerial Refueling Tanker Protest, Statement of Daniel I. Gordon, Deputy General Counsel, 10 July 2008 
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08991t.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1275 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 72-74. The RAND Report observes at 
74: “[w]e make one basic observation regarding this sustainment: [c]learly, problems existed in the design and 
evaluation of the KC-X RFP, particularly in the area of requirements and the methodology for evaluating the 
proposal against them. There are three components to this problem. First, the RFP did not clearly identify key 
discriminators nor carefully restrict trade space to key discriminators. Second, the RFP used imprecise language 
on the weighting and evaluation methodology for items in the trade space. And third, the documentation provided 
by the Air Force did not clearly link specific evaluation language to the RFP […] Unfortunately, GAO and its well-
established precedents make clarity a must, as well as rigorous adherence to stated and implied evaluation 
criteria. The Air Force must take into account this basic reality when it designs and executes its RFPs.” 
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objectives."1276  
 
Thirdly, the protest record did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the Air Force’s 
determination that Northrop Grumman’s proposed tanker could refuel all current 
tanker-compatible receiver aircraft compliant with Air Force procedures in 
accordance with the solicitation.1277 
 
Fourthly, the Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing. 
The Air Force had informed Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance 
parameter objective but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this 
objective. The Air Force did not notify Boeing but continued to conduct discussions 
with Northrop Grumman concerning its satisfaction of the same requirement.1278 
                                                 
1276 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 75-77. As the RAND Report observes 
at 75-76: “[p]roposals had to meet all KPP threshold values but the RFP explicitly stated that no credit would be 
awarded for exceeding a KPP objective. The RFP laid out nine KPPs. The second KPP was fuel offload range 
which was defined using a chart equivalent to the KC-135 capabilities. The fuel offload vs. unrefueled range KPP 
threshold required equaling the fuel offload capabilities of the KC-135 at various unrefueled ranges as indicated 
on the chart. The KPP objective was merely to exceed the threshold. Both the Boeing and the Northrop 
Grumman/EADS proposals met and exceeded the threshold, and thus both also met the objective. However, the 
KC45 offload capability significantly exceeded that of the Boeing KC-767. As a result, fuel offload at unrefueled 
range ultimately became one of the most important discriminators for the Air Force. Common sense suggests that 
this should not be surprising, given the basic mission of an aerial refueling tanker. The language in the RFP failed 
to reflect this common sense interpretation […]” The RAND Report further observes at 77: “[o]ur major lesson 
from this sustained protest is that the Air Force, with all its extensive scrubbing and review of the RFP, failed to 
detect a very small but key inconsistency in the RFP language buried in a couple of sentences in totally different 
parts of the RFP […]” 
1277 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 78-80 which observes at 78: “[t]his was 
a key shortcoming, in that the number one KPP threshold requirement evaluated under the aerial refueling area of 
the key system requirement subfactor necessitated this capability. In principle, if a proposal failed to satisfy this 
KPP threshold requirement, it was automatically disqualified from the competition.”  
1278 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 81-82 which observes at 82: “[m]any 
knowledgeable observers in the Air Force and industry believed that this protest issue bordered on the frivolous. 
The Air Force argued that it was not obligated to inform Boeing of the changed rating, because this element was 
part of the trade space and, even after the change in rating, Boeing’s proposal was still ranked with a strength in 
this area, rather than having been changed to a deficiency. Second, the Air Force maintained that this error in 
ranking and subsequent change had taken place after all discussions with the offerors had been closed, so that it 
was not appropriate to hold discussions with Boeing over the change. Finally, and perhaps most important, the Air 
Force claimed that the change had absolutely no material effect on the outcome of the competition […] GAO 
countered the Air Force arguments with three basic points. First, GAO reiterated the basic point that whatever the 
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Fifthly, a solicitation requirement specified that that the offerer would plan and 
support the Agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years 
of delivery.1279 Northrop Grumman did not clearly commit to the 2 year time frame 
and on being informed stated that it would be resolved at “contract award”.1280 The 
GAO concluded that the Air Force had unreasonably determined that Northrop 
Grumman’s actions were merely an administrative oversight.1281 
 
Sixthly, during the protest, the Air Force conceded that it made a number of errors in 
evaluating military construction costs for the purposes of calculating the offeror’s 
most probable life cycle cost. On correction, Boeing would have had the lowest most 
probable life cycle cost. Further, the evaluation did not take account of the offeror’s 
specific proposals. In addition, the calculation of military construction costs based on 
a notional (hypothetical) plan was not reasonably supported.1282  
 
Finally, the Air Force improperly increased Boeing's estimated non-recurring 
                                                                                                                                                        
reason or context, the Air Force had misled Boeing and treated it unequally in this case. Second, GAO claimed 
the Air Force did reopen discussions with the offeror on other topics after RFP, so why not on this topic? Finally, 
GAO insisted that this error could have reasonably prejudiced Boeing’s proposal, since it involved the only KPP 
objective assessed in the operational utility area under the key system requirements subfactor […] GAO made it 
clear that GAO precedent clearly states that the government must scrupulously treat all offerors equally. In the 
case of this protest, the Air Force unquestionably misread GAO’s oversight policy and determination to apply strict 
interpretations of precedent.” 
1279 See GAO Press Release (n 1274) 
1280 F Camm, M E Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability 
Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 83 
1281 ibid 83 which observes that: “[a]fter reviewing this issue, GAO concluded that the organic repair requirement 
was a material requirement which had been consciously rejected by Northrop Grumman/EADS. In GAO’s 
interpretation, this behavior technically disqualified the entire Northrop Grumman/EADS proposal.” Further, the 
RAND Report indicates at 84 that in its conclusion: “[…] once again the Air Force failed to adequately document 
why Northrop Grumman’s logistics, maintenance and repair support for the KC-X was acceptable within the two-
year time frame required by the RDP […]” 
1282 See F Camm, M E Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government 
Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 
1219) 85-87 which observes at 86-87: “[…] GAO once again highlighted two basic principles. The Air Force must 
(1) follow the evaluation criteria laid out in the RFP and (2) clearly document the assumptions and approach it 
uses to calculate MILCON costs […] The second point is perhaps more surprising. By arguing that the Air Force 
must carefully and thoroughly document the methodology and key assumptions it uses in its evaluations of 
proposal costs, the GAO decision demonstrated that it will not defer to the Air Force on the sufficiency of these 
assumptions without extensive documentation.” 
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engineering costs in calculating its most probable life cycle costs to account for risk 
associated with Boeing's failure to satisfactorily explain the basis for how it priced this 
cost element, where the Agency had not found that the proposed costs for that 
element were unrealistically low.1283 In addition, the Air Force's use of a simulation 
model to determine Boeing's probable non-recurring engineering costs was 
unreasonable because the Air Force used as data inputs in the model the percentage 
of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an overall programme level and 
there was no indication that these inputs would be a reliable predictor of anticipated 
growth in Boeing's non-recurring engineering costs.1284  
 
3.3.3. Relative Significance for Transatlantic Defence Procurement 
 
After the bid protest, and prior to the subsequent re-award to Boeing, certain U.S. 
commentators argued that neither the GAO’s decision nor its underlying reasoning 
called into question the merits of non-discriminatory and competitive approaches to 
defence procurement; rather, the GAO review simply identified apparent deficiencies 
                                                 
1283 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 88-89 which observes at 88: “[i]n 
GAO’s seventh sustained ground for protest, it played an activist role we did not see in any of the sustainments 
discussed above – or in any other decision we examined over the course of this study. It sustained a ground for 
protest that even the protester had not raised in its protest. Rather, GAO originated a ground for protest of its own 
[…] It continues at 89: “[g]iven how unusual the activist stance behind this sustainment was, it is had to draw a 
clear lesson from it. Perhaps the best lesson to draw is that future protesters can raise the kind of objection that 
GAO generated itself in this sustainment. To avoid such an objection, the Air Force must comply with very strictly 
drawn procedural rules when it dollarizes risk. These rules derive from broad policy stated in FAR Parts 15.305 
and 15.404, implemented through a very pointed GAO interpretation. More broadly, for better or worse, this 
sustainment indicates that the Air Force did not fully understand or appreciate GAO precedent relevant to the 
adjustment of unrealistic cost estimates, or the full technical implications of that precedent for the interpretation of 
the FAR.” 
1284 See GAO Press Release (n 1274). For a detailed discussion of this ground, see F Camm, M E Chenoweth, 
J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 90-91 which observes at 91: [t]he 
lesson for the Air Force from the eighth sustained ground for protest is virtually the same as the sixth. The Air 
Force must thoroughly justify and document the cost-estimating methodology that it uses to assess offeror’s cost 
estimates. Without such documentation, GAO will not defer to the assumptions made by the Air Force.” 
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in the process by which the contract was initially awarded in that particular case.1285  
 
Whilst it is beyond the confines of this thesis to engage a detailed analysis of the KC-
X award, the RAND Report’s findings raise interesting issues from a legal 
perspective. The RAND report emphasises an apparent difference between the 
priority accorded by the U.S. Air Force to the “needs of the warfighter as it enforces 
federal regulations within its own acquisition system” and the GAO which “focuses on 
the regulations themselves and deliberately keeps its distance from substantive 
issues”.1286 It continues that in its reviews of bid protests, GAO sees itself as “simply 
applying legislative language to the specific facts” but that over the course of time, 
however, GAO has developed a history of decisions that it draws on as “precedents” 
which provide an “implicit set of rules”.1287 According to the Report, these rules are as 
follows: (1) Did the Agency follow the evaluation criteria in the RFP?; (2) Were the 
Agency determinations reasonable and properly documented?; (3) Did the Agency 
violate any statute or regulation?1288 The Report concludes by suggesting that with 
an “appropriate understanding of how these rules operate in any particular setting”, 
the Air Force could better design and execute source selections to avoid protests and 
make more informed decisions about corrective action.1289 It is pertinent to observe 
that the Report itself identifies that “despite close vetting by Air Force attorneys, 
senior Air Force officials misread the implicit rules GAO used to make decisions” and 
                                                 
1285 R D Anderson and W E, ‘Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements 
to Ensure Good Performance in Public Procurement Markets’ (n 24) 99. The GAO was careful to state that: “[t]he 
GAO decision should not be read to reflect a view as to the merits of the firms' respective aircraft. Judgments 
about which offeror will most successfully meet governmental needs are largely reserved for the procuring 
agencies, subject only to such statutory and regulatory requirements as full and open competition and 
fairness”. See GAO Press Release (n 1274) 
1286 See F Camm, M E Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government 
Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 
1219) xi 
1287 ibid 
1288 ibid 
1289 ibid 
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that “the better Air Force decision-makers understand how GAO applies these 
implicit rules in practice, the easier it should be to avoid protest sustainments”.1290 
 
It is submitted that the Report’s findings appear to be predicated largely on the basis 
that the GAO’s adjudicatory method is clearly discernable by reference to a system of 
“precedent”, in fact referring to the need for officials to execute and document their 
evaluations in a way that complies with GAO’s “expectations”.1291 However, it is at 
least arguable from the KC-X award that these “implicit” rules are not clear. For 
instance, the Report itself indicates that ambiguity in the KC-X RFP gave the GAO 
“large openings to impose its own judgment about what a “reasonable person would 
think the Air Force intended in its RFP”. 1292  Further, as the Report also 
acknowledges, the GAO had not applied a “common sense” approach to certain of 
the grounds and which arguably reflect more of a strict linguistic, and even legalistic, 
interpretation.1293 In addition, the GAO sustained a ground of protest that had not 
even been raised by the protester, namely ground 7 in relation to non-recurring 
engineering costs. The Report suggests that the sustainment indicates that the Air 
Force did not fully understand or appreciate GAO precedent relevant to the 
adjustment of unrealistic cost estimates, or the full “technical implications of that 
precedent for interpretation of the FAR”.1294 In addition to the issue of the GAO’s 
                                                 
1290 ibid 
1291 ibid 
1292 ibid 
1293 See for example, the arguments in relation to ground 2 concerning the basis for meeting and exceeding 
“thresholds” and “objectives. For a discussion in this regard, see (n 1276) above and F Camm, M E Chenoweth, J 
C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office Bid Protests in Air Force 
Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219), and 76-77 
1294 It is recalled that this concerned FAR Part 15.305. For a discussion in this regard see (n 1283) above and F 
Camm, M E Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability Office 
Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 88 
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general competence and jurisdiction to adjudicate grounds that are not pleaded1295 
the Report appears to confirm the necessity for a legalistic approach which has 
focused on a “narrow reading of FAR Part 15 and GAO precedent”.1296 The RAND 
Report also makes repeated references to the GAO’s assessment of 
“reasonableness”. 
 
In light of the above, it is at least open to question the nature and form of the GAO’s 
administrative review or adjudicatory methodology. It may be difficult to sustain the 
argument that this ostensible quasi-judicial methodology is clear given that 
experienced Air Force attorneys were unable to pre-empt the application of many of 
these so-called “implicit rules”. More generally, it is questionable whether the GAO’s 
assessment maintains a sufficiently discrete separation of review from a substantive 
examination of the merits. A whole host of issues may be raised in this regard, not 
least whether a “reasonable person” “test” is an adequate and effective standard of 
review for application in highly complex and technical tenders. All of the above raise 
potential issues of administrative and legal uncertainty for foreign contractors seeking 
to utilise the U.S. review system.1297 
 
The KC-X award provides not only an interesting perspective for foreign contractors 
but also for U.S. contracting officials that intend to facilitate foreign competition in 
contract awards. As will be discussed below, the KC-X was largely based on a pre-
existing commercial design. It has been observed that this presents difficulties if the 
                                                 
1295 The RAND Report (n 1219) itself observes at 95 that: “[o]n several of the specific grounds for protest, real 
questions can be raised regarding the materiality of the issues reviewed and sustained by GAO. Several of the 
sustained grounds for protest do not seem to meet GAO’s standard of materiality.” 
1296 ibid 89 
1297 The expectation might be that foreign operators can simply instruct U.S. attorneys in light of their specialist 
knowledge of U.S. government contract litigation. Yet, the indications above could suggest that even this may not 
provide any greater assurance 
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Air Force, for example, wishes to maintain competition and avoid choosing the 
winner in its statement of requirements.1298  For instance, the more precisely the Air 
Force states its requirements the easier it is for potential offerors to compare 
available designs against the requirements and determine the likely winner; 
consequently, unless the RFP left enough room for at least two offerors to make 
credible proposals, it would not be rational for anyone but the frontrunner to enter.1299 
It has been observed that in light of increasing U.S. focus on competitive prototyping 
and preliminary design review prior to source selection the more precise the 
understanding of system requirements will be, in turn, making it more difficult to 
sustain competition.1300 On the one hand, in this instance, if the requirements are 
then known, it may be logical not to hold a competition.1301 On the other hand, the 
simple fact of permitting another competitor to bid can impose cost discipline on the 
frontrunner.1302 The RAND Report observes that in the KC-X acquisition, the Air 
Force knew this and had to frame its requirements with “exceptional sublety” to 
induce enough offerers to participate and that this became necessary because of the 
public profile of the award.1303 In turn, this exposes a greater liability to subtle 
elements of the RFP being challenged. Given that possible awards to foreign 
contractors will almost always gain significant public interest, this risk is particularly 
apparent. Further, the RAND Report observes that whilst it found no evidence that 
Congressional interest affected decision making within the Air Force or GAO, 
“individual decision-makers do not deliberate in a vacuum and could not avoid being 
                                                 
1298 F Camm, M E Chenoweth, J C Graser, T Light,  M A Lorell and S K Woodward, Government Accountability 
Office Bid Protests in Air Force Source Selections, Evidence and Options— Executive Summary (n 1219) 100-
101 
1299 ibid 101 
1300 ibid 
1301 ibid 
1302 ibid 
1303 ibid 
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affected by political arguments in the wider debate”.1304 
 
In light of the above discussion, it is important to undertake a more measured 
assessment of the KC-X award. In a discussion of perceptions of access of foreign 
contractors to a reciprocal transatlantic defence market, it is important for EU 
observers to avoid treating the tanker contract as adversely prejudicing EU 
competitors, or for U.S. observers to use the award to advocate protectionist 
measures. It is stark to consider that one instance of U.S. legal commentary has 
sought to argue that Boeing won the contract on objective grounds when it ought to 
have been awarded the contract exclusively in consideration of socio-economic 
factors or requirements as part of the evaluation process (e.g. such as job creation 
and protection) and that Congress should be encouraged to change existing defence 
procurement law and policy to ensure future contracts are awarded “fairly and 
efficiently using domestic preference policies, and not to leave major acquisition 
decisions to primarily price”.1305  
 
Yet, even U.S. commentary written after the initial award to the Northrup Grumman–
EADS consortium identified that the significance of decisions like the KC-X tanker 
award for the Transatlantic defence relationship must be tempered on several 
grounds. First, the “changing attitude” towards transatlantic competition which is said 
to be evidenced by the initial award is not universal but simply constitute ad hoc 
decisions by particular DoD components. 1306  Second, it was recognized that a 
                                                 
1304 ibid 102 
1305 L I McCarl, ‘Foreign Competition in U.S. Defense Contracts: Why the U.S. Government Should Favor 
Domestic Companies in Awarding Major Defense Procurement and Acquisition Contracts’ (2011) Pac. McGeorge 
Global Bus & Dev LJ 303 
1306 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol II) (n 12) 669 
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significant portion of the value of the programme must be provided in the U.S.1307 
Thus, substantial content is U.S. based and that had the Northrup Gruman–EADS 
bid won, the latter would have been required to open U.S. manufacturing facilities.1308 
Third, as indicated above, the reality is that the foreign participant would have only 
provided what was essentially a commercial aircraft and not a defence system as 
such. Thus, it cannot be said in cases of this kind that there is a substantial reliance 
on a foreign defence system and it remains to be seen whether this is ever likely to 
be the case in the near future.1309 
  
To this extent, the KC-X award should be considered as an important case study for 
analysis in transatlantic defence procurement relations not as a basis for perceived 
openness or protectionism within the transatlantic defence market but more 
specifically for the issues it raises in relation to e.g. the formulation of RFPs, the 
application of evaluation criteria and the role of review mechanisms such as the 
GAO. 
 
 
4. Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources 
 
The preceding Sections have concerned instances in which full and open competition 
is possible. However, it is recalled that CICA also enables full and open competition 
after the exclusion of sources.1310 Whilst, as indicated below, U.S. legal commentary 
has identified the relevance of small business set asides in a transatlantic defence 
                                                 
1307 ibid  
1308 ibid 
1309 ibid 
1310 10 U.S.C. § 2304(b)(1) and 41 U.S.C. § 3303(a)(1) 
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procurement context, there has been substantially no focus on the industrial 
mobilization exclusion. It is necessary to examine this provision in light of the fact that 
there are corresponding CICA exceptions (rather than exclusions) on this ground 
which permit non-competitive procedures.1311 
 
4.1. Establishing or Maintaining Alternative Sources  
 
It has been suggested that CICA was, in part, adopted as “protectionist legislation” 
designed to reinforce industrial mobilization in response to a fear of too great a 
reliance on foreign suppliers for defence material.1312  Irrespective of the extent to 
which this was historically accurate and remains the case today, the formal priority 
accorded to industrial mobilization is clearly reflected by its inclusion as both an 
exclusion and exception under CICA. In FAR 6.202, the six circumstances permitting 
full and open competition after exclusion of sources are grouped under the single 
head of “establishing or maintaining alternative sources”. This Chapter only focuses 
on the main exclusions.1313 
 
Before examining this exclusion, it is important to observe that according to 
USASpending.gov data, for FY 2012, exclusion on grounds of establishment or 
maintenance of alternative sources constituted only 0.24% 1314  of competed 
                                                 
1311 For a discussion in this regard, see Chapter 10, Section 4 
1312 A Cox and S Greenwold, ‘The legal and structural obstacles to free trade in the United States procurement 
market’ (n 1051) 241 
1313 The other two concerns an exclusion to satisfy projected needs on the basis of a history of high demand and 
an exclusion to satisfy a critical need for medical, safety or emergency supplies. See FAR 6.202(5) and (6), 
respectively 
1314 By amount, this totalled $153,320,727.19 
  328 
dollars.1315 The data does not provide a further breakdown as to which particular 
circumstances are invoked. Nor does it provide an indication as to whether foreign 
competition was even possible. Notwithstanding, it is necessary to examine the 
provisions in full. 
 
4.1.1. Increase or Maintain Competition and Likely Cost Reduction 
 
The first circumstance enables an Agency to exclude a particular source or sources if 
the Agency Head determines that to do so would increase or maintain competition 
and likely result in reduced overall costs for the acquisition, or for any anticipated 
acquisition.1316 This circumstance enables the development of a competitive second 
source by precluding an existing sole source contractor from participating in the 
second source competition. It also enables the maintenance of an alternate source 
by precluding the primary source from being awarded all of the Agency’s 
requirements.1317 
 
The ability of the U.S. to ensure the availability of two or more options absent any 
threat to a primary source is indicative of stark contrasts between the political and 
economic circumstances of the U.S. and EU defence markets. Whilst CICA enables 
free-standing industrial mobilization grounds to enable dual sourcing, EU law is only 
likely to permit the most exceptional use of Article 346 TFEU for industrial 
                                                 
1315 This excludes orders subject to fair opportunity. See USASpending.gov data for Fiscal Year 2012. Available 
at <http://www.usaspending.gov/pie-summary-
tabular?q=node%2F91&tab=By+Agency&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&typeofview=detailsummary&fiscal_year
=2013&maj_contracting_agency=9700&maj_contracting_agency_name=Department+of+Defense&cdtype=0&pag
e=1&rp=15&sortname=sum&sortorder=desc&dtype=Comp> accessed 20 September 2013 
1316 FAR 6.202(a)(1) 
1317 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 320-321 citing 
Hawker Eternacell, Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-283586, 99-2 CPD ¶ 96 
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mobilization and only then to justify the continued existence of a single capability. 
Any such form of assistance could also constitute a form of State aid. 
 
However, use of this exclusion is subject to important regulatory limitations. FAR 
6.202(b) provides that a determination and findings (“D&F”) by an Agency head or 
designee must support the decision to exclude particular sources.1318 Each D&F 
must set out enough facts and circumstances to “clearly and convincingly” justify the 
determination.1319 After exclusion, an Agency is required to establish full and open 
competition using one of the competitive procedures. 1320  DFARS Subpart 206 
imposes an additional requirement in relation to the information to be included in the 
D&F.1321 PGI 206.202 requires the following. Firstly, the acquisition history of the 
supplies or services must be included.1322 Secondly, it is necessary to state the 
circumstances that make it necessary to exclude the particular source including: the 
                                                 
1318 See FAR 1.707. According to FAR 1.701 “Determination and Findings” means: “a special form of written 
approval by an authorized official that is required by statute or regulation as a prerequisite to taking certain 
contract actions. The “determination” is a conclusion or decision supported by the “findings.’’ The findings are 
statements of fact or rationale essential to support the determination and must cover each requirement of the 
statute or regulation.” According to FAR 1.702(a), a D&F applies ordinarily to an individual contract action. 
Further, the approval granted by a D&F is restricted to the proposed contract action(s) reasonably described in 
that D&F. D&F’s may provide for a reasonable degree of flexibility. Furthermore, in their application, reasonable 
variations in estimated quantities or prices are permitted, unless the D&F specifies otherwise. It is also possible to 
use class D&F’s. According to FAR 1.703(a), a class may consist of contract actions for the same or related 
supplies or services or other contract actions that require essentially identical justification. In accordance with 
FAR 1.703(b), the findings in a class D&F shall fully support the proposed action either for the class as a whole or 
for each action. A class D&F shall be for a specified period, with the expiration date stated in the document. 
Further, FAR 1.703(c) provides that the contracting officer shall ensure that individual actions taken pursuant to 
the authority of a class D&F are within the scope of the D&F  
1319 According to FAR 1.704, as a minimum, each D&F shall include, in the prescribed agency format, the 
following information: (a) Identification of the agency and of the contracting activity and specific identification of 
the document as a “Determination and Findings.” (b) Nature and/or description of the action being approved. (c) 
Citation of the appropriate statute and/or regulation upon which the D&F is based. (d) Findings that detail the 
particular circumstances, facts, or reasoning essential to support the determination. Necessary supporting 
documentation shall be obtained from appropriate requirements and technical personnel. (e) A determination 
based on the findings, that the proposed action is justified under the applicable statute or regulation. (f) Expiration 
date of the D&F, if required. (g) The signature of the official authorized to sign the D&F and the date signed 
1320  See FAR 6.201  
1321 DFARS 206.202(b) 
1322 PGI 206.202 (b)(i). This includes, for example, sources, prices, quantities and dates of award 
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reasons for the lack of, or potential loss of, alternative supplies1323 and the current 
annual requirement and projected needs.1324 Thirdly, it must be identified whether the 
existing source must be totally excluded or whether a partial exclusion is 
sufficient.1325 Fourthly, it must provide information on the potential effect of exclusion 
on the excluded source in terms of loss of future capability.1326 Further, with regard to 
the determination of reduced overall costs, information must include start-up, facility 
and administrative costs as well as economic order quantities and life cycle cost 
considerations.1327 
 
At least formally, this D&F requirement appears to provide a useful check on the 
invocation of the exclusion. It is recalled from Chapter 2 that there is no comparable 
evidential requirement for the use of the exceptions under EU law. However, whilst, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 10, Section 2.2, there is available evidence regarding 
the extent to which justifications and approvals (“J&A”) are effectively utilised, there is 
no similar evidence in relation to the use of D&Fs. It is therefore difficult to determine 
the extent to which, if at all, these act as effective accountability mechanisms for 
investigating the extent of foreign exclusion. 
 
4.1.2. Interest of National Defence and Industrial Mobilization 
 
The second and third circumstances permit exclusion because it would be in the 
“interest of national defence” either in having a facility (or a producer, manufacturer, 
                                                 
1323  For example, the technical complexity and “criticality” of the supplies or services. See DFARS 
206.202(b)(i)(B)(1) 
1324 206.202(b)(i)(B)(1) and (2) 
1325 206.202(b)(i)(C) 
1326 DFARS 206.202(b)(i)(D) 
1327 DFARS 206.202(b)(i)(E). This corresponds with FAR 6.202(b)(3) 
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or other supplier) available for furnishing the supplies or services in case of a national 
emergency or industrial mobilization, or in establishing or maintaining an essential 
engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational or 
other nonprofit institution or a federally funded research and development centre.1328 
It is not precisely clear how these two exclusions relate to the third exception 
permitting other than full and open competition discussed in Chapter 10, Section 4. 
The latter permits the use of a non-competitive procedure where it is necessary to 
award the contract to a particular source or sources for the two reasons permitting 
the exclusion of sources identified above. Notwithstanding the similarity in wording, it 
is important to distinguish the formal effect of the exclusion which still requires use of 
a competitive procedure and the exception which permits use of a non-competitive 
procedure. There is no tangible evidence providing an indication as to the 
circumstances in which an Agency would invoke the former instead of the latter. 
Further, it is not clear how decisive the decision to have recourse to the former or 
latter is in excluding foreign competition. The fact that both the exclusions and 
exceptions are very similar may raise fundamental questions about the potential for 
their indiscriminate use.  
 
Again, with regard to the second exclusion, DFARS Subpart 206 imposes an 
additional requirement in relation to the information to be included in the D&F. PGI 
206.202 requires that when relying on this exclusion, the D&F must include 
information regarding: the current annual mobilization requirements for the supplies 
or services, citing the source of, or the basis for, the data; a comparison of current 
                                                 
1328 FAR 6.202(a)(2) and (3). The second and third exclusions are said to be similar to the former 10 U.S.C. § 
2304(a)(16), which permitted the use of negotiated procurement to maintain multiple producers that were part of 
the mobilization base. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 
1055) 320 
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production capacity with that that necessary to meet mobilization requirements; an 
analysis of the risks of relying on the present source; and a projection of the time 
required for a new source to attain capacity necessary to meet mobilization 
requirements.1329 
 
In the absence of available evidence, it is not clear whether this authority could 
simply enable a decision to stop sourcing from a foreign supplier. The addition of an 
assessment of “risk” under the D&F is also uncertain. To this extent, again it is not 
clear whether the D&F constitutes an effective check.  
 
4.1.3. Continuous Availability of a Reliable Source of Supply 
 
The fourth circumstance is where the exclusion of a source would ensure the 
continuous availability of a reliable source of supply of such property or service.1330  It 
is not clear how significant this exclusion is in practice.1331 Again, this exclusion is 
extremely broad. It is not clear what “ensuring” “continuous availability” means or in 
what circumstances it would be required. Further, it is recalled from Chapter 5 that 
the Defence Procurement Directive contains a number of references to 
“reliability”.1332 As indicated, “reliability” is highly subjective.1333 Theoretically, this 
exclusion would not automatically exclude foreign competition.1334 However, it is 
                                                 
1329 DFARS 206.202(b)(i)(E) 
1330 FAR 6.202(4) 
1331 There is no commentary on this exclusion in the leading treatise on U.S. Government Contracts. See J 
Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 320 
1332 See Recitals 65 and 67 and Article 39(2)(e) 
1333 For instance, there may not need to be any dimunution (howsoever determined) in the reliability of a 
producer in order to justify recourse to the exclusion so as to test or increase its reliability. The breadth of the 
exclusion may justify limitations on sources simply to maintain an already reliable supplier 
1334 For instance, it is possible that even where there is one or more national producers, it may be considered 
necessary to also ensure that a reliable foreign supplier can also provide the same goods 
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possible to conceive of instances in which a foreign source had been an exclusive 
provider (in the absence of a national provider) but which is now deemed “unreliable” 
and vice versa. It is not clear whether “reliable” is synonymous with “national”. 
Beyond these limited findings, in the absence of clear evidence it is nevertheless 
important to reinforce the commonality of references to ill-defined terms such as 
“reliability” and which expose the considerable generality of legal prescriptions in this 
field, in turn, conferring considerable discretion on contracting authorities. 
 
Finally, there is no additional D&F requirements stipulated for this exclusion beyond 
those contained in FAR 6.202.1335 
 
 
5. Small Business Set Asides 
 
Another major exclusion falling within the category of full and open competition after 
exclusion of sources concerns small business set asides.1336 CICA recognizes that 
the Head of an Agency may provide for the procurement of property or services using 
competitive procedures but excluding concerns other than small business concerns 
in furtherance of the Small Business Act.1337 An important difference from the other 
CICA exclusions, however, is that Agencies making small business set asides do not 
need to provide a separate D&F.1338 
 
                                                 
1335 FAR 6.202(b)(1) 
1336 FAR 6.203-6.208 
1337 10 U.S.C. 2304(b)(2) and 41 U.S.C. § 253(b)(2).  U.S. Code, The Small Business Act, Public Law No. 83-
163, 67 Stat. 232 (July 30, 1953), currently codified as amended in U.S. Code Title 15, ss.631–657(o) (2010) 
1338 FAR6.203(b) 
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The Small Business Act was enacted in 1953, setting as its objective the possibility to 
secure the “maximum practicable opportunity” for small businesses to win a “fair  
proportion” of federal contracts.1339 Supported by the Small Business Administration 
(“SBA”), the U.S. maintains substantial socio-economic programmes through federal 
procurement.1340 The DoD is similarly committed to the pursuit of such programmes, 
inter alia, through its Mentor-Protégé Program.1341 USASpending.gov data provides a 
breakdown by amount and percentage of the various types of small business set 
aside. For Fiscal YR 2012, the largest category in this regard totals 7.75%1342 of 
competed dollars.1343 
 
Whilst historically, the EU has not utilised procurement expressly as an instrument to 
achieve socio-economic objectives, the EU has strategically focused on so-called 
small and medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”) in recent years. For instance, the EU 
has committed to a Small Business Act for Europe1344 which is supported by a set of 
policy initiatives.1345 Similarly, the role of SMEs in the defence sector is increasingly 
recognized.1346 
                                                 
1339 (n 1337)  
1340 For a useful up to date overview of the U.S. small business law and policy framework, see M V Kidalov and 
K F Snider, ‘Once more, with feeling: federal small business contracting policy in the Obama administration’ (n 
1056) 1 PPLR 15 
1341 Details are available at: <http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sb/programs/mpp/> accessed 20 September 2013 
1342 By amount this totals $6,070,090,516.47  
1343  This excludes orders subject to fair opportunity. Available at: <http://www.usaspending.gov/pie-
summarytabular?q=node%2F91&tab=By+Agency&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&typeofview=detailsummary&fis
cal_year=2013&maj_contracting_agency=9700&maj_contracting_agency_name=Department+of+Defense&cdtyp
e=0&page=1&rp=15&sortname=sum&sortorder=desc&dtype=Comp> 20 September 2013 
1344  Commission, ‘ “Thinks Small First” A “Small Business Act” for Europe COM (2008) 394 final 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0394:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 20 September 
2013 
1345 More information is available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/small-business/policy-statistics/policy/> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1346 EU (Commissioned)  ‘Study on the Competitiveness of European Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) in the Defence Sector’, Final Report, 5 November 2009 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/files/20091105_europe_economics_final_report_en.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2013. See also Commission, Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and 
security sector’ (n 7) 9-10 
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It is beyond the aims of this thesis to even outline U.S. and EU law and policy in this 
field.1347 However, specifically relevant to the present thesis, U.S. legal commentary 
has recently sought to respond to successive EU Commission Reports on U.S. 
Barriers to Trade and Investment which have claimed that U.S. small business set 
aside schemes are discriminatory measures which limit bidding opportunities for EU 
contractors.1348  
 
In particular, it has been argued that the Defence Procurement Directive and EDA 
policies evidence a shift in focus away from the EU’s historical approach of merely 
encouraging SME opportunities towards providing measurable participation 
outcomes for SME’s in specific contracts and which are akin to legally binding 
reservations and set asides at the prime contracting level in the U.S.1349 It has been 
suggested that the Defence Procurement Directive goes even further than the Public 
Sector Directive by tying support for SMEs to competitiveness and national security 
goals.1350 
                                                 
1347 On social objectives in public procurement generally, see C McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, 
Government Procurement and Legal Change (OUP 2007); S Arrowsmith and P Kunzlik (ed.) Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions (CUP 2009); For general 
commentary on U.S. policies assisting small businesses, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1573-1613. For a non-exhaustive list of the extensive literature 
contained in the UK Public Procurement Law Review alone, see G O'Brien, ‘Public procurement and the small or 
medium enterprise (SME)’ (1993) 2 PPLR 82; D Mardas, ‘Sub-contracting, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
and public procurement in the European Community’ (1994) 1 PPLR 19; A Erridge ‘Involvement of SMEs in public 
procurement’ (1998) 2 PPLR 37; S L Schooner, ‘United States: mixed messages: heightened complexity in social 
policies favouring small business interests’ (1999) 3 PPLR 78; M Burgi, ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises and 
procurement law - European legal framework and German experiences’ (2007) 4 PPLR 284; D C Specht, ‘The 
SBIR program: small businesses and "individuals" on the cutting edge’ (2008) 2 PPLR 99-118; R Williams, 
‘European Code of Best Practices Facilitating Access by SME's to Public Procurement Contracts’ (2008) 6 PPLR 
249; M V Kidalov and K F Snider, ‘Once more, with feeling: federal small business contracting policy in the 
Obama administration’ (n 1056). The U.S. literature is too voluminous to recite in this footnote 
1348 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ 
(2011) 40(2) Pub Cont LJ 443 citing at 445 Commission, U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008 
(July 2009), 15 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_144160.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1349 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ (n 
1348) 460 
1350 According to Kidalov at 456 this is evidenced by Recital 3 which states in relevant part that: “[…] Member 
States may use different tools, in conformity with Community law, aiming at a truly European defence equipment 
market and a level playing field at both European and global levels. They should also contribute to the in-depth 
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On this basis, it has been suggested that it could pose serious long-term industrial 
competitiveness challenges to the U.S. defence and civilian sectors if the U.S. fails to 
maintain strong set asides and other small business preferences and would be “well 
justified in refusing European demands to waive or repeal the Small Business 
Act”. 1351  More specifically, it has been suggested that “abandoning the Small 
Business Act or generally opening up U.S. business procurements to European firms 
would be short-sighted and detrimental to the U.S. national interests”.1352  
 
It is necessary to examine these claims in more detail. For the sake of analytical 
clarity, this Section separates the analysis of EU law from EU SME policy. It is also 
important to identify at the outset that it is not exactly clear what evidence there is to 
substantiate the effects (and extent) of small business laws and policies on 
transatlantic defence procurement. This reflects a more fundamental underlying 
uncertainty regarding the extent to which socio-economically oriented laws and 
policies actually achieve their functions without adversely impacting on fundamental 
goals of the procurement system. 1353  Therefore, observations which attribute 
particular significance to the effects of such laws and policies ought to be treated with 
some caution.1354  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
development of the diversity of the European defence-related supplier base, in particular by supporting the 
involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers in the European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base, fostering industrial cooperation and promoting efficient and 
responsive lower tier suppliers. In this context, they should take into account the Commission’s Interpretative 
Communication of 7 December 2006 on the application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence 
procurement and the Commission Communication of 5 December 2007 on a Strategy for a stronger and more 
competitive European defence industry.” 
1351 ibid 509 
1352 ibid. These “national interests” are not defined 
1353 See S L Schooner, ‘United States: mixed messages: heightened complexity in social policies favouring small 
business interests’ (n 1347) 83. On these ‘goals’ more generally, see S L Schooner, ‘Desiderata: objectives for a 
system of government contract law’ (2002) 2 PPLR 103 
1354 Of course, this does not mean to say that the use of small business laws and policies, if empirically 
substantiated, could not be utilized to improve transatlantic defence procurement 
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5.1. Subcontracting under the Defence Procurement Directive 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 5, Section 2, that the Defence Procurement Directive 
contains specific subcontracting provisions. In this regard, it has been asserted that 
Article 20 Defence Procurement Directive “approves the use of subcontracting, 
including subcontracting driven by social consideration [sic], as conditions of contract 
performance”. 1355  However, it must be questioned to what extent the Directive 
emphasises the use of subcontracting driven by social considerations. Strictly 
speaking, Article 20 provides that performance conditions may, in particular, concern 
subcontracting or take social considerations into account.1356 Further, the Directive’s 
provisions on subcontracts awarded by successful tenderers make no express 
reference to social considerations.1357 In addition, whilst a contracting authority may 
require a successful tenderer to apply criteria chosen by the contracting authority 
when selecting subcontractors, in the absence of any reference to social 
considerations, the Directive merely provides that the criteria chosen by the 
successful tenderer must be objective, non-discriminatory and consistent with the 
criteria applied by the contracting authority for the selection of tenderers for the main 
contract.1358 
  
U.S. legal commentary has itself recognized that the extent to which it is possible for 
Member States to facilitate social considerations has been significantly reduced 
under the Directive. For instance, it has been suggested that whilst European 
                                                 
1355 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ (n 
1348) 501 
1356 Emphasis added. This emphasis is further reinforced by the fact that social considerations feature last in 
Article 20 after subcontracting, security of information and security of supply, reflecting a possible priority 
accorded to the former 
1357 See Articles 50-54 
1358 Article 53(1). See also Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 11 point 39 
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defence procurement has largely been utilised to facilitate socio-economic 
programmes,1359 the Directive attempts to ease socioeconomic goals, specifically 
jobs creation, from defence procurements by insisting that no performance conditions 
may pertain to requirements other than those relating to the performance of the 
contract itself and that this is intended at least in part to exclude extraneous 
conditions including socio-economic requirements that are not directly related to 
contract performance.1360 Most importantly, it is recalled from Chapter 7, Section 3.2, 
that a core rationale underlying the subcontracting provisions is an attempt to 
eliminate recourse to offsets. It is difficult to sustain the assertion that the Directive’s 
subcontracting provisions will simply result in the exchange of one form of national 
socio-economic preference for a European socio-economic preference. To this 
extent, there is limited basis for suggesting that the Directive would render it any 
more or less likely that social considerations become an increasingly important (let 
alone decisive) factor in a way that would adversely impact against U.S. contractors. 
 
More significantly, Article 21(4) of the Defence Procurement Directive has been cited 
within the U.S. legal commentary as an example of an instance of an increasing EU 
focus on “measurable identifiable participation outcomes”, 1361  which operates  
“essentially as a subcontracting set-aside required of prime contractors”1362 and 
represents the Commission’s “strong endorsement of mandatory subcontracting set-
asides”. 1363  Article 21(4) provides that a contracting authority may require 
subcontracting for a certain share of the main contract (described as the ‘minimal 
                                                 
1359 Yukins, ‘The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (n 311) 4  
1360 ibid 4 citing Recital 45 and Article 20  
1361 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ (n 
1348) 460, fn75 
1362 ibid 501 
1363 Ibid 
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percentage’ and capped at 30% of contract value) in competition while the successful 
tenderer decides which parts are to be subcontracted in competition.  
 
It is argued that Article 21(4) is not “essentially”, or equivalent to, a “mandatory 
subcontracting set-aside”. Firstly, this does not correspond with the formal effect 
accorded to this provision. It was not a requirement that Article 21(4) be 
transposed.1364  According to the Commission Report on transposition, only two 
Member States have chosen not to provide for compulsory subcontracting. 1365 
However, whilst all of the other Member States have given their contracting 
authorities the possibility to require subcontracting, contracting authorities are not 
required to use compulsory subcontracting.1366 Secondly, Article 21(4) specifies no 
more than an option to award a percentage of subcontracts in competition. It follows 
that the contracting authority cannot require the successful tenderer to subcontract 
specific parts of the contract.1367 Further, Article 21(4) does not permit a contracting 
authority to require a successful tenderer to award subcontracts to specific 
subcontractors or to subcontractors of a specific nationality, and does not permit sole 
source awards to certain classes of small business. Thirdly, by design and/or result, 
through its optional provisions, the Defence Procurement Directive is intended to be 
receptive to the effect of any subcontracting requirements on the existing supply 
chain of an EU prime contractor (which may comprise third country elements).1368 
                                                 
1364 See Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 4, point 17, para 2 
1365 Commission, Report to the European Parliament and The Council on transposition of directive 2009/81/EC 
on Defence and Security Procurement, Brussels’ (n 302) 7 
1366 ibid 
1367 The successful tenderer is free to decide which subcontracts it wants to award to meet the percentage 
required. See Guidance Note, Subcontracting, 5, para17 
1368 For example, the negotiated and competitive dialogue procedures allow for discussion of the impact of the 
subcontracting provisions with suppliers in order to reduce the risk of causing unnecessary harm to an existing 
supply chain. Further, see Guidance Note Subcontracting, 4-5, paras. 16-17 which states: [t]he Directive points 
out that an excessive distortion of the supply chain should be avoided: Article 21 (4) states that the range of 
percentages defined ‘shall be proportionate to the object and value of the contract and the nature of the industry 
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The Guidance Note on Subcontracting expressly identifies the need to avoid 
“excessive distortion” of the supply chain, through a consideration of the importance 
of the nature of the industry sector involved, the level of competition in the relevant 
market as well as the relevant technical capabilities of the industrial base.1369 To this 
extent, Article 21(4) is far from constituting a mandatory set aside. 
 
5.2. EU SME and Subcontracting Policies 
 
The same U.S. legal commentary has identified a number of intergovernmental 
initiatives, in particular the EDA, as addressing not only the issue of opportunity to 
compete, but also (to an admittedly lesser extent) share of participation in public 
procurement through the “reservation” of certain procurement opportunities for SMEs 
at the prime and sub-contract levels. For instance, the EDA’s Code of Best Practice 
in the Supply Chain has been identified as effectively permitting subcontracting with 
SMEs as award criteria.1370  Similarly, it has been argued that the EDA further 
                                                                                                                                                        
sector involved, including the level of competition in that market and the relevant technical capabilities of the 
industrial base. Recital 40 insists that ‘the proper functioning of the successful tenderer’s supply chain should not 
be jeopardised. Therefore, the percentage that can be subcontracted to third parties at the request of the 
contracting authority/entity should appropriately reflect the object and value of the contract.’ Similarly, the 
Guidance Note on Security of Supply, 13, point 40 in relation to Article 23(c) (concerning the organization and 
location of a tenderer’s supply chain) states that: “[i]n this context, one has also to take into account that the 
organisation of the tenderer’s supply chain might be influenced by the contracting authority/enity, if the latter 
makes use of Article 21(3) and/or (4) to oblige the successful tenderer to award subcontracts by a competitive 
procedure under Articles 51-53. In such a case, both the tenderer and the contracting authority/entity must try to 
reconcile these two obligations.” For a discussion of Article 23(c), see Chapter 5, Section 6 
1369 Guidance Note, Subcontracting, ibid, 5 
1370 See M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ 
(n 1348) 502, fn 350 citing the Code which provides in relevant part: “[i]n Assessing what is economically 
advantageous in the selection of Suppliers, it shall be taken into consideration that both Buyers and Suppliers 
need to take strategic sourcing decisions that are wider than individual contract or programme requirements […] 
In evaluating tenders of Suppliers, buyers will consider, amongst other things, the approach undertaken or 
proposed for the selection of souces of supply (including where appropriate, make or buy plans), having regard to 
the principles of the CoBPSC […] Monitoring arrangements will be introduced to the extent to which the CoBPSC 
is being applied. It will be based on Prime Contractors providing information on sub-contract opportunities 
advertised.” 
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recognizes offsets, including subcontracting requirements, to local industry as one of 
the best value selection criteria.1371  
 
However, it is recalled from Chapter 7, Section 2.3 that whilst the political 
significance of the EDA Codes is arguable, the EDA Codes are limited 
intergovernmental, voluntary Codes of conduct which do not have legal effect and 
whose scope is confined to procurement excluded pursuant to Article 346 TFEU. 
Further, it is recalled that in light of the Defence Procurement Directive, the possibility 
for extensive recourse to offsets is likely to be significantly reduced. It is re-
emphasised that these practices are determined to be prima facie incompatible with 
EU law. It therefore cannot be argued that the EU, or indeed the EDA, actively 
supports widespread use of offsets (especially through the use of subcontracting) 
even if they acknowledge their existence.1372 
 
Importnatly, notwithstanding, the same U.S. commentary has also stated that it does 
not follow that the U.S. and EU cannot ever negotiate a trade agreement to provide 
reciprocal procurement opportunities to each other’s small businesses.1373 It has 
been suggested that such cooperation is better suited to limited procurement 
programmes e.g. where both sides contribute financially, agree on a common 
definition of a small business and on related measures and devise common 
assistance tools for small firms.1374 NATO procurements have been proposed as 
                                                 
1371 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ (n 
1348) 502 
1372 For a discussion in this regard, see Chapter 7, Section 4.2 
1373 M V Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ (n 
1348) 502 
1374 ibid 
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suitable candidates for such initiatives.1375 It should be observed that in 2012, the 
U.S. and EU signed an MoU Concerning Cooperation on Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises.1376 However, the MoU does not make any reference to SMEs in the 
defence sector. In any event, as this Section has indicated, it is submitted that, in the 
first instance, there ought to be more detailed research undertaken of the role and 
effects of small business regulation and policy on defence procurement practice both 
nationally and on a transatlantic scale.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Whilst U.S. law prescribes “full and open competition”, statistics indicate that the 
extent of permitted foreign competition is limited. In light of the inherent generality of 
the legal prescriptions which constitute the exclusions to full and open competition, It 
is unsurprising that the Fortresses and Icebergs Study identifies that it is the 
contracting authority’s discretionary authority which constitutes the most significant 
barrier to trade. 
 
However, this Chapter has demonstrated that it is extremely difficult to pinpoint how 
certain discretions may be utilized to affect foreign competition. Further, the findings 
of the analysis of the CICA exclusions were limited. As expected, the exclusions 
were broadly defined. These appear to reflect the overriding emphasis of U.S. 
                                                 
1375 ibid 
1376 Memorandum of Understanding Between U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration 
and European Commission Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry Concerning Cooperation on Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 3 December 2012 
< http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/12042012%20U.S.-EU%20SME%20MOU.pdf> accessed 20 September 
2012 
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procurement on protecting the industrial base, maintaining a self-sustaining national 
competition through dual-sourcing and overt promotion of national socio-economic 
objectives. Whilst these exceptions may be utilized to exclude foreign competition, 
they are not designed, or operate, specifically with the exclusion of foreign 
competition in mind. Notwithstanding, this Chapter has identified the need for further 
analysis of precisely how U.S. law and its discretionary application may be used to 
exclude foreign competition. At the very least, it is suggested that there is a basis for 
re-evaluating the current formulation of the CICA exclusions. The thesis is not naïve 
to the fact that if it is intended to exclude foreign competition, a limited set of statutory 
provisions, no matter how well formulated, will be unlikely to prevent exclusion. 
Nevertheless, it may be questioned to what extent the provisions themselves, as well 
as the determinations and findings, could better regulate decision-making in relation 
to foreign competition if only to increase accountability and transparency. The EU 
experience is extremely limited by comparison. However, this Chapter has sought to 
indicate, where possible, the extent to which EU law focuses on restricting the 
potential for legislation to be used to exclude or discriminate against foreign 
competition. 
 
Finally, the discussion of U.S. claims about EU law and policy on SMEs and 
subcontracting revealed the current limits but also potentialities of comparative legal 
scholarship. The analysis cautioned the necessity of asking fundamental questions 
about the extent to which this particular field of activity impacts, in real terms, on the 
transatlantic market before determining whether, and if so how, transatlantic legal or 
other institutions may usefully operate. 
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10  
Other than Full and Open Competition under U.S. Federal 
Procurement Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 9 that CICA provides for “other than full and open 
competition”. CICA refers to, but does not provide a statutory definition of, other than 
full and open competitive procedures. Therefore, any procurement contract entered 
into without full and open competition is, by default, non-competitive. However, it 
does not follow that every such contract infringes CICA. CICA permits an exhaustive 
list of seven circumstances in which other than competitive procedures may be 
used.1377 The exceptions are implemented in FAR Subpart 6.3 and supplemented by 
DFARS Subpart 206.3. Recourse to one of the exceptions is not automatic. Even if 
one of the exceptions applies, the contracting officer is still required to request offers 
from as many potential offerors as is “practicable”.1378 
 
Whilst Chapter 9 examined the extent to which contracting authorities could possibly 
exercise what has been described as their “informal exclusion authority” to exclude 
foreign competition, it has been identified that the statutory CICA exceptions 
                                                 
1377 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a). CICA does not explicitly refer to these circumstances as 
“exceptions” to its competition requirements. However, the term “exception” is used by CICA in reference to these 
circumstances in its requirement for justifications and approvals of contracts awarded using other than full and 
open competition and commentators commonly refer to the “CICA exceptions” when describing these 
circumstances. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(3)(B) and 41 U.S.C. § 253(e)(2)(B). For a general discussion of the CICA 
exceptions, see J D Clark, Overcoming the Critical Challenges of Contingency Contracting, Understanding the 
Flexibility Permitted by CICA, Simplified Acquisition Procedures and Small Purchases (1999) 28 Pub Cont LJ 503 
1378 FAR 6.301(d). For a discussion of this requirement and corresponding case law, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash 
Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 116-117 
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“effectively provide managers with the discretionary authority to exclude foreign 
participation in acquisition programs”.1379  
 
In the last two years, two GAO Reports have been published with a specific focus on 
competition in procurement. According to a 2012 Report, out of the nearly $1.5 trillion 
that DoD obligated for all contracts during FY 2007-2010, 41% ($606.3 billion) were 
based on other than full and open competition, 1380  primarily through the CICA 
exceptions.1381 According to the latest 2013 Report, DoD’s overall competition rate 
has declined 5.5% from 62.6% percent in FY 2008 to 57.1% in 2012. 1382 
Considerable variation also exists between the DoD components.1383 
 
This Chapter examines the exceptions of most potential relevance to a defence 
procurement analysis.1384 As will be demonstrated, certain of the exceptions broadly 
correspond with the provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive which permit 
exceptional use of the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice. 
However, as indicated in Chapter 8, Section 1, points of comparison and contrast 
                                                 
1379 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 662-663 
1380  These statistics are based on data from the FPDS-NG data for FY 2007-2010. See Government 
Accountability Office, Defense Contracting – Improved Policies and Tools Could Help Increase Competition on 
DOD’s National security Exception Procurements GAO-12-263, 6 (Washington D.C. January 2012 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587681.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013  
1381 ibid  
1382 Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase Competition (n 1163) 
8-9 citing Figure 1 DOD Competition Rate for All Contract Obligations from Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012 
(Source:  GAO analysis of FPDS-NG data)  
1383 The Air Force had the lowest competition rate at 37.1%. The DLA had the highest at 83.3%. See 
Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase Competition (n 1163) 10-11 
citing Figure 3 Competition Rates by DOD Component for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012 
1384 This Chapter does not consider the permissible use of other than full and open competition where a statute 
expressly authorizes or requires that the procurement be made through another executive agency or from a 
specified source, or the agency’s need is for brandname commercial items for authorized resale. See 410 U.S.C. 
2304(c)(5). Guidance is located at FAR 6.302-5 and DFARS 206.302-5. This exception does cover small 
business set-asides. For a dicussion of this exception, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 318-319 and J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive 
Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 114-115 
  346 
reveal the idiosyncratic features of the U.S. and EU legal, political and economic 
systems. 
 
2. Justification and Approvals 
 
Before examining the CICA exceptions, it is first necessary to emphasise that CICA 
requires that Agency contracting officials must justify and obtain J&As for use of 
other than competitive procedures.1385 Justification must be in writing, certifying the 
accuracy and completeness of the Agency’s justification.1386 Further, Agencies must 
post the J&A documents for all contracts awarded pursuant to a CICA exception on 
FedBizOpps1387 within 14 days of award.1388 In order to rely on a CICA exception 
permitting use of a non-competitive procedure, the J&A requirement must be 
satisfied.1389  
 
 
 
                                                 
1385 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f). For a general discussion of Justifications and Approvals, see  J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr 
and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 286 – 288 and J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R 
O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 129-131  
1386 10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(1)(A) 
1387 Federal Business Opportunities, or FedBizOpps, is the government wide single-point-of-entry on the internet 
for all federal government contracting opportunities. It lists all major federal government solicitations, contract 
awards, subcontracting opportunities, surplus property sales and foreign business opportunities. For further 
information, see <https://www.fbo.gov> accessed 20 September 2013 
1388 CICA originally required Agencies to make their justifications for noncompetitive awards, as well as “any 
related information,” available to the general public under the Freedom of Information Act (10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(4) 
and 41 U.S.C. § 253(f)(4)). The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 amended CICA by requiring that 
Agencies also post the justification and approval documents for all contracts awarded in reliance on a CICA 
exception on FedBizOpps within 14 days of contract award (P.L. 110-181 § 844, 122 Stat. 236-39 (Oct. 14, 
2008)). When the noncompetitive award is made on the basis of unusual and compelling urgency, Agencies have 
up to 30 days after the award to post it on FedBizOpps. Under CICA, Agencies are also required to publish 
notices regarding certain noncompetitive contracts that they propose to award on FedBizOpps prior to their award 
(10 U.S.C. § 2304(f)(1)(C) and 41 U.S.C. § 253(f)(1)(C)). See generally 41 U.S.C. § 416(b)(5) (notice 
requirements)). These notices identify the intended recipient of the noncompetitive contract award and state the 
Agencies’ reasons for making a noncompetitive award. Because notice of these proposed awards precedes the 
awards, other contractors could submit proposals to the Agency or protest the proposed award 
1389 FAR 6.303-1 
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2.1. Content of a Justification and Approval 
 
It is recalled that DFARS Subpart 206 imposes an additional requirement in relation 
to the information to be included in the D&F for use of a CICA exclusion.1390 By 
contrast, the DFARS does not provide a supplemental requirement in relation to the 
use of a CICA exception beyond the basic J&A requirements of the FAR even though 
it authorises the use of non-competitive procedures.1391 
 
An important requirement is that Agency officials of a higher rank than the contracting 
officer must approve Justifications, the appropriate official determined on the basis of 
the contract’s dollar value.1392 In terms of the general content of a J&A, the document 
must inter alia: identify the statutory authority permitting other than full and open 
competition;1393 demonstrate that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or 
the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority;1394 identify efforts made to 
ensure solicitation from as many sources as practicable;1395 provide a determination 
that the cost will be fair and reasonable; 1396  provide a description of market 
research;1397 and provide any other factors in support.1398 
 
 
 
                                                 
1390 DFARS 206.202(b). See PGI 206.202 discussed in Chapter 9, Section 4.1.1 
1391 See DFARS 206.303 
1392 FAR 6.304 
1393 FAR 6.303(b)(4)  
1394 FAR 6.303(b)(5) 
1395 FAR 6.303(b)(6) 
1396 FAR 6.303(b)(7) 
1397 FAR 6.303(b)(8) 
1398 FAR 6.303(b)(9) 
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2.2. Evidence of the Use of Justifications and Approvals in Practice 
 
The above 2013 GAO Report found that J&As generally met FAR requirements. 1399 
However, as this Chapter will discuss in reference to the Report’s findings, a number 
of general issues have been identified. These can be summarised as follows. Firstly, 
there are reported instances in which J&A’s have been prepared in advance of 
issuing a presolicitation notice with the effect of excluding consideration of a viable 
source. Secondly, J&A’s only specify a minimum content requirement. Whilst 
identifying general compliance with FAR requirements, the above Report also 
identified that Justifications provided limited insight into the reasons for the non-
competitive award.1400 It is therefore important to question whether this minimum is 
sufficient and, further, whether the DoD encourages officers to exceed the minimum. 
For instance, as will be discussed, GAO Reports have identified that with regard to 
certain exceptions, the justification was not adequate.1401 Thirdly, it is possible for the 
DoD to issue what is termed a “class justification”, a single J&A document that 
applies to multiple contracts. As will be discussed, a GAO report has identified 
concerns about the extent to which class justifications can limit competition within the 
admitted class as well as limit access of new entrants.1402 Further concern has been 
expressed regarding the level of review of contracts awarded under class 
justifications.1403 
 
 
                                                 
1399  United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase 
Competition (n 1163) 17 
1400 As will be discussed below, the FAR requirements relating to J&As only set a minimum standard required 
1401 See the discussion of the unusual and compelling urgency exception in Section 6 below 
1402 See the discussion of the national security exception in Section 5.1 below 
1403 ibid 
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2.3. Justifications for the Use of the Negotiated Procedure without Publication 
 
EU legal commentary has not examined in any particular detail the issue of 
accountability (including as a matter of administrative process) with regard to the use 
of exceptions permitting non-compliance with EU public procurement law. For 
instance, whilst there has been substantial debate regarding the conditions for use of 
Article 346 TFEU, it is recalled that Article 346 TFEU contains no requirement of ex 
ante or ex post notification. Assessment of a Member State’s justification will only 
generally occur if the Commission is notified by a third party or takes its own initiative 
to commence or consider commencing proceedings. Similarly, whilst Article 30(3) 
Defence Procurement Directive requires that the use of the negotiated procedure 
without publication must be justified, Article 37(d) simply requires that the 
circumstances referred to in Article 28 which justify the use of the procedure must be 
stated. Beyond a statement of the circumstances, no other formal requirement is 
imposed. 
 
In light of the broad legal prescriptions contained within exclusions and exceptions to 
competitive procurement, transparency and accountability mechanisms of a kind 
similar to D&Fs and J&As could provide an important check on their use. However, 
as this Chapter will also demonstrate, it is open to question how effective such 
requirements are in practice. 
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3. Sole Source  
 
As indicated in Chapter 9, Section 2.1.1, the most common circumstance justifying 
use of a non-competitive procedure is where the requested property or services are 
available from only one responsible source or, in the case of the DoD, only a limited 
number of responsible sources, and no other type of property or service will satisfy 
the Agency’s needs.1404 Guidance on the use of this exception can be found at FAR 
6.302-1 and DFARS 206.302-1.1405 It has been stated that this exception is the 
broadest and possibly most utilized exception to the requirement of full and open 
competition.1406 
  
An Agency determination that a proposed contractor is the only source capable of 
meeting the technical needs of the Agency is subject to close scrutiny but will not be 
overturned if the Agency has properly justified its needs and there is a reasonable 
basis for its determination.1407 The GAO has held that the availability of only one 
source has to be demonstrated “convincingly”1408 but that in most protests, Agencies 
have been able to meet this test.1409 An Agency’s legitimate need to standardize 
equipment has been determined to provide a reasonable basis for imposing 
                                                 
1404 10 USC 2304(c)(1) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(1). For a discussion of this exception, see J Cibinic Jr, R C 
Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 282 – 295 and J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr 
and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 93-109  
1405 DFARS 206.302  
1406 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 282 – 295 
1407 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 301 and cases 
cited therein and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 94 and 
cases cited therein 
1408 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 302 citing Daniel H. 
Wagner Assocs., 65 Comp. Gen 305 (B-220633) CPD ¶ 166 
1409 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 302 citing EADS N. 
Am., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-291805, 2003 CPD ¶ 51 
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restrictions of competition.1410 Protests of sole source determinations have, however, 
been sustained if the facts indicate that other sources could satisfactorily meet the 
government’s needs, for example, where records show that another potential vendor 
has been given an incorrect understanding of the Agency’s requirements1411 and 
where the pre-solicitation notice generated an expression of interest from a second 
source but the J&A was prepared in advance of the notice and did not consider the 
viability of the second source.1412  
 
Importantly, however, it is not possible to determine the extent to which this 
exception has specifically affected foreign competition. Aside from the uncertainty of 
determining whether a foreign source is capable of meeting a government need in 
the first instance, it is also difficult to determine, for example, the extent to which 
specific considerations e.g. relating to standardization or interoperability could 
provide a basis for excluding foreign competition. In addition, whilst the issue of 
predeterminations made under J&As raises further questions about the extent to 
which the use of exceptions are properly justified, it is not possible to discern any 
specific effect on foreign contractors.  
 
Notwithstanding, as indicated in Chapter 1, even where no foreign competition is 
possible, it necessary to determine the extent of sole source contracting in the U.S. 
not least because an internally competitive U.S. market is in general the interests of 
the transatlantic defence market in the same way that U.S. commentators have 
                                                 
1410 See K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 95 and cases 
cited therein 
1411 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 303 citing Lockheed 
Martin Sys. Integration – Owego, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-287190.2, 2001 CPD ¶ 110 
1412  K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 96 citing Barnes 
Aerospace Group, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-298864, 2006 CPD ¶ 204 
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emphasised the importance of an internally competitive EU defence market. The 
opening of non-competitive contracts to more national competition could, in turn, 
create the possibility for further foreign competition.1413 
 
The determination to procure on a sole source basis may be justified according to 
several other circumstances which are considered in turn. 
 
3.1. Privately Developed Items and Reasons Connected with Exclusive Rights  
 
One circumstance in which sole source procurement may be necessary concerns 
items developed at private expense e.g. patented and copyrighted items or items 
described by proprietary data.1414 it may be necessary to undertake sole source 
procurement because the government may have no other proprietary data 
package,1415 or identifying alternative sources may result in unacceptable costs or 
delay e.g. where a new contractor would need to gain a working knowledge of data, 
where delivery is urgent or where reverse engineering is prohibitive.1416   
 
According to the 2013 GAO Report, for services supporting DoD weapons 
programmes, the Government’s lack of access to proprietary data as a result, inter 
alia, of failures in previous years to purchase technical data packages to support 
                                                 
1413 For example, even where sole source awards are made to a U.S. contractor, it may be possible for that 
contractor to rely on foreign supply chains at the lower tiers 
1414 For a discussion in this regard, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 303-309 and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process 
(n 1055) 96-104 
1415 Similarly, an Agency may not even have adequate data to establish qualification requirements for an item 
because the data necessary to do so is in the possession of the original designer thereby precluding a sound 
determination about how to achieve acceptable performance. See for e.g. Masbe Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-
260253.2, 95-1 CPD ¶ 253 cited in K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection 
Process (n 1055) 101  
1416 See K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 101-101 and 
cases cited therein 
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purchased solutions1417 and a heavy reliance on specific contractors for expertise, 
have limited or precluded the possibility of competition and resulted in single source 
awards under this CICA exception.1418  
 
Again, available evidence does not provide a clear indication of the extent to which 
foreign competition may be “locked out” of contract awards on the basis of retention 
of, or access to, proprietary data. It cannot be presumed that foreign contractors 
would have comparable data packages. Further, it is not clear the extent to which 
contracting authorities would be expected to identify competitive foreign data 
packages for future procurements.  
 
In comparison, the Defence Procurement Directive similarly provides for use of the 
negotiated procedure without publication when the contract may be awarded only to 
one particular economic operator for technical reasons or reasons connected with the 
protection of exclusive rights.1419 Whilst, as indicated above, there is no specific J&A 
procedure under the Directive, according to Recital 52, these reasons should be 
rigorously defined and justified on a case-by-case basis. Recital 52 provides a 
number of examples (which are not exhaustive) of permissible justifications. These 
include: strict technical impracticability for a candidate other than the chosen 
economic operator to achieve the required goals; the necessity to use specific know-
how, tools or means which only one operator has at its disposal (e.g. the modification 
or retrofitting of complex equipment); and specific interoperability or safety 
                                                 
1417  United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting - Actions Needed to Increase 
Competition (n 1163) 19-20  
1418 ibid,18-24 
1419 Article 28(e)  
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requirements which must be fulfilled in order to ensure the functioning of the armed 
or security forces.1420 
 
As indicated above, U.S. case law appears to indicate that the exception covers 
substantially the same circumstances. It is not yet clear how or to what extent the 
exception will be utilised under the Defence Procurement Directive. Further, there is 
no indication of the extent to which U.S. contractors would likely be excluded on 
these grounds. However, as indicated in Chapter 2, the CJEU has been prepared to 
scrutinise the legitimacy of decisions to reserve contracts to national operators on 
grounds of “interoperability”.1421 
 
3.2. Follow-on Contracts and Additional Deliveries 
 
In addition to the protection of exclusive rights, U.S. law also permits sole source 
contracting for follow-on contracts,1422 namely where an award other than to the 
original source would result in substantial duplication of cost to the U.S. and which it 
does not expect to recover through competition,1423 or unacceptable delays.1424 It is 
recalled from Chapter 9, Section 2.1 that in light of the number of on-going legacy 
programmes, there is a relatively high proportion of follow-on work awarded to 
incumbent contractors. 
                                                 
1420 ibid 
1421 Case C-337/05 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-2173, para 59. See Chapter 2, Section 4.3  
1422 See 10 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(1)(B). See generally J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 310 and J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive 
Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 107 
1423 See e.g. Aerospace Research Assocs., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-201953, 81 CPD ¶  36 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C 
Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 313. However, the Agency is required to 
determine and document that the cost of the initial capital investment made by the developer of new items cannot 
be offset by savings that would result from competing the item. See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-
DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process (n 1055) 107 
1424 Raytheon Co., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-400610, 2009 CPD ¶ 8 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 312 
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It has been suggested that such an exception is “eminently logical” in that it would 
make no sense to seek bids on old programmes where an award was competitively 
bid years ago unless the prime contractor is failing to deliver.1425 However, it is not 
clear the extent to which the DoD is prepared to conduct rigorous investigations into 
levels of prime contractor performance, or the viability of alternative foreign 
competitors. Again, this would, however, assume that foreign competitors would be 
equally capable of performing the work. 
 
The Defence Procurement Directive also permits the award of a contract by 
negotiated procedure without publication for additional deliveries by the original 
supplier under a supply contract.1426 Two circumstances for use are specifically 
identified. The first is for a partial replacement of normal supplies or installations.1427 
The second is for extensions of existing supplies or installations, where a change of 
supplier would oblige the contracting authority to acquire material having different 
technical characteristics which would result in incompatibility or disproportionate 
technical difficulties in operation and maintenance.1428 This is the case, for example, 
for the integration of new components into existing systems or for the modernisation 
of such systems.1429 It has been acknowledged that there is some degree of overlap 
with the technical reasons or exclusive rights grounds under the Directive.1430 
                                                 
1425 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 666 
1426 Article 28(3). There is a similar provision with regard to works and services under Article 24(a) and (b) 
1427 ibid 
1428 ibid. See Recital 51 which states: “[…] incompatibility or disproportionate technical difficulties in operation 
and maintenance justifying the use of the negotiated procedure without publication of a contract notice in the case 
of supply contracts for additional deliveries should be assessed in the light of this complexity and the associated 
requirements for interoperability and standardisation of equipment. This is the case, for example, for the 
integration of new components into existing systems or for the modernisation of such systems.” 
1429 ibid 
1430 See Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations 2011, Chapter 8 - Procurement Procedures 
(Guidance) 21 August 2011, 14 para 88 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27658/dscpr_c8_procurement_pr
ocedures_apr12.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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In addition, the Directive provides that the length of such contracts as well as 
recurrent contracts may not exceed five years except in “exceptional 
circumstances”. 1431  These circumstances are not defined. The length of such 
contracts must be determined by taking account of the expected service life of any 
delivered items, installations or systems and the technical difficulties in operation and 
maintenance.1432 
  
The additional deliveries justification under the Defence Procurement Directive is 
possibly slightly narrower than the circumstances permitting the award of sole source 
follow-on contracts under U.S. law because the latter covers not only continued 
production but also continued development of a major system, whereas the former is 
confined to additional deliveries of existing items that have already been produced. 
Further, it is recalled that U.S. law may justify single source awards for follow-on 
contracts on the basis of “substantial duplication of costs” and “unacceptable delays”. 
There is no equivalent provision or justification under the Directive. In addition, unlike 
the Directive, U.S. law does not appear to place time restrictions on contracts or their 
use in “exceptional circumstances”, to the extent that any such restrictions could act 
as an effective check on the use of this exclusion.  
 
3.3. Framework Contracting 
 
In contrast to the limited discussion of protection of exclusive rights and follow-on 
work, U.S. legal commentary has identified one specific form of sole source 
contracting which may be liable to appreciably affect foreign competition, namely the 
                                                 
1431 Article 28(3)(a), subparagraph 2 
1432 ibid 
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use of framework contracting, a specific variety of which is known as “indefinite 
delivery-indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) contracts under U.S. law.1433  
 
Under U.S. law there are a number of discrete types of so-called variable quantity 
contract that might otherwise fall under the general category of “framework” 
agreements or arrangements under EU law. 1434  Task (services) and Delivery 
(supplies) Order Contracts (“TODO”) are one example.1435 TODO’s are contracts for 
services or goods that do not procure or specify a “firm quantity”. 1436  Instead, 
TODO’s provide for the issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the 
period of the contract. An initial contract may be awarded in competition, followed by 
further orders under the initial contract which may or may not be awarded in 
competition and under which one or more vendors may be eligible for award.1437  
 
Procurement notices and competition are generally not required for the issuance of 
TODO’s under either single or multiple award contracts. 1438  However, each 
contractor must nevertheless be provided a “fair opportunity to be considered” for 
each order unless one of the following circumstances are met.1439 The first is where 
the Agency’s need is of such “unusual urgency” that providing an opportunity to all 
contractors would result in unacceptable delays. The second is where only one 
contractor is capable or providing the services or property. The third is where the 
                                                 
1433 For commentary on the categories of framework contracts, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1331-1434 
1434 For a discussion of this comparison, see C Yukins, ‘Are IDIQs Inefficient? Sharing Lessons with European 
Framework Contracting’ (n 1056) 
1435 For a discussion of TODO contracts, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 148-152 
1436 10 U.S.C. §2304(d)(1) and (2) and 41 U.S.C. § 4101(1) and (2) 
1437 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and K R O’Brien-DeBakey, Competitive Negotiation: The Source Selection Process 
(n 1055) 148-152 
1438 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(a) and 41 U.S.C. § 1708(b)(1)(D) 
1439 See 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(b) 
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TODO should be issued on a sole source basis in the interest of economy and 
efficiency because it is a logical follow-on to a task or delivery order already 
competitively issued. The final circumstance is where it is necessary to place the 
order with a particular contractor in order to satisfy a minimum guarantee.1440 Non-
competitively awarded TODO’s can potentially cover a broad spectrum depending on 
the nature and scope of the work statement under the basic contract.1441  
 
Recently, more competition and notice requirements have been introduced,1442 as 
well as protests to the GAO of IDIQ orders over $10 million.1443  
 
It is recalled from Chapter 4 that the Defence Procurement Directive contains a 
specific provision on framework agreements.1444 According to Article 29, the term of a 
framework may not exceed seven years, except in exceptional circumstances in 
accordance with an appropriate justification.1445 Again, these are not elaborated in 
any detail. 
 
U.S. legal commentary has identified framework agreements as a serious potential 
barrier to foreign vendors not least because unlike other so-called categories of 
barriers to procurement (e.g. domestic content, socioeconomic requirements etc) 
there is no institutional resistance to framework agreements because government 
Agencies themselves foster barriers in pursuit of objectives such as efficiency, for 
                                                 
1440 ibid. The statutory exemption of task and delivery orders from competition is implemented in FAR 6.001(d)-
(f) 
1441 see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 328-330  
1442 FAR 8.405 and FAR 16.505 
1443 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e) and 41 U.S.C. § 253j(e) 
1444 Article 29 
1445 Article 29(2) 
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example.1446 Generally, framework contracting in the U.S. has been criticised on 
grounds of lack of competition, limited transparency and accountability e.g. through 
lack of publication requirements and limited protest jurisdiction, even though U.S. law 
requires that suppliers are offered a “fair opportunity” to compete for subsequent 
orders.1447 Particular instances have been identified in the DoD.1448  
 
More specifically with regard to barriers faced by foreign vendors, these include the 
initial difficulty for a newcomer discovering a framework agreement because of failure 
to publicize their existence (let alone any awards made); the practical problem of 
actually joining a framework which, after initial award, may in certain instances be 
closed for up to a decade1449  as well as the fact that there are a number of 
uncertainties in call-off competitions. 1450 These include the generality of stated award 
criteria that may favour an incumbent contractor and the general absence or 
unwillingness to pursue protests. 
 
                                                 
1446 C R Yukins and S L Schooner,‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement 
Market’ (n 29) 529, 556 
1447 ibid. Yukins and Schooner usefully summarise the findings of official reports as follows: “[c]entralized 
purchasing agencies, which establish the framework agreements in the first instance, will feel pressure to 
accommodate customer agencies by allowing tasks to be awarded to those customer agencies' favored 
contractors. To ease award to a favored contractor- often the incumbent contractor-the contracting agency may 
(1) fail to notify other vendors (other framework agreement holders) of an available task, (2) provide inadequate 
notice, (3) fail to provide useful specifications, (4) impose biased technical requirements, (5) allow a slanted 
evaluation of offers, (6) inadequately assess the reasonableness of the favored vendor's proffered price, or (7) 
ignore the many other rules meant to ensure vigorous, transparent competition”. (footnotes omitted). Ibid 552 
1448 ibid. 551 and citations at fn67 and 68 
1449 According to Article 29(2) of the Defence Procurement Directive, the term of a framework agreement may 
not exceed seven years, except in exceptional circumstances determined by taking into account the expected 
service life of any delivered items, installations or systems, and the technical difficulties which a change of 
supplier may cause 
1450 C R Yukins and S L Schooner, ‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to a Global Public Procurement 
Market’ (n 29) 556 who observe: “[w]hen the competition for an order is held, the agency may keep its stated 
criteria for award to a breezy minimum, and, because debriefings and protests often are not required, the 
agency's discretionary award decision may be completely immune from challenge or review. To add insult to 
injury, the data on the award may be spotty, and the terms used-because the standing contracts are generically 
crafted with little particularity-may well favor a savvy, incumbent contractor.” 
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However, it is important to observe that there is no substantial research examining 
the effects of framework contracting specifically on foreign competition in defence 
procurement either with regard to U.S. or EU operators. To this extent, the general 
conclusions drawn regarding their effects on foreign vendors in public procurement 
may indicate similar trends with regard to defence procurement but which cannot be 
taken to be conclusive. In short, more research needs to be done to determine to 
what extent foreign competition is affected by the use of framework contracting in the 
field of defence procurement. 
 
4. Maintenance of the Industrial Base 
 
As indicated in Chapter 9, Section 4.1, CICA permits the exclusion of sources on 
industrial mobilization grounds. CICA also provides for the use of non-competitive 
procedures in two circumstances where it is necessary to award the contract to a 
particular source(s). 1451  The first is in order to maintain a facility, producer, 
manufacturer, or other supplier so that the maintained entity will be available to meet 
the government’s request in the case of a national emergency or to achieve industrial 
mobilization.1452 The second is to establish or maintain an essential engineering, 
research, or development capability provided by an educational or other nonprofit 
institution or a federally funded R&D centre. 1453  Guidance on the use of this 
exception is located at FAR 6.302-3 and DFARS 206.302-3.  
 
                                                 
1451 10 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(3)(B) and (C) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(3)(B) and (C) 
1452 ibid 
1453 ibid 
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This Section focuses on the first circumstance which has been interpreted to address 
situations akin to dual sourcing. The FAR specifies a number of broad circumstances 
permitting such use. These include, inter alia, maintaining vital suppliers in business; 
training of a selected supplier to furnish critical supplies or prevent the loss of a 
supplier’s ability and employees’ skills; maintaining active engineering, research, or 
development work; maintaining properly balanced sources of supply for meeting the 
requirements of acquisition programs in the interest of industrial mobilization; 
continue in production, contractors that are manufacturing critical items when there 
would otherwise be a break in production; and divide current production requirements 
among two or more contractors to provide for an adequate industrial mobilization 
base.1454 Again recourse to the exception must be justified. An Agency’s decision to 
rely on this exception will not be questioned as long as it can demonstrate that its 
determinations are related to its industrial mobilization needs.1455  
 
It is clear from references to terms such as “vital”, “national emergency”, “critical” loss 
of “ability” and “skills”, “properly balanced” sources of supply, “industrial mobilization”, 
and maintaining an “adequate” industrial base that the above is exceptionally broad 
in its authorisation.  
 
4.1. Industrial Mobilization under the Defence Procurement Directive 
 
The Defence Procurement Directive does not contain a free-standing industrial 
mobilization ground permitting use of the negotiated procedure without publication. It 
                                                 
1454 See FAR 6.302-3(b)(1)(i)-(vii) 
1455 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) and cases cited 
at 317-318 
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has been suggested that protection of any such interest would require Article 346 
TFEU to be invoked.1456 It is further recalled from Chapter 2, Section 5.1 that it has 
been suggested that there must be a discrete separation of permissible non-
economic (i.e. security) considerations and impermissible economic (i.e. job and 
employment-related) considerations.1457 Whilst the extent to which a strict separation 
is, at all, possible, is questionable for the purposes of EU law, it appears that U.S. 
law does not make any formal distinction on the basis of interests which may 
comprise the broader interest of “industrial mobilization”.  
 
Therefore, there is a clear contrast between an express industrial mobilization ground 
under U.S. law and the comparable absence of such a ground under EU law except 
to the extent permitted by Article 346 TFEU and only then on security grounds. As 
indicated in Chapter 8, Section 1 this reflects fundamentally different predispositions. 
U.S. procurement law has a fundamentally national orientation. In contrast, EU 
procurement law is designed to enable domestic and foreign competition. However, it 
is open to question whether the absence of a primary focus of the U.S. system on 
foreign competition should continue to legitimate exceptionally broad grounds such 
as “industrial mobilization” without their being subject to conditions or other limitations 
on their terms and use, an issue to which this Section now turns. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1456 Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, point 4 
1457 See also Guidance Note, Security of Supply, 2, point 419-20, point 4 
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4.2. Continued Role of Industrial Mobilization Exceptions 
 
Whilst the Fortresses and Icebergs Study states that there are legitimate bases for 
precluding foreign sources from participating in certain sensitive areas,1458 the Study 
also candidly states: 
 
While the U.S. retains the legal basis to take many extraordinary actions 
in time of war or other emergency such as excluding foreign sources on 
“industrial base and mobilization” grounds, industrial mobilization has in 
fact not been included in strategic planning or spending since the end of 
the Cold War. In the context of twenty first century warfare, the entire 
notion of requiring domestic production to ensure wartime industrial 
ramp-up is antiquated: the short duration of modern wars and the 
complexity of modern weapon systems make the rapid expansion of 
production for anything other than munitions extremely difficult.  
 
In addition, in a global industrial economy, maintaining several domestic 
sources can be both costly and unnecessary from both a security of 
supply standpoint (because foreign sourcing does not necessarily imply 
vulnerability) or to ensure competition. In the past, the industrial base 
exclusion has been used where a DoD component sought to maintain 
two competitive sources in order to maintain competition […] In today’s 
economy, it may make more sense to allow a foreign producer to provide 
                                                 
1458 The examples identified are system integrators on stealthy vehicles. See Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol II) 
666 
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the competition rather than require the maintenance of a second 
source.1459 
 
It should be observed that whilst the above implies that industrial mobilization has 
been used to exclude foreign competition, as indicated in Chapter 9, Section 4.1, the 
extent of its use is not clear. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to engage the 
political debate regarding the importance to be attributed to industrial mobilization in 
defence policy. However, from a legal perspective, it is important to question whether 
there is a basis for limiting the potential for broadly stated grounds to legitimate the 
exclusion of competition. This thesis does not necessarily posit specific means by 
which this could be achieved. However, it would involve a fundamental consideration 
of the interests which must be legally defined, whether specific terms within a 
provision can limit its use as well as whether it can be controlled through more 
stringent notification and justification requirements. This fundamental thinking 
resonates with the debate provoked in Chapter 5, Section 3 regarding the necessity 
for broadly defined security of supply requirements.  
 
 
5. National Security 
 
Another important exception permitting the use of non-competitive procedures allows 
an Agency to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals if 
disclosure of the Agency’s needs would otherwise compromise national security.1460 
                                                 
1459  ibid. For a contrary view, see W R Hawkins, ‘The Need for Socioeconomic Guidance in Defense 
Procurements’, (2004-2005) 40(4) Procurement Law, 8 
1460 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(6) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(6) 
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Guidance on this exception is located at FAR 6.302-6.1461 DFARS does not provide 
any additional supplementation. 
 
This exception must not be used merely because the acquisition is classified or 
access to classified material will be necessary to submit a proposal or to perform the 
contract. 1462  Contracts awarded pursuant to the exception must continue to be 
supported by written J&As but need only stipulate the minimum essential 
information.1463 A contracting officer need not submit a notice in the Governmentwide 
Point of Entry (“GPE”) when the contracting officer determines that the synopsis 
cannot be worded to preclude disclosure of an Agency’s needs.1464 Notwithstanding, 
Agencies must request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under 
the circumstances.1465  
 
It should be observed that according to one leading treatise, there have been no 
reported protests on the use of this exception.1466 It is not clear what this could 
indicate about the use of the national security exception. The National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 required the Comptroller General to review the 
use of this exception.1467 As indicated in Section 1 of this Chapter, this included 
                                                 
1461 FAR 6.302-6(b) 
1462 FAR 5.202(a) 
1463 FAR 6.302-6(c) 
1464 FAR 5.202 
1465 FAR 6.302-6(c)(3) 
1466 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 319 
1467 Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, §844. §844(b) 
provided that this included review of the following: (1) the pattern of usage of the national security exception by 
acquisition organizations within the Department to determine which organizations are commonly using the 
exception and the frequency of such usage; (2) the range of items or services being acquired through the use of 
such exception; (3) the process for reviewing and approving justifications involving such exception; (4) whether 
the justifications for use of such exception typically meet the relevant requirements of the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation applicable to the use of such exception; (5) issues associated with follow-on procurements for items or 
services acquired using such exception; and (6) potential additional instances where such exception could be 
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publication of a 2012 GAO Report.1468 The Report indicated that dollar obligations 
under the national security exception were small relative to other exceptions to full 
and open competition in that only approximately 2% of DoD’s other than full and 
open competition obligations ($13 billion) were obligated under the national security 
exception.1469 
 
The GAO Report made a number of findings in relation to the use of the exception, to 
which this Chapter now turns. It should be observed that it did not make any specific 
findings in relation to its use with regard to foreign competition.  
  
5.1 Class Justifications and Approvals 
 
With regard to J&A’s, the 2012 GAO Report identified that for the contracts reviewed, 
most DoD entities used a single J&A document, otherwise identified by the FAR as a 
“class justification” which applies to multiple contracts.1470 It was reported that despite 
the number of firms listed in the class justification, competition among them for a 
given contract award was rare due to the fact that only one of the firms was capable 
of meeting requirements or that amending existing class justifications to add new 
entrants to the market had proved difficult, thereby reducing competition by limiting 
                                                                                                                                                        
applied and any authorities available to the Department other than such exception that could be applied in such 
instances 
1468 See United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting, Improved Policies and Tools 
Could Help Increase Competition on DOD’s National Security Exception Procurements (n 1380) 
1469 ibid 6 citing at 7 Figure 1: Percentage of Total DOD Obligations Based on Other Than Full and Open 
Competition, by FAR Exceptions to Competition, Fiscal Years 2007 through 2010 (source: GAO analysis of 
FPDS-NG data) 
1470 According to the Report, among the contracts reviewed, $3.3 billion in obligations during the period of fiscal 
years 2007 through 2010 used class justifications, while less than $0.1 billion was obligated during that period 
under individual justifications. See United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting, 
Improved Policies and Tools Could Help Increase Competition on DOD’s National Security Exception 
Procurements (n 1380) 12-14 citing Figure 5: Relationship of Contracts Reviewed to Type of Justifications Used 
by the Military Departments and Associated Obligations for Fiscal Years 2007 – 2010 (source: GAO analysis of 
DOD files and FPDS-NG data). 
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the ability to work with new entrants to the market.1471 The Report also identified that 
some officials had also noted concerns about the level of review of individual 
contracts awarded without full and open competition under class justifications.1472 It 
was suggested that the existence of class justifications may render it easier to forego 
competition.1473 Importantly, the Report identified that irrespective of the choice to 
use individual or class justifications, all those reviewed met FAR standards for 
approving justifications.1474 
 
5.2. Competition Failures 
 
The 2012 GAO Report also indicated that whilst the military departments sought to 
provide competition to the greatest extent practicable as required by the FAR, they 
attributed failure to ensure sufficient competition to a number of reasons. The first 
concerned the small number of firms able to meet the security requirements for the 
goods and services being procured.1475 Importantly, military departments typically did 
not achieve competition in national security exception contracts because the DoD 
only received one proposal.1476 Further, contracts receiving only one proposal are 
considered competitively awarded if the solicitation was open to multiple potential 
offerers; therefore, contracts reported in FPDS-NG that received only one proposal 
                                                 
1471 ibid18, reporting the statements of U.S. Air Force Officials 
1472 According to the Report, the Air Force revised its process in a recently approved national security class 
justification for an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance program office, requiring individual contract 
actions over $85.5 million to be submitted to the Air Force senior procurement executive for expedited review. 
This class justification also includes a mechanism for adding new firms after the initial approval of the justification. 
Officials indicated that they anticipate an increase in competition rates as a result of this new flexibility. ibid 
1473 ibid 26 
1474 ibid 18-19 
1475 ibid 22 
1476 The Report indicates that of the more than 11,300 DoD military department contract actions citing the 
national security exception from fiscal years 2007 through 2010, the DoD only received one proposal for $10.6 
billion of its obligations (approximately 84% of the total $12.7 billion in obligations under this exception). See ibid, 
20 
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may have been awarded using competitive procedures. 1477  A second reason 
concerned constraints on soliciting new vendors including proprietary data and 
reliance on incumbent contractor expertise.1478 A third reason concerned general 
constraints regarding not having the tools to increase market research and solicit 
vendors in a secure environment. 1479  Another reported concern was that 
FedBizOpps.com is not suitable for security sensitive contracting, Agencies 
preferring to conduct their own market research and provide solicitations to firms 
directly.1480  
 
The Fortresses and Icebergs Study has indicated that this exception serves a 
legitimate function, for example, where it is deemed necessary to safeguard a unique 
U.S. capability that may be compromised were details released to foreign 
companies. 1481  However, as indicated above, in those instances identified, a 
particular issue concerns the relatively low number of possible contractors able to 
tender for contracts. The ability to meet security requirements may be one factor.1482 
However, it has also been identified that most foreign defence firms are able to adapt 
to ensure compliance with such requirements.1483 It is also conceivable that most 
foreign contractors may simply lack the capability to tender for such contracts.  
                                                 
1477 According to the Report, the data on the extent to which national security exception contracts were awarded 
competitively were not sufficiently reliable but the available data confirmed that competition is infrequent in that 
less than 25% of military department obligations under this exception were competitively awarded. See ibid, 21  
1478 It is recalled from Section 3 above that similar reasons appear to be responsible for the award of follow-on 
contracts to incumbent contractors without competition under the sole source exception 
1479 ibid, 22 
1480 ibid 23  
1481 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 666 
1482 ibid 689. For instance, the Fortresses and Icebergs Study indicates that it may also be difficult for companies 
with a foreign element to satisfy security requirements. In particular, even where such a company can secure 
special security arrangements, it cannot obtain access to “proscribed information” without a “National Interest 
Determination” in the absence of which a firm would be precluded from competing for, or participating in, 
classified contracts. In particular, it has been stated that a firm under a Special Security Agreement (“SSA”) may 
not even become aware of an opportunity to compete for a contract with proscribed data  
1483 ibid 689 
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Notwithstanding, a common issue which appears to recur in relation to the 
exceptions concerns proprietary data, the relevance of incumbent contractors, 
mechanisms used to retain approved suppliers as well as difficulties experienced in 
terms of the resources and capability necessary to expand searches for new 
sources. Further, whilst the Report identified general compliance with J&A approvals, 
there had been some concern expressed about the level of review of individual 
contracts awarded without full and open competition under class justifications. As 
indicated, there is no substantial evidence that is able to discern the effects, if any, 
which may result to foreign contracts from limitations placed on national competition.  
 
5.3. National Security Exceptions under U.S. and EU Law 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 2, Section 2.1 that Article 346(1)(a) TFEU provides that 
“no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security.” The protection accorded 
to this interest is reflected in a specific exclusion contained within the Defence 
Procurement Directive. Article 13(a) provides that the Directive shall not apply to: 
 
[…] contracts for which the application of the rules of this Directive would 
oblige a Member State to supply information the disclosure of which it 
considers contrary to the essential interests of its security. 
 
However, it is further recalled from Chapter 2 that there is no case law concerning 
the invocation of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU. The replication of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU in 
Article 13(a) may be intended to limit the effect of this Treaty exception in practice. 
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Importantly, it is recalled that the Defence Procurement Directive contains a set of 
designated provisions designed to safeguard sensitive information certain of which 
were briefly discussed in Chapter 10, Section 3.1. 
 
It would appear that the U.S. national security exception has not occupied as 
decisive a role as Article 346 TFEU. However, it is difficult to speculate on the 
precise reasons for this position. One possible factor is that competition is 
predominantly national.1484 A second factor might be that the CICA sole source and 
industrial mobilization exceptions provide a sufficiently broad legal basis to limit 
competition in most instances, including national security. It is also recalled that it is 
possible to rely on more than one exception in order to justify a limitation on 
competition. Unlike Article 346 TFEU which is intended to be limited by the concepts 
of “essentiality” and “necessity”, the U.S. national security exception only refers to the 
“compromise” of national security.  
 
Drawing on earlier observations of this Chapter, this brief comparison raises broader 
questions as to whether, in the absence of a legal definition of matters such as 
“national security” and the necessity and essentiality of the security interest, more 
extensive provision could and/or should be made in relation to J&A requirements. In 
addition, it may be possible to argue that Article 346 TFEU should be subject to 
similar requirements. 
 
 
                                                 
1484 By contrast, it is recalled from Chapter 2, Section 4 that Member States have sought to rely on Article 346 
TFEU generally to preclude the participation of foreign competition out of a concern to maintain or respect 
confidentiality (including in relation to third countries) 
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6. Unusual and Compelling Circumstances  
 
Another circumstance permitting other than full and open competition is where the 
Agency’s need for property or services is of such an unusual and compelling urgency 
that the government would be seriously injured unless the Agency is permitted to limit 
the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals.1485 For this exception, 
the J&A may be made and approved after contract award when preparation and 
approval prior to award would unreasonably delay the acquisition.1486 This exception 
is implemented in FAR 6.302-2 and DFARS Subpart 206.302-2(b) and supplemented 
by PGI 206.302-2(b).  
 
It has been stated that this exception is narrowly construed because the acquisition 
planning process is intended to overcome all but the most compelling urgency 
situations.1487 Legitimate circumstances enabling the exception have included the 
continuation of weapons tests vital to national security,1488 as well as where only one 
company could ensure supply for the military for immediate use in operations.1489 
Urgency does not necessarily justify sole source procurement (i.e. competition may 
be limited to two or more contractors) but an Agency may limit competition to the only 
firm that it reasonably believes can perform the work promptly.1490  CICA does not 
                                                 
1485 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(2) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(2) 
1486 FAR 6.302-2(c)(1)  
1487 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 313 
1488 See e.g. Support Sys. Assocs., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-232473, 89-1 CPD ¶ 11 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash 
Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 314 
1489 Greenbrier Indus., Inc Comp. Gen. Dec. B-241304-91 CPD ¶ 92 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R 
Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 314 
1490 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 314 and cases 
cited therein 
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define what type of “serious injury” must result in order to justify limiting competition; 
however, the GAO has included possible financial injury.1491  
 
When Agencies use the urgency exception, they must limit the quantity of the supply 
or services being procured to only the amount necessary to meet their needs and 
should not continue for more than a minimum period prior to the time when 
competition can be obtained.1492  
 
In contrast to the use of the sole source and national security exceptions, there is  
even less data available to discern the use of this exception by the DoD in practice. A  
2004 Inspector General Report which reviewed use of the exception by NASA, found 
that in 20% of the contract actions reviewed, the justification for use of this exception 
was not adequate, in particular, in failing to adequately address (or failing to cite) the 
specific nature and extent of the harm to the Government necessitating its use and in 
failing to include a statement as to whether any other parties expressed an interest in 
the requirement.1493 Again it is not clear to what extent this exception has been used 
to exclude foreign competition. However, this Report may corroborate general 
findings in relation to the use of J&A’s. 
 
The Defence Procurement Directive also provides for use of the negotiated 
procedure without publication of a contract notice in cases of urgency in two 
circumstances. The first is where the periods laid down for use of the restricted 
                                                 
1491 See Arthur Young Co., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-221879, 86-1 CPD ¶ 536 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C 
R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 316 
1492 J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 317 and cases cited 
therein 
1493 Office of Inspector General, Review of Sole-Source and Limited Competition Contract Actions Citing 
“Unusual and Compelling Urgency”, January 8 2004, IG-04-007, 3 <http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY04/ig-04-
007.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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procedure and negotiated procedure with publication of a contract notice are 
incompatible with the “urgency resulting from a crisis”.1494 The second is where the 
time-limit for the above procedures cannot be complied with and the negotiated 
procedure without publication is “strictly necessary for reasons of extreme urgency 
brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting authority”. 1495  The 
Directive adds the important qualification that the circumstances invoked to justify 
extreme urgency must not be attributable to the contracting authority.1496 Similar to 
the other exceptions examined, the Directive contains no specific additional 
notification or justification requirements. 
 
Again, it is not possible to discern the extent to which this kind of exception is likely to 
impact on foreign competition. At the least, it appears that the exception in the 
Directive imposes limitations by reference to “strict necessity”, “extremity” and 
“unforeseeability”, in contrast to the CICA exception which refers only to “unusual” 
and “compelling urgency”.  
 
 
7. Requirements of International Agreements 
 
Another important exception relates to international agreements and refers to two 
circumstances. The first is where the U.S. is to be reimbursed by a foreign nation, 
                                                 
1494 Article 28(1)(c). Article 1(10) defines a ‘crisis’ as: “any situation in a Member State or third country in which a 
harmful event has occurred which clearly exceeds the dimensions of harmful events in everyday life and which 
substantially endangers or restricts the life and health of people, or has a substantial impact on property values, 
or requires measures in order to supply the population with necessities; a crisis shall also be deemed to have 
arisen if the occurrence of such a harmful event is deemed to be impending; armed conflicts and wars shall be 
regarded as crises for the purposes of this Directive [.]” 
1495 Article 28(1)(d) 
1496 ibid  
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and that country has specified in written direction, such as a Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance, that the supplies or services are to be procured from a particular firm 
e.g. foreign military sales.1497 The second is where the planned contract is for 
services to be performed, or supplies to be used, in the sovereign territory of another 
country and the terms of a treaty or agreement specify or limit the sources to be 
solicited.1498 There is no requirement that the foreign government initiate a sole 
source designation.1499 Guidance on the use of this exception is located at FAR 
6.302-4 and DFARS 6.302. DFARS 206.302-4 adds the limitation that the J&As 
described in FAR 6.303 and 6.304 are not required if the Head of the contracting 
activity prepares a document that describes the terms of an agreement or treaty or 
the written directions, such as a Letter of Offer and Acceptance, that have the effect 
of requiring the use of other than competitive procedures.1500 As will be discussed in 
Chapter 11, Section 3, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to examine foreign military 
sales contracting. However, the relation of foreign military sales to offsets will be 
discussed.1501 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 3, Sections 3 and 6 that the Defence Procurement 
Directive contains international contract exclusions and a specific exclusion on 
government-to government contracts.1502 With regard to the second circumstance 
comprising the CICA exception, the Defence Procurement Directive contains two 
specific exclusions. The first relates to contracts awarded pursuant to international 
                                                 
1497 41 U.S.C. 2304(c)(4) and 41 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4) and FAR 6.302-4(b)(1) and (2) 
1498 ibid 
1499 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 318 
1500 DFARS 206.302-4  
1501 See Chapter 11, Section 3. For a useful legal discussion of foreign military sales contracting, see C B Barry, 
‘Contracting by Competitive Negotiations in Support of FMS’ (1993-1994) DISAM Journal of International Security 
Cooperation Management, 89; L D Anderson, ‘Foreign Military Sales Sole Source Exception: The Current 
USASAC Practice’ (1993) DISAM Journal of International Security Cooperation Management 83 
1502 Article 12(a) and Article 13(f) 
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agreements and arrangements relating to the stationing of troops and the 
undertakings of a Member State or third country.1503 It has been observed that this 
likely covers NATO Status of Forces Agreements.1504 The second exclusion under 
the Directive relates to contracts awarded in a third country, including for civil 
purchases, carried out when forces are deployed outside EU territory where 
operational needs require them to be concluded with economic operators located in 
the area of operations.1505  
 
Whilst the CICA exception and the above exclusions do not directly correspond, 
common to both forms, it is not possible to discern the full effect of these exclusions 
on foreign competition, and which is, in any event, limited to the exigencies of a 
limited number of circumstances outside national territory. 
 
 
8. Necessary in the Public Interest 
 
The final CICA exception concerns an instance in which the Head of an Executive 
Agency determines that it is necessary in the public interest to use other than 
competitive procedures in a particular procurement. Guidance is located at FAR 
                                                 
1503 Recital 26 and Article 12(b). Article 15(b) Public Sector Directive contains a broadly comparable provision. 
For a discussion of the differences, see Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the boundaries’ (n 80) 110. For earlier 
commentary, see Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (n 47) 226; Arrowsmith, The Law of 
Public and Utilities Procurement (119) point 6.100 
1504 See Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 
London, June 19, 1951 (“NATO SOFA”); Agreement between the Member States of the European Union 
concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the 
headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation 
and execution of the tasks referred to in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and 
of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this 
context (EU SOFA) [2003] OJ C 321/02. Discussed in Heuninckx, ‘Lurking at the boundaties’ (n 80) 108 and 110. 
See also Guidance Note, Defence- and security-specific exclusions, 3, point 2.3 
1505 Article 13(d). For guidance on this provision, see Guidance Note, Defence- and security-specific exclusions, 
8-9, point 3.5 
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6.302-7 and DFARS 6.302-7.1506 This exception has a residual application and only 
applies when none of the other exceptions apply.1507 The public interest exception is 
subject to four limitations. Firstly, a written determination for use must be made by 
the Head of an Executive Agency (i.e. the Secretary of Defense), an authority which 
cannot be delegated.1508 Secondly, Congress must be notified in writing of such 
determination no less than 30 days before contract award.1509 Thirdly, if required by 
the Head of an Agency, the contracting officer must prepare a justification to support 
the written determination.1510 Finally, the D&F must not be made on a class basis.1511 
 
Again, this exception is extremely broad. In terms of its effect on foreign contractors, 
this exception has been used to justify the purchase of foreign aircraft,1512 as well as 
to restrict competition to U.S. firms where the contract was performed in a foreign 
country.1513 In 2003, the DoD cited this exception under FAR 6.302-7, to preclude 
other nations joined in the U.S. coalition in Iraq from competing for certain Iraqi 
reconstruction contracts. This controversial decision raised questions as to whether 
the exercise of sole source authority in this instance violated U.S. obligations under 
the WTO GPA.1514 
 
                                                 
1506 For discussion of this exception, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government 
Contracts (n 1055) 318, 319-320 
1507 FAR 6.302-7(b) 
1508 FAR 6.302(c)(1)(i) and (ii); DFARS 206.302-7 
1509 FAR 6.302(c)(2) 
1510 FAR 6.302(c)(3)  
1511 FAR 6.302(c)(4) 
1512 See Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-403471, 2010 CPD ¶ 271 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr 
and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055), 319 
1513 See Zublin Del., Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-227003.2, 87-2 CPD ¶ 149 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C 
R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055), 319 
1514 See J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 319-320; C 
Pitchas, ‘World Trade Organisation/United States: award of prime contracts for infrastructure reconstruction in 
Iraq - an assessment under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement’ (2004) 3 PPLR, 85 
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It is recalled from Chapter 2, Section 2, that EU law does permit restrictions on free 
movement, inter alia, on grounds of “public policy”. However, any measure taken is 
subject to a strict proportionality assessment. It is further recalled that Member States 
have been more inclined to simply invoke Article 346 TFEU. A general public interest 
exception does not feature in the Defence Provision Directive.  
 
The overall significance and ability of this exception to impact on foreign contractors 
should not be overstated. For Fiscal Year 2012, there has been a reported 0.19% 
use of this exception.1515 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that, by their terms, the CICA exceptions permitting 
non-competitive procurement are extremely broad. As indicated, certain exceptions 
correspond with the circumstances permitting use of the negotiated procedure 
without publication under the Defence Procurement Directive. To this extent, these 
exceptions appear to be standard features common to both the U.S. and EU 
procurement systems. 
 
However, as indicated in Chapter 8, similarities and differences reflect the historical 
political and economic circumstances of each procurement system. In the U.S., legal 
institutions reflect the priority accorded to the protection of broadly defined national 
interests. In the EU, legal institutions are intended to equalize national and foreign 
                                                 
1515  By dollar value this equaled $286,213,609.99 of dollars not competed. See 
<http://www.usaspending.gov/pie-
summarytabular?q=node%2F91&tab=By+Agency&fromfiscal=yes&carryfilters=on&typeofview=detailsummary&fis
cal_year=2012&maj_contracting_agency=9700&maj_contracting_agency_name=Department+of+Defense&cdtyp
e=0&page=1&rp=15&sortname=sum&sortorder=desc&dtype=NonComp> accessed 20 September 2013. 
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competition and which is reflected in the generally more circumscript exceptions 
contained in the Defence Procurement Directive. 
 
In terms of discerning the effect of these exceptions on foreign competition, the 
research findings were necessarily limited by the absence of empirical data. 
Anecdotal evidence from GAO and other reports appears to indicate certain issues. 
Firstly, whilst the reports indicate general compliance with FAR J&A requirements, 
certain issues have been raised in relation to their use. Further, the fact that existing 
J&A requirements are generally met does not address the question of whether or not 
these requirements are effective. Secondly, issues have been raised concerning the 
effect of sole source contracting in limiting competition. Prime examples include the 
use of framework contracting.  
 
To date, there have been no significant attempts to re-assess the CICA 
exceptions.1516 This Chapter recognizes the fact that the CICA exceptions do not 
constitute detailed means for regulating foreign competition. Notwithstanding, they 
exercise an important “gate-keeper” function in deciding the level of permissible 
competition. This includes the fundamental decision of whether foreign competition is 
permitted. To this extent, there is a transatlantic interest in ensuring that such 
exceptions operate effectively. A brief comparison of the CICA and EU exceptions 
indicate certain incidents of comparison as well as contrast which provoke interesting 
                                                 
1516 See, for example, a 1993 speech given by the then deputy DoD Inspector General: “We have not seen any 
analyses or demonstration of a problem that supports moving away from full and open competition or eliminating 
the seven exemptions to competition.” Prepared statement of Derek J. Vander Schaaf, deputy DoD inspector 
general to the House Small Business Committee on Thursday August 03 1995, entitled: “Debunking Acquisition 
Reform Myths” <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=948> accessed 20 September 2013 
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debate regarding the definition, function, use and accountability for use of exceptions 
in defence procurement.  
 
This thesis now turns to the final substantive Chapter of this Part which examines 
U.S. foreign acquisition law. 
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11 
U.S. Foreign Acquisition Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is recalled from Chapter 3 that the Defence Procurement Directive attempts to 
expressly exclude certain forms of international contracting from its scope of 
application through Articles 12 and 13 and which is, therefore, a field of activity 
regulated by the Member States subject only to their obligations to ensure conformity 
of action with EU law. Similarly, the U.S. regulates the conduct of its procurement 
relations with foreign contractors through its provisions on “foreign acquisition” 
contained in FAR Part 25 and DFARS Subpart 225.  
 
This Chapter will examine key aspects of U.S. foreign acquisition law. Having 
outlined the main provisions, this Chapter will focus on offsets in foreign military sales 
and the reciprocal defence procurement memoranda of understanding (“RDPs”) in 
light of the significance recently attributed to these instruments by U.S. legal 
commentary in response to the Defence Procurement Directive. 
 
 
2. U.S. Foreign Acquisition Law: International Contracting 
 
Before examining offsets and the RDPs, it is first necessary to place U.S. foreign 
acquisition law in context not least because U.S. law prescribes “buy national” laws 
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and domestic sources restrictions which apply specifically to foreign contractors. As 
will be discussed in Section 4, signatories to the RDPs qualify for a waiver of these 
and other requirements. Importantly, however, these restrictions remain prima facie 
applicable to EU Member States which are not signatories to the RDPs unless they 
can secure a waiver by other means. 
 
2.1. Domestic Source Restrictions and the Buy American Act 
 
It is generally agreed that measures conferring a competitive advantage on domestic 
industries constitute a barrier to national procurement markets.1517 Such measures 
can take the form of “buy national” laws and policies. Whilst there is little statistical or 
other empirical evidence to substantiate their effect, research on discriminatory 
procurement and international trade suggests that “home biased” procurement 
practices are endemic and substantially affect trade flows, particularly in the 
manufacturing sectors.1518 With regard to EU Member States, the Fortresses and 
Icebergs Study has confirmed that most of the major defence trading Member States 
studied do not have explicit domestic content laws.1519 This is likely due, in part, to 
the fact that the application of such practices within the EU would constitute 
quantitative restrictions or measures of equivalent effect which are prohibited under 
EU law unless justified. 1520 As will be discussed in Section 4 below, even if Member 
States were to engage such practices, it is open for the U.S. to contend that such 
                                                 
1517 S Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (n 77) 13-19 
1518 S J Evenett and B Hoekman (ed.) The WTO and Government Procurement (Edward Elgar 2006) 356-73; 
Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. I) (n 12) 269 
1519 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 342 (with regard to France); 388 (with regard to Germany); 431 
(with regard to Italy); 479 (with regard to Poland); 518 (with regard to Romania); 554 (with regard to Sweden); 
608-9 (with regard to the UK)  
1520 Article 34 (ex Article 28 TEC) and Article 35 (ex Article 29 TEC). See Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland 
[1982] ECR 4005; Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council v KJ Lewis Ltd [1983] ECR 4083. See 
generally L W Gormley, EU Law of Free Movement of Goods and Customs Duties (n 96) 420 para 11.25 and 
para 11.27 and cases cited therein 
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treatment would be inconsistent with the guarantees provided in the RDPs.1521 The 
Fortresses and Icebergs Study nevertheless indicates the insistence of providing 
national content or value by a number of other means; these include partnering or 
teaming with indigenous firms or providing offsets.1522 The issue of offsets was 
examined in Chapter 7 and will be discussed in more detail in Section 3 below. 
 
U.S. law stands in sharp contrast in this regard.1523 U.S. law expressly mandates 
domestic preferences in order to protect domestic production and industries. In light 
of its historical significance, this Chapter focuses exclusively on the Buy American 
Act (“BAA”).1524 However, other important domestic source restrictions include the 
so-called “Berry Amendment” which prohibits the DoD from acquiring listed items 
which are not grown or produced in the U.S and which has included speciality 
metals.1525 Importantly, the specialty metals restriction does not apply to “qualifying 
countries” which include signatories to an RDP.1526  
  
The BAA was originally enacted in 1933 during the Great Depression in order to 
create and preserve jobs for American workers.1527 The BAA is one of the most 
                                                 
1521 This has, at least, been confirmed by Germany. See Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 388 
1522 ibid 
1523 For a useful overview of the issues presented by U.S. domestic preferences generally, see P H Wittie, 
‘Transnational concerns: domestic preferences’ (n 1056)  
1524 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d, as amended 
1525 10 U.S.C. § 2533a. For a useful discussion of the Berry Amendment and specialty metals restriction, see V 
B Grasso, ‘The Specialty Metal Provision and the Berry Amendment: Issues for Congress’ (Congressional 
Research Service) 22 March 2007 <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=715821> accessed 20 September 2013; V B 
Grasso, ‘The Specialty Metal Clause: Oversight Issues and Options for Congress’, (Congressional Research 
Service) July 2012 <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33751.pdf> accessed 20 September 2012 
1526 Qualifying Countries are listed at FAR 252. 225.7012 
1527 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d, as amended. The original enactment is contained in Ch. 212, 47 Stat. 1520, 72nd 
Congress, 2nd Session. (1933). The Act has only been substantively amended four times in succeeding years. 
See, P.L. 100-418, Title VII; 102 Stat. 1545, 100th Congress, 2nd Session (1988), P.L. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3346-
7, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session (1994), codified at 41 U.S.C. 10a., P.L. 104-201, § 827, 110 Stat. 2611 104th 
Congress, 2nd Session (1996), codified at 41 U.S.C. 10b-3, and P.L. 110-28, Title VIII, § 8306, 121 Stat. 112, 211, 
110th Congress, 1st Session (2007), codified at 41 U.S.C. 10a(b) 
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important components of the FAR and DFARS Parts on foreign acquisition.1528 An 
often stated objective of the Act is to protect domestic labour by restricting the U.S. 
government from purchasing supplies for use within the U.S. that are not “domestic 
end products”. 1529  The nationality of the contractor is not considered when 
determining if a product is of domestic origin.1530 The BAA is implemented in FAR 
Part 25 and DFARS 225.1. 
 
For unmanufactured articles or supplies acquired for use in the U.S., the BAA 
requires that they must have been “mined” or “produced in the U.S.1531 By contrast, a 
manufactured article will be deemed a “domestic end product” if the cost of the 
components mined, produced or manufactured in the U.S. exceeds 50 percent of the 
cost of all its components.1532 In implementation of the BAA, FAR 25.105 provides 
that if there is a domestic offer that is not the low offer, and the restrictions of the 
BAA apply to the low offer, the contracting officer must determine the 
reasonableness of the cost of the domestic offer. This requires the application of a 
price differentiatial to the foreign offer. 1533 However, DFARS 225.105(b) requires the 
application of a 50% differential to DoD procurements.  
 
                                                 
1528 The Buy American Act is mentioned expressly in FAR Subparts: 25.1 (Buy American Act – Supplies); 25.2 
(Buy American Act – Construction Materials) and 25.6 (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act – Buy 
American Act – Construction Materials) and DFARS Subpart 225.1 (Buy American Act supplies) and 225.2 (Buy 
American Act – Construction Materials). For general commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1614-1624 
1529 FAR 25.001 
1530 See, E-Systems, Inc., 61 Comp. Gen. 431 (1982); and Patterson Pump Co., B-200165, 80-2 CPD ¶ 453 
(1980) 
1531 41 U.S.C. §8302(a)(1) 
1532 41 U.S.C. §8303(a)(2) 
1533 The differential is applied only to the bid price for material to be delivered under the contact, not the total 
contract price. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Freidkin, 635 F.2nd 248 (3rd Cir. 1980) cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash 
Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1622 
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There are a number of exceptions to the BAA. Firstly, the BAA does not apply to 
procurements to which application would be inconsistent with the public interest.1534 
As will be discussed below, as a result of memoranda of understanding and other 
international agreements, the DoD has determined it inconsistent with the public 
interest to apply restrictions of the BAA and the Balance of Payments Program1535 to 
the acquisition of qualifying country end products. 1536  Signatories to the RDPs 
constitute “qualifying countries” for this purpose.1537 It is possible for a public interest 
exception to be applied and an individual waiver secured in certain 
circumstances.1538 DFARS 225.103(B) also provides that it is inconsistent with the 
public interest to apply the BAA to procurements covered by the WTO GPA to end 
products that are substantially transformed in the United States. Secondly, the BAA 
does not apply to products determined not to be reasonably available in commercial 
quantities and of satisfactory quality.1539 Thirdly, the BAA does not apply if the cost of 
the lowest priced domestic product is unreasonable. 1540  A system of price 
                                                 
1534 41 U.S.C. §8302(a)(1) 
1535 The Balance of Payments Program restricts, inter alia, the purchase of supplies that are not domestic end 
products, for use outside the United States. See DFARS 225.7501 
1536 DFARS 225.103 (a)(i)(A). See Self-Powered Lighting v. United States, 492 Supp. 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), 
where the court ruled that an MoU created a blanket exemption for all UK defence products and American Hosp. 
Supply, Equipping & Consulting, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-221357, 86-1 CPD  ¶ 70, where GAO found proper use of 
an exemption under an MoU with Italy. These exemptions also extend to non-defence products procured by the 
DoD. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Arnold, 619 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1980) and Air Plastics, Inc. Comp. Gen. Dec. B-
199307, 80-2 CPD ¶ 141 (exemption for Denmark by MoU), cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, 
Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1623 
1537 225.872-1. The following constitute “qualifying countries”: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK 
1538 For instance, according to DFARS 225.103(a)(ii), a public interest exception may be appropriate in the 
following circumstances: (1) if accepting the low domestic offer will involve substantial foreign expenditures, or 
accepting the low foreign offer will involve substantial domestic expenditures; (2)  to ensure access to advanced 
state-of-the-art commercial technology; or (3)  to maintain the same source of supply for spare and replacement 
parts (i)  for an end item that qualifies as a domestic end product; or (ii) in order not to impair integration of the 
military and commercial industrial base. ibid 
1539 41 U.S.C. §8302(a)(2)(B); FAR 25.103(a). See Midwest Dynamometer & Eng’g Co., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-
252168, 93-1 CPD ¶ 408 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts 
(n 1055) 1622-1623 
1540 41 U.S.C. § 8302(a). For general commentary, see J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R Yukins, Formation of 
Government Contracts (n 1055) 1622 
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differentials has been established for use in making this determination.1541 Fourthly, 
the BAA does not apply to procurements of products for use outside the United 
States.1542 Finally, the BAA does not apply to information technology determined to 
be a commercial item.1543 
 
For many years, the BAA has been the subject of intense scrutiny, not least because 
of claims regarding the potential for protectionist measures to threaten bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements concluded between the U.S. and other countries.1544 It 
is beyond the scope of this Chapter to engage an analysis of the BAA in full. For 
present purposes, it is necessary to focus, to the extent possible, on discerning the 
effect of the BAA with regard to the position of foreign contractors in defence 
procurement and which will be examined in Section 4 below. However, the position 
with regard to non-signatory EU Member States is even more difficult to discern. For 
instance, all of the countries examined for the purposes of the Fortresses and 
Icebergs Study are RDP signatories with the exception of Romania. The Study 
indicates that Romania “greatly desires such agreements”.1545 However, it is not clear 
whether it is to be inferred that Romania has been subject to significant restrictions in 
application of the BAA. It has been argued that a 50% price differential “severely 
inhibits a programme manager’s ability to choose from a globally competitive market 
                                                 
1541 Executive Order 10582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 (1954). These differentials have been codified in FAR 25.105 
1542 41 U.S.C. §8302(a)(2)(A). See Systems & Def. Servs. Int’l, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-254254.2, 94-1 CPD ¶ 91; 
Maremont Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 1362 B-186276, 76-2 CPD ¶ 181 cited in J Cibinic Jr, R C Nash Jr and C R 
Yukins, Formation of Government Contracts (n 1055) 1623 
1543 FAR 25.193(e) 
1544 See for instance, J A Howell, ‘The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 Versus The Buy American Act: The 
Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object’ (2005-2006) 35 Pub Cont LJ 495; S L Schooner and C R Yukins, 
‘Public Procurement: Focus on People, Value for Money and Systemic Integrity, Not Protectionism’, The George 
Washington University Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No.460, 87; S L Schooner and C 
R Yukins, ‘Tempering ‘Buy American’ In the Recovery Act – Steering Clear of a Trade War’ (2009) 51(10) 
Government Contractor 1; J S Smyth, ‘The Impact of the Buy American Act on Program Managers’ (1999) 
Acquisition Review Quarterly, 263 
1545 Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 506. According to the Study, there is no indication at present that 
the U.S. is seeking to negotiate an RDP, in particular, citing problems with Romania’s compliance with EU and 
international norms regarding transparency, corruption and organized crime 
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for defence goods.”1546 Again, however, it is not clear the extent to which non-
signatory EU Member States are disproportionately affected as compared to other 
foreign countries.1547  
 
2.2. International Trade Agreements 
 
In addition to domestic source restrictions, FAR 25.4 and DFARS 225.4 also stipulate 
the policies and procedures applicable to acquisitions that are covered, inter alia, by 
the WTO GPA. However, FAR 25.4 does not apply to acquisitions of arms, 
ammunition or war materials, or purchases indispensable for national security or for 
national defence purposes.1548 
 
The most important provisions of the FAR and DFARS for the purposes of the 
present Chapter concern the categories of other international agreement. FAR 25.8 
specifies the general provision relating to treaties and agreements between the U.S. 
and foreign governments. DFARS 225.8 contains a number of supplementary 
provisions. The main provisions relate to cooperative projects under NATO and the 
RDPs. The RDPs will be examined separately in Section 4 below. 
  
With regard to NATO, U.S. law prescribes specific rules relating to cooperative 
procurement projects. For the purposes of DFARS, a “cooperative project” means a 
“jointly managed arrangement” which is described in a written agreement between 
the parties and undertaken to further the objectives of standardization, rationalization, 
                                                 
1546 J S Smyth, ‘The Impact of the Buy American Act on Program Managers’ (n 1544) 268-269 
1547 As will be discussed in Section 4.7 below, it should also be borne in mind that it has been reported that even 
the BAA waivers under the RDPs have not been fully applied in all circumstances and it is not possible to fully 
discern the effect of the BAA waivers in practice 
1548 FAR 25.401(a)(2) 
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and interoperability of the armed forces of NATO member countries.1549 The relevant 
agreement must provide for: (i)  one or more of the other participants to share with 
the U.S. the cost of research and development, testing, evaluation, or joint production 
(including follow-on support) of certain defence articles; (ii) concurrent production in 
the U.S and in another member country of a defence article jointly developed; or 
(iii)  acquisition by the US of a defence article or defense service from another 
member country. 1550  In terms of the authority delegated under this provision, 
Departments and Agencies may enter into cooperative project agreements with 
NATO or with one or more NATO members.1551 This includes the authority to enter 
into contracts or incur other obligations on behalf of other participants,1552 and to 
solicit and award contracts to implement cooperative projects.1553  
 
A waiver of certain laws and regulations may be obtained if the waiver: (1) is required 
by the terms of a written cooperative project agreement; (2) will significantly further 
NATO standardization, rationalization and interoperability and (3) is approved by the 
appropriate DoD official.1554  
 
In addition, DFARS allows the Director of DPAP to authorize the direct placement of 
                                                 
1549 DFARS 225.872(a)(1) and (2) 
1550 DFARS 225.872(a)(3) 
1551 pursuant to DoDD 5530.3, International agreements. See DFARS 225.871-3 
1552 225.871-3(a)(2) 
1553 225.871-3(a)(2) and 225.871-3(a)(3) 
1554 225.871-3(b). Under 225.871-4(a) (statutory waivers), for contracts or subcontracts placed outside the 
United States, the Deputy Secretary of Defense may waive any provision of law that specifically prescribes— 
(1)  Procedures for the formation of contracts; (2)  Terms and conditions for inclusion in contracts; 
(3)  Requirements or preferences for— (i)  Goods grown, produced, or manufactured in the United States or in 
U.S. Government-owned facilities; or (ii)  Services to be performed in the United States; or (4)  Requirements 
regulating the performance of contracts. (b) There is no authority for waiver of— (1)  Any provision of the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751); (2)  Any provision of 10 U.S.C. 2304; (3)  The cargo preference laws of the 
United States, including the Military Cargo Preference Act of 1904 (10 U.S.C. 2631) and the Cargo Preference 
Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241(b)); or (4)  Any of the financial management responsibilities administered by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. (c)  To request a waiver under a cooperative project, follow the procedures at PGI 
225.871-4. (d) Obtain the approval of the Deputy Secretary of Defense before committing to make a waiver in an 
agreement or a contract 
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subcontracts with particular subcontractors. Directed subcontracting is not authorized 
unless specifically addressed in the cooperative project agreement.1555 The Subpart 
further states that in some instances, it may not be feasible to name specific 
subcontractors at the time the agreement is concluded.  However, the agreement 
must clearly state the general provisions for work sharing at the prime and 
subcontract level.1556   
 
The above provision evidences a considerable degree of flexibility to enable 
cooperation within NATO, including without regard to competitive contracting. It is 
recalled from Chapter 3, Section 5 that the Defence procurement Directive does not 
regulate cooperative procurement and simply provides one of a possible number of 
legal bases to exclude NATO procurement.1557  
 
FAR 25.9 also contains specific provisions on customs and duties. DFARS 225.900 
provides that the DoD will issue duty-free entry certificates for qualifying country 
supplies (end products and components). For the purposes of DFARS 225.003 a 
qualifying country means a country with a RDP.  
 
 
3. Offsets in Foreign Military Sales 
 
Chapters 3 and 7 briefly examined foreign military sales primarily from the 
perspective of the recipient. As indicated, the U.S. operates a Foreign Military Sales 
                                                 
1555 225.871-5(a) 
1556 225.871-5(b). For additional information on cooperative project agreements, see PGI 225.871-5 
1557 See Articles 12(a) and (c) discussed in Chapter 3, Sections 3 and 4, respectively 
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(“FMS”) programme in which it provides requested items to requesting Governments. 
This exchange is substantially one way. Section 22 of the Arms Export Control Act 
1976 authorizes the DoD to enter into contracts for resale to foreign countries or 
international organizations.1558 The policies and procedures concerning acquisition 
under FMS are regulated in DFARS 225.73.1559  
 
It is beyond the confines of this thesis to engage a detailed discussion of FMS 
contracting. It is recalled from Chapter 9, Section 2.1.1 that one of the criticisms that 
has arisen from U.S. Reports on competition in procurement concerns the extent to 
which FMS are seen as reducing competition in procurement.1560 CICA permits other 
than full and open competition in such an instance.1561 In particular, FMS customers 
can request a subcontract to be placed with a particular firm.1562 Further, whilst U.S. 
law regulates customer involvement to a certain extent, contracting officers have 
discretion to permit FMS customers to be involved in contract negotiations.1563 The 
extent to which such contracting processes may impact on competition has not been 
extensively researched. However, in accordance with the focus of Part I of the thesis, 
this Chapter is confined to an examination of related offset agreements.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 3, Section 6, a legitimate sale may often be accompanied by 
an offset agreement. Chapter 7, Section 4.2.2 examined the problematic relation of 
the sale and offset and its implications for third countries. As this Section will discuss, 
                                                 
1558 22 U.S.C. 2762 
1559 DFARS 225.7300(b) provides that it does not apply to: (1)  FMS made from inventories or stocks; 
(2)  Acquisitions for replenishment of inventories or stocks; or (3)  Acquisitions made under DoD cooperative 
logistic supply support arrangements 
1560  United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting: Actions Needed to Increase 
Competition (n 1163) 15 
1561 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(4). Implemented in DFARS 225.7304 in accordance with FAR 6.302-4 
1562 DFARS 225.7304 
1563 DFARS 225.7304 
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U.S. law similarly differentiates a legitimate sale from an offset agreement 
accompanying the sale. However, the U.S. is similarly ambivalent with regards to the 
legal and policy distinctions it draws between legitimate sales and offset agreements 
which, in the views of one U.S. legal commentator, has given a “false impression of 
an absence of offset arrangements in FMS transactions”.1564 
 
Annual monitoring of the impact of offsets on the U.S. defence industrial base dates 
as far back as 1984.1565 According to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), 
from 1993-2010 52 U.S. firms reported entering into 763 offset-related defence 
export sales contracts worth $111.59 billion with 47 countries, with associated offset 
agreements valued at $78.08 billion.1566  
 
3.1. U.S. Government Policy: “Hands Off(sets)” 
 
U.S. Government policy on offsets states that the government considers offsets1567 to 
be “economically inefficient and trade distorting.”1568 The U.S. prohibits any U.S. 
                                                 
1564 M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for 
the United States’ (n 971) 529 
1565 In 1984, Congress amended the Defense Production Act to require the President to submit an annual report 
to Congress on the impact of offsets on the U.S. defense industrial base. See Pub. L. 98-265, April 17, 1984, 98 
Stat. 149. In 1992, Congress amended the DPA and directed that the Secretary of Commerce function as the 
President’s Executive Agent in this regard. See Pub. L. 102-558, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4198. See also Part IV 
of Exec. Order No. 12919, 59 Fed. Reg. 29525 (June 3, 1994). Section 723 of the DPA authorizes the Secretary 
of Commerce to develop and administer the regulations necessary to collect offset data from U.S. firms. The 
Secretary of Commerce has delegated this authority to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). BIS published 
its offset reporting regulation in 1994. See 59 Fed. Reg. 61796, December 2, 1994, codified at 15 C.F.R. § 701. 
BIS amended its offset regulation in 2009. See 74 Fed. Reg. 68136, December 23, 2009, codified at 15 C.F.R. § 
701. For a useful historical discussion of U.S. initiatives in offset reporting, see M J Nackman, ‘A Critical 
Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for the United States’ (n 971) 524 
1566 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, Offsets in Defense Trade, Sixteenth Study, 
Conducted Pursuant to Section 723 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, January 2012, 3 citing 
Table 2-1: ‘Summary of Defense Export Sale Contract Values with Related Offset Agreements, 1993-2010’ 
(Source: BIS offset database) <http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/396-offsets-in-
defense-trade-sixteenth-study> accessed 20 September 2013 
1567 The U.S. Defense Offsets Disclosure Act of 1999 Pub. L. 106-113, section 1243(3) defines the term “offset” 
as: “the entire range of industrial and commercial benefits provided to foreign governments as an inducement or 
condition to purchase military goods or services, including benefits such as coproduction, licensed production, 
subcontracting, technology transfer, in-country procurement, marketing and financial assistance, and joint 
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government Agency from encouraging, entering directly into, or committing U.S. firms 
to any offset arrangement in connection with the sale of defence articles or services 
to foreign governments. 1569  To this extent, companies retain responsibility for 
determining whether to undertake, negotiate and implement offset agreements.1570 
Accordingly, as DPAP observes, the DoD has implemented a “hands off” approach to 
offsets.1571 This position is formalised in legal terms by DFARS 225.7303-2(3)(ii) 
which provides that: “the U.S. Government assumes no obligation to satisfy or 
administer the offset requirement or to bear any of the associated costs.”1572 This 
extends to a policy of providing no involvement with the negotiation of the offset 
agreement itself between the company and the FMS customer, and no role in judging 
the merits of these agreements.1573  In addition, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance 
(“LOA”) between the U.S. Government and the FMS customer and the resulting 
contract, inter se, do not include any of the terms of the offset (even though the LOA 
and contract may include costs associated with the offset).1574 Notwithstanding, it has 
been observed that whilst discussions will only take place directly between the 
purchasing country and contractor outside U.S. Government control, the implication 
is that the U.S. will have some knowledge of any proposal.1575 U.S. commentary has 
                                                                                                                                                        
ventures.”  
1568 Presidential Policy on Offsets in Military Exports, Statement by President Bush’s Press Secretary 16 April 
1990 <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/paic/attachments/offsets/presidential_policy_on_offsets_in_mil_exports.pdf> 
accessed 20 September 2013 
1569 ibid. Implemented in DFARS 225.7306 
1570 ibid 
1571 Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office, Offsets of Foreign Military Sales, FMS Offsets and 
Other Issues Affecting FMS Procurements, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)  
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/offsets_of_foreign_military_sales.html#_ftn1%23_ftn1> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1572 DFARS 225.7303-2(a)(3)(ii) 
1573 ibid 
1574 The FMS agreement is documented in a Letter of Acceptance. DFARS 225.7301(a) in accordance with DoD 
5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual 
1575 M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for 
the United States’ (n 971) who observes at 527: “The U.S. Government supposedly remains blissfully ignorant of 
the fact of their existence. Yet it is no secret which countries have offset requirements, as the offsets are 
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suggested that, to this extent, the DoD “turns a blind eye” to offsets in FMS and in 
doing so implicitly endorses the practice despite the U.S.’ official position.1576 
 
3.2. Offsets in Transatlantic Defence Trade 
 
Chapter 7 has provided the context for understanding the significance attributed to 
offsets within the EU. In terms of the extent of U.S. involvement in offset practices 
within the EU, according to a 2010 BIS report, in 2009, U.S. firms reported entering 
into 17 new offset agreements with EDA members valued at $670 million.1577 EDA 
members accounted for 30.36 % of the new offset agreements reported by U.S. firms 
in 2009 based on quantity and 9.95% based on value.1578 In addition, U.S. firms 
reported 230 offset transactions with EDA members with an actual value of $1.11 
billion, and an offset credit value of $1.44 billion.1579 The EDA members accounted 
for 34.64% of all offset transactions reported by U.S. firms in 2009 based on quantity 
and for 31.62% of the overall offset transaction value.1580  
 
Within the U.S., it is generally well reported that U.S. prime contractors readily 
identify the benefits of offsets as an important point of leverage into foreign defence 
markets as well as supporting the U.S. defence industries base.1581 However, it has 
been suggested that the views of subcontractors are often overlooked.1582 A principal 
                                                                                                                                                        
ultimately later disclosed to the U.S. Government as part of an annual reporting requirement to BIS [footnote 
omitted], shortly after the DCSA news release is published [footnote omitted].” 
1576 ibid 
1577 BIS, ‘Offsets in Defense Trade Sixteenth Study’ (n 1566) 6  
1578 ibid 
1579 ibid 
1580 ibid 
1581 ibid 
1582 See M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options 
for the United States’ (n 971) 523. See also G Ianakiev, ‘The United States and the “Offsets in Defence Trade” 
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concern relates to sales with direct offset requirements. These are said to displace 
U.S. subcontractors with foreign sources on export versions of initial systems 
designed by those subcontractors, in turn, resulting in the disclosure of intellectual 
property and other technical “know-how” which enables foreign sources to become 
competitors.1583 
 
Another important observation indicates the relative lack of clear offset tracking even 
in the U.S. where U.S. law imposes a number of statutory requirements in this 
regard.1584 The upshot it that the U.S. is still “studying” the effects of offsets and that 
before any substantive policies can be adopted, there needs to be greater 
transparency in reporting their use. 1585  This current emphasis on monitoring is 
broadly consistent with EU policy in the field.1586 
 
However, it is also important to emphasise that whilst the U.S. does not formally 
endorse offset policies in the way that has otherwise been explicit in EU Member 
States through dedicated offset laws and practices, the U.S. nevertheless actively 
seeks domestic content and workshare from foreign contractors on major 
programmes.1587 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Issue’ (2006) Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security 308 
<http://www.city.academic.gr/special/events/economics_and_security09/2006/11-Ianakiev.pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1583 M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for 
the United States’  (n 971) 522 
1584 ibid, 521 and 523  
1585 ibid 524 
1586 See for instance, the discussion of the EDA Offset Code in Chapter 7, Section 4 
1587 An example in this regard would have been the KC-X aerial refueling tanker contract discussed in Chapter 9, 
Section 3.3. See also Fortresses and Icebergs: (Vol. II) (n 12) 674 
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3.3. U.S. Offset Reform 
 
Of specific relevance to the present thesis, U.S. legal commentary has examined 
possible options for offset reform. For instance, it has been observed that the U.S. 
cannot simply prohibit U.S. companies from participation in offsets through 
regulation, although a legal (as opposed to political) assessment in favour or against 
this position has not been advanced.1588 More emphatically, it has been identified 
that this would “prove crippling” in the international defense trade market and that, 
rather, a global prohibition is needed.1589 Again, this is broadly correspondent with 
the EDA’s commitment to a global reduction of offset use through progressive 
elimination.1590 However, the reality is that offsets are culturally engrained in the 
procurement practices of the most developed defence nations as well as many of the 
emerging economies.  
 
One suggestion that has been identified as a “deceptively appealing option”, might be 
to require offsets in U.S. defense procurements from foreign contractors, with a view 
to “driving the WTO to eliminate the offset prohibition loophole altogether”. 1591 
However, it has been acknowledged that such a shift would harm the U.S.’ closest 
defense partners in the transatlantic defence industry, incentivizing them to move 
toward more protectionist measures at a time when they are “beginning to move 
away from them”.1592  It has also been suggested that efforts could be made to 
standardize the defence trade offset practice by pushing for additions to the WTO 
                                                 
1588 M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for 
the United States’ (n 971) 528 
1589 ibid 
1590 See Chapter 7, Section 4 
1591 Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for the 
United States’ (n 971) 528 
1592 ibid 
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GPA, thereby at least making the practice more predictable with the ultimate goal of 
eradicating the practice entirely.1593 To this extent, an emphasis on short to medium 
term management (including through the use of legal institutions) as opposed to 
absolute prohibition may be the most pragmatic solution as a means of progressively 
phasing offsets practices out. 
 
As indicated in the Introduction, a legal analysis of offset practices in the transatlantic 
defence market would necessitate a thesis in its own right. The objective of this 
thesis is served by highlighting the extent to which ambivalent EU and U.S. attitudes 
to offsets has required a mediated and compromised legal position. Offsets and 
related practices should be a high priority for future legal research examining 
transatlantic defence procurement. 
 
 
4. Reciprocal Defence Procurement MoU’s 
 
It is apposite that the substantive Part of this thesis should conclude with a 
discussion of the RDPs in light of repeated references made to these instruments in 
previous Chapters. Specifically, in response to what has been identified as a 
“seemingly perpetual European gripe with what is perceived to be a protectionist U.S. 
defense procurement policy” it has been proposed that: 
 
[r]evamping the RDPs with more stringent procedural requirements aimed 
at fairly competing more U.S. defense contracts could appease America’s 
                                                 
1593 M J Nackman, ‘A Critical Examination of Offsets in International Defense Procurements: Policy Options for 
the United States’ (n 971) 528-529, although the form and content of these “additions” is not specified 
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wary European allies and nip any “buy European” inclination in the 
bud”.1594 
 
In particular, it has been suggested that the absence of significant transparency 
requirements, or any detailed positive rules governing how procurements are to be 
conducted is a “lost opportunity to say the least”.1595 In addition, as will be discussed 
below, U.S. legal commentary has also suggested the need for reform of the review 
provisions.1596 This analysis pre-empts the fact that certain of the RDPs are intended 
to terminate in 2015, provoking a necessary discussion of their renewal, reform or 
replacement. 1597 
 
4.1. Background 
 
RDPs are currently in effect between the U.S. and 21 countries. 1598 Sixteen of those 
countries are EU Member States.1599 This group comprises all of the EU’s major 
defence producers. One of those countries (Turkey) is an EU accession candidate 
                                                 
1594 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) 
1595 ibid 
1596 Developments, ‘Transatlantic Procurement Outlook is Mixed, Panelists Say’ (2009) 51(42) Government 
Contractor ¶ 393, 2 (summary of comments at a George Washington University Law School Colloquium) 
1597 For instance, the US-UK RDP (inclusive of its annexes) will terminate on 1 January 2015. Further, if either 
Government considers it necessary for “compelling national reasons” to discontinue its participation under the 
RDP before the date of termination, an immediate consultation must take place to determine “such actions” as 
may be necessary to alleviate problems that may result from termination. See Memorandum of Understanding 
Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland Relating to the Principles Governing Cooperation in Research and Development, Production, 
Procurement And Logistics Support of Defense Capability, December 16 2004, Section 6 (6.2) 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/paic/MOU-United%20Kingdom%20(Dec%202004).pdf> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1598 These countries comprise: (1) Australia; (2) Austria; (3) Belgium; (4) Canada; (5) Denmark; (6) Egypt; (7) 
Finland; (8) France; (9) Germany; (10) Greece; (11) Israel; (12) Italy; (13) Luxembourg; (14) Netherlands; (15) 
Norway; (16) Portugal; (17) Spain; (18) Sweden; (19) Switzerland; (20) Turkey; (21) UK. The DPAP provides links 
to the RDPs and their accompanying annexes and amendments 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html> accessed  20 
September 2013 
1599 (1) Austria; (2) Belgium; (3) Czech Republic; (4) Denmark; (5) Finland; (6) France; (7) Germany; (8) Greece; 
(9) Italy; (10) Luxembourg; (11) Netherlands; (12) Poland; (13) Portugal; (14) Spain; (15) Sweden; (16) UK 
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and NATO member State. It follows that twelve EU Member States are not RDP 
signatories. 1600  Most of those non-signatories have limited or substantially no 
defence capabilities.1601 A number of the RDPs were concluded in the 1970’s,1602 
reflecting a Cold War concern of the U.S. to signal collaboration with its allies.1603 
The recent signature of RDPs with Eastern European States such as Poland and the 
Czech Republic may signal a different contemporary relevance to the RDPs, 
although, as will be discussed, this is certainly not reflected in the generic terms of 
the latest RDPs which substantially replicate their predecessors. 
 
The common objectives shared by the RDPs is to: (a) make the most cost-effective 
and rational use of the resources allocated to defence; (b) promote the widest 
possible use of standard or interoperable equipment and (c) develop and maintain an 
advanced technology capability for the North Atlantic Alliance.1604  
 
Before examining their provisions in full, certain fundamental observations can be 
made. Firstly, the RDPs also identify principles relating to RDT&E, logistics support, 
quality assurance and security of supply and information. The generality of their 
scope therefore constitutes a significant limitation on their ability to exercise a 
discrete and dedicated procurement function. This perception is perhaps evidenced 
by the fact that certain signatories have viewed the RDP’s primarily as “national 
                                                 
1600 These Member States are: (1) Bulgaria; (2) Croatia; (3) Cyprus; (4) Estonia; (5) Hungary; (6) Ireland; (7) 
Latvia; (8) Lithuania; (9) Malta; (10) Romania; (11) Slovakia; (12) Slovenia 
1601 Romania is arguably the exception in this regard and is reflected by its coverage in the Fortresses and 
Icebergs Study. However, as indicated in Section 2.1 (n 1545) the U.S. has no present intention to enter into an 
RDP with Romania 
1602 For a useful historical overview of attitudes towards the RDPs during this period and efforts aimed at reform 
in this regard, see United States General Accounting Office, European Initiatives: Implications for U.S. Defense 
Trade and Cooperation (n 60) 36-44 
1603  Prior to this date, certain countries had maintained understandings relating to reciprocal defence 
procurement 
1604 See for example, the U.S.-UK RDP (n 1597) 
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security agreements”. 1605  Secondly, whilst U.S. legal commentary highlights the 
importance of the RDPs to transatlantic defence trade, as indicated, the U.S. has 
signed RDPs with non-European, non-NATO countries.1606 Therefore, in the further 
pursuit of transatlantic defence cooperation, it is by no means clear that the U.S. 
would be prepared to sign RDPs with all EU Member States or with the EU in place 
of its Member States.1607 Finally, most importantly, it should be observed that the 
neither the US-Poland or US-Czech Republic RDPs (both of which were signed after 
transposition of the Defence Procurement Directive) contain any reference to the 
Directive. 
 
4.2. Main Provisions 
 
The RDPs vary in their content according to the specific circumstances of the country 
concerned. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most comprehensive in terms of content is 
the US-UK RDP which, for ease of exposition, will be the subject of analysis and 
whose provisions broadly correspond with those of other RDPs concluded before the 
Defence Procurement Directive.1608 It should be observed at the outset that the main 
text is relatively short. More substantial provision is made in Annexes accompanying 
the main text. For instance, the US-UK RDP contains 7 Annexes. In light of the focus 
                                                 
1605 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (Report to Congressional Committees) GAO/NSIAD-92-126, March 1992, 2 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/215699.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1606 The latest proposal has concerned the possibility for the conclusion of an RDP with Argentina 
1607 In the political sphere, any such possibility could mean that the U.S. would, to some extent, lose the political 
control and flexibility which it currently has in conducting its transatlantic defence trade relations bilaterally with 
individual Member States 
1608 The UK is also a useful candidate for analysis in light of the fact that, as will be discussed in Part III, the U.S. 
has concluded a bilateral defence trade treaty with the UK albeit with regard to the export and transfer of defence 
articles  
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of U.S. legal commentary on the procurement aspect, this Chapter focuses on Annex 
I which stipulates the procedures implementing the RDP.1609 
 
4.2.1. Field and Scope of Application 
 
Concerning the field of application, the U.S.-UK RDP is broadly defined and non-
specific. The RDP covers the acquisition of defence capability by the US DoD and 
UK Ministry of Defence through both research and development and procurement of 
defence equipment, supplies and services.1610 However, the RDP does not cover 
construction contracts.1611 Concerning the personal scope of application, the RDP 
refers to both Government-to-Government and Government-to-industry 
procurement. 1612  It follows that the RDP does not cover industry-industry 
procurement. It should be observed, however, that the RDP does not explicitly 
differentiate between each form. 
 
4.2.2. Principles Governing Reciprocal Defence Purchasing 
 
The RDP makes a number of general statements regarding the intention of 
signatories to facilitate the “mutual flow” of defence procurement, aiming at long term 
“equitable balance” in exchanges.1613 The stated objective is the intention for each 
                                                 
1609 The other Annexes are: Annex II (concerning mutual acceptance of testing and evaluation); Annex III 
(concerning reciprocal audits of contracts and subcontracts); Annex IV (concerning logistics support of defence 
equipment); Annex V (concerning quality assurance); Annex VI  (on security of supply) and Annex VII (concerning 
exchange of technical information) 
1610 Section 1 (1.1.)  
1611 Section 1 (1.2.) 
1612 Section 2 (2.4.1.). See also Section 4 on industrial involvement  
1613 Section 2 (2.1.) The reference to “equitable balance” is very similar to the term “equitable return” which is 
sometimes used to refer to industrial return and global balance strategies. Within the terms of the RDP, however, 
the reference most likely simply refers to the need for steady defence trade flows between the U.S. and UK 
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Government to provide firms of the other country with treatment “no less favourable” 
than that accorded to domestic enterprises.1614 The RDP enumerates the following 
principles in this regard. 
 
4.2.2.1. Identification of Defence Items 
 
The RDP provides that the Governments will identify and nominate for consideration 
defence items believed to be suitable to satisfy their respective requirements.1615 In 
this regard, the Governments will decide the purchases to which the RDP will apply 
and whether the items may be procured on a Government-to-Government or 
Government-to-industry basis. 1616  Further, the RDP also provides that each 
Government will adopt qualified defence items that have been developed or 
produced in the other country, in the interests of standardization and the utilization of 
scarce resources, to the extent practicable.1617 On current understanding, neither 
Government has adopted a specific list including qualifying categories of such 
items.1618 Similarly, neither Government has designated specific procedures for use 
in this regard. 
 
4.2.2.2. Regular Discussion of Adverse Effects of Offsets and Other Policies 
 
The RDPs do not contain any substantial provisions specifically related to offsets or 
countertrade. A recent exception is the U.S.-Czech RDP which expressly provides 
                                                 
1614 Section 2 (2.3.) 
1615 Section 2 (2.4.1.). See also Annex I, Section 2 (2.1) and Annex I, Section 3 (3.3.3.) 
1616 Section 2 (2.4.1.) 
1617 Section 2 (2.4.2.). See also Annex I, Section 2 (2.1.) 
1618 For example, there is no list equivalent to the EU 1958 list, on which see Chapter 2, Section 2.2 
  401 
that the RDP does not regulate offsets.1619 The basis for this inclusion is not clear. 
Notwithstanding, the RDPs generally identify a requirement to regularly discuss 
measures to limit the “adverse effects” of offsets.1620 However, whilst the possibility 
for “discussion” may exist, there is no designated forum within the framework of the 
RDP which is dedicated to focusing on the use of the RDPs to limit offsets and 
related practices. 
 
4.3. Implementing Procedures: Procurement 
 
Annex 1 contains a number of Sections, two of which refer to “General Procedures” 
and “Procurement Procedures” and both of which refer specifically to procurement. 
The Annex is intended to give effect to a general principle of “transparency and 
integrity” in the conduct of procurements.1621 In turn, a number of more specific 
principles are enumerated which are discussed below. It should be observed that at 
the time of their initial adoption the Department of Commerce recommended that the 
Annexes should include provisions conforming closely to the then GATT Government 
Procurement Code so as to ensure specificity and enforceability.1622 However, the 
DoD rejected the recommendation on the basis that such provisions were “too 
cumbersome”, would “eliminate the flexibility required on such procurements” and 
would, fundamentally, limit the nations’ sovereign right to regulate defence trade for 
national security reasons.1623  
                                                 
1619 Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America and The Government of the Czech 
Republic Concerning Reciprocal Defence Procurement Agreement, 18 April 2012, Article III 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-czech.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013  
1620 ibid 
1621 Section 2.4.4 
1622 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 8 
1623 ibid 
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4.3.1. General Procedures  
 
The Section on General Procedures contains a number of discrete references to 
procurement as follows. 
 
4.3.1.1. Obtaining Information About Possible Procurement 
 
The RDP provides that it will be the primary responsibility of industry to obtain 
procurement information and to respond to requests for proposals in accordance with 
nationally prescribed procurement procedures and regulations. 1624  Further each 
Government will, consistent with normal practice and procedures, ensure that 
responsible Government authorities will assist sources from the other country by 
responding promptly to requests for appropriate information.1625 
 
Importantly, however, as will be discussed below, the RDP does not identify any 
specific requirements to assist foreign sources in obtaining information about 
possible procurements beyond that which is ordinarily provided.1626 
 
According to one U.S. legal commentator, an important objective of transparency 
requirements is “informational utility”; in this regard, the current lack of access to 
                                                 
1624 Annex 1, Section 2.2 
1625 This information concerns: [2.3.1] plans and programs for production, logistics support and acquisition of 
defence equipment and defense services; [2.3.2.] requirements for the qualification of sources; [2.3.3.] 
specifications, quality assurance standards and other appropriate documentation 
1626 The fact that industry is primarily responsible for finding business opportunities was identified a point of 
criticism in the 1992 GAO Report. See United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: 
NATO Allies’ Implementation of Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 5 
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procurement information on the part of prospective suppliers has been identified as a 
specific deficiency under the RDPs.1627  
 
4.3.1.2. Full and Equitable Consideration to All Qualified Sources 
 
One principle identified by the RDP is that “full and equitable consideration” will be 
given to all qualified sources. 1628  This also extends to sources applying for 
qualification.1629 “Full and equitable consideration” is not defined except to the extent 
that consideration must be in accordance with the policies and criteria of the 
purchasing agencies (in the case of qualified sources) and the laws, policies, 
regulations and procedures of the purchasing Government. This also includes 
relevant and applicable European Union regulations.1630 
 
It is inferred that it is this principle on which U.S. observers seek to rely in arguing 
that U.S. economic operators should be accorded treatment equal to that of EU 
economic operators both in terms of being invited to participate in contract award 
procedures and in substantive treatment once admitted.1631  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1627 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31); The fact that 
industry is primarily responsible for finding business opportunities was identified as an issue in the 1992 GAO 
Report. See United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 5 
1628 Section 2 (2.4.4.(ii)). Annex I, Section 2(2.4) 
1629 ibid 
1630 ibid 
1631 For a discussion in this regard, see Chapter 4, Section 3 
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4.3.1.3. Satisfaction of Requirements 
 
The U.S.-UK RDP further provides that offers will be required to satisfy requirements 
including performance, quality, supportability, delivery and cost.1632  Specifically, it 
provides that in preparing invitations for bids and requests for proposals, and in 
evaluating offers, full consideration will be given to potential NATO savings and/or 
increased NATO combat capability expected to result from procurement items that 
are standardized or interoperable with those of the Allies, where applicable and 
consistent with national laws and regulations.1633 These considerations are similar to 
those contained under the most economically advantageous tender principles in the 
Defence Procurement Directive, in particular, the reference to “interoperability”.1634 
 
4.3.1.4. Offers Evaluated Without Application of Price Differentials under Buy 
National Laws  
 
The most often-cited provision of the RDPs concerns that which ensures that offers 
of defence items developed and/or produced in the other country will be evaluated 
without applying price differentials under ‘Buy National’ laws and regulations and 
without applying the cost of import duty.1635 
 
It is recalled from Section 2.1 that certain provisions of the RDP’s have been 
incorporated into U.S. law and implemented by the DFARS 225.872 entitled 
                                                 
1632 Section 2 (2.4.4.(iii)); Annex I, Section 2(2.5) 
1633 ibid 
1634 Article 47(1)(a), although this provision does not explicitly refer to NATO 
1635 Annex I, Section 2(2.6). Section 2(2.7) further provides that: “[c]onsistent with national laws and regulations 
and, in the case of HMG relevant and applicable European Union regulations, provision will be made for duty-free 
certificates and related documentation.” 
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“[c]ontracting with qualifying country sources”. Before examining these provisions, it 
is important to observe that DFARS 225.872 does not apply, inter alia, to acquisitions 
of supplies restricted by: (1)  U.S. National Disclosure Policy;1636 (2)  U.S. defense 
mobilization base requirements,1637 except for quantities in excess of that required to 
maintain the defense mobilization base; (3)  other U.S. laws or regulations;1638 and 
(4)  U.S. industrial security requirements. Therefore, procurement in accordance with 
the RDPs is precluded to the extent of any prior determination on one of the grounds 
listed. 
  
In the event that the above do not apply, DFARS 225.872-1(a) and (b) give specific 
legal effect to the principle that offers or proposals must be evaluated on the basis of 
non-discrimination on the grounds of place of manufacture, without applying price 
differentials under ‘Buy National’ laws and regulations. It is recalled that DFARS 
identifies a list of “qualifying countries”.1639 These include States with which the DoD 
has signed an RDP.1640  
 
However, it is important to observe that the waiver does not have automatic 
application for Austria and Finland, which can only be exempted on a purchase-by-
purchase basis.1641 Further, the statutory waiver is not absolute. The waiver can be 
rescinded where the Secretary of Defense determines that a foreign country has 
discriminated against certain types of products produced in the U.S. and covered by 
                                                 
1636 DoD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International 
Organizations 
1637 This refers to purchases under the authority of FAR 6.302-3(a)(2)(i). For a discussion of this exception, see 
Chapter 10, Section 4 
1638 This includes the annual DoD Appropriations Act 
1639 See DFARS 225.872-1(a)  
1640 This waiver also has a statutory basis in § 10a 41 U.S.C.; FAR 25.103(a); and 19 U.S.C. §2512(b)(3) 
1641 DFARS 225.872-1(b)  
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the agreement.1642 In addition, the waiver does not limit the Secretary of Defense’s 
authority to restrict acquisitions to domestic sources or reject an otherwise 
acceptable offer from a qualifying country source when considered necessary for 
national defence reasons.1643  
 
A full waiver for all signatory RDP would be a necessary equalising measure under 
reformed RDPs. 
 
4.3.1.5. No Substantive Authorisation to Export Defence Items 
 
Finally, the RDP is not intended to, and does not, create any substantive authority to 
authorize the export of defence items, including technical data, controlled on the UK 
Military List or the U.S. Munitions List.1644 Further, any export subject to the UK 
Export Control Act or U.S. Arms Control Act and the ITAR must be compliant with 
such Acts and such Regulations.1645 However, as will be discussed in Part III, the 
U.S. and UK have sought to mitigate the effect of certain export control laws through 
a recently adopted U.S.-UK defence trade cooperation treaty.  
 
4.4. Procurement Procedures 
 
As indicated, the Annex contains a specific section on “Procurement Procedures”. It 
is recalled from Chapter 3, Section 3.2 that whilst commentators have generally 
                                                 
1642 41 U.S.C. §10b(2)(a)(1)   
1643 DFARS 225.872-1(c) 
1644 Annex I, Section 2.8 
1645 ibid. For a discussion of ITAR in light of the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive and ICT 
Directive, see Chapter 5 
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assumed the automatic exclusion of the RDPs from compliance with the Defence 
Procurement Directive under Article 12(a), according to the Guidance Note on 
defence and security specific exclusions, the wording of Article 12(a) appears to 
require a set of distinct rules that “specifically concern the award of contracts” and 
provide a “minimum of details” setting out the “principles and the different steps” to 
be followed in awarding contracts.1646 Therefore, this Section will examine whether 
the RDPs meet these requirements. 
 
4.4.1. Publication of Contract Notices in a Generally Available Periodical  
 
Annex I provides that each Government will publish or will have published a notice of 
proposed purchases in a generally available periodical, in accordance with national 
rules or practices, to the extent practicable.1647 In this regard, the RDPs do not 
specify available periodicals, leaving a range of possibilities.1648 Further, the RDP 
does not identify circumstances in which it would not be practicable to publish a 
notice. Issues relating to information access will be specifically considered below. 
 
4.4.2. Content of Notices 
 
The Annex provides that the notice will contain: the subject matter of the 
procurement; time limits set for the submission of offers or requests to participate in 
the bid invitation process and addresses to which offers or requests to participate 
                                                 
1646 Guidance Note, Defence- and security- specific exclusions, 2, point 3, para 2 
1647 Annex I, Section 4(4.1) 
1648 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 7  
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should be sent.1649 However, the Annex does not specify a minimum content of 
details relating to subject matter or specific time limits for submission. 
 
4.4.3. Content of Invitation to Tender 
 
The Annex also provides that contracting authorities will provide copies of invitations 
to tender/solicitations for proposed purchases in accordance with national rules or 
practices.1650 These must contain the following: the nature and quantity of the items 
supplied; whether the procedure is by sealed bids or negotiation; the criteria on which 
the award is to be based, such as by lowest bid price or otherwise; any delivery date; 
the address and closing date for submitting bids as well as the language(s) in which 
they must be submitted; the address of the contracting authority; any economic 
and/or technical requirements, financial guarantees and information required from 
suppliers; and the amount and any terms of any sum payable for tender/solicitation 
documents.1651 Again, however, the RDPs do not identify a set of procurement 
procedures or specify key requirements such as those relating to qualitative selection 
or award. 
 
4.4.4. Publication of Invitations to Tender in Adequate Time 
 
The RDP provides that any invitation to tender will be published in “adequate time” to 
enable interested suppliers to signify their interest and will allow adequate time for 
                                                 
1649 Ibid 
1650 Annex I, Section 4(4.2.) 
1651 Ibid 
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response consistent with user requirements.1652 However, the RDP does not identify 
specific time limits in this regard. It is recalled from Chapter 9, Section 3.1 that a 
particular issue identified for foreign contractors accessing the U.S. market 
concerned the date of RFP release and the limited time available to prepare and 
submit a proposal. 
 
4.4.5. Notification of Outcome 
 
With regard to post award considerations, the RDP provides that tenderers/offerors 
will be promptly notified as to the outcome of the tender/solicitation process.1653 
However, again no time limit for notification is specified. 
 
4.4.6. Reasons for Non-Award 
 
The RDP also provides that, on request, a supplier will be provided with “pertinent 
information” concerning the reasons why he was not allowed to participate in a 
procurement or was not awarded a contract.1654 However, the U.S.-UK RDP does not 
specify a minimum content or type of information to be provided. In the more recent 
U.S.-Poland RDP, some attempt has been made to strengthen this provision. For 
instance, in addition to the provision of pertinent information, this RDP provides that: 
 
                                                 
1652 This is not the only reference to “adequate time” in the RDP. The RDP provides that in meeting their 
procurement requirements, the Governments will ensure, as far as practicable, that the industries of each country 
are afforded adequate time to be able to participate in the production and procurement processes. See Annex I, 
Section 3(3.3.3.) 
1653 Annex I, Section 4(4.4) 
1654 Annex I, Section 4(4.5.) 
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Upon request, the procuring Party shall provide additional information to 
any unsuccessful offeror dissatisfied with the explanation for rejection of 
its offer or that may have further questions about the award of the 
contract. The additional information shall, consistent with the procuring 
Party’s laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and international 
obligations, include information on the characteristics and the relative 
advantages of the offer selected.1655 
 
This provision appears to go a step further in its attempt to ensure transparency and, 
to a lesser extent, accountability in providing the possibility for requests for additional 
information. Further, provision appears to extend beyond a minimum content of 
information to include “characteristics” and “relative advantages of the offer”. The 
inference is that this should be equivalent to that provided to domestic contractors on 
request, subject to any other applicable national laws e.g. relating to disclosure of 
sensitive data.  
 
This also appears to be further reinforced by a provision in the U.S.-Poland RDP 
which identifies a requirement to have published procedures for the hearing and 
review of complaints arising in connection with any phase of the procedure process 
to ensure “to the greatest extent possible” that complaints “shall be equitably and 
expeditiously resolved”.1656 By contrast, the U.S.-UK RDP merely requires that the 
                                                 
1655 Memorandum of Understanding Between The Government of the United States of America and The 
Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement 27 August 2011, Artivle V(5) 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/mou-poland.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
1656 Article V(6) 
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Governments will “maintain” and  “exchange pertinent information on these 
procedures”.1657 
 
4.4.7. Absence of A Distinct Set of Rules Specifically Concerning Award  
 
In light of the above, it is arguable that the RDPs do not satisfy the purported criteria 
necessary to legitimate exclusion under the Defence Procurement Directive. As U.S. 
legal commentary has itself observed, the RDPs’ most stringent procedural 
requirement is a relatively slight list of information required to be included in 
solicitations. 1658  Further, the RDPs simply make reference to procedures under 
national law. It is important to observe, however, that the Guidance Note which 
purports to identify “specific procedural rules” as a criterion is not a legally binding 
interpretation of EU law.  
 
Fundamentally, it is not clear why a Member State even needs to rely on Article 12(a) 
in order to exclude contracts awarded in accordance with an RDP. The question is: 
what is the purpose of the exclusion? Generally, the purpose is to provide flexibility in 
procurements conducted according to a discrete set of procurement rules which are 
tailored to the specific objectives of the international agreement, or international 
organisation concerned. However, the RDPs only provide guarantees of non-
discrimination and equal treatment in accordance with the laws, policies, regulations 
and procedures of the purchasing Government. This also includes relevant and 
applicable European Union regulations. The RDPs do not provide for more 
favourable treatment to be accorded to U.S. economic operators, nor necessarily 
                                                 
1657 Annex I, Section 4(4.6.) 
1658 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) 102 
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provide a substantial means to circumvent the provisions of the Defence 
Procurement Directive.  
 
The logical result on the Guidance Note’s interpretation is that if the international 
agreement or arrangement does not contain specific procedural rules, the contract 
must be awarded in accordance with the Directive. However, this does not affect the 
fact that the U.S. economic operator is provided with the guarantee under the RDP in 
any event, namely equal treatment in accordance with EU law, because the Directive 
is without prejudice to a Member State’s decision as to whether or not to permit third 
countries to participate in contract award procedures. 
 
It is suggested that the RDPs need to be revised in order to clarify precisely what 
function they are intended to serve with regard to non-discrimination and equal 
treatment in light of the Defence Procurement Directive. The reference to “European 
Union Regulations” may have referred to the Public Sector Directive (and, possibly, 
in consideration of WTO GPA obligations under the Directive).1659 However, the 
Defence Procurement Directive does not expressly regulate third country 
participation. The RDPs themselves envisage that amendments can be made in 
order to take account of any such changes.1660  Similarly, as indicated in Chapter 2, 
Section 3 the wording of Article 12(a) itself also requires clarification.  
 
 
                                                 
1659 For a brief discussion in this regard, see Chapter 4, 2.2 
1660 For instance, the U.S-UK MoU states the following in the introduction: “The Governments intend the 
understanding of this MOU to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance. In so doing, the Governments recognize the 
efforts of European governmental defense cooperation organizations to enhance collaboration on defense 
capability programs by more comprehensive and systematic arrangements among the individual member nations. 
They, therefore, understand that in the event of a possible conflict between understandings entered into between 
one of these organizations and the USG, and this MOU, the signatories hereto will consult with a view to 
amending this MOU.” 
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4.5. Reform of Procedural Requirements: Transparency and Accountability 
 
It is recalled that U.S. legal commentary has criticized the RDPs because they do not 
govern how procurements are to be conducted.1661 Whilst not unequivocal, this 
criticism could refer to the absence of specific rules e.g. identifying discrete 
procedures for the award of contracts. This gives rise to a question as to whether the 
RDPs should specify their own procedures. It is submitted that this would never be a 
viable option, not least because it would raise issues of compatibility with existing 
procedures and potential duplication. Essentially, the RDPs are not intended to 
regulate procurement per se but are rather focused on guarantees in relation to 
market access.  
 
4.5.1. Standards of Competition 
 
In light of the above, it is suggested that the RDPs should focus on promoting non-
discrimination, equal treatment, transparency and accountability objectives. For 
instance, it may be possible to better regulate access to competition (e.g. 
comparable to the function of CICA) which then informs the decision on the choice of 
appropriate national procedure.1662 This might be achieved, inter alia, by setting 
minimum standards on the publication of reasons justifying the level of competition 
sought. 
 
                                                 
1661 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 1594) 
1662 For instance, it is recalled that CICA requires full and open competition, full and open competition after the 
exclusion of sources and other than full and open competition. The exclusions and exceptions require 
determinations and findings and justifications and approvals. By contrast, the Defence Procurement Directive 
simply provides that Member States may select the procedure which they seek to use. However, the exercise of 
this discretion remains substantially unregulated, or at least, unaccountable at the point of selection 
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4.5.2. Transparency Through Publication 
 
According to one U.S. legal commentator, an important objective of transparency 
requirements is “informational utility”. In this regard, the current lack of access to 
procurement information on the part of prospective suppliers has been identified as a 
specific deficiency under the RDPs.1663 It is recalled that the RDPs do not make any 
detailed provision for the content of notices, contents of invitation to tender and do 
not specify time frames or time limits for publication of tenders. Further, notices must 
simply be published in a non-specific periodical and only to the extent practicable. 
Whilst this thesis does not specifically advocate any particular reform proposal, no 
consideration has been given, for example, to possibilities for a designated 
“Transatlantic Defence and Security Contract Portal”1664 for government to industry 
and/or industry to industry procurement for contracts above a certain threshold 
determined to be of “transatlantic interest”.1665 
 
4.5.3. Limitations on “National Security Exceptions” 
 
Related to the issue of better regulating access to competition, it has been suggested 
that there should be “limited exceptions for national security concerns”. In particular, 
it has been observed that achieving the optimal balance between procedural 
                                                 
1663 See citations at n1267 above 
1664 For instance, in 2010, the EU set up a TransAtlantic IPR Portal. The US-EU Intellectual Property Rights 
Working Group developed the joint portal as a collaborative effort to strengthen IPR protection globally through 
support for U.S. and European small- and medium-sized enterprises.  The United States and the European Union 
established the IPR Working Group in 2005 and is under the umbrella of the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(“TEC”). See FAQ, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/initiatives/ipr/faq/index_en.htm. 
1665 The present author draws on the notion of contracts of “clear cross border interest” as that concept is 
developing under EU law for the purposes of determining the application of the EU procurement Directives and 
EU procurement principles 
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requirements and national security exemptions will be the decisive issue in drafting 
language for the RDPs.1666  
 
A number of observations have been made in this regard. It has been observed in 
relation to the application of WTO GPA award procedures and the permissible 
justifications for limited tendering, that the WTO GPA seems to preclude derogation 
from non-discrimination commitments for the purpose of pursuing national industrial 
policies.1667 It has been suggested that strict adherence to this prohibition in the 
RDPs would be unwise and that to be “politically feasible” and “militarily prudent”, 
revised RDPs will need to permit defence procurement agencies to limit tendering to 
domestic firms under certain defined circumstances.1668  
 
It has been stated that determining what circumstances warrant invoking such an 
exception would be critical.1669 It has been proposed that “emergency” or “short-term 
military supply necessity” should certainly warrant limited tendering.1670 However, it 
has also been observed that: 
 
[w]hether and to what extent RDP parties would be willing to expressly 
permit limiting tendering to domestic suppliers for long-term defense 
industrial base protection will pose a more difficult task, and this issue will 
                                                 
1666 ibid 
1667 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) citing at fn81 
Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (Kluwer Law International, 2003) (n 77) 344-5  
1668 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) ibid 
1669 ibid fn82 
1670 Ibid 
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be the critical battleground in crafting the language of such an 
exception.1671 
 
It is interesting to observe that a provision in the EDA Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement is cited as an example of a narrow exception. The exception states that 
participating Member States: 
 
may exceptionally need to proceed with specific procurements without 
competition, in cases of pressing operational urgency; for follow-on work 
or supplementary goods and services; or for extraordinary and compelling 
reasons of national security.1672 
 
It has been suggested that while the exception will be open to exploitation by RDP 
parties seeking to skirt their obligations, the memorialization of a strict exception, 
coupled with provisions requiring justification for its invocation, may discourage would 
be abusers by raising the reputation cost of non-compliance.1673 In particular, specific 
reliance is placed on the notion that Governments raise their “reputational stake” 
when they commit to international agreements, decreasing, however slightly, the 
chances of abuse and that because the RDPs operate on the principle of reciprocity, 
a strictly defined exception will make non-compliant behaviour easier to identify, 
increasing the exposure of bad faith actors to retaliatory measures by RDP 
counterparts.1674 
 
                                                 
1671 ibid fn83 
1672 Miller, ibid, fn83 citing the EDA Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement 
1673 ibid 
1674 ibid 
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It is beyond the intended aims of this thesis to proffer an alternative draft of such an 
exception. However, it is not clear why such commentary has not similarly drawn on 
the provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive concerning the circumstances 
permitting the use of the negotiated procedure without publication.1675 It is recalled 
from Chapter 10 that whilst still relatively broad, at the very least, by their terms, 
these provisions are more restricted in their application than certain of the CICA 
exceptions to full and open competition under U.S. law.  
 
Further, the above proposal rightly separates the issue of whether a defence 
industrial base ground should even be included from the issue of the form and extent 
that any such exception could take. It is recalled from Chapter 10, Section 4.1 that it 
is at least arguable as to whether or not there should be a free-standing industrial 
mobilization ground and, if so, its precise scope. However, as indicated above, it is 
further necessary question precisely what purpose the exception should serve.1676 
This is quite apart from the fundamental issue as to precisely what interests should 
legitimately be protected by industrial mobilization. This is necessary in order to avoid 
industrial mobilization becoming a residual “catch-all category” open to indiscriminate 
use. 
 
In addition, whilst the above U.S. legal commentary recognizes the corresponding 
need for justification procedures, no attempt has been made to identify the form and 
content of such procedures. For example, as became apparent from the analysis 
undertaken in Chapter 10, it might be possible to include justification and approvals 
                                                 
1675 Article 28 
1676 For instance, it is recalled that industrial mobilization can take a number of specific forms. In statutory form, 
it enables the exclusion of certain sources (but otherwise full and open competition). It also acts as an exception 
precluding full and open competition. It also serves a discrete function in precluding application of the Buy 
National waiver in otherwise competitive procurement under the RDPs 
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procedures as standard and/or notification requirements of use and/or intention to 
use as a grounds for limiting competition in both the U.S. and EU. It is not clear how 
a strictly defined exception will make non-compliant behaviour easier to identify in the 
absence of dedicated reporting, monitoring and review mechanisms which have not 
been prioritised in the case for reform. 
 
Finally, whilst it is agreed that the “memorialization” of one or more exceptions 
coupled with provisions requiring justification for its invocation may discourage 
would-be abusers, it may be questioned whether the so-called “reputational cost” of 
non-compliance will be sufficient to act as an effective deterrent.1677  
 
Whilst this thesis does not advocate any one specific measure to either reform 
existing exceptions, stipulate new exceptions or otherwise improve transparency and 
accountability requirements pertaining to their use, the above provides a basis for 
thinking more critically about whether it is possible to develop common definitions of 
the exceptions, justifications, approvals, notification requirements and reporting 
mechanisms. 
 
 
4.6. Review and Dispute Settlement 
 
It is recalled that the recent U.S.-Poland RDP attempts to provide a more formal 
commitment to transparency in the provision of post-award information. However, a 
                                                 
1677 Whilst it is recognized that “naming and shaming” can be a useful tool within procurement communities, the 
experience of the voluntary EDA regime discussed in Chapter 7 indicates that absent adequate enforcement, the 
institution of specific provisions alone is unlikely to deter non-compliance 
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more fundamental issue concerns the absence of the provision of a review 
mechanism. The U.S.-UK RDP provides as follows: 
 
Any difference of view regarding the interpretation or application of the 
MoU will be resolved by consultation between the two Governments and 
will not be referred to a national or international tribunal or third party for 
settlement.1678 
 
It is necessary to consider review procedures in more detail. 
 
4.6.1. Consultation 
 
It is observed that “consultation” is not defined. An important question is whether 
consultation is an adequate and effective means of redress. For instance, U.S. legal 
commentary has specifically identified the provision of informal consultation (as 
opposed to a reference to a specific bid protest forum) as a limitation of the 
RDPs.1679 More formal protest fora aside, in light of the emphasis placed in the U.S.-
Poland RDP on “equitable” and “expeditious” resolution, it is suggested that greater 
consideration could be given, in the first instance, to whether existing consultation 
mechanisms could be improved.1680 In any event, it is possible to suggest that, 
signatories, in fact, currently exceed this level of provision through a designated 
national Ombudsman.  
                                                 
1678 Section 6(6.4.) 
1679 Developments, ‘Transatlantic Procurement Outlook is Mixed, Panelists Say’ (n 1596), Statement of C R 
Yukins at 2 
1680 This would depend on a host of factors. For instance, there may be issues regarding disclosure, anonymity 
etc which may militate against any possibility of a formal consultation mechanism which could, for example, 
require the production of written records and statements identifying the basis for any grievance and any resolution 
procedure adopted  
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4.6.2. Ombudsman 
 
According to the U.S. DPAP, if a foreign company does not fully understand 
contracting rules and regulations or considers that it was unfairly excluded from 
defence procurement, it may contact the DoD Ombudsman.1681 Similar Ombudsman 
exist in EU Member States.1682 
 
In 1991 the DoD designated a senior level acquisition official to serve as an 
Ombudsman to deal with issues raised by foreign governments relating to the 
RDPs.1683 At the time, the DoD encouraged other RDP signatories to adopt similar 
procedures. However, according to a contemporary 1992 GAO Report, certain 
officials stated that an Ombudsman was unnecessary.1684  Further U.S. defence 
industry representatives questioned the need for an Ombudsman for large U.S. 
defence firms but that smaller U.S. firms seeking business in Europe might benefit 
from such provision. 1685  The GAO Report also expressly recommended their 
continued use.1686 However, there is substantially no information relating to the 
functions and processes of national Ombudsman in this field. It is clear that they do 
                                                 
1681  For more information, see DPAP, DoD Ombudsman, 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/dod_ombudsman.html> accessed 20 September. The website does not 
provide any related information or guidance in relation to the conduct of the DoD Ombudsman’s functions 
1682 See for example the Delegation Generale Pour L'Armement <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1683 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 Public Law 101-510; 104 Stat. 1693 
1684 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (1605) 11 
1685 ibid 
1686 ibid 
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not function in the same way as an Ombudsman would ordinarily function (i.e. as a 
point of redress which may be exhausted before recourse to judicial review).1687   
 
Notwithstanding, again, it is possible to consider ways in which national Ombudsman 
procedures could be improved as an alternative to more substantial forms of redress. 
At the very least, there should be greater transparency with regard to the role and 
extent of the Ombudsman’s function. 
 
4.6.3. National and International Tribunals 
 
The express exclusion of recourse to international tribunals and third party dispute 
settlement is understandable, in particular, in light of the possibility for questions to 
arise regarding the subjection of the State to jurisdiction.1688 Such mechanisms are 
likely more suitable for use in disputes between private contractors. 
 
However, it is not clear whether “tribunal” includes a court. It is submitted that the 
above provision in its current form does not necessarily preclude determinations 
being made in judicial proceedings which implicate references to the RDPs.1689  
                                                 
1687 A number of factors may preclude recourse to such Ombudsman. For instance, foreign contractors may not 
be well accustomed to such procedures. Further, it may not be clear to contractors what potential benefit is to be 
derived by contacting an Ombudsman. In addition, for large defence firms, an Ombudsman is unlikely to be 
perceived as an effective means of redress for high value, complex procurements which necessitate the 
expenditure of significant resources and expertise in detailed review as well as the availability of remedies. 
Importantly, contractors may also be reluctant to complain in light of the potential for disclosure of the complaint to 
prejudice their chances of future awards  
1688 On the relevance of international arbitration in procurement generally, see M Audit, Contrats Publics et 
Arbitrage International (Bruylant 2011) 
1689 It is recalled from Chapter 4, Section 3.1.1 that the UK refers to the possibility of procurers being subject to 
implied contractual obligations to consider a tender fairly when it considers a tender from a third country. If 
litigated, it is conceivable that U.S. contractors could argue that they should receive equal treatment in 
accordance with the Directive and which is reinforced by the guarantee provided under the RDPs 
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As indicated above with regard to the use of the Ombudsman, in the early 1990s it 
was observed that EU and U.S. firms rarely used European contract grievance 
procedures.1690  
 
4.7. Reform of Review and Remedies 
 
In addition to improvements in transparency requirements, one eminent U.S. legal 
commentator has also identified that if U.S. vendors fear discrimination under the 
Defence  Procurement Directive, they may press for broader remedies under the 
RDPs. 1691  More specifically, it has been suggested that one of the interesting 
questions would be whether or not the RDPs could “cross-reference” the bid-protest 
fora that are allowed under the GPA or Defence Procurement Directive.1692 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to propose a model for dispute settlement of 
transatlantic defence procurement issues. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a 
number of core issues in consideration of any such proposal. Firstly, the WTO GPA 
presently excludes defence procurement from its scope. In any event, as the same 
U.S. legal commentator has identified elsewhere, one of the structural issues that 
U.S. policy makers face in seeking to improve the effectiveness of the WTO GPA (as 
well as other trade agreements) concerns its enforceability in U.S. bid protest forums, 
in particular the GAO.1693 An unresolved issue is whether, as a practical matter, 
foreign contractors will be able to enforce their rights under the various free trade 
                                                 
1690 GAO, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 
9 
1691 C Yukins, ‘The European Defence Procurement Directive: An American Perspective’ (n 311) 5 
1692 Developments, ‘Transatlantic Procurement Outlook is Mixed, Panelists Say’ (n 1596), Statement of C R 
Yukins at 2 
1693 Yukins and Schooner, ‘Incrementalism: Eroding the Impediments to A Global Procurement Market’ (n 29) 18 
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agreements to trade in the U.S. procurement market without suffering discrimination. 
The same is arguably the case with regard to foreign contractors in the courts of EU 
Member States. 
 
Secondly, the Defence Procurement Directive only refers to the fact that Member 
States determine whether or not to permit third countries to participate in contract 
award procedures. The Directive is silent on the issue of any corresponding provision 
of review and remedies. Further, the Directive’s review procedures do not apply to 
contracts excluded pursuant to Articles 12 and 13.1694  
 
Thirdly, such provisions are only useful if foreign contractors are inclined to seek 
forms of administrative and judicial review in practice, something which, as indicated 
above, is not certain.  
 
Whilst the above has emphasised legal redress, it is possible to consider whether 
alternative forms of redress could be suitable. For instance, dispute settlement 
procedures exist under the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).1695 
Further, NATO has specific competition advocates which provide informal avenues 
for appeals and settlement of disputes without recourse to litigation.1696 Recently, the 
European Space Agency (“ESA”) has created a Procurement Review Board with 
specific competences to review contract awards as well as award limited remedies by 
way of damages. 1697 This thesis does not necessarily advocate the adoption of 
                                                 
1694 Article 55 (1) 
1695 For details, see  <http://www.naftanow.org/dispute/default_en.asp> accessed 20 September 2013 
1696 For instance, see: <http://www.nspa.nato.int/en/organization/procurement/competition.htm> accessed 20 
September 2013 
1697 I am grateful to Professor Martin Trybus for this observation 
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independently appointed “transatlantic competition advocates”, “transatlantic defence 
trade Ombudsman” or a “Transatlantic Defence Procurement Review Board”. 
Nevertheless, alternative means of redress ought to be given due consideration in 
any future research agenda in addition to the “cross-referencing” of existing bid 
protest for a as currently proposed. 
 
4.8. Effect of the Reciprocal Defence Procurement MoU’s in Practice 
 
As one U.S. legal commentator observes, the practical effect of the RDPs is difficult 
to determine.1698 This is historically due, in part, to the fact that for many years 
information relating to waivers of the BAA was unavailable.1699 As will be discussed 
below, there now exists some statistical data on use of the waivers. However, it is 
also important to emphasise that whilst the BAA waiver is a significant feature of the 
RDPs, it should not be the exclusive focus in determining its effect.  
 
4.8.1. Waivers of The Buy American Act 
 
According to the 2012 Report to Congress on purchases from foreign entities in FY 
2011, 2,645 waivers were granted to Qualifying Countries totalling $1.1 billion 
dollars.1700 This represented 9.1% of the total $12.4 billion in DoD purchases from 
foreign entities that were not subject to the BAA.1701 To this extent, the waiver is a 
substantially effective provision. Whilst acquisition officials have identified that 
                                                 
1698 D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) 98  
1699 ibid 
1700 Report to Congress on Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Purchases From Foreign Entities, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (n 1175) 1 (source FPDS-NG) 
1701 ibid 
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obtaining approval for a waiver can cause delays, the waiver generally allows foreign 
goods to compete with U.S. goods on a “reasonably competitive basis”.1702  
 
4.8.2. General(ised) Trends 
 
Notwithstanding the above, whilst the RDPs were the subject of focus by the GAO in 
the early 1990s, there has been substantially no official analysis of the functioning of 
the RDPs in recent years. In 1991, the GAO reported that in light of DoD estimates of 
a “significant decline” in the U.S. defence trade advantage with its European allies, 
government and industry observers began to question the “continued usefulness” of 
the RDPs.1703 A 1992 GAO Report indicated that, from a European perspective, 
according to the views of some States, the RDPs had helped to achieve more 
balance in defence trade.1704 However, it also identified that most countries said that 
despite the RDPs, their contractors had limited access to the U.S. defence market 
citing “numerous legislative and regulatory restrictions”, in particular, identifying the 
fact that the RDPs did not waive speciality metals restrictions, set asides for small 
businesses and national mobilization restrictions which were otherwise 
applicable.1705  This continues to be asserted in the EU U.S. Barriers to Trade 
Reports.1706 By contrast, from a U.S. perspective, it was identified that the RDPs 
were probably less advantageous to the U.S. but that it was not possible to quantify 
the extent to which the RDPs have enabled access of U.S. contractors to the 
                                                 
1702 J S Smyth, ‘The Impact of the Buy American Act on Program Managers’ (n 1544) 269-271 
1703 United States General Accounting Office, European Initiatives: Implications for U.S. Defense Trade and 
Cooperation (n 60) 2-3 
1704 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 3 
1705 ibid 4 
1706 United States Barriers To Trade and Investment Report for 2008 (European Commission) July 2009, 16 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_144160.pdf> accessed 20 September 2013 
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European defence market.1707  
 
To this extent, a recurrent theme which has emerged since the 1990s is a general 
failure on the part of the signatories to develop on the initial implementing Annexes 
and to monitor the potential for the RDPs to extend beyond waivers of the BAA. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sought to reinforce the analysis in Chapter 7 by highlighting the 
significance of offsets as a priority issue for transatlantic focus. Importantly, 
consistent with the underlying philosophy of this thesis, U.S. legal commentary has 
observed the importance of studying regulatory behaviour and practice before 
proposing extensive reform through the use, inter alia, of legal institutions such as 
treaties. In the short-to-medium term, it may be possible to consider proposals for an 
instrument such as an MoU which could, at the least, bring U.S. and EU offsets onto 
a transparent transatlantic agenda. Whilst such an instrument would inevitably lack 
the degree of specificity and enforceability that could otherwise be accorded through 
an international treaty, such a proposal could become a feasible interim measure. 
 
This Chapter has also identified the importance which has been attributed to the 
RDPs in light of the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive. As indicated, the 
RDPs serve an important function in one particular respect, namely providing 
authorization for a BAA waiver. However, a cursory analysis identified significant 
limitations of the provisions. Whilst U.S. legal commentators have made reference to 
                                                 
1707 United States General Accounting Office, International Procurement: NATO Allies’ Implementation of 
Reciprocal Defense Agreements (n 1605) 4-5 
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strengthening procedural and remedial provision under the RDPs, such commentary 
has not explicitly identified whether the RDPs should continue to operate as such or 
whether they should be replaced by trade agreements or other arrangements which 
confer rights that are legally enforceable under national law. At the very least, the 
above analysis has exposed the extent to which legal discourse increasingly draws 
on the relevance of legal processes and institutions (e.g. transparency requirements 
and remedial provision by reference to existing procurement regimes) in positing 
cases for reform of transatlantic defence procurement. 
 
This Chapter concludes the analysis of U.S. federal defence procurement law. 
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PART III 
CABLES AND BRIDGES ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 
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12 
Conclusions 
1. Introduction 
 
In accordance with the aims, objectives and research questions identified in Chapter 
1, this thesis has subjected the core legal regimes which regulate defence 
procurement in the European Union and the United States of America to critical 
analysis. This final Chapter draws the threads of analysis together in order to 
extrapolate key areas of short-term, mid-term and long-term priority focus for the 
purposes of examining the existing and potential role of legal institutions in the 
regulation of transatlantic defence procurement.  
 
It is recalled that a major U.S. study relied on the figurative depiction of “fortresses” 
and “icebergs” to depict transatlantic defence trade dynamics. This Chapter adopts 
its own depiction of “cables” and “bridges”. On August 16, 1858, the first transatlantic 
telegraph cable transmitted a communication from Her Majesty Queen Victoria to 
U.S. President James Buchannan. 1708  President Buchanan’s statement that the 
communication should serve as an instrument destined to diffuse law and that its 
communications shall be held sacred in passing to their places of destination (with a 
question as to such possibility even in the event of hostilities) is apposite in the 
                                                 
1708 For a useful history, see J S Gordon, A Thread Across the Ocean: The Heroic Story of the Transatlantic 
Cable (Harper Perennial 2003); see also C G Hearn, Circuits in the Sea: The Men, the Ships, and the Atlantic 
Cable (Westport, Conn: Praeger 2004)  
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context of a discussion of transatlantic defence procurement where issues of trust 
and security are at the core transatlantic relation. 
 
In this instance, cables are lines of communication that should be opened between 
lawyers and the acquisition communities in the EU and U.S. on defence procurement 
issues. Through an informed dialogue, these messages can be relayed to legislators 
and policy-makers tasked with ensuring that the foundations of the EU and U.S. legal 
regimes are capable of bearing the changes in regulatory and competitive dynamics 
that are likely to result from increased defence trade legislation. In turn, this will 
provide the bases on which to assess the possibilities for building bridges across the 
Atlantic in the form of more coordinated transatlantic regulation. For ease of 
reference, an Annex is appended to the thesis which provides a breakdown of short-
term, medium-term and long-term research agendas which correspond with a 
progressive assessment of the existing legal position towards a basis for reform. 
 
In considering the research findings set out below, it is worth bearing in mind, as a 
frame of reference, three key elements identified by one eminent U.S. legal 
commentator as necessary for successful transatlantic defence cooperation. These 
are: (1) a mature system of procurement rules on open competition and 
transparency; (2) an assurance of non-discrimination against foreign contractors and 
(3) a bid protest or remedy forum.1709 
 
 
 
                                                 
1709 ‘Transatlantic Procurement Outlook is Mixed, Panelists Say’, Recorded Comments of C R Yukins (n 1596) 
Statement of C R Yukins, 2 
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2. Cables: Priority Focus in the Short-Term 
 
2.1. Role of Security and Other Exceptions in Transatlantic Defence Procurement 
 
Chapter 2 identified Article 346 TFEU as the archetypal example of the extent to 
which security exceptions can condition regulatory approaches to defence 
procurement. The EU institutions have sought to limit the theoretical and practical 
scope of Article 346 TFEU through a limited interpretation and the adoption of a 
Defence Procurement Directive defined by reference to its terms. This has been 
achieved, primarily, through the portrayal (by the Commission and EU legal 
commentators) of a consistent body of case law confirming the fact that the legitimate 
scope of Article 346 TFEU is limited. On this basis, there have been calls for a “new” 
interpretation of Article 346 TFEU and the “europeanisation” of essential security 
interests. However, Chapter 2 also identified that this has precluded an enquiry which 
focuses more precisely on what the legitimate scope of Article 346 TFEU actually is. 
A reorientation of the analysis in this regard challenges reified conceptions of the 
perceived accepted and acceptable role of Article 346 TFEU. A broader analysis 
questioned whether a Member State could invoke Article 346 TFEU where third 
country considerations are implicated. Such analysis is necessitated by the need to 
discern whether Article 346 TFEU could continue to have a legitimate role in 
transatlantic defence procurement even if its role has been limited in the field of 
European defence procurement. This imperative is confirmed, for example, by the 
fact that NIAG has recommended the need for “legally acceptable interpretations”.1710 
To this extent, a key finding of the Chapter is a need to fundamentally assess the 
                                                 
1710 NATO NIAG High Level Advice Study No 154, Developments in Europe to Reform Export Control and 
Defense Procurement Processes and Implications and Opportunities Resulting, Particularly with Regard to 
Multinational Programs Supporting NATO Capabilities and Interoperability’ (n 60) 
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conceptual bases of security exceptions as well as the extent to which those 
exceptions are culturally determined by the “structural biases”1711 of interested actors 
involved in their interpretation. Future research should focus on the question of 
precisely what legitimate role broadly defined security (and other) exceptions do and 
should have in transatlantic defence trade. 
 
2.2. Compatibility of International Obligations in Transatlantic Defence Procurement 
 
Chapter 3 examined the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions on excluded 
contracts. At a general level of analysis, it was emphasized that the Directive’s scope 
is limited in significant respects. Articles 12 and 13 intend to exclude the most 
institutionally, organizationally, politically and economically complex forms of 
procurement. However, at a more critical level of analysis, the exclusions reveal 
considerable legal uncertainty. The exclusions are broad and non-specific. The legal 
bases for exclusion are not entirely clear. Yet, legal certainty is necessary for 
Member States and the U.S. to ensure the legitimate exercise of procurement 
competences whilst maintaining full compliance with their international obligations. 
As indicated, at present, the Defence Procurement Directive does not provide an 
adequate mechanism to police the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate 
exclusion. A more fundamental observation is that those same forms of procurement 
are likely to continue to operate in circumstances which are either unregulated, 
subject to regulation that is not generally understood or enforced or which is 
misapplied, or ignored. Future research should focus on precisely how, and to what 
extent, Member States will utilize the exceptions as well as their corresponding and 
                                                 
1711 The author loosely appropriates a term used in M Koskeniemmi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (Cambridge 2006) Epilogue 
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relative effect on intra-EU and third country procurement relations in the fields of 
excluded activity.  
 
2.3. Third Country Relations in the Field of EU Defence Procurement 
 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the EU has largely superseded Member States with regard 
to third country relations in the field of public procurement. By contrast, there is 
substantially no detailed research on access and treatment of third countries in the 
EU procurement market. Whilst the Defence Procurement Directive attempts to 
maintain a position of ostensible neutrality with regard to third countries, it is difficult 
to discern the potential effect of the Directive on the national regulatory and policy 
approaches of Member States. Although the thesis’ findings were necessarily limited, 
it identified the possibility for considerable variability in national approaches to affect 
internal and external trade. Importantly, the Chapter also raised a more fundamental 
question regarding the extent to which the EU is likely to be able to continue to 
refrain from adopting a position with regard to third country access in the field of 
defence procurement. This forces difficult questions which strike at the heart of the 
appropriate and necessary division of Member State and EU competences. The 
thesis emphasized that third country relations in the field of defence procurement 
should be accorded concurrent priority in line with the focus that will inevtitably be 
placed on the internal operation of the Directive. Given the fact that it is only now that 
EU third country initiatives are starting to develop in the field of public procurement, 
the EU should similarly focus at the outset on the third country dimension of defence 
procurement. Future research should focus on examining the overall coherence of 
EU public and defence procurement law with regard to third country relations, in 
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particular, based on an informed understanding of the legal position at the national 
level.  
 
2.4. Discrimination and Discriminating under the Defence Directives 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions on 
security of supply and technical specifications. It must be acknowledged and 
emphasised that U.S. commentators are cautious to observe that the Defence 
Procurement Directive is not intended to discriminate against the U.S. and could 
produce positive effects (howsoever qualified and quantified). Notwithstanding, U.S. 
claims must be taken seriously. Fundamentally, the Defence Procurement Directive 
is not an instrument of transatlantic defence procurement liberalization. By definition 
and nature, its principal objective is to promote EU-wide competition in the first 
instance. Importantly, the Directive itself contains few references to third countries. 
Notwithstanding, the Chapter treated U.S. claims with regard to ITAR with the 
necessary level of credibility. However, it also sought to differentiate between 
possible interpretations of generally worded provisions and their potential effect in 
practice. The Directive legitimately distinguishes between discriminating and 
discriminatory factors. The assessment of ITAR prima facie falls under the former. 
Future research should focus on the extent to which the Defence Procurement 
Directive’s provisions are applied in consideration of matters pertaining to third 
countries.1712  As indicated, the manner in which the Guidance Notes attempt to 
distinguish EU economic operators from third countries is, at points, overly simplistic 
                                                 
1712 This should be tied to the broader consideratons outlined above in relation to Chapter 4 
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and perhaps reflects a deeper level of uncertainty regarding the EU’s position with 
regard to third country involvement under the Directive. 
 
2.5. Relevance of EU Governance to Transatlantic Defence Procurement: Offsets 
 
If the preceding Chapters were unable to convince observers that the overall 
coherence of the EU defence procurement regime is not simply a matter for internal 
EU debate, Chapter 7 should confirm its importance as a matter of transatlantic 
concern. A casualty of the co-existence of supranational and intergovernmental 
defence procurement competences is the practice of offsets. The thesis has 
identified a number of instances of legal and practical uncertainty in the EU and U.S. 
which must be addressed. These issues are rendered even more acute in light of the 
close relation of offsets to government-to-government sales. Future research should 
seek to subject offsets (including related “compensation practices”) to critical legal 
description and to test their compatibility with the full corpus of EU and international 
trade law. In addition, research should focus on the legalities of offset administration. 
A fundamental question concerns whether to legally prohibit offsets altogether, prima 
facie prohibit offsets without expressly regulating them but allow for their justification 
in exceptional circumstances, or permit offsets but regulate them with a view to 
progressively reducing and/or eliminating them.  
 
2.6. Limits of Legal Institutions (and effects) and the Use of Discretions 
 
Chapter 9 examined the extent to which national law in the U.S. enabled, restricted 
and precluded foreign participation in U.S. contracts as well as treatment once 
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admitted. The fundamental limitations of the analysis were immediately apparent. 
The Chapter drew on the limited available empirical evidence to examine certain 
ways in which it may be possible to discriminate against foreign contractors. As it 
was pointedly observed, it is not necessarily regulatory regimes which constitute the 
most significant impediment to transatlantic defence trade but rather the discretionary 
practices legitimated by procurement cultures. Whilst the research findings were 
limited, the analysis sought to draw on comparable means by which the Defence 
Procurement Directive seeks to address the kinds of issues identified, although it has 
been cautious to respect the theoeretical and practical limitations of the comparative 
endeavour. At the least, questions arise as to whether it is possible to better regulate 
the exercise of discretions. In addition, a brief analysis of a major U.S. award 
revealed an alternative perspective on the difficulties faced by contracting officials 
concerned to ensure participation of foreign contractors. The Chapter also brought 
into focus a neglected area of research, namely access to and treatment of foreign 
contractors under national review systems.  
 
Future research should focus on the ways in which legal requirements may be 
formulated so as to facilitate discrimination against U.S. and EU contractors e.g. 
through the drafting of requests for proposals in terms of specifications and other 
requirements. 1713  Most importantly, as indicated in Chapter 10, this requires a 
fundamental re-assessment of the continued necessity for broadly worded provisions 
                                                 
1713 Although, it is accepted that this may be extremely difficult as a matter of practicality in light of the sensitive 
nature of defence contracting, the limited disclosure of documentation and the general reluctance to volunteer 
information on procurement practices 
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conferring significant discretions and whether these could be subject to greater 
accountability and transparency mechanicms.1714  
 
2.7. Effects of Non-Competitive Contracting 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 identified clear limitations of available legal commentary and 
empirical evidence on the issue of non-competitive contracting. On the one hand, 
sole source contracting is patently more defensible than blanket recourse to national 
security or industrial mobilization grounds if contracting authorities are tied up with 
proprietary data issues and a limited supply base. On the other hand, issues such as 
data retention and framework contracting (even if pursued on grounds of perceived 
economic efficiency) should not result in the comfort of recourse to a limited supply 
base. A limited national supply base in turn limits the global supply base at lower 
tiers. To this extent, open national competition in the U.S. is as much a transatlantic 
defence procurement objective as open access to foreign competition. Future 
research should focus on the broader effects of such practices beyond the national 
supply base. 
 
3. Foot-Bridges: A Priority Focus in the Medium-Term 
 
Whilst defence procurement is substantially excluded from the framework of 
international treaties, it is possible to discern a nascent state of legalization of 
                                                 
1714 For instance, to date, there has been little focus on the fact that exceptions such as Article 346 TFEU and 
the exceptions under the Defence Procurement Directive are not subject to any substantial form of detailed 
invocation or notification requirements in contrast to U.S. law which provides a system of determinations and 
findings and justifications and approvals. 
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transatlantic defence trade.1715 The 1979 Klepsch Report enhanced awareness of 
transatlantic defence procurement issues.1716 However, consideration of transatlantic 
defence trade as a legally regulated system(s) was confirmed in 1989 when William 
Taft, then U.S. Permanent Secretary to NATO1717 proposed a system modelled on 
the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (“GATT”) to promote fair trade practices 
in defence trade.1718 The initiatives were never developed but the relevance of the 
possibilities for considering the use of legal institutions to regulate defence 
procurement on a transatlantic (as opposed to bilateral) basis are in the midst of 
resurgence. As indicated in this thesis, U.S. legal commentary has identified the 
possibility for reform of the RDPs by reference to, if not incorporation of, legal 
standards.  
 
Further, in 2007, the U.S. and UK concluded a specific Defence Trade Cooperation 
Treaty (“DTCT”).1719 The Treaty only applies between the U.S. and U.K. which, for 
the purposes of the DTCT, constitute the “Approved Community”. 1720 The Treaty is 
intended to provide a comprehensive framework for “exports”1721 and “transfers”1722 
                                                 
1715 By this term it is not mean that previously illegal forms of behaviour are legalized. Rather, the term connotes 
the sense of the increasing use and/or proposed use of legal institutions to regulate aspects of transatlantic 
defence trade  
1716 E A Klepsch and T Normanton, Two-way Street – Klepsch Report: Europe-United States Arms Procurement 
(1979 Brassey’s London) 
1717 And lest it be forgot, former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense 
1718 For a useful overview in this regard, see J B Steinberg, ‘The Transformation of the European Defense 
Industry: Emerging Trends and Prospects for Future U.S.-European Competition and Collaboration, Prepared for 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, RAND, 1992, 109-110 
1719 Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the United States of America concerning defence trade cooperation: London and Washington, 21 
and 26 June 2007, Cm 7213, September 2007. The DDTC was specifically implemented by the Security 
Cooperation Act of 2010 Pub. L. 111-266, Oct 8, 2010. The requirements under the Act were further implemented 
by the DFARS Subpart 225.79 – Export Control (added May 22, 2012) 
1720 Article 1(10). See also Articles 1(11) and 1(12). Article 4 defines the “United Kingdom Community”. Article 5 
defines the “United States Community”. See also DFARS 225.7902-1, 225.7902-5(b) and 252.225-7047(a) 
1721 Article 1(2) defines “Export” as: “the initial movement of Defense Articles from the United States Community 
to the United Kingdom Community.” See also DFARS 225.7902-1, 225.7902-5(b) and 252.225-7047(a) 
1722 Article 1(9) defines “transfer” as: “the movement of previously Exported Defense Articles within the 
Approved Community”. See also DFARS 225.7902-1, 225.7902-5(b) and 252.225-7047(a) 
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of “defence articles”1723 (whether classified or not) without a licence or other written 
authorization. 1724  Under the Treaty, instead of a U.S. exporter preparing and 
requesting Department of State approval of an export licence or other written 
authorization for a project, the exporter may export defence articles within the scope 
of the Treaty without such prior licences or written authorizations.1725 Similarly, all 
defence articles exported pursuant to the Treaty may be transferred without prior 
written authorization of the U.S. Government.1726 It is recalled that in 2009 the EU 
commissioned a study on The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the 
United States for European Defence Industries.1727 The Study made one particular 
recommendation which has subsequently received specific endorsement by a 2011 
NIAG Report.1728 Specifically, it has been recommended that the DTCT licensing 
model should be used as a basis for the development of a “transatlantic general 
licence”. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine licensing regulation, 
in light of the analysis engaged in Chapter 5, there is a close relation between the 
fields of procurement and licensing and which is, itself, exemplified by the 
contemporaneous adoption of the Defence Procurement and ICT Directives. To this 
extent, there is a possibility for considering whether such initiatives could be 
developed in the field of defence procurement. 
                                                 
1723 Article 1(1) defines “Defence Articles” as: “articles, services, and related technical data, including software, 
in tangible or intangible form, listed on the United States Munitions List of the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, as modified or amended.” See also DFARS 225.7902-1, 225.7902-5(b) and 252.225-7047(a) 
1724 Article 2 U.S.-UK DTCT 
1725 Article 6(1). In order to do so, the exporter must verify that: (i) the U.K. partner is on the list of approved 
companies/facilities i.e. a member of the Approved Community; (ii) the effort is in support of at least one of the 4 
purposes indicated above; (iii) the defence article is not on the exempted technology list. Also in 22 CFR 126 
Supplement No.1 
1726 Article 7(1) 
1727 ‘The Nature and Impacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for European Defence Industries’, Final 
Report, December 2009 (n 662), 4-5 and 89-98 
1728 “SMART DEFENCE, SMART TADIC”, 14 October 2011, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and NATO 
Industrial Advisory Group High Level Advice Study No 154, Developments in Europe to Reform Export Control 
and Defense Procurement Processes and Implications and Opportunities Resulting, Particularly with Regard to 
Multinational Programs Supporting NATO Capabilities and Interoperability 
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These developments should also be considered within the broader context of current 
debates concerning whether or not to bring defence procurement within the scope of 
regimes such as the WTO GPA1729 and UNCITRAL.1730 The extent of any privileged 
transatlantic legal relations between the U.S. and EU in this regard would need to be 
factored into account. 
 
3.1. Reciprocal Defence Procurement Memoranda of Understanding 
 
As indicated in Chapter 11, Sections 4.5 and 4.7, U.S. legal commentary has 
proposed reform of the RDPs. However, such commentary has also identified the 
limits of offering specific numerical estimates of the economic benefits to be expected 
from the suggested changes. 1731  Notwithstanding, it has been suggested that 
assuming the effectiveness of transparency provisions in reducing trade barriers, 
RDP signatories are likely to benefit from at least some reduction in defense 
costs.1732  In addition, it has been observed that the more detailed a trade agreement, 
                                                 
1729 See for example, C Yukins, ‘Barriers to International Trade in Procurement After the Economic Crisis, Part II: 
Opening International Procurement Markets: Unfinished Business’ (n 459) Int’l 2-22. Whilst it has been suggested 
that the WTO GPA is not yet a ready means of achieving such uniformity. it has been suggested that it could be 
pointed in such a direction. In this regard, three specific developments have been identified. The first is the fact 
that, as recalled from Chapter 8, since 1984, the U.S. has had a unified civilian-defense procurement regime 
under the FAR. Secondly, it has been suggested that the adoption within the EU of the Defence Procurement 
Directive, in particular, has bolstered this trend. Thirdly, in 2010, the Working Group developing the revised 
UNCITRAL model procurement law has recommended a revised UNCITRAL model procurement law that would 
merge defence and civilian procurement, in particular, because developing nations saw unification as a means of 
reducing corruption in weaker defence procurement systems. ibid 
1730 See for example, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Forty-second 
session (29 June-17 July 2009), General Assembly, Official Records, Sixty-fourth session, Supplement No.17 
<https://cms.unov.org/.../GetDocInOriginalFormat.drsx?DocID...7d85> accessed 20 September 2013. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to examine the UNCITRAL proposals in full. Suffice to state that there are a number of 
interesting proposals, one of which is to provide examples of situations intended to be covered by the notion of 
“essential national security”. See 21-12 ibid 
1731 It has been stated that given the complexity of modeling international trade flows, predicting, and measuring 
the behavioral effects of transparency requirements, it is doubtful that such estimates could be reliably made. See 
D B Miller, ‘Is it Time to Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements?’ (n 31) 
1732 Ibid 
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the less costly it is to monitor. 1733  An important question that will need to be 
confronted is precisely what is the continued function of the RDPs and is their 
function most effectively served in their current form?  
 
3.2. Other Discrete Issues - Offsets 
 
In addition to the issue of market access and treatment in defence procurement, as 
indicated in this thesis and particularised by way of illustration in the Annex, there are 
a range of other priority areas in the medium term. One significant issue concerns the 
question of U.S. export control reform, in particular, in relation to ITAR. In the 
medium term, this is likely to involve reform at the national level. Other possible 
alternatives may include the consideration of an MoU on offsets (and other possible 
counter-trade practices) and abatements. As indicated in Chapter 7, the EDA has 
identified the possibility for engagement with the U.S. on these issues. A specific 
“Transatlantic Offset and Countertrade Treaty” is an unlikely medium term prospect. 
 
4. Suspension-Bridges: A Priority Focus in the Long-Term 
 
In the long term, a fundamental issue concerns the continuing basis of engagement 
of the U.S. and Europe on defence procurement issues. Much will depend on 
whether the EU will develop a sufficiently robust defence identity such as to leverage 
its defence policy into the field of defence trade and convince Member States that it 
should exercise greater competences in the field of defence procurement. Further, 
much will also depend on any U.S. reiorientation of its trade in defence strategies 
                                                 
1733 Miller citing J Linarelli, ‘The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations 
Theory’, in S Arrowsmith and M Trybus (eds.), Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 57-60 
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away from Europe and towards other States. Both positions will also ultimately be 
influenced by the rate, and development, of emerging economies, in particular those 
with developing defence capabilities. 
 
Whilst this thesis has advocated restraint against proposing grand designs for 
transatlantic legal institutions, it is possible to conceive of long term initiatives. 
Certain of these are particularised by way of illustration in the Annex and which may 
build on issues adressed as short and medium term priorities. These include: a 
Transatlantic Defence Procurement Treaty; a Transatlantic Defence Trade 
Cooperation Treaty; a Transatlantic Trade Treaty on Government Defence Sales, 
Offsets and Countertrade; a Transatlantic Defence Procurement Ombudsman or 
Review Board and a Transatlantic Defence Contract Portal. 
 
Having provided the most rudimentary cartography of EU and U.S. defence 
procurement law, this thesis concludes with a final observation. The transatlantic 
telegraph suffered major failures on several occasions after first transmission. 
Through persistence and spirit of cooperation, it finally succeeded. Competition had 
its own distinctive part to play. 1734 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1734 It took the introduction in 1869 of competing French companies to dramatically reduce telegraph rates and 
improve viability 
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ANNEX 
 
Summary of Options for Future Research 
 
SHORT-TERM PRIORITIES 
 
As indicated, this thesis would not advocate the use of treaty mechanisms to regulate 
specific aspects of transatlantic defence trade in the short term. There should be a more 
systematic and comparative focus on understanding the historical and current operation of 
legal institutions which operate within both the U.S. and the national legal systems of EU 
Member States. The following provides a non-exhaustive illustration of possible areas to 
examine: 
 
1. Analysis of the role of security and other exceptions under EU and US law 
a. How does the language of security exceptions compare (both within EU 
primary and secondary law and across national legal systems)? 
b. What is the legitimate scope of application of security exceptions in the field of 
defence procurement? 
c. What is their precise function (as distinct from their intended function)? 
d. Do these exceptions effectively fulfill their intended or actual function? 
e. Should these exceptions be deleted, retained or amended? 
f. Should Article 346 TFEU be subject to a notification requirement (whether ex 
ante or, if not possible, ex post)? 
g. Should the CICA exclusions and exceptions be amended? 
h. What conditions could be placed on the use of exceptions e.g. as a matter of 
wording, justifications and approvals etc 
i. How do national and EU courts approach issues of competence in the 
application of security exceptions (including as a matter of separation of 
powers)? 
 
 
2. Analysis of the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions on excluded contracts 
a. To what extent do the exclusions delimit and balance Member State and EU 
competences? 
b. What is the legitimate scope of application of the exclusions? 
c. How should the language of the exclusions be interpreted? 
d. How are the exclusions applied in practice? 
e. How do the exclusions affect the procurement relations between Member 
States and the relations of third countries, in particular the U.S.? 
f. Should the exclusions be deleted, reformed or retained or amended? 
g. Should the Directive include more effective mechanisms to ensure the 
justification, monitoring and policing of the use of exclusions? 
h. To what extent, if at all, should co-operative and collaborative procurement 
within the EU be subject to more stringent legal requirements? 
 
 
3. Analysis of EU law and third country relations in the field of defence procurement 
a. How do Member States conduct their relations with third countries in the field 
of defence procurement? 
b. What effect, if any, will the Defence Procurement Directive have on regulatory 
and policy approaches to third country relations, in particular with regard to 
the fact that Member States retain the power to decide whether or not to 
permit third countries to participate in contract award procedures? 
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c. What effect will any regulatory and policy approaches have on third country 
relations in practice? 
d. What effect will the variability of national laws and policies have on internal 
trade between Member States within the EU? 
e. How does EU law apply to, and affect, third country access and treatment 
more generally with regard to free movement of goods, persons, 
establishment, competition law, merger control and foreign investment in the 
defence sector? 
f. Should the EU accord equal priority to third country relations in the field of 
defence procurement (as it does to third country relations in public 
procurement) in its assessment and monitoring of the Directive’s application 
(also in consideration of medium-term objectives identified below)? 
 
4. Analysis of the application of the Defence Procurement Directive’s provisions to, and 
in consideration of, third countries 
a. How should regulators approach the political and legal conceptualization of 
“security of supply” and “security of information”? 
b. How will contracting authorities apply the Defence Procurement Directive in 
relation to third country economic operators invited to participate in contract 
award procedures? 
c. How will contracting authorities apply the Defence Procurement Directive in 
relation to EU economic operators which rely on third country suppliers, or 
third country products? 
 
 
5. Analysis of the application of the ICT Directive’s provisions 
a. To what extent is the ICT Directive being used in conjunction with the Defence 
Procurement Directive? 
b. To what extent does the regime impact on third countries (howsoever 
determined), in particular, in light of its prima facie exclusion of ITAR 
transfers? 
c. Could the ICT regime provide a possible model for improving U.S.-EU export 
and transfers of defence material? 
d. What impact (howsoever determined) will the ICT Directive have on issues 
regarding re-export of defence material? 
 
 
 
6. Analysis of offsets and related compensation practices 
a. To what extent are offsets and offset-related practices (including e.g. juste 
retour compatible with EU law? 
b. To what extent is the administration of offsets regulated? 
c. Should offsets be prohibited under existing international procurement 
agreements? 
d. Should offsets be regulated within international procurement agreements? 
e. Should offsets be expressly prohibited as a matter of EU and US law? 
f. Should offsets continue to be viewed as prima facie incompatible with EU law 
but subject to a more well-defined, regulated exception than Article 346 TFEU 
and the EDA procurement regime? 
g. Should offsets be permitted but their management subject to more detailed 
regulation? 
h. To what extent do legal regimes applicable to foreign military sales contracting 
affect national and foreign competition? 
i. Should the EU and US regulate abatement practices? If so, how? 
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7. Exercise of discretions conferred by legal authorisations 
a. In what ways is it possible for legal requirements pertaining to the definition of 
technical specifications and other requirements (e.g. relating to RFPs) to be 
utilized to discriminate against foreign contractors? 
b. Could legal institutions better regulate the exercise of discretions? 
c. To what extent can the exercise of any such discretions and their “effects” or 
“impacts” be measured (qualified and/or quantified)? 
 
 
8. Use of Justifications and Approvals for use of exceptions 
a. Should certain provisions of the Defence Procurement Directive be subject to 
more robust determinations and findings or justifications and approvals 
requirements equivalent to those applicable under U.S. law (e.g. to legitimate 
use of certain exclusions and use of the least competitive procedures)? 
b. Should existing justification and approval provisions available under U.S. law 
be reformed? 
c. Should Article 346 TFEU be subject to a justification and approvals 
requirement? 
 
 
9. Sole Source Contracting 
a. Research should focus on examining the extent to which sole source 
contracting precludes foreign competition (i.e. differenting legitimate sole 
sourcing from instances in which foreign competition would otherwise be 
possible). 
b. More extensive focus could be placed on the extent to which issues such as: 
protection of proprietary data; follow on work; framework contracting and 
grounds such as industrial mobilization are utilised. 
c. Should broadly defined industrial mobilization grounds be subject to greater 
definition, conditions on their discrete use?  
 
10. Small business contracting 
 
a. How does small business contracting operate in the defence procurement 
context? 
b. To what extent do small business policies and regulation impact (howsoever 
determined) on competition in the transatlantic defence market? 
c. To what extent, if at all, could U.S.-EU small business initiatives be pursued in 
the field of defence procurement?  
 
 
 
MEDIUM TERM PRIORITIES 
 
As indicated, any medium-term priorities should be informed by an extensive and 
consolidated investigation and implementation of the short-term priorities. However, subject 
to the above considerarions, in the medium-longer term, it may be possible to consider the 
following: 
 
1. Reform of the RDPs 
 
Form  
 
a. Should the U.S. conclude RDPs with non-signatory EU Member States? 
  446 
b. Could a “Transatlantic Defence Procurement Memorandum of Understanding” be 
adopted? This could be concluded between the U.S. and each individual Member 
State or, alternatively, by the EU on behalf of its Member States (but which would 
need to take account of any exercise of EU competence in the field of external 
relations. 
 
 Content 
 
c. Clarification of the legal position vis-à-vis the Defence Procurement Directive is 
necessary. 
d. Should the scope of existing RDPs and future RDPs be confined to market 
access and equal treatment as opposed to the conduct of procurement and other 
issues? 
e. Should the existing (or any proposed RDP) incorporate more substantial provision 
on transparency and accountability e.g. in relation to information requirements, 
review and remedies? 
 
 
2. Offsets and counter-trade practices 
 
a. Should the U.S. and individual EU Member States (or the EU on behalf of its 
Member States) conclude a Memordandum of Understanding on offsets and 
countertrade practices and/or a Memorandum of Understanding on abatements? 
 
 
3. Coverage of defence procurement in international agreements 
 
a. Should defence procurement be incorporated within the WTO GPA and 
UNCITRAL? 
b. To what extent would this impact (howsoever determined) on discrete 
transatlantic defence procurement relations?  
 
4. EU policy on third country access 
 
a. Whilst advocated as a short-medium term priority, should the EU adopt a discrete 
policy on third country access to the EU defence procurement? 
b. To what extent should any such proposal be modelled on EU third country policy 
in the field of public procurement?  
 
5. U.S. reform of U.S. export control policies and laws  
a. To what extent is strategic refom of U.S. policies and laws on export controls 
necessary? 
 
6. “Transatlantic General Licences” 
 
a. To what extent should the U.S. and EU consider the possibility of adopting 
licensing schemes in relation to the export and transfer of defence material (and 
considering the issue of re-exports)? 
b. Does the ICT regime provide a possible model for adaptation? 
 
 
LONG-TERM PRIORITIES 
 
As indicated, long-term priorities would ultimately depend both on the progress of issues 
addressed in the short-medium term and the broader political and economic contexts (which 
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may present any number of significant obstacles that could preclude the viability of any 
proposal identified below). Notwithstanding, in accordance with an identified state of nascent 
legalization identified in this thesis, it is possible to conceive of a transition from policy 
initiatives and instruments such as Memoranda of Understanding to more formalized 
transatlantic legal relations. Of course, these must, in any event, be supported by robust 
national and EU legal frameworks. The following provides a non-exhaustive illustration of the 
possibilities. It should be observed that this thesis does not necessarily commit to a particular 
view as to the viability or merits of any of the following: 
 
1. Transatlantic Defence Procurement Treaty 
 
a. Could this constitute a full scale market access agreement (equivalent to existing 
bilateral free trade agreements in the field of public procurement), concluded by 
the U.S. and the EU on behalf of its Member States and building on the 
experiences of the existing and proposed RDPs? 
 
2. Transatlantic Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty  
 
a. Could this constitute a full scale export and transfer licensing regime for defence 
material between the U.S. and EU, concluded by the U.S. and EU on behalf of its 
Member States and drawing on the experiences of the existing U.S.-UK DTCT?  
 
b. Any such instrument would necessarily require compatibility with a Transatlantic 
Defence Procurement Treaty.  
 
 
3. Transatlantic Trade Treaty on Government Defence Sales, Offsets and Countertrade 
 
a. Could this constitute a full scale offsets, sales and counter-trade regime, 
concluded by the U.S. and EU on behalf of its Member States and draeing on the 
experiences of any offset and counter-trade RDP? 
 
 
4. Transatlantic Defence Procurement Ombudsman or Review Board 
 
a. Could a Transatlantic Defence Procurement Review Board be instituted to 
adjudicate complex contracts above a certain threshold determined to be of 
“transatlantic interest” (howsoever determined) 
b. To what extent could existing review boards constituted under existing 
international organisations provide a model for any such Board?  
 
 
5. Transatlantic Defence Contracts Portal 
 
a. Could this cover government-to-industry, and industry-to-industry procurement? 
b. To what extent could existing portals in the defence context provide a model for 
such a Portal? 
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